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ABSTRACT
This work considers Karl Rahner's theology of the person as hearer through a critical 
engagement with Julia Kristeva's post-structuralist notion of the speaking subject. 
This offers an experimental exploration of contemporary theological understanding of 
subjectivity, with specific reference to ideas of relationality, and with a particular 
interest in the possibility of dialogue with post-structuralist ideas.
From separate disciplines, with different tools and to different effects, Rahner and 
Kristeva reject the modernist cast of the human self. They demonstrate a common 
desire to explore subjectivity as a notion that has been problematised. In examining 
the person as hearer and the speaking subject together we discover a surprising 
number of areas of coherence as well as those of fundamental divergence. To this end 
we consider our theorists' pre-supposed arenas for human subjectivity, their 
epistemologies, and the importance each gives to language and otherness. We also 
examine how they relate intra- and inter-relationality. For Kristeva this involves a 
consideration of notions of the M/Other, the semiotic and the stranger in society. With 
Rahner we consider the social Trinity, the self-alienation of symbolism and the 
concept of neighbour-love.
We suggest here that Rahner both pre-empts aspects of current theological interest in 
subjectivity and provides important resources that are especially useful in relating 
theology to post-structuralist notions.
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A Personal Reflection
The extent to which the interdisciplinary task has made me a "stranger" has been 
evident and at times painful in writing this thesis.
One question I have become accustomed to answering is why use a critical 
comparison of a Jesuit priest and a post-modern critical theorist in order to answer 
questions about the nature of human subjectivity?
Some theologians I have met seem incredulous of the amount of time I have spent in 
the foreign lands of Continental critical and literary theory. Is there really any 
possibility of a dialogue with a system that perhaps sees Christianity as among the 
'grandest of grand narratives' to be toppled with the tools of deconstruction? Some of 
those comfortably 'at home' in the land of critical theory are equally as incredulous of 
my desire to bring with me on this journey both my theological framework and a good 
deal of Christian supposition.
During the course of my studies I have read papers in theological circles as well as 
English literature departments. Whilst both have been generous and encouraging to 
my project, both ask why I am doing it this way. I am indeed a stranger.
In attempting to engage with literary theory (and a good deal of Continental 
philosophy) I have been a conspicuous stranger in a foreign land, a wide-eyed 
traveller, somewhat overwhelmed by the alien landscape of this new domain. I have 
found myself in need of a host of secondary materials to serve as guides and a fair 
number of dictionaries to find my way about. At times I have felt completely alienated 
by the post-modern, post-structuralist paradigm I have encountered in Kristeva's 
work.
My 'academic passport' would say "theologian" and more properly, "confessing 
Christian theologian." My methodology has taught me that to travel beyond my home 
territory requires me to learn new languages: the language of post-structuralism, of 
psychoanalysis, of post-Marxist theory, of post-Feminism. My ability to get by, and 
perhaps even to be accepted, in each new domain is somewhat reliant upon my
willingness to learn these new languages and, perhaps more importantly, to listen to 
the inhabitants of each new territory in their native tongue. I suggest that the role of 
the theologian in an interdisciplinary endeavour such as mine is not to come 
marauding as invader or even colonialist, nor to stand back in contempt and refuse to 
speak in any other than my own mother-tongue, but to engage, be it falteringly, with 
each new academic land. This process highlights the extent of my "strangeness," but, 
as all good journeys do, is a catalyst to see my own homeland through different eyes 
when I return to it.
This has been my experience in writing this thesis.
Introduction and Methodology
In this thesis we examine and contrast the work of the Catholic theologian Karl 
Rahner with that of the post-structuralist critical theorist Julia Kristeva. This is an 
experimental exploration of contemporary theological understanding of 
"subjectivity", with specific reference to at ideas of relationality and with a particular 
interest in the possibility of dialogue with post-structuralist ideas.'
When we speak of "subjectivity" as an area of common interest between Rahner and 
Kristeva we do so to indicate areas of concern in each thinker which we think may 
offer interesting and significant elements of both divergence and congruence. 
Whether and how far this is the case will be put to the test by this thesis. In other 
words, by exploring Rahner's notion of the "person as hearer" and Kristeva's 
"speaking subject" within their own disciplinary contexts we seek to demonstrate 
whether or not Rahner and Kristeva have concerns, themes and/or ideas in common 
and in particular whether and how a contemporary theology might react to and 
possibly learn from post modern approaches. We stress here that we do not seek to 
use "subjectivity" as a generic term or understanding, but rather to indicate a range of 
concerns which it seems each theorist may be pursuing, although perhaps in different 
ways. Whether or not there is scope for genuine dialogue between Rahner and 
Kristeva will be the crux of our thesis, to be established, or otherwise, in the main 
body of this work.
1 An observation of contemporary theology's enthusiastic adoption of relational models of the self is 
made by Christoph Schwobel in his essay "The Human Being as Relational Being" in Persons Divine 
and Human (ed. Col in Gunton and Christoph Schwobel, T&T Clark, 1991). Although it would not be 
possible to list all of the key theological anthropologies adopting relational models, renowned examples 
of this trend include the personal dialogism of Martin Buber, (I and Thou translated Ronald Gregor 
Smith, T&TClark 1 st edition 1937). See also John Zizioulas' re-examination of Cappadocian doctrines 
of the Trinity to establish a notion of "Being as Communion" (Being as Communion: Studies in 
Personhood and the Church Contemporary Greek Theologians 4, St Vladimir's Press 1985). The social 
personalism of feminist writers such as Anne Carr in Transforming Grace: Christian Tradition and 
Women's Experience. (Harper and Row, 1988) and the dialogical/dialectical approach of Alistair 
McFadyen's The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships , 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990), where he posits a Christian notion of the self as a process of 
organisation and the structuring of social experience and communication, are further examples of 
theological relational anthropology. Theological attempts to relate directly to "French feminists", such 
as Kristeva, include Rebecca S. Chopp's The Power to Speak: Feminism. Language. God. (New York: 
Crossroads, 1989) and Pamela Sue Anderson's A Feminist Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 1998). 
A further specific approach is taken by the "Sea of Faith" theologians who adopt the non-realist 
paradigmatic claims of postmodernism, E.g.: Mark Tavlor Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology. 
(Chicago University Press, 1984); Don Cupitt Sea of Faith (SCM Press, 1984 ) and David A. Hart, 
Faith in Doubt: Non-Realism and Christian Belief (Mowbray. 1993).
From separate disciplines, with different tools and to different effects, Rahner and 
Kristeva reject the modernist cast of the human self. Together they demonstrate a 
desire to explore subjectivity as a notion that has been problematised. Within the 
broad stream of reflection upon issues around subjectivity Rahner will propose the 
notion of the "person as hearer", whilst Kristeva constructs her theory of the 
"speaking subject". These apparently antonymic depictions of subjectivity will be 
explored to reveal a surprising number of common themes: an emphasis on 
relationality and dialogue; considerations of otherness; a study of the nature of 
language and symbols and the relationship between intra- and inter-subjectivity. 
These provide us with the main foci for our project.
Given the difficulties in constructing a dialogue between such divergent thinkers it 
might be worthwhile briefly reflecting on the possible value of this enterprise. 
Theology has long had to grapple through the minefield of inter-disciplinary 
engagement. One stream of theology, perhaps best represented by Barth, determines 
that this type of endeavour is not possible, or perhaps not even necessary, to the 
theological task. However, our chosen theorist, Rahner, expressly desires an "open" 
theological method that takes seriously the need to engage with the best thought from 
other interested fields. Rahner's anthropological theology is an example of this. He 
seeks to construct a theology that is informed by, as well as engages with, other 
disciplines. In the present-day setting, there is widespread interest within 
contemporary theology to engage with post-modem writers and their ideas. This 
thesis offers a very focussed and specific exercise in attempting to construct a 
dialogue between a theologian and a post-structuralist critical theorist. The exertion 
required to properly "hear" and understand the other has been apparent for the 
duration of this project and is exemplified in the methodological difficulties we shall 
now outline.
An immediate difficulty relates to terminology. In our study of Rahner and Kristeva's 
writing on subjectivity we encounter terms such as "person", "man", "human nature", 
"human being", "subject", "ego", "self and "the I". As we encounter these terms we 
shall examine the particular ways in which they are used by each of our theorists. The 
very question as to whether there can be a dialogue or comparison between our
thinkers is apparent from the sheer range of terms, the differences between their 
disciplines' terminology (and often between writers from the same discipline): a range 
and difference which indicates the contested nature of these notions. In other words, 
we find that difference in terminology which, of itself, must shape our method in 
seeking to bring these two diverse theorists into a dialogue. Given the differences in 
their terminology we must firstly examine their thought within its own particular 
context, looking closely at how they use the terms they choose. Within their 
explorations of subjectivity, Rahner and Kristeva explore and employ different terms: 
the "subject", "ego" and "the I" in Kristeva's writing, and "person", "man" "subject" 
and "human nature" in Rahner's. It is also apparent that the meaning of each term has 
become increasingly precise and discipline-specific. How can we seek to critically 
compare the "hearer" and "speaker" when each is couched in a different language and 
comes from divergent traditions? We seek to address this significant difficulty by 
allowing each writer to speak in their own terms, making it apparent when they are 
addressing different facets of subjectivity. Comparisons will be drawn after they have 
explained themselves in their own words and no synthetic term is sought to combine 
both sets of notions. We are not interested here to combine the thinking of Rahner and 
Kristeva, but rather to see what light is shed on theological thinking about 
"subjectivity" by means of an interface between them.
In considering terminology, we note that increasingly a "hermeneutics of suspicion" is 
required. We suggest that any attempt at a generalist definition reveal the vagueness 
there is around many of the terms. Even a very cursory study of dictionary entries 
from various disciplines reveals that there is vagueness around many of the terms. 
Often collections of terms appear interconnected, as in this early dictionary entry,
"Self: Ego, subject, I, me, as opposed to the object or to the totality of 
objects"2
Such generalist definitions obscure important differences of meaning. Increasingly the 
meaning of many of these terms is discipline-specific. For example, in philosophy, the 
term "self remains a notion connoting the bearer of a set of attributes such as
2 Noah Webster, Webster's dictionary of synonyms : a dictionary of discriminated synonyms with 
antonyms and analogous and contrasted words. 1918 and 1942
thoughts, beliefs, emotions, intentions and sensations.3 It is frequently adopted, 
philosophically, to delineate personal from social identity;
"A "person" is associated with the body and public or social roles, while the 
"self is more related to the inner part or aspect of a person"4
Without generic terms between disciples, we further note that each term has 
developed increasingly precise and considered connotations within disciplines. For 
example, within psychology, the term "self has a precise meaning, referring to the 
mediating function of the ego within Freud's tripartite mind.
"The ego, the subject of intentional actions and decisions, is the mediator 
between the id and superego, and is the real "I" or genuine self." 5
The contested nature of the terms and concepts within specific disciplines also 
disallow discipline-based generalisations being made. In respect of this study, we 
note that not all post-modernists or post-structuralist writers would agree with 
Kristeva's understanding and use of terms. We shall therefore be unable to make 
incontestable conclusions about an interface between the disciplines of theology and 
post-structuralism here, and offer instead a very specifically focused exploration of 
the interface between two particular theorists. Even given this, the vagueness around 
non-specific disciplinary uses of the terms poses a problem for our project. Each term 
appears inadequate when attempting to transpose it into another discipline; its 
meaning fragments. It is necessary therefore to carefully look at how terms are used 
by a particular person and to avoid implying a false cohesion between writers, even 
where they use the same terms.
Considering terminology, Kristeva favours the terms "I" or "subject". The use of the 
personal pronoun to speak of the subject/?er se, is favoured in much post-structuralist 
writing, and does not appear in Rahner's work in this precise way. The terms "I" or 
"subject" used in this context express, with Freud, a fictive unity which the 
developing child encounters and adopts as its own symbolic representation.6 In this 
sense, the use of the jarring personal pronoun more clearly points to the notion of a 
constructed subjectivity than any other current term such as "self. The use of the
3 As per Bunnin and Yu's definition in The Backwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. Blackwell, 
2004.
4 Ibid p.627
5 Ibid p. 119
6 This ideas will be fully examined in Ch 3 of this thesis.
term "I" or "subject" in Kristeva's discussions of subjectivity points to the influence 
of psychoanalysis. In this context it implies that the "I" is the result of a false but 
necessary self-identification; the subject is a construct. For Kristeva, the term "self 
has become a convention to hide the extent to which a subject is in process, 
multiplicitous, socially and linguistically constructed. She rejects the term "self 
because she rejects the notion of subjectivity it implies. For Kristeva, the term "self 
implies a measure of self-awareness and intentionality, a self-possession which makes 
the subject a subject-to-no-one."7 Kristeva views the Enlightenment self not only as 
false but as a dangerous notion of subjectivity used to silence the experience of many 
non-white, non-male subjects. For her, any understanding of subjectivity that views 
the self as first and foremost alone and free, denies the experience of dependency that 
is central to human existence. As we consider her notion of the M/Other we see that, 
for Kristeva, the foremost experience of human dependency relates to the feminine. 8 
To take independence and individuality as the starting point for subjectivity ignores 
the centrality of the feminine in the construction of human subjectivity. The self, for 
Kristeva, is always marked by its experience of the M/Other, and in this by 
experiences of "strangeness" and "otherness". In writing of her notion of the 
"speaker" she therefore adopts the term "I" or "subject" to better denote the inclusion 
of psychoanalytic notions. There is one further advantage influencing Kristeva's 
choice of terminology. The terms "I" and "subject" have a provenance and tradition 
within the disciplines of linguistics and literary theory. In using the terms "the I" and 
"subject" Kristeva overtly offers a view of subjectivity that highlights the fractured, 
changing and constructed nature of self-identity. We shall see from our study of 
Kristeva, that the very concept of the "self has become,
"The elusive "I" that has an alarming tendency to disappear when we
try to introspect it."9
However, given this, we shall consider that Kristeva makes allowance for pragmatic 
notions of persistence within the fractured subject, even if this is seen as nothing more 
than a necessary illusion adopted to enable a person to function in day to day life. 10
7 Noelle McAfee Julia Kristeva. Routledge Critical Thinkers, 2004, p. 1-2
8 See Ch.6 of this thesis.
9 Simon Backburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy Oxford University Press, 2005 p.332
10 See Ch. 3.2 on the notion of the Chora.
Rahner predates Kristeva and does not have the benefit of contemporary fastidious 
considerations of the terminology around subjectivity. In his consideration of 
subjectivity he most frequently uses the term "person". This term has a long 
theological tradition and is rooted in the Latin term "persona" meaning mask or actor, 
and its Greek equivalent of "hypostatis". It has a long history in Christian 
anthropology. In the first Christian century it became usual to use the term "person" to 
mean simply an individual human being, however the term was strongly rooted in 
Trinitarian discussions. 11 Two separate streams developed from early Christian use of 
the term. The first interprets the term in the light of classical Trinitarian ideas of 
"persona" as the unique subject of consciousness and self-consciousness, as 
Augustine does. This gives rise to Boethius' definition that "a person is an individual 
substance of a rational nature." 12 However, other theologians, and we shall see that 
this is Rahner's position, see that a number of problems have arisen from modern 
usage of the word "person". Like Barth, Rahner argues that the proper theological use 
of the word "person" points back to ideas of substance rather than notions around 
modes of being. We discuss this in detail when we examine Rahner's review of the 
doctrine of the Trinity. 13 It gives rise to a plural and dialogical understanding of divine 
personhood that elicits the relational human person. This may chime with the 
heterogeneity of Kristeva's "speaking subject".
We also note Rahner's use of the term "man" to speak of the state of being a person. 
For example, when addressing human history he refers to the "history of man." 14 
When speaking of what constitutes personal being Rahner again speaks in masculine 
gendered terms,
"Being situated in this way between the finite and the infinite is what 
constitutes man, and is shown by the fact that it is in his infinite transcendence 
and in his freedom that man experiences himself as dependent and historically 
conditioned." 15
Even when addressing relationality Rahner speaks of "man",
11 Alan Richardson and John Bowden (ed.s) A New Dictionary of Christian Theology. SCM, 1983,
p.442-3
12 See "Person" in Bunnin and Yu, The Backwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, Blackwell, 2004,
p.511-2. Also Gillett and Peacocke (ed.) Persons and Personality: a contemporary enquiry Blackwell,
1987.
13 See Ch.7 of this thesis.
14 Rahner, TI 9, p.32
15 FCF, p.42
"Man only comes to himself in the encounter with the other man, who is 
presented historically to one's experience in knowledge and love, who is not a 
thing but a man."16
Given this usage we can comment that Rahner clearly intends "man" as inclusive, and 
generally intends "anthropos" by the word. In today's climate this may not be 
defensible. However, it is important to see his work in context. He is writing before 
the sexist nature of this term was widely acknowledged and before careful use of 
gendered terms became prevalent. Before we castigate his thinking as sexist and 
outdated (as his language clearly is) it is worth considering the extent to which his 
notions of personhood were ahead of their time and influenced contemporary theology 
to re-envision personhood in a post-Enlightenment manner. 17 We have not 
commented further on the use of "man" to denote subjectivity, but allowed Rahner to 
speak in his own words.
Our thesis suggests that a novel dialogue between Rahner, a theologian, and Kristeva, 
a post-structuralist critical theorist, can highlight issues about subjectivity within 
contemporary theology, shedding light onto the possibility of debate with 
postmodernism by means of an interface between these two divergent thinkers. The 
extent to which we find shared themes in the "hearer" and "speaker" is surprising 
since our theorists come from such divergent fields. However, we suggest that the 
movement to re-examine the nature of personhood in contemporary theology 
correlates somewhat with the post-modern turn to the subject, with both stressing the 
place of relationality, dialogue, otherness and imaginative symbolisation. However, 
this dialogue should not be taken to imply that the disciplines of theology and post- 
structuralism are coherent. Our concern is to consider how Rahner's theology might 
engage with Kristeva's philosophy, despite some of the fundamental differences 
between these two theorists' paradigms.
As we consider the foci elicited from shared themes we shall be mindful that in 
considering the "hearer" and "speaker" we are also confronted with differences which 
fundamentally underlie those of terminology. As their respective terms imply they 
situate the experience of subjectivity very differently. Rahner's "hearer" implies that 
the experience of personhood is reliant upon the actions of an other to "speak". The
16 TI 13,p.l27
17 We consider this in following chapters which deal specifically with Rahner's theories
10
"hearer" has a secondary and responsive role in a dialogical reality within which it is 
situated. Its ontology 18 is contingent upon an other. For Rahner, personhood exhibits a 
necessary "transcendental existential"; the hearer's being is dependent upon a 
transcendent Speaker. In contrast, Kristeva's "speaking subject" possesses a primary 
function; it speaks itself into being. This function initially appears less reliant upon 
the act of a partner in dialogue.19 As we compare and contrast the "hearer" and 
"speaker" we discover very different ways of viewing the experience of human 
subjectivity.
Although our project is shaped by the anticipation of areas of common interest 
between the "hearer" and "speaker" we bear in mind that at times our thinkers do not 
address the same questions and we should resist making them appear to do so. Our 
belief is that we should recognise disjuncture rather than to attempt to force a dialogue 
at such points. As our theorists address similar themes the lack of symmetry we 
encounter is, of itself, interesting. It is possibly indicative of the questions that arise, 
and those that are perhaps disallowed, by each of our thinker's paradigmatic 
framework. Allowing for this lack of symmetry we remain convinced that there is 
scope enough to allow for a dialogue at later points. Within each chapter we will 
signpost and briefly comment on areas of interest to our thesis. We will then draw 
these areas together in chapter ten where we explore what is to be learnt from this 
interface between Rahner's "person as hearer" and Kristeva's "speaking subject".
We also need to explain our pragmatic choice of writing as "we", rather than in the 
more common impersonal style or single personal pronoun. However archaic the use 
of a plural personal pronoun may be, in our consideration, it has two advantages over 
the alternatives. Primarily, in writing as "we" the use of the term "I" is avoided. This 
not only avoids textual confusion but is also fundamentally important if we are really 
to "hear" Kristeva. For post-structuralists the very notion of the pre-existence of the 
"I" is rejected. The use of the currently unpopular plural pronoun may be jarring; 
however it offers less difficulty than writing about the non-existence of the "I" in the 
first person singular. Furthermore, the use of "we" might be said to infer a multiplicity 
of authors. The deconstruction of the myth of the singular author and the contention
18 We explore later that an ontology for subjectivity is precisely what Kristeva rejects.
19 With exception of the M/Other, an subject-less, agent-less entity relating to the pre-Oedipal infant.
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that knowledge is deeply connected to a web of discourse will be examined in this 
thesis. Both of these facets of knowledge and writing are perhaps anticipated in the 
plural personal pronoun? The main disadvantage of our choice is that "we" could be 
taken to infer that the reader agrees with the author(s). This is clumsy and might even 
be seen as totalitarian, which is rather unfortunate in that this thesis concerns a 
critique of just such modernist tendencies. However, given the greater drawbacks of 
the alternatives, we have chosen this option.
Having attempted to explain some of the methodological choices we have made we 
shall now outline the shape of our study. Our first question, addressed in chapters one 
and two, concerns where human subjectivity is created and exists for our two thinkers. 
We begin with Rahner's view of the arena of human history. We seek to situate 
Rahner within contemporary Christian theology and, to this end, briefly examine the 
Thomist approach he adopts. Whilst we do not seek to define Rahner's exact relation 
to Thomism, a task fraught with difficulty20 and not necessary to our project, our 
appraisal finds him entirely orthodox within Catholic thought whilst being 
characteristically philosophically rigorous. Our focus in examining Rahner's work 
will be upon the centrality he gives to notions of relationality and openness. We shall 
suggest that, in this, he is one example among a broader stream of contemporary 
theological anthropology. SchwSbel describes such relational understandings of the 
human person as "form(ing) a common element in contemporary anthropological 
reflection." 21
In chapter two we shall examine the arena of subjectivity presupposed by Kristeva. 
We examine the arena of discourse and how it elicits a phantom of subjectivity that 
has no ontological or metaphysical validity. In the place of metaphysics we observe a 
turn to linguistics, literary theory and psychoanalysis. It might be said that here we see
20 The situation is further complicated by an ongoing discussion as to Thomas Aquinas' relation to 
Thomism! The debate over Rahner's particular relation to Thomism remains unresolved. A summary of 
this debate is found in Fergus Kerr's After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism, Oxford Blackwell, 2002.
21 Schwobel "The Human Being as Relational Being" in Persons Divine and Human . p. 141. See 
further consideration of this in ch. 7 pp.161-177 of this thesis. We note with James Jones in "The 
Relational Self: Contemporary Psychoanalysis Reconsiders Religion" Journal of American Academy of 
Religion, 1991, Vol. 59, pp.119-135, that secular psychoanalysis has similarly enjoyed a renewed 
interest in relational models of selfhood. In contrast to the "relatively self contained system of 
instinctive drives or archetypes [of Freud or Jung] more recent theoreticians propose an interpersonal 
and interactional model of personality" to the extent that, in Jones' opinion, "Virtually all major 
psychoanalytic studies of religion published in the last decade draw upon relational models of the self." 
(p. 119)
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the "constructivism" of postmodernism apparently at immediate odds with the 
"objectivist" paradigm imagined by theology.22 This is an example of post-modern 
re-framing of the question of human subjectivity. As Gary Madison says,
"The post-modern condition entails the rejection of the modernist framing of 
the question regarding the human subject as a metaphysical query about the 
human essence"23
We find Kristeva's work to be both complex and controversial. She is a Professor of 
linguistics, a practising psychoanalyst, and a renowned critical theorist. We observe 
two interrelated interests throughout Kristeva's work: the scientific study of language 
and the psychology of the unconscious and human sexuality. She sees these two 
fields, semiotics and psychoanalysis, as together providing insight into the nature of 
human subjectivity and they form the foundation for her emergent notion of the 
speaking subject. Kristeva stresses the ex-centric and relational nature of the subject 
and rejects modernist notions of a transcendental or essential core. In seeking to 
situate Kristeva's work, this chapter will also include a brief examination of the 
genesis of her philosophy from its beginnings in Continental literary theory. This 
decision, as opposed to tracing post-modern philosophy from the thought of Western 
philosophy, of perhaps Nietzsche, is partly due to the extensive and thorough 
consideration already available on this approach. 24 Our chosen approach is also due to 
a desire to be true to Kristeva's own project, which began in earnest with her doctoral 
thesis on the nature of semiotics. This early Kristevan work is overtly directed 
towards taking forward the work of post-structuralist literary theorists and Continental 
psychoanalytic theory rather than presenting us with a post-modern philosophy per se. 
Our project will therefore seek to contextualise Kristeva's work within its literary and 
psychoanalytic heritage rather than beginning with an examination of the origins of
22 Cf.: Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism. Eerdmans, 199, p.40. "In a sense, postmoderns 
have no worldview. A denial of the reality of a unified world as the object of our perception is at the 
heart of postmodernism. Postmoderns reject the possibility of constructing a single correct worldview 
and are content simply to speak of many views and, by extension, many worlds...that is to say, we 
have moved from an objectivist to a constructionist outlook." Grenz cites Walter Truett Anderson 
Reality Isn't What It Used To Be, San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1990, pp. x-xi, in contrasting 
modern and postmodern paradigms in this way.
23 Gary Madison, The Hermeneutics of Postmodernitv: Figures and Themes. Indiana University Press, 
1988. p. 155 cited in The Social God and The Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago 
Dej,Stanley J. Grenz, Westminster John Knox Press, 2001.
24 Recent examples of which include Nietzsche and the question of interpretation: between 
hermeneutics and deconstruction by Alan D. Schrift, Routledge, 1990, Infectious Nietzsche by David 
Farrell Krell, Indiana University Press, 1996 and Hegel. Nietzsche and the criticism of metaphysics bv 
Stephen Houlgate, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
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post-modern philosophy within Nietzsche's writing, as appears to be the more usual 
approach.
In addressing the arena of the" person as hearer" for Rahner and that of the "speaking 
subject" for Kristeva, we are immediately faced with the differing epistemologies of 
our thinkers. We shall explore Rahner's use of the transcendental method of enquiry, 
which is a useful example of an "objectivist" theory of knowledge.25 By this we mean 
that Rahner is committed to an epistemology whereby what is revealed reliably 
correlates with what is. His is a realist paradigm is at odds with the constructionist 
outlook of Kristeva who disallows any one construction of reality to preclude any 
number of alternative interpretations.26 In many ways Rahner's notion of reality is just 
such a master-narrative as that jettisoned by Kristeva. However, we shall observe that 
Rahner's confidence in the correspondence of revelation to reality does not rest (as 
per Modernity) in the rational faculties of the human, but rather in the special position 
of the human being as a created hearer of God - a facet of spirit and relationality 
rather than rationality which indicates his similar rejection of Modern rationalism. 27 
Whilst each of our thinkers would being unwilling to adopt the wider framework of 
the other their critiques of the modernist self bear great resemblance as well as some 
points of interesting divergence. It is from considering this that we suggest a better 
understanding of the nature of subjectivity can be drawn; one which will be informed 
by the interface of Rahner and Kristeva's thought such as their similar emphasis on 
religious imagination and art as opposed to relationality and unitive oneness.
Having situated Kristeva's work in chapter two, we continue in chapter three to a 
closer examination of her thesis on the "speaking subject". We consider how she 
views the creation of the "I" in her resourcement of Lacanian psychoanalysis, her 
application of post-structuralist linguistics and her study of the borderline patient.
In chapter four we focus upon Rahner's thesis that human subjectivity is a special 
example of self-expressive being. This is important because whilst Rahner's person is 
primarily a "hearer" this does not preclude the ability to "speak". The person is, in
25 See ch. 1 pp. 13-29 of this thesis outlining Rahner's Thomist belief in this respect and cf. note 22 
above.
26 Cf.: Hilary Lawson and Lisa Appignanesi (ed.s) Dismantling Truth: Reality in the Post-Modern 
World (St. Martins Press, 1989 pi-4).
27 We shall consider this in ch. 5 pp.!61-181of this thesis.
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fact, in a reciprocal dialogue to the transcendental "speaker" and it is in this that the 
human self achieves its personhood; both speaking and hearing are part of this process 
of self-actualisation. The main consideration of this chapter will be Rahner's 
philosophy of language and how this underpins and informs his notion of subjectivity. 
He views reality as essentially self-expressive and dialogical. Chapters three and four 
establish significant shared areas of interest between our thinkers. This is mostly with 
respect to the role of language as creative of selfhood and also in presenting human 
subjectivity as a dynamic process. We see in both the privileging of poetic language 
and an interest in religious language and art.
In chapter five we shall pull together what we have learnt from our investigation of 
Rahner's writings and examine further the nature of the hearing person which he 
proposes.
In chapters six and seven we narrow our focus to the understanding of otherness in 
both Kristeva and Rahner's writings. We anticipate that this is a key theme for this 
engagement. This is where we suggest theology can be informed by the post- 
structuralist emphasis of relating intra- to inter-subjectivity in an exploration which 
emphasises the role of otherness in the creation of the subject.
In chapter six we begin by returning to Kristeva. In doing so, we find two inter-related 
notions of the other: the semiotic M/Other and the stranger. We shall explore how the 
former is used in the exploration of intra-subjectivity, whilst the latter provides 
Kristeva with a basis for inter-subjective ethics. This chapter will be followed by a 
study of Rahner's similarly twofold use of the notion of an 'other'. He adopts the 
doctrine of the Trinity as a model of inner-plurality and the notion of neighbour-love, 
the loving response to the 'other', in the construction of ethics. In this, we shall see 
that the Kristevan notion that to recognise 'strangeness within' is necessary in order 
not to do violence to the strangers in society is a useful way to understand Rahner's 
notion of neighbour-love, successfully relating inter-subjectivity to intra-subjectivity 
in a way which can inform the notion of the person as hearer.
In chapter seven, focussing on Rahner's use of models for otherness, we introduce 
Rahner's consideration of the doctrine of the Trinity. Rahner is certainly not alone in
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revisiting notions of personhood by way of reconsidering this theological doctrine. 
Grenz (2001) suggests that when questions regarding human selfhood came to the 
fore in the twentieth century, theologians began a thoroughgoing re-examination of 
divine personhood. Christian theologians revisited ideas about the imago dei and the 
Trinity28 . Such a focus is exemplified in Karl Barm's "Church Dogmatics" (1936-
*">Q
1969) . Grenz (2001) points out that Barm's influence has achieved far more than 
returning the doctrine of the Trinity to theological centre-stage.30 It is the particular 
Trinitarian model that Earth adopts, one of "social analogy", which impacted so 
decidedly upon contemporary theology. In fostering a social notion of the Trinity and 
emphasising the notion of the imago dei, following Barth, there has been a call to 
revisit Christian anthropology in the light of Trinitarian doctrines. If God's 
personhood is primarily to be seen as "social", then the human person, created in this 
image, is also primarily social and relational. This is a rejection of the Enlightenment 
rational ego on theological terms. In Grenz's words the result of the social analogy of 
the Trinity
"(H)as been the coalescing of theology with the widely accepted philosophical 
conclusion that "person" has more to do with relationality than with 
substantiality and that the term stands closer to the idea of communion or 
community than to the conception of the individual in isolation or abstracted 
from communal embeddedness."31
In Rahner's use of the Trinity as a model for Otherness we witness the theme of 
relationality emerging from a relational notion of the Trinity. It also provides him 
with an ethic of respect for the other, which is outworked in his concept of neighbour 
love. Furthermore, with his desire to see the doctrine of the Trinity as central to the 
theological task and his emphasis on notions of relationality, this focus will show that 
Rahner is representative of a major shift in twentieth century theology.
In chapters eight and nine we seek to emphasise two points where our comparison has 
been most striking. Here we consider the very different notions of freedom and the
28 Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and The Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei. 
John Knox Press, 2001.
29 For Barth the doctrine of the Trinity is to be addressed prior to all other doctrinal considerations. This 
is a direct and overt inversion of Schleiermacher's ordering, emphasising Barth's insistence that the 
Trinity is an "explanatory confirmation" of all revelation of who God is. Barth's bold stance purports 
that a proper understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity is needed as a prolegomenon of all theology. 
Such a view was greatly influential for twentieth century theology, as pointed out by John Gresham in 
"The Social Model of the Trinity and Its Critics" Scottish Journal of Theology. 46/3 (1993) p.327.
30 Stanley Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self. Westminster John Knox Press, 2001.
31 Grenz, op.cit., p.4.
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possibility of a telos for human selfhood. For Rahner, this will involve a consideration 
of Christ as the norm and telos of the human self. For Kristeva, we consider the notion 
ofjouissance".
In our final chapter we seek to draw together our thesis and make some conclusions as 
to the extent to which the hearing person might be a useful tool for theology to 
interface with a post-structuralist notion of a speaking subject. This will include a 
consideration of the areas where theology can be advantageously informed by post- 
structuralism and attempt to make provisional conclusions as to the usefulness and 
significance of this inter-disciplinary theological project.
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1. Where is Subjectivity Created for Rahner? 
The Hearer as Created within a Graced History.
We begin here with an examination of the location of the "person as hearer". We 
anticipate that the setting for subjectivity determines its shape. Questions about reality 
may configure and circumscribe the shape of the human subjectivity for both writers. 
We begin with an examination of the presupposed arena for Rahner's hearer.
The paradigm presupposed by Karl Rahner is, unsurprisingly, thoroughly theistic. For 
Rahner, the human person exists within a created order that can be described 
fundamentally as the arena where divine revelation takes place. In other words, it is 
God as primordial speaker, and the created world as the place of divine revelation, 
which determine that the human be seen as primarily a hearer. In considering 
Rahner's understanding of reality we adopt three of his important themes. Taken 
together the themes of historicity, relationality and revelation provide us with a full 
understanding of the arena of the hearing person that Rahner posits.
1.1 Human history as a historic reality
We note that, when addressing the arena of personhood, Rahner does not speak of the 
doctrine of creation per se, but turns to an examination of human history in particular.
"We have said that the only thing we can say about the place of a possible 
revelation is that man himself is to be this place.. .Thus the place of a possible 
revelation is always and necessarily also the history of man." 32
In describing the person as a hearer Rahner is not concerned to examine the whole of 
the natural world so much as to present human history as the place into which God 
speaks. He says,
"Revelation is possible...the place where such revelation may occur is our 
history. The historical appearance in the world may, in the human world, make 
known the free word of the God of revelation."33
32 Rahner, TI 9, p.32 
"Rahner, HW, p. 136
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In other words, Rahner elevates human history to be the place where divine revelation 
takes place in a way that would not be possible if the presence of human beings were 
removed from the natural world.34 This position may appear surprising. 
Commentaries on Rahner more generally focus upon the emphasis he gives to God's 
immanence in the natural world, his refusal to separate God from creation. Given this 
emphasis on the immanence of God, it cannot be assumed that Rahner sees God's 
revelation as in any way reduced in the natural, non-human realm. For Rahner,35 God 
speaks to humans in and through the material order of creation as a whole but from 
within human history in particular. Importantly, the human as hearer of God is placed 
within an arena that is both historical and temporal. This is important to keep in mind, 
especially since it might be said that the most readily recollectable facet of Rahner's 
anthropology is his emphasis on the human as transcendent being. However, given his 
emphasis on the temporal and historic nature of the arena of selfhood, the hearer's 
transcendence is from an original historical and temporal grounding and full self- 
transcendence is never completely achieved in life. This emphasis on history and 
temporality will provide us with an important contrast with the speaking subject, 
which we shall pursue later in this thesis.
This examination of the nature of reality requires us briefly to investigate Rahner's 
theory of matter. What kind of material world does the human person exist within?
In Hearers of the Word (1969) Rahner's description of the nature of matter finds him 
at his most philosophical and demonstrably influenced by Thomas Aquinas36 .
"We saw matter is the in itself undetermined possibility of real 
determinations."37
Rahner broadly adopts the theory of matter associated with Aquinas which views 
material objects as "forms" of being. For example, the body is the form of the soul. 
Whilst such material things are necessarily spatial and temporal they also point 
towards a fuller and increasingly actualised state of being,
34 Rahner, TI 9
35 Rahner, TI 9
36 The relation of Rahner to Thomas Aquinas is not relevant to our project; however we note that it is 
not possible to use the terms Thomist or neo-Thomist in a non-contentious way. This is discussed in 
Fergus Kerr's After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism, Blackwell, 2002.
37 HW, p. 110
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"Hence the material being is one which always points towards the totality of 
the realisation of its possibilities as the future of its inner movement and keeps 
striving towards it."
In viewing material entities this way Rahner follows the Thomist axiom that 
"existence precedes essence." Stated simply this metaphysical a priori purports that 
knowledge of any particular thing is preceded by a pre-thematic awareness of 
existence. In other words, one has to know that something exists before it can be 
apprehended for what it is. Following Aquinas, Rahner sees the existence of reality as 
entirely apparent but not logically necessary; being exists, but it need not exist. 
Therefore being is inherently contingent and, given this, its contingency makes it 
finite39 . This is the basis of the Thomist cosmological argument for the existence of 
God. Given that reality is contingent, then it must have, by necessity, been caused to 
exist. Logically it could not have caused itself to exist; therefore there must be an 
external cause of being. Thomists see that this cause must ultimately be an original 
"uncaused cause" of all being, which is God.
Rahner's Thomist insistence on being before essence gives rise to his anthropological 
axiom that the human person as hearer should not be seen as a collection of various 
"modalities." Given this, one might say that Rahner avoids both a Platonic mind-body 
dualism and a reductive materialism. By this we mean that, following Thomist 
principles, the hearer's body is the form of the soul and cannot be thought of as a 
separate "essence" in and of itself. The human is seen as a unity, composed of soul 
and body in mutual dependence.
Furthermore, by working within a Thomist schema, the historical, material and 
temporal aspects of a human being are not to be seen as additions to human nature but 
as constitutive of the hearer.
"Man is not put into a spatio-temporal world after first being made into man. 
He is not simply put on a spatio-temporal stage to act out his life. Spatio- 
temporality is his inner make-up that belongs properly to him as man. Because 
matter is one of his essential components, it is by himself that he constructs 
space and time as inner moments of his existence." 40
38 HW, p. 110
39 The finite nature of the human being is explored in SW and will be a theme we return to throughout 
this thesis, and particularly in chapter 5.
40 HW,p.lll
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Rahner states that whilst the human being is spiritual, he or she is not only spiritual, 
but experience him or herself as both historical and dependent. Rahner says,
"Man as personal being of transcendence and freedom is also and at the same 
time a being in the world, in time and in history."41
In this, Rahner's view concurs with the human experience of being deeply affected 
and, to an extent, personally constituted by the particular historical and social 
situation into which one finds oneself.
Thus, according to Rahner, the human person cannot be sectioned up into different 
modes of being; rather the human is a unity of body and soul, of immanence and 
transcendence.42 In drawing upon Thomist notions of existence Rahner suggests that 
human experience is one of both fmitude and self-transcendence. We suggest that, for 
Rahner, the human experience of being profoundly conditioned by the world is as 
important as the awareness of self-transcendence. For Rahner these two experiences 
are coherent and interdependent. It is the awareness of our fixed and finite historicity 
that mediates the possibility of our self-transcendence and freedom. Again this is 
fundamentally divergent from post-structuralist subjectivity which, we shall see, 
offers no place for transcendence out of (textual) reality, but only within it. In 
contradistinction Rahner says,
"In so far as he experiences his historical conditioning he is already beyond it 
in a certain sense, but nevertheless he cannot really leave it behind. Being 
situated in this way between the finite and the infinite is what constitutes man, 
and is shown by the fact that it is in his infinite transcendence and in his 
freedom that man experiences himself as dependent and historically 
conditioned."43
From our examination so far we find that primary emphasis is given to presenting the 
hearer as originally placed within a temporal and historic realm in and through which 
God is present in self-revelation.
41 FCF,p.40 
42 HW,p.lll 
43 FCF, p.42
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1.2 Human history as a social reality - Rahner's consideration of human 
relationality.
We turn now to consider the second major theme Rahner considers in speaking of the 
wider arena of the hearer. Here he speaks of history as social; that all material things 
must be necessarily more than any individual event, but one among many. He says in 
respect to the human being, "Man is real only in a humanity." 44 It is to this important 
theme that we now turn our attention. We keep in mind that these two tenets of the 
human person, as material and relational, will provide a basis for comparing this with 
the very different notion of the self as speaking subject.
We find that Rahner presents the world as an essentially relational reality. Both the 
horizontal axis of human relationships and the vertical axis of human-divine 
relationship are necessarily present. For Rahner, the very core of reality is 
relationship. As such, both human and divine persons construct history through their 
interrelation. He says of this,
"The free act of God is again and again kindled by the activity of man. History 
is not merely a play that God himself performs and in which the creatures are 
simply what is performed. Rather, the creature is a genuine co-performer in 
this divine-human drama of history." 45
History, and in this sense Rahner means the totality of human reality, is thus portrayed 
as a "performance", or dialogue between persons human and divine. As Mark Lloyd- 
Taylor (1986) says, history is "a genuine personal dialogue between God and the 
world that is established by divine self-communication."46
For Rahner, it is unsurprising that human history is essentially relational because he 
views the original act of creation as an inter-relational event.47 From such a 
foundation, human history proceeds as a continuation of the divine dialogue, with 
human beings as partners. We note that this emphasis on creation and history as 
relational is evident in much contemporary Christian anthropology. Rahner can be 
seen to pre-empt this contemporary focus, which makes his theology especially of
44 HW,p.lll
45 TI l,p.lll
46 Mark Lloyd-Taylor God is Love: A Study in the Theology of Karl Rahner. Scholars Press American 
Academy of Religion, 1986, p.155-6.
47 FCF, p.76. Rahner purports that we are not "creatures" simply because God has "caused" us. 
Creatureliness is not a one-time experience. It is the experience of being in a relationship with mystery.
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interest since he is influential for a great many later writers. For example, Alistair 
McFadyen shares this relational and dialogical view of history, outlined in The Call to 
Personhood.
"The Biblical theme of creation is not ultimately concerned with cosmogony 
or cosmology but with the relationship between God and God's creatures." 48
"In the provision of space for free human response to the divine address, the 
divine-human relationship is structured from God's side as a dialogue. For 
human being is intended in this communication to be God's dialogue- 
partner....Because God's communication takes dialogical form, it should be 
conceived in terms of grace. Dialogue here means that, on God's side at least, 
there is respect for freedom and independence and an absence of 
overdetermination. In the mystery of God's grace human beings are addressed 
as God's dialogue partners."49
Rahner can be seen to pre-empt such readings of the relational and dialogical nature 
of both creation and human history in Theological Investigations 11,
"God's activity in the course of salvation history is not simply a monologue 
that God undertakes for himself alone. It is rather a long dramatic dialogue 
between God and his creature in which God grants to man the possibility of 
genuinely responding to his word. Thus, in fact, God make his own further 
word dependent upon the outcome of man's free response."50
We note the particular nature of relationality Rahner outlines: it is one whereby reality 
is social and these social relationships exist between persons. It is also one where both 
partners are engaged in a reciprocal dialogue of speaking and listening. It is God who 
speaks first, as the primordial Word, however God's continuing dialogue is 
"genuinely responsive" to the reply of the human self. In this the human self exists as 
fundamentally a hearer, a dialogue partner, of God. Furthermore in this, the human 
self is never an isolated entity, or a sole voice, but rather the nature of the self as 
hearer is only actualised in community.
48 Alistair McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the individual in Social 
Relationships Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 18. In a later chapter, pp. 161-181, on Rahner's use 
of the doctrine of the Trinity we shall return to consider McFadyen's thesis that the tri-unity of God 
provides both an ontological and ethical model, an "is" and an "ought", for human personhood.
49 McFadyen, op.cit., p. 18.
50 TI ll,p.225
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"It follows that a single human person can never exhaustively, and at one time, 
actualize all that belongs to it by way of possibilities as a material being. That 
is why referring to other beings of one's own kind, which everyone does as 
this particular individual, is not something unimportant...We are actually 
human only in a humanity. To be human is to be one among many."51
Rahner's is an inter-personal 52view of the nature of reality, which will give rise to a 
relational view of human subjectivity. In his study of Rahner, Mark Lloyd-Taylor 
concludes that,
"It cannot be stressed strongly enough that, for Rahner, this inter-subjectivity 
or relatedness to others is essential to human being."53
We anticipate that this may be seen as fundamentally at odds with post-structuralist 
subjectivity, if that subjectivity privileges intra-subjective relationality between facets 
of discourse over the relation between persons.
However, in portraying Rahner giving great importance to the facet of interpersonal 
relationality we note, with Lloyd-Taylor, that this reading does not enjoy universal 
consensus among scholars. He cites the work of Eberhard Simons and Alexander 
Gerken54 as examples of critics who question the adequacy of Rahner's treatment of 
the theme of interpersonal relations. Lloyd-Taylor himself admits, "There is no doubt 
that the interpersonal nature of human being is hardly considered at all in "Geist in 
Welt"55 Were these criticisms valid, our suggestion of Rahner's hearer as a possible 
means to critique the individualism of post-structuralism's speaking subject would be 
diminished. We therefore briefly consider this critique of Rahner.
During his lifetime, his student Johann Baptist Metz publicly criticised Rahner for not 
developing the theme of relationality further and applying it to a discussion of 
political theology (such that Metz favoured).56 In response, we should note that
51 HW ch.ll "The Human Person as a Historical Spirit", p.l 11.
52 A fuller study of Rahner's use and intention in the term "person" will be undertaken in ch.5 pp.112- 
131 where we bring together the major characteristics of Rahner's hearer.
53 Lloyd-Taylor, op.cit., p.67.
54 Cited in Mark Lloyd-Taylor op.cit.: Simons, Eberhard Philosophie der Offenbarung:
Auseinanderetzung mit Karl Rahner Stuttgart: w, Kohlhammer Verlag, 1966 and
Gerken, Alexander. Offenbarung und Transzendenzerfahrttng; Dusseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1969.
55 Lloyd-Taylor, op.cit., p.65-66.
56 For an example of Metz's argument for a more political use of the theme of relationality see The 
Emergent Church : the future of Christianity in a postbourgeois world. Johann Baptist Metz, translated 
by Peter Mann from the German, SCM, 1981.
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Rahner addresses these issues in later writings including "Theology of Poverty" in 
Theological Investigations 8 pp.168-214 and "The Unreadiness of the Church's 
members to Accept Poverty" in Theological Investigations 14 pp.314-330.
However, could it be that relationality is an after-thought of Rahner's anthropology, 
rather than, as Lloyd-Taylor suggests, an integral part of it? In response to this we 
suggest that consideration should be given to several aspects of the way in which 
Rahner worked. Rahner did not usually pursue a systematic programme but wrote to 
address issues raised when the Catholic Church considered disputes both internally 
and by contact with other disciplines. He often wrote apologetically, pastorally, or by 
responding to interviewers' questions and letters.57 His theology is as much to be 
drawn from his many sermons, prayers and devotional works as from his better- 
known theological tomes. It could be said that his is largely a responsive and reactive 
corpus, which was later compiled and published thematically, such as the many 
volumes of Theological Investigations. Writing in this responsive way, it might be 
expected that as the theme of relationality increased in appeal more generally, so his 
engagement with this theme developed. Instead of forming conclusions based upon 
Rahner's earliest work we suggest that the entire body of writing merits consideration. 
This is especially the case since Rahner did not set out to explicitly address the theme 
of human inter-relatedness in isolation, but rather as an emerging anthropological 
theme within the wider theme of his view of human history and as part of his project 
of truly "anthropological" theology.
However, if we accept that relationality is an important theme for Rahner, we would 
expect it to at least appear infrequently in his earlier work. In a review of the entire 
corpus of Rahner's work, Mark Lloyd-Taylor finds that this is just the case. He finds 
that the theme is addressed more frequently as the broader academic climate shows 
increasing interest in a relational way of exploring what it is to be human. 58 However, 
Lloyd-Taylor cites one early and unequivocal statement of Rahner's view of inter- 
personality from an interview as early as 1954. Here Rahner says,
57 For an example of Rahner's collected pastoral writings see Meditations on Hope and Love, translated 
by V. Green, Burns and Oats, 1976.
58 We return to this argument in ch.5 of this thesis "Rahner's Hearer".
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"Personal spirit is spirit that is directed toward the other. Absolutely solitary 
spirit is a contradiction in itself and is -insofar as there can be such - hell. If 
[man is to be conceived as spirit] then this means the embodied spirit that man 
is, exists necessarily in relation to a Thou.. .Whoever posits man, posits 
necessarily, not only factually, human community, that is bodily, personal and 
spatial-temporal human community."59
Lloyd-Taylor's thesis maintains that the theme of relationality is a continuous but 
developing theme for Rahner. We conclude here that the theme of relationality may 
have been of increased importance in his later work, but cannot be said to be entirely 
absent from his earlier work. It is an emerging theme. We agree with Lloyd-Taylor 
that a full philosophy of human inter-subjectivity is never fully realised in Rahner's 
work and that it is only in Rahner's later work that a more thoroughly interpersonal 
account of human being is found.60 However, in considering the whole of Rahner's 
writings it is certainly evident that, for Rahner, the human being as hearer realises 
itself relation to the "other", in community. 61 As Lloyd-Taylor summarises, for 
Rahner,
"The Thou is there with the I necessarily."62
Rahner himself writes,
"Man only comes to himself in the encounter with the other man, who is 
presented historically to one's experience in knowledge and love, who is not a 
thing but a man."63
Rahner's insistence here is that the other person is encountered, to use Martin Buber's 
now famous terminology, as a "Thou."64 As such the person encountered in this social 
reality is not a projection of the I and cannot be considered as merely a means to self- 
actualisation. As Lloyd-Taylor says, "The Thou stands over against the I in her or his 
own reality."65 The relationality which brings about self-actualisation must therefore 
be viewed as truly inter-personal and reciprocal.
59 Appearing in Theologisches ;um Monogenismus, 1954, cited in Mark Lloyd Taylor op. cit. pp. 60
60 Lloyd Taylor op.cit. p.66
61 A theme we shall focus upon in ch.7 of this thesis, where we consider Rahner's theme of neighbour- 
love.
62 Lloyd-Taylor, op.cit., p.67.
63 TI 13,p.l27
64 Martin Buber I and Thou translated Ronald Gregor Smith, T&T Clark, 1 st edition 1937.
65 Lloyd-Taylor, op.cit, p.67
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It can be claimed that Rahner's early and emerging theme of human relationality has 
come to the fore in contemporary theological anthropology. Alistair McFadyen's 
thesis on personhood as relationally constituted is an example of such contemporary 
focus. McFadyen extends the metaphor of divine-human dialogue to the "horizontal 
axis" of interpersonal relations.
"The I is constituted by the form of its response in which others are intended 
either as co-subjects of dialogue (other Is or Thous) or as manipulable objects (Its)."66
This is precisely what Rahner intends in describing self-actualisation as the encounter 
with "the other man," as "not a thing but a man". Lloyd-Taylor's thesis demonstrates 
that this "other" is "precisely another human subject" and, in this way, Rahner is fully 
consonant with the theme of relationality that has become a characteristic of 
contemporary theology. We anticipate that this theme of relationality will be key in 
relating to the view of the self within post-modern thought as we consider our 
example of Julia Kristeva's speaking subject. Could it be that the emphasis Rahner 
gives to the inter-personal aspects of relatedness highlight an aspect possibly absent in 
Kristeva's schema where subjectivity is arguably an illusion within text, and self- 
creative relationality does not take place between personal entities?67
We find that Lloyd-Taylor's thesis helpfully redresses overly epistemological 
readings of Rahner. These emphasise the way in which the self is created and shaped 
by its questions and relation to a world of objects (rather than other co-existing 
subjects). Whilst the quest for knowledge is a key way by which the self travels 
towards its horizon, it should not be forgotten that the arena of self-creation is 
inhabited by other selves, and that these are encountered, not as objects, but as "Thou" 
to the self s "I". Such inter-personality is a no less formative to the creation of the self 
than each individual's epistemological search for answers to its own existence. 
Rahner suggests our greatest self-actualisation involves encounters not with objects of 
enquiry, but with other subjects, other "Thou's" sharing the arena of self-creation.68
66 Alistair McFadyen, op.cit., p. 122.
67 We explore the different concepts of relationality in ch.Sand ch.8. We shall connote these as 
Rahner's "exo-centric" person compared to Kristeva's "ex-centric" subject in ch.10.
68 We return to this in ch. 7 and ch. 8 of this thesis, where we consider Rahner's treatment of 
"neighbour love".
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Such an insistence upon relationality has, in our opinion, provided a necessary 
corrective to previous modernist assumptions of individual autonomy which appear in 
both former theology and secular philosophical fields. In this, Rahner's emphasis 
upon the notion of the self as relational hearer co-relates to some extent with the 
rejection of the modern autonomous self in Kristeva's writing.69 It is one example of 
where Rahner and Kristeva broadly agree.70
We wish to make a further identification of the precise nature of relationality in 
Rahner's anthropology. It is our contention that Rahner's notion of creative self- 
agency avoids defining the self exclusively by its relations to others.71 He offers a 
place for the self to exist as de-centred but nonetheless ontologically real and present. 
For Rahner the self exists; it is far from substantive in the sense of a static reality, yet 
it is also more than the sum of its immediate and temporal relations, since it is a 
created being. It is, in Hegel's terms, a 'being-present-for-itself as well as a 'being- 
in-relation'. Mark Trelstad makes the important point72 that feminist writers have 
warned of the inherent danger done to women when they are defined in such a solely 
relational way,
"Patriarchal constructions of women's selfhood have always defined women's 
values in terms of their relations to others and this is a pitfall to avoid in 
constructing a more adequate sense of human agency in theology.. ..it is 
obvious that creative self-agency (of women) is necessary as a caveat to these 
former models that described women as only instrumentally [by their 
relations] valuable."73
We believe that Rahner safeguards against the danger of the hearer being understood 
as purely a web of relations. He balances a notion of relationality with one of 
individuality.74 There is a genuine connectedness in Rahner's understanding of the 
person as hearer, but it is the connectedness between persons, which we might expect 
to identify as fundamentally different to the play of discourse which we will be
69 We briefly deal with the difficulty of distinguishing these terms in ch.2 of this thesis.
70 We return to discuss this question later.
71 See chapter 7 and ch.10 of this thesis for a further examination of Rahner's notion of the subject and 
the subject-in-relation.
72 Trelstad, "Relationality Plus Individuality: The Value of Creative Self Agency"72From Dialog vol. 
38, number 3, summer 1999, pp.193-198.
73 Trelstad, op.cit., p. 193
74 The clearest example of this being in his careful examination of the two-fold nature of Christ's 
subjectivity, which we examine in ch.9 of this thesis.
28
examining in Kristeva. The hearer is a person-in-relation and these are inseparable for 
Rahner. For Rahner, for there to be relationality, the presence of the "I" must be 
maintained as well as the presence of a "Thou". In other words, the agency and 
creative power of the other cannot be allowed to completely overshadow the agency 
and self-creative power of the self. Trelstad writes,
"While understanding all humans as part of a relational matrix, we can reclaim 
a positive, healthy understanding of "separate self that does not work to 
undermine relationality, but rather enhances it...The challenge is to describe 
all humans as both influenced and influencing, adding their own novel 
experience to the process of all experience."75
Rahner's understanding of the hearer has both these facets. On the one hand the 
selfhood of the hearer is separate. It experiences its "thrownness of being" and 
grapples with the question of its own existence by a process of questioning and unrest. 
However, it is not in this situation alone. Within the arena of self-creation it 
experiences other objects but also other subjects; other beings and its own unthematic 
knowledge of Ultimate Being. The hearer is therefore, by necessity, a relational being. 
It can no more ignore the "Thou's" sharing its arena of self-creation than the objective 
world around it. For, Rahner, as we shall see in chapter eight of this thesis, true self- 
actualisation is entered into only as a person realises its freedom in acts of neighbour- 
love, and fulfils the potential of influencing other selves positively. In this way self- 
creation is relational and the hearer is necessarily both separate and inherently 
interrelated.
1. 3 Human history as a place where divine revelation exists
We turn now to our third and final theme that is apparent in Rahner's consideration of 
the wider arena of selfhood, the theme of revelation. The most important aspect of this 
theme is the emphasis Rahner gives to God's presence in revelation. Where does God 
stand in the arena of the person as hearer?
For Rahner the world is a created reality which owes its very existence to the decision 
of God to reveal God-self in an act of creative expression. Rahner does not see the
75 Trelstad, op.cit. Trelstad is writing about the usefulness of Alfred North Whitehead's notion of the 
self. However, we believe that the same balance between separate and relational self can be found in 
Rahner's thought, see ch.7and ch.10 of this thesis. We share her belief that purely relational notions of 
the self are dangerous to women in particular and damaging to the notion of the self generally.
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world as merely a stage into which God may decide to act; rather it is intrinsically 
graced by the immanent presence of God. As a material reality it points to the form 
beyond it. In this way the world is a symbol for God. It is distinct from God, yet 
wholly dependent on God and exists to express God's being. It is what Rahner calls a 
"vicarious sign, of that which is not given in itself." 76
As we have seen, Rahner constructs a view of creation that emphasises revelation and 
dialogue and rejects the duality potentially implied in the relationship of a creator and 
creation. Rahner presents us with the view that "the dependence of the world upon 
God and the world's autonomy are directly and not inversely, proportional."77 In this, 
Rahner believes that seeing the God-world relationship as a loving dialogue corrects 
the error of dualism. God is seen as present within the world and not apart from it. 78 
The world is God's primary means of self-revelation and the external expression of 
God's being. In rejecting dualism, we find that Rahner also dismisses pantheistic 
understandings of the relationship between God and the world. He believes that God 
cannot be wholly identified with the world and is radically different from the world. 
In this Rahner upholds the orthodox Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo.
"Creation ex nihilo means, in essence, creation totally from God, precisely 
such that in creation the world is radically dependent on God, while God is not 
dependent on the world, but remains the self-sufficient one who is free over 
against the world." 79
In rejecting pantheism, Rahner is careful not to inadvertently suggest dualism. If 
pantheism is to be rejected it should be, according to Rahner, on the grounds that it 
does not distinguish God from the world. However, God should not be separated 
from the world in a dualistic fashion. The distinction should be made, but with 
caution, as Rahner says the distinction between God and the world is not that of "two 
categorical realities" since this presupposes that God can be set against a different 
background and judged as distinct from the world. This is not possible for Rahner; 
God is the ultimate background of all reality. The difference between God and the
76 HW, p. 46. A full consideration of Rahner's theory of symbols shall be offered in ch.4 of this thesis.
77 Mark Lloyd Taylor, 1986, pi53.
78 This view of reality will be seen to provide scope for theology critiquing some of the pre- 
suppositions made by post-modernists. See ch.10 of this thesis.
79 FCF, p.78. A helpful consideration of the debate surrounding the relationship between God and the 
world in contemporary theology is found in John Macquarrie's Thinking About God, see especially the 
chapter "God and the World: Two realities or one?" SCM Press, 1975. Also William Hill, The Three- 
Personned God The Catholic University of America Press, 1982.
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world must therefore be an internal difference within the being of God.80 Rahner 
argues that our experience of distinction within the world cannot be accurately used to 
describe the distinction between God and the world, since God is not one object 
among many but the very ground of being of all objects. God's distinction is 
important yet difficult to define, yet it must be made in order to view the world as a 
real place of dialogue rather than monologue. The primary function of the world is to 
be the place into which God speaks. Yet God is not to be seen as talking to Godself.
"We have already said that creation can and should be conceived as a moment 
within, a presupposition of, the self-communication of God in which he does 
not create and set over against himself that which is other than himself, but 
rather communicates his own reality to the other .. .this indwelling is no longer 
to be thought of as a particular occurrence given here and there within the 
world. Instead, it is a fundamental relationship of God to the world in general."81
We anticipate that Rahner's dialogical view of the person hearer may offer a useful 
contrast to Kristeva. As many postmodernists, Kristeva purports that the presence of a 
transcendent voice (of God) implies a 'master' voice or 'phallogocentrism', 
precluding the real presence of other voices. 82 In Rahner's understanding of the nature 
of reality there are always multiple voices, speaking to each other, shaping each other 
and shaping themselves. 83 God is present in the arena of human subjectivity, but has 
graciously determined to address human persons as partners in a creative dialogue.
We find that Rahner's dialogical view of reality can be seen as part of a long 
theological tradition that seeks to emphasise relationality. The development of modern 
Catholic thought such as Rahner's has some surprising progenitors. Grenz84 suggests 
that this tradition of relational selfhood can be traced back to the desire of the 
Protestant Reformers to offer a relational rather than structural understanding of the 
imago del. In Grenz's words "The relational understanding of the imago dei moves 
the focus from noun to verb."85 In tracing this tradition, Grenz suggests that Aquinas 
represents "the high-water mark" of the development of structural understanding of
80 FCF, p.62-5.
81 TI ll,p.225.
82 We consider this in ch.s 8 and 10 of this thesis.
83 We shall comment further on this in ch.8 It has been noticed here since the primary source is so 
suggestive of this important point.
84 Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self. Westminster John Knox Press, 2001.
85 Grenz, op.cit pp. 162-177.
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the imago dei, emphasising the inherent power to know and love God as the definitive 
human characteristic. Luther and Calvin's shared emphasis was to propose that the 
imago dei could be completely lost through sin and must be restored in the 
relationship of faith. According to Grenz, this dynamic dimension of the image of 
God set the scene for a fully relational view of what it meant to be human. Emil 
Brunner developed this emphasis in stressing that the relational aspect of the human 
was found in relationship to the Word of God.86 In Brunner we see the most apparent 
progenitor for Rahner's hearer. For Brunner, the human self experiences God's Word 
as both a 'call' and a 'capacity to respond'. In other words, for Brunner, the 
'structure' of the hearer of God is its relation. This enables Thomist notions of 
structure to be correlated with relational notions of self. For Rahner, within the imago 
dei, the same relationship exists between structure and relationality. This is a position 
whereby the human person is best characterised by his or her relation to the Word of 
God: to recall Brunner's terms they are a "being-in-the-Word".87 Grenz calls this a 
"word-and-response" relational anthropology. Interestingly, the centrality given to the 
theme of love found in Rahner's anthropology is also present in that of Brunner.88
Clearly, there is a history of theological attempts to explore the relationality of the 
human person, which can be seen to inform Rahner's notion of the hearer. Our choice 
of Rahner to represent theological anthropology is somewhat determined by the place 
he occupies in this tradition. We believe that his notion of the hearer pre-empts 
themes that have come to the fore in more recent contemporary theological 
discussions. These would include, for example, the notions of reciprocal relationality 
found in the 'History of God' theologians Moltmann and Pannenberg, and those of 
'being as communion', found in John Zizioulas. We shall refer to these writers 
throughout this thesis and believe that Rahner's notion of the self as hearer can be said 
to be greatly influential on current theological anthropology.
In summary then, Rahner's is an optimistic and positive understanding of the world. It 
is one whereby the transcendent presence of the divine saturates human history. The 
task of the person as hearer is to search out history, finding either the revealing word
86 Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology, translated Olive Wyon, Luterworth, 1939.
87 Brunner, p.58.
A A
See ch. 7 and 8 of this thesis, where the concept of neighbour-love as inter-subjective relationality is 
examined and explored.
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of God or the revealing word of God's silence. Rahner's depiction of human history 
allows for a considerable focus on the world as a mysterious place in which each 
person as hearer, and human history in its totality, is orientated towards 
transcendence. In this, it is also a thoroughly holistic reality with no ultimate 
separation between the immanent and transcendent. This allows for "multiple voices" 
and not the over-powering "master-voice" that disallows dialogue. This graced and 
dialogical environment will shape the person that inhabits it.
In summary we have found that this notion of reality prescribes that the "person as 
hearer" has both facets of separation and relationality. This is not a pure relationality, 
rather, with Trelstad, within the notion of the "person as hearer" a healthy notion of 
separation here enhances interrelation.
Having examined Rahner's view of the nature of reality, we turn to a very different 
paradigm presupposed as encompassing human subjectivity, that of Julia Kristeva's 
discursive reality; the place where her speaking subject is formed.
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2. Where Does Subjectivity Exist for Kristeva? 
The Arena of the Subject as Speaker
We turn now to an examination of the nature of reality presupposed by Kristeva as she 
constructs her notion of the speaking subject. This will involve a consideration of the 
nature of structuralist and post-structuralist thought. In seeking to explore the nature 
of reality pre-supposed by Kristeva we anticipate that, just as for Rahner, the arena of 
selfhood will determine the shape of the self. Fundamentally, Kristeva purports that 
reality is discursive. In other words, what we can know about reality is only accessible 
through discourse, with no direct reference to a "real" reality beneath the constructs of 
language. The arena of the "I" is impersonal and a-historical. This sets the parameters 
for the speaking subject, both in terms of where it exists and what it consists of. This 
provides us with a striking contrast to Rahner's theological arena of the hearer.
Broadly speaking, Kristeva adopts the paradigm of Continental post-structuralism. 
The context of her writing on the speaking subject falls with a particular French 
intellectual movement which had its height in the 1960's and 70's. Arriving in Paris 
on a scholarship from Bulgaria, Kristeva began to move in the intellectual circle of a 
new generation theorists including Lucien Goldmann, Roland Barthes, Claude Levi- 
Strauss, Emile Benveniste, Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault. 89 This circle has 
become known as "structuralist" in that they sought to locate and analyze structures in 
all fields relating to subjectivity: sociology; linguistics and psychology. Structuralism 
was to be a foundational influence on Kristeva's view of reality, the arena of the 
speaking subject.
At the heart of structuralism is the belief that things cannot be known in isolation, the 
greater "structures" around them need to be recognized and accounted for. The 
individual therefore can only be understood in relation to the larger structure to which 
it belongs.90 These structures are not, of themselves, objective realities, but larger 
abstract constructs that come to be from the particular culturally constructed way we 
view the world. The structures are the discourses and disciplines that impact upon any
89 Kristeva writes on her experience of being an exiled academic in Paris in Intimate Revolt trans. 
Jeanine Herman, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 (first published in French in 1997)
90 A good summary of structuralism is found in Peter Barry's Beginning Theory: An Introduction to 
Literary and Critical Theory. Manchester University Press, 1995.
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individual entity, including the subject. In this paradigm, meaning is therefore always 
attributed to things, rather than being inscribed or inherent within them.
Many of the guiding principles of the structuralist paradigm come from the thinking 
of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913). Saussure emphasised the 
arbitrary, constitutive and relational nature of words. Importantly, for Saussure, 
language constitutes reality rather than merely explaining or labelling it. Meaning is 
attributed to a thing by the human mind; of themselves they have no inherent 
meaning. Saussure's work was important to the later structuralist theorists, who 
Kristeva was to encounter in Paris, because it gave them a system for seeing reality as 
discursive; where systems were constructed through arbitrary relationships between 
signs. These systems could be recognized and evaluated in order to deconstruct the 
meanings previously assumed as inherent and given. In this, the structuralists of the 
1950'and 60's believed that Saussure's findings in regard to language could be 
extrapolated to explain how all signifying systems work. The structuralist task was to 
deconstruct all assumed knowledge by reference its context; to the greater systems of 
thought that constituted it. In effect this took the focus away from the thing itself and 
outwards to consider the nature of the discursive reality wherein it is found. This 
provided a view of reality which was entirely discursive and non-realist.91 Within this 
new paradigm, many new directions opened up for structuralist thinkers. Roland 
Bathes applied the method to modern culture and literature, Claude Levi-Strauss 
focussed on the contexts of myth and Lacan revisited the psychoanalysis of Freud. All 
of these critical theorists can be seen to influence the paradigm Kristeva adopts in her 
consideration of the speaking subject.92
As we consider Kristeva's arena of the speaking subject we can see that she takes the 
findings of structuralism and develops them to their fullest conclusions whereby 
reality becomes entirely "de-centred", that is all reference points for meaning are 
deconstructed and a universe of radical uncertainty is revealed. This is one meaningful
91 We consider the influence of non-realism on theology in chapter ten of this thesis. Here we introduce 
this paradigmatic approach to reality as a striking contrast to the objective reality pre-supposed by Karl 
Rahner.
92 More of this in the following chapter.
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way to define "post-structuralism"; it possesses the courage of the convictions of 
structuralism, and more readily celebrates paradigmatic non-realism. 93 As Barry says, 
"Post-structuralism inherits the habit of scepticism, and intensifies it."94
Most important for our task is to identify post-structuralism's confidence in viewing 
reality itself as textual. Here, with meaning found only in the play between words, the 
choice of words, each with its greater structure identified, becomes highly important. 
Words are chosen as much to deconstruct ideas as to express them. They often 
achieve both tasks at the same time. In this, post-structuralist writers, such as 
Kristeva, exhibit what Barry calls "linguistic anxiety"95 . Kristeva employs a number 
of words which are heavy with former associations and disrupted by a clash of 
possible meanings. We shall consider her use of the term "jouissance" and note that 
this is a good example of "linguistic anxiety".96 The playful or ironic use of words to 
dislocate and play with meaning is to be expected in a discursive in which the only 
certainty is the lack of all certainty (an irony that is celebrated rather than worrisome 
to post-structuralists). Meaning is always and everywhere unstable and knowable 
reality is purely a matrix of intersecting discourses, with no possible objective 
"centre" or fixed point of reference.
"We cannot know where we are, since all the concepts which previously 
defined the centre, and hence also the margins, have been 'deconstructed', or 
undermined."97
To this end, Kristeva was greatly influenced by the structuralist and post-structuralists 
project to eradicate the /. This was approached by a consideration of how meaning is 
elicited from a text. The novel approach of the new French theorists of Kristeva's day 
was to begin with an insistence that in the production of meaning, the text, and not the
QO
author, is the active, meaning-producing force.
93 Barry further suggests characteristic differences in origin, tone, style, attitude to language and project 
between structuralism and post-structuralism. Op.cit, p.63-65.
94 Barry, op.cit. p.63
95 Barry op.cit p.65
96 See chapter 9 of this thesis.
97 Barry, op.cit. p.62.
98 We shall see that Barthes, Derrida and Kristeva stop short of completely eradicating the self. They 
maintain a partial place for a tenuous self, le sujet, which is a construct of the text but has itself a 
measure of activity. This is described as a bi-active approach. However, since the I is a construct of the 
text, the text remains the active agent, even in these compromise positions.
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We can see this approach most clearly in the writing of Roland Barthes. In the quote 
following, Barthes insists upon the view that the text is active and the self is the 
construct of the text.
"I read the text. This statement, consonant with the "genius" of the language 
(subject, verb, compliment) is not always true. . .1 do not make (the text) 
undergo a predicative operation called reading, consequent upon its being and 
T is not an innocent subject, anterior to the text, which will deal subsequently 
with the text as it would an object to dismantle or a site to occupy. This T 
which approaches the text is already itself a plurality of other texts, of infinite 
codes, or more precisely, codes whose origins is
The text is active in these systems firstly to negate the need for an "external" author as 
the originator of meaning, which is seen as internal to the text itself, and furthermore 
to replace the role of interpreter, since this task is also resituated to within the text. 
The text not only inscribes meaning (it takes over the "author" role) but it also "reads" 
itself; it is self-interpreting,
"Within the reader-subject resides a multiplicity of texts and codes, and this 
"resource" effectively rules out any conception of the reader-text transaction 
as a simple relation of subjectivity to objectivity. The invasions of 
intertextuality into the self of the reader disintegrate that enclosed self. The 
borders collapse, producing a disorienting complicity. The reader like the text, 
is unstable. . .Essentially, deconstruction regards the subject as an effect of 
language. The "ego," a rational formulation, emerges out of a play of 
signifiers." 100
Here it is the texts and codes within the reader which are active rather than the "self 
of the reader. Codes interpret codes. This is described in the passage as an "invasion" 
resulting in "collapsing borders." Such language successfully conveys the power of 
the active text for post-structuralists and the supposed vulnerability of the "enclosed 
self." There is the interesting use of images of war or, borrowing phraseology from 
the Kristeva, of a "revolution " in this reversal of the active role from author to text. 
However, it is worth noting here that there are no prisoners in this war. There is no 
room for the "enclosed self to become merely complicated, internally plural, or 
otherwise affected as a result of the operation of the text. It appears that in text-active 
systems it is the text or the self. The text is not considered as a tool of the self (as we
99 Barthes, S/Z 1957 (English translation 1972, p!32) See also chapter 6, Barthes. " The Cambridge 
History of Literary Theory: From Formalism to Poststructuralism" Vol 8, ed. Raman Selden 1995 
Cambridge University Press.
100 Vincent B. Leitch, "Deconstructive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction" New York , Colombia 
University Press, 1983, p.l 11
37
might have expected) rather the self is a casualty of the active text. It is either/or. The 
signifiers have total power and operate to create, disrupt and eradicate the "ego". 101
Derrida further investigated the new arena heralded by structuralist claims. He 
examined the nature of meaning present in words. He formulated an understanding of 
meaning as a process of deferral and referral by emphasising the ability for signifiers
1 (YJ
to "slip". . For Derrida the ability for words to signify a variety of concepts and the 
way in which these very concepts are by necessity couched in other words (signifieds 
becoming signifiers) deconstructed a sense of "core meaning" within the text. If the 
signifying processes occur within the text then meaning is a property of the text, and 
not inscribed by an external human subject. This led to the disruption of the notion of 
meaning itself and a rejection of the author as the originator of meaning. The 
deconstruction of all essence, existence, substance, subject, transcendence, 
consciousness, God and "Man" was to follow by the same means. If the process to 
construct any "meaning" to these terms is a textual process, then they all exist only 
within a textual realm and not a metaphysical external reality. Upon this foundation 
everything could be seen as a facet of text. The foundation for Derrida's eradication of 
the external subject (and much else) is based upon the activity within the text. The 
active text, for Derrida, essentially negates the active subject.
The tenets of structuralism as being developed by Barthes, Derrida, and others, gave 
Kristeva a new textual, non-realist arena for human subjectivity. 103 This was the 
heady intellectual, philosophical and political movement that Kristeva encountered in 
Paris. She took an active role in this circle, joining the "Tel Quel" (meaning "such as 
it is") group, among others. Working from the linguistic base of structuralism, 
Kristeva worked to undermine the "already saids" and forged a new understanding of
101 Reader-response theorists make a critique of the either/or thinking behind the philosophy of post- 
structuralists. An example of this is Norman Holland's "The Critical I" see p. 217 "One reason this 
literary formalism persists is the general pattern of either/or thinking common among literary critics. 
Either the text controls response or the reader does. ..Either there is an objective text or subjectivity 
rules."
102 Derrida, Jacques. 1967 "Of Grammatology" (1976 English Trans: Spivak)
103 Criticisms of the purely textual reality proposed by post-structuralists can be found in many camps, 
from Raymond Tallis's critique of Saussurean lingistics, Not Saussure: a Critique of Post- 
Saussuarean Literary Theory. MacMillan, 1998, and John Ellis's Against Deconstruction, Princetown 
University Press, 1989. Criticisms of the post-structuralist paradigm are also directed from some 
femininst writers such as Susan Bordo "(Re)Writing the Body: the Politics and Poetics of Female 
Eroticism" pp7-29 of The Female Body in Western Culture ed. S. Suleiman. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1986 pp.7-29. We shall consider these criticisms in later chapters.
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the self that would go beyond (or post) structuralism and formulate a new 
understanding of human subjectivity.
With the new de-centred universe Kristeva could readily reject the notion of the self 
as autonomous, free and unified. In its place, using linguistics, psychoanalysis and 
literary theory she constructed a notion of the speaking subject, one at the mercy of 
external forces, and internal, unconscious experiences, which we examine in detail in 
the following chapter. The arena to trace the subject was to be found within texts, and 
especially those of avant-garde writers and poets. He she proposed to identify the true 
nature of the subject; a dynamic, shifting and multiplicitous stance within a discursive 
reality.
However, unlike many of her structuralist progenitors, the structures of language and 
literature did not provide Kristeva with a full enough account of the human subject. 
She sought new ways of seeing the subject that would take account of the signifying 
practices of human beings. In an interview with Diana Kuprel, Kristeva says,
"My position was that mere structure was not sufficient to understand the 
world of meaning in literature and other human behaviours."104
Kristeva became increasingly interested in the role of psychoanalysis to explore the
nature of the subject. 105
"The psychoanalytic experience struck me as the only one in which the 
wildness of the speaking being, and of language, can be heard."106
It is very important for Kristeva that the subject is viewed as part of an "open 
system". 107 Psychoanalysis argues for a view of the subject that is able to shift and 
remodel itself in the transfer of energy between people in relationships, especially 
love relationships. For Kristeva, the relationship between the analyst and analysand
104 Diana Kuprel, In Defence of Human Singularity: Diana Kuprel Speaks with Julia Kristeva" 
Canadian Review 28 (8/9) Jan 21-26, 2000
105 Noelle MCAfee Julia Kristeva, Routledge Critical Thinkers, 2004. See introduction "Why 
Kristeva?" for a discussion of Kristeva's influences. McAfee argues that Kristeva's increased focus 
upon psychoanalysis coincided and was caused by her increasing disillusionment with Communist 
politics.
106 Kristeva, Ibid. p. 19. 
107 RPLp.l4
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offers particular insight into the inter-relational and fluctuating aspects of subjectivity.
"It can be said that with Freud, for the first time, the love relationship 
(imaginary as it might be) as reciprocal identification and detachment 
(transference and counter-transference) has been taken as a model of optimum 
psychic functioning."108
The practise of psychoanalysis, therefore, sheds new light on the inter-dependence of 
the subject. Rather than being autonomous and rational the subject is held and shaped 
by relationships where the flow of energy between people shapes them both. Kristeva 
suggests that this can be a dangerous experience within a love-relationship and that 
the analyst offers a safer place for the speaking subject to begin to explore and 
redefine themself. 109 The findings of psychoanalysis became, therefore, another axis 
defining the arena of the subject.
In reviewing Kristeva's corpus then, we can trace the various disciplines she pursued 
to provide a place to speak of post-structuralist subjectivity. 110 In the mid 1960's and 
1970's Kristeva focused on semiotics and language, she was also keenly interested in 
left-wing political notions of the subject. This gave her a place to begin to define the 
post-structuralist subject. This gives way in the 1980's to more overtly 
psychoanalytical writing, where a revision of Lacan added a further axis to her frame 
for the speaking subject. The 1990's saw Kristeva taking two new directions, a return 
to political writing, where she sees the speaking subject as informing the macro- 
political problem of oppression of foreigners, 111 and her first fictional works. 112 
Increasingly, of late, we see Kristeva exploring subjectivity through her own fictional 
writing and by a consideration of the autobiographies of women. Her most recent 
work has included autobiographical studies of the theorists Hannah Arendt, Melanie 
Klein and the French writer, Collette. This has provided yet another dimension to the 
arena of the speaking subject. Currently Kristeva is a professor in the University of
108 RPLp.l4 
109 RPLp.l4
110 See Kuprel, ibid, p.9 in STO
112 Kristeva's fictional works in the 1990's are The Samuri (1992) The old Man and the Wolves (1994) 
and Possessions (1996)
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Pairs, a regular visiting professor at Colombia and Toronto Universities, and a 
practising psychoanalyst.
It is perhaps worth briefly considering possible causes why Kristva, and many of her 
contemporaries, sought new arenas within which human subjectivity might be 
defined. Commentators have offered suggestions as to why the project to deconstruct 
subjectivity holds so much attraction for Kristeva's generation of literary theorists and 
offer an explanation as to why this might be. Many, such as Norman Holland, suggest 
that it is a predominantly Continental phenomenon. m Holland suggests that the 
twentieth century history of Europe sheds some light in this respect. He purports that 
the general political cast to avoid individual responsibility for the atrocities of the 
Second World War gave rise in the early sixties (the time of the "Tel Quel" movement 
in Kristeva's biography) to a left-wing politically motivated desire to be disingenuous 
of the individual. In order to further distance the intellectual body of the time the 
atrocities of war and holocaust were laid at the feet of a failed Enlightenment project, 
rather than at the collective feet of Europeans. Clearly theory (the Enlightenment) and 
practice (the escalating atrocity of war in Modern European history) are linked. With 
the benefit of critical hindsight, it might be said that the Enlightenment desire to 
elevate Man to a position of transcendental rational objectivity lies beneath many of 
the abhorrent oppressive regimes in modern European history, not least the 
horrendous ramifications of the National Socialist movement and its agenda of 
progress. According to Holland, blaming a failed Enlightenment ideology reduced the 
pain of individual responsibility in a society unable to come to terms with national 
and localised atrocities.
This movement was further encouraged by the growing demand to be "heard" made 
by formally "silenced" and marginalized groups in the sixties, such as feminists. The 
claim was that all sorts of oppression and marginalisation (of gender, ethnicity, class 
etc.) resulted from Enlightenment humanism and the belief in a transcendental Self. 
The charge against humanism was that it elevated only one sort of self: male, white 
and gentrified. Such was seen as political and intellectual tyranny and the means to 
silent other 'deviant' voices within society. According to Holland, the growing voices 
of marginalized people within European society during the Sixties met with the co-
Norman Holland, The Critical I. Yale University Press, 1999.
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incidence of a continent unable to accept the atrocities of war and holocaust. By 
deconstructing the "I" Continental Europe might have perhaps been attempting to lay 
a lot of ghosts to rest. Of course, looking for the reasons behind an intellectual 
movement is always a process of conjecture. However such explanations such as 
Holland's are compelling in that they might offer an insight into the importance of 
historical context. They are a reminder to keep in mind the particular political 
aspirations of the deconstructionist project since its inception.
We recall that, in common with all poststructuralist writers, Kristeva indeed believed 
that the model of the transcendent ego, the Enlightenment or Humanist Self, was 
fundamentally false and a tool of oppression. Kristeva was confident that a critique of 
the humanist self would emerge from a post-structuralist deconstruction of language,
"The semiological approach identifies itself, from Hjelmslev on, as an anti- 
humanism which outmodes those debates - still going on even now - between 
philosophers, where one side argues for a transcendence with an immanent 
'human' causality while the other argues for an 'ideology' whose cause is 
external and therefore transcendent; but where neither shows any awareness of 
the linguistic and, at a more general level, semiotic logic of the sociality in 
which the (speaking, historical) subject is embedded."114
Kristeva suggests here that it is only within the study of language that the subject can 
be freed from humanist, transcendentalist notions, and proposes to undertake just such 
a venture. Kristeva felt strongly that previous attempts to identify subjectivity and 
examine language in other disciples were at best ineffective, and at worst knowingly 
oppressive,
"Our philosophies of language, embodiments of the Idea, are noting more than 
the thoughts of archivists, archaeologists and necrophiliacs."115
To this end she set about constructing her own study of linguistics. She undertook this 
in her doctoral work in 1974, which was published in English in 1984 as Revolution 
in Poetic LanguaRe. For Kristeva, only post-structuralism provides a way to view the 
subject as able to generate meaning and experience within a dynamic process of 
discourse. For Kristeva, post-structuralism provides for an understanding of the
114 Kristeva in the essay "The System and the Speaking Subject" which first appeared in the Times 
Literary Supplement (12 October 1973, pp 1249-52) and was re-printed in Thomas A Sebeok (ed.) The 
Tell-Tale Sign. A Survey of Semiotics. Lisse, The Peter de Ridder Press, 1975. This essay is also 
reprinted in The Kristeva Reader ed. Toril Moi, Basil Blackwell, 1986 p. 25-26. 
115 RPLp.l3
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powerful and transformative practices possible through language, whereby language 
is seen as a place for a potentially explosive discharge of a subject's energy. 116
As a rejection of the transcendent ego, the new subjectivity Kristeva seeks is one 
where a 'grand-master' ideology is replaced with a plethora of other subject-positions. 
At the centre of the post-structuralist concern is to undermine the notion of 
logocentrism: the idea of one pervasive "Truth", a position which limits the influence 
of the particular standpoint of the subject. Post-structuralism argues for the voices of 
the many subject positions to be heard, and that none should be privileged. Perhaps 
the appeal of post-structuralism to feminist writers is in some way explained in this. 
Post-structuralism offers a voice to the marginalised and insists that their positions are 
as valid as any that might suppose themselves to be the centre of discourse; those 
assuming one Truth. Post-structuralist writers view themselves as the vanguard of a 
new age of ideological pluralism, where repressed and marginalised voices will rise 
up to challenge the hegemony of modernism. 117 It is essentially (if we can use such a 
word!) an argument for philosophical pluralism. For Kristeva, as we shall see in 
following chapters, this movement is a literary endeavour led by the avant-garde poets 
and writers who decentre the subject within a text. Their tools are the dispersal of 
meaning and the disruption of syntax. 118 In this way the post-structuralist cause is for 
a 'Revolution in Poetic Language'; a revolution which transforms poetry itself, then 
the notion of the subject, and finally all stable subject-object distinctions until the very 
notion of objective truth is dismantled.
We note here that Larraine sees the post-structuralist position, such as Kristeva's, as 
distinct from that of postmodernism generally. Post-modernism also adopts the tools 
of deconstruction, the dispersal of meaning and a philosophical pluralism. However, 
as Larraine says, the consequence of this programme in the hands of postmodernism 
is to replace ideology by the end of ideology. Perhaps we might characterise this in 
saying that postmodernism replaces the single voice of modernism with the many 
voices of post-structuralism but continues to conclude that there is no real subject 
position, rather than merely many. It is this anti-foundational stance which defines
116 RPLp.l6
117 Cf Kristeva's essay "A New Type of Intellectual: The Dissident" which was originally published as 
an editorial in Tel Quel no.74, Winter 1977, pp.3-8, and reprinted in The Kristeva Reader ed. Toiril 
Moi, 1984, pp292-300. We shall examine this essay fully in chapter 10 pp.237-253 of this thesis.
118 Kristeva's use of deconstruction is examined in chapters 3 pp.52-80 of this thesis.
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postmodernism and leaves it with the stance of parody, pastiche and irony. This is 
perhaps all that postmodernism can say in terms of cultural commentary. 119 It is the 
'ultra-relativism' of postmodernism that tends it towards nihilism 120 and which post- 
structuralist authors, such as Kristeva, are keen to avoid.
According to Jorge Larraine the distinction between post-modernism and post- 
structuralism is useful but far from clear.
"The dividing line between poststructuralism and postmodernism is far from 
clear. They certainly share a good number of premises and principles - for 
instance, the centrality of discourse for modern life, the relativist distrust of 
truth, the discursive constitution of the subject, and so on...While for 
poststructuralism ideology critique is replaced by the articulating discourse 
which creates ideologically active subject positions, for postmodernism 
ideology critique is replaced by the end of ideology."121
A similar interest in the discourse of Otherness is the key characteristic of both
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groups. Both emphasise particularity and the split, contradictory subject. However 
post-structuralism is keener to explore the interrelationship of discourse, power and 
subjectivity (as per Foucault) and maintains the importance of historicity as 
contingent to the subject's position. 123 Postmodernism seems more interested in 
challenging modernism on the grounds of an anti-foundational perspective of 
knowledge.
Douglas Kellner argues that postmodernism needs to be rescued from ultra-relativism. 
He sees the 'problem with post-modernism', as its tendency towards nihilism, as 
based upon Lyotard's inability to differentiate between types of narrative. 124 Kellner
119 See Ursula Kelly, Schooling Desire: literacy, cultural politics and pedagogy. Routledge, 1997. Kelly 
delineates postmodernism from structuralism in terms of their different emphases. She ascribes 
Kristeva to a clear post-structuralist camp, alongside Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Cherryholmes, Weedon 
and Davies, whilst fixing Lyotard, Jameson, Baudrillard, Rorty and Haraway as "postmodern". We 
have some issue with adopting rigid categories which we shall explore using Kristeva as a case in hand 
in this chapter. However, her underlying principle agrees with that of Larraine, that post-structuralism 
more keenly retains a sense of the self, albeit in a problematised and pluralist sense, whereas 
postmodernism seeks to undermine the sense of the subject per se.
120 See Linda J Nicholson's (ed.) introduction to Feminism/Postmodernism , Routledge 1990 and 
Nicholson and Steven's Social postmodernism: beyond identity politics. Cambridge University Press 
1995.
121 Jorge Larrain, Ideology and Cultural Identity: Modernity and the Third World Presence Cambridge 
Polity Press, 1994, p.90-91.
122 See Kelly op.cit and ch. 6 pp.132-160 of this thesis for a discussion of Kristeva's use of notions of 
otherness.
123 See Kelly and Larraine op.cit.
124 Douglas Kellner and Steven Best, Postmodern theory : critical interrogations , Macmillan 1991
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suggests that a distinction needs to be made between "master narratives" that attempt 
to subsume every view under one total theory and "grand narratives" which have a 
greater understanding of their situational dimension and seek to chart the history and 
development of a particular notion.
What conclusions can we draw, then, as to the arena of Kristeva's subject, in relation 
to post-structuralism and post-modernism? From our study of her arena of subjectivity 
we suggest that Kristeva begins from a post-structuralist standpoint. She is keen to 
retain a "space" for the subject, although this is tenuous space. 125 In common with the 
wider post-structuralist movement her discourse on otherness, which we examine in 
chapter six of this thesis, she uncovers the power play of gendered signifiers. With 
post-structuralism, she maintains the arbitrary relationship of signs and stresses the 
importance of the unconscious and the contingency of identity. In this she constructs 
what might be seen as a classically post-structuralist notion of the self.
However, we suggest that there are also apparent postmodernist tendencies in 
Kristeva's writing which reveal a desire to go beyond the philosophical pluralism of 
post-structuralism to the ultra-relativism of post-modernism. This is most apparent in 
her denial of universal categories (we anticipate her denial of the category of 
'woman'). 126 Furthermore, her negation of the materiality of the feminine in 
subjectivity results in a sense of the position-less subject, which is characteristic of 
post-modern anti-realism.
Peter Brooker describes Kristeva as post-modern. He says that she has a,
"Thorough-going scepticism towards monolithic systems and categories, and 
her deconstructive, psycho-semiotic theory of language and identity. It is thes 
that she brings to postmodernism."127
Kristeva is tellingly described in this passage as "bringing" theories to 
postmodernism. This aptly describes her relationship to this movement. Linguistics 
and psychoanalysis, the findings of which lead her to a more confident anti-realist 
postmodernism, drive her early writing. We can conclude from this discussion that 
Kristeva stands at the juncture of postmodernism and post-structuralism.
125 For Kristeva's tenous notion of a space for selfhood see chapters 3.2 p56-60 of this thesis.
126 See ch.8.1 and 8.2 pp!81-191of this thesis where we consider Kristeva's notion of freedom from the 
"marked body" which is the basis for her denial of universal categories such as woman.
127 Peter Brooker (ed) Modernism/Postmodernism Longman 1992, p. 198
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In terms of the arena of subjectivity, we can say that, for Kristeva, this question is 
framed by a post-structuralist understanding of language and symbols. To this she 
adds the axis of psychoanalysis and the subject in fictional literature. The subject has 
no ontological validity of itself but is rather a position, and a tenuous one, within a 
matrix of linguistic relationships and discourse. The subject is best examined by a 
consideration of linguistics, especially avant-garde poetry and psychoanalysis, and 
best expressed through artistic and literary representation.
We turn now to consider more closely how the speaking subject comes to be and 
evolves within this particular arena. We anticipate that the given the arena of 
linguistic and textual process, the subjectivity Kristeva constructs emphasises the 
subject's ability to speak into its arena; a subject that not only uses language but is 
constituted through its use of language.
1 OC
"Signification is like a transfusion of the living body into language."
It is in speaking, or other acts of signifying its presence, that the subject comes into 
being. Having examined the subject as "speaker", we shall then critically compare this 
to Rahner's "hearer" and consider how they can be said to inform each other. For 
both, the arena of subjectivity is fundamentally discursive and dialogical (although in 
very different ways), hence the language of speaking and hearing. Constructing a 
dialogue between Rahner and Kristeva can be seen to provide a valuable dialogue that 
might be valuable to the theological task of engaging with post-structuralist notions of 
subjectivity.
128 Kelly Oliver, "Introduction" in The Portable Kristeva, Colombia University Press, 1997, p.xx
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3. The Creation of the Speaking Subject - Kristeva
In our previous chapter, we explored the nature of Kristeva's discursive reality within 
which the speaking subject is said to emerge. We now begin a closer examination of 
its creation and shape. In this, we narrow our focus to adopt three of Kristeva's main 
foci. The first concerns the way in which Kristeva's thesis has an overt "psychological 
orientation."129 Here we consider Kristeva's reworking of Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
Kristeva's willingness to engage with the work of Freud and Lacan is shared by other 
"New French Feminists", and has often been used to classify this approach. 130 We 
shall briefly comment on her relationship to this school of thought and outline some 
criticisms of the adoption of Lacan, which is so evident in Kristeva's writing.
Our second focus will be Kristeva's emphasis on the speaking subject as a process. 
Kristeva describes this as "le sujet en proces."131 The French term both denotes the 
sunject in process and has legal connotations: the subject on trial. We shall consider 
how the speaking subject evolves through a process of disruption and deconstruction. 
By way of examining the multiplicitous nature of the sunbject, Kristeva posits the 
notion of the dissolution of dualistic sexual distinction. She seeks to thoroughly 
disrupt notions of sex and gender and posit the notion of a complex subject, one able 
to achieve "mystical metamorphosis"132 as the speaking subject is created and 
recreated by the revolution of language. We consider the dissolution of sexual 
categories here.
129 The description is taken from Margaret Whitford's Preface to Mapping Women ed. Kath Jones, 
CPL, 1994.
130 Commentaries often group Kristeva's work with that of Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous. As we 
shall suggest, this is not entirely helpful or satisfactory on a number of fronts, offering a false 
homogenization of their very different contributions. "The term French feminism quickly became 
associated with three names in particular: Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva" See 
Bowlby Still Crazy After All These Years. Routledge, 1992 pp.117-130, especially ch. 7 "The 
Judgement of Paris."
131 Kristeva introduces her notion of subject-in-process in her early texts including Revolution in Poetic 
Language (RPL), as a chapter entitled "Le Sujet en Proces" in Polylogue and in Desire in Language. 
She develops this notion of the subject as process in later writings that we shall also refer to in this 
chapter. See also "Subject/Object" by Susan Hekman, chapter 3 of her work Gender and Knowledge. 
Polity Press, 1990, for a discussion as to why Kristeva adopts this notion of the subject and draws back 
from the dissolution of the subject.
132 In her interview with Vassiliki Kolocotroni, Textual Practice vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 1991. She 
describes this process as the "alchemy of the word" which "so irradiates the resources of the alphabet" 
to bring about such "mystical metamorphosis."
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Our third focus is of significant interest to our wider project in that Kristeva's work 
reveals a preoccupation with religion and poetry. Kristeva sees the semiotic disrupting 
symbolic unity in "madness, holiness and poetry". She privileges religion along with 
art and poetry as a context where the semiotic breaks through. We then draw some 
provisional conclusions about Kristeva's analysis of the speaking subject and identify 
themes that we shall return to in a critical comparison with Rahner's notion of the 
person as hearer.
3.1 Kristeva and Lacan
Kristeva introduces her doctoral thesis on the notion of the speaking subject by 
saying,
"We will be attempting to formulate the distinction between semiotic and 
symbolic within this perspective, which was introduced by Lacanian analysis, 
but also within the constraints of a practice - the text - which is only of 
secondary interest to psychoanalysis."133
In this Kristeva introduces her synthesis of Lacanian psychoanalysis and textual 
theory. It is the coincidence of psychoanalysis and textual criticism that allows 
Kristeva's writings to be seen as a form of psychoanalysis of the written word. 134 She 
offers a thesis on how the subject is formed and split by the process of two discursive 
forces, the semiotic and symbolic. She views these forces as emerging in discourse 
and shaping the psyche during infant development.
A common feature of'French Feminism,' of which Kristeva is often described as 
being a part, is the adoption of Lacan's reworking of Freud. In fact, one way to 
distinguish what has become known, as 'French' from 'Anglo-American' feminism is 
the extent to which it affords a place for the influence of psychoanalysis. Before 
Lacan, Freud's theories received a fairly hostile reception by feminists, who objected 
to the 'phallocentric' nature of Freud's schema (a term first used by Ernest Jones). 135 
Initially Freud's theories were understood on a basic biological level and this made 
them less attractive to feminist theorists keen to break free from universalism. By 
emphasising the 'phallus' as a 'symbolic concept' rather than a biological actuality
133 RPL p.98. The original French version of Kristeva's doctoral thesis was published in 1974. Key 
passages from this work are also available in The Kristeva Reader Toril Moi (ed.) Blackwell, 1986
Toril Moi's introduction to The Kristeva Reader Blackwell, 1986
135 A good summary of these positions is found in Peter Barry's Beginning Theory. Manchester 
University Press, 1995.
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Lacan provided a way to avoid biological essentialism, making psychoanalysis more 
readily adaptable to feminist theory. Lacan agrees with Freud that key to 
understanding the subject is by a study of the unconscious. 136He agrees with Freud 
that the fundamental events that shape the unconscious occur in infancy. However, he 
begins his re-working of psychoanalysis by rejecting the biologism inherent in
« OT __
Freud. For Lacan, the "phallus" is a symbol of ultimate power rather than a 
biological reality, as it was for Freud. Furthermore, it threatens both sexes with 'the 
castration complex'. For Lacan therefore the concept of loss is central to the 
formation of identity in both male and female infants. Lacan relates the phallus to 'the 
Name-of-the-Father' and it is juxtaposed against the feminine "imaginary". Lacan 
situates language development alongside the process of individuation, and it is this 
aspect of Lacan's psychoanalysis that is so fundamental to Kristeva's notion of the 
emergence of the speaking subject.
Briefly, Lacan sees the acquisition of symbolic language as beginning at the same 
time as, and as a corollary of, the experience of loss when the infant differentiates 
itself from its mother and, later, other objects and its own reflection. 138 This 
experience gives rise to the ability to adopt signifiers for such external objects. 
However, in this, the infant loses access to the realm of the feminine "imaginary" 
enjoyed in its pre-Oedipal phase. Lacan sees the process of individuation and 
differentiation as the suppression of the imaginary by the "Law of the Father".
French feminists have enthusiastically taken up the project to adopt Lacanian 
psychoanalysis as a resource for contemporary identity theory. This is perhaps 
unsurprising since one might say that Freud has always enjoyed greater currency in 
France than in America or England. French feminism has, to a great extent, re- 
introduced psychoanalysis to discussions about identity creation. This is clear in
136 Freud makes the claim that the self is fundamentally unconscious in The Interpretation of Dreams 
(1900)
137 See Philippe Julien Jacques Lacan's Return to Freud: the real, the symbolic and the imaginary. New 
York University Press, 1994 and Madan Sarup, Jacques Lacan, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
138 The experience of Woman's loss relating to the phallus is explored in Lacan's "God and the 
Jouissance of The Woman. A Love Letter" in Feminine Sexuality ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline 
Rose, New York: Norton, 1982, p.l 14. Here Lacan says, Woman "does not exist and ...signifies 
nothing." Woman is the binary opposition of the phallus and therefore of signification according to 
Lacan. op.cit p. 145 Kristeva adopts the same gendered terminology when speaking of the feminine 
semiotic and relate this to that which defies signification.
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Kristeva's work where Lacanian psychoanalysis is seen as offering the opportunity to 
express and symbolise aspects of the unconscious self. John Lechte says,
"Kristeva's work can be seen, in fact, as a prolonged meditation on the effect 
of the unconscious in human life, an effect psychoanalytic discourse is 
charged with rendering thinkable, symbolizable, and perhaps explicable." 139
French feminists, such as Kristeva, have appreciated a privileging of female 
'openness' in Lacan's schema. Kristeva's work often polarises 'closed' rational 
systems, and the 'irrational' 'female' 'open', disruptive system. She confidently 
adopts many Lacanian principles with a few changes that will be outlined later in this 
chapter in her notion of the speaking subject.
Kristeva's understanding of the development of the self in infancy can be divided into 
four stages, which we shall briefly summarise.
The first stage in an individual's development occurs roughly between 0-6 months of 
age. Kristeva refers to this stage as centring on the "chora."140 This is the semiotic 
stage of experience. In the earliest stage of development a chaotic mix of perceptions, 
feelings and needs dominate the individual, Kristeva often terms these "pulsations". 
At this stage the infant does not distinguish itself from its mother141 or from the world 
around. At this stage, according to Kristeva, the infant is dominated by "drives". This 
is the stage at which the infant is closest to the pure materiality where everything is 
experienced as pleasurable without any acknowledgement of existence, which Lacan 
terms "the Real". 142
The second stage of infant development occurs roughly between the ages of 4-8 
months. During this time in an individual's development a separation between the self 
and the maternal begins to occur thus creating boundaries between self and other. 
Following Lacan, for Kristeva, these boundaries must be in place before the 
acquisition of language is possible. Also with Lacan, symbolic language will be
139 Lechte, Julia Kristeva Routledge, 1990, p.33.
140 We shall examine what Kristeva means by this term later in this chapter.
141 A full examination of Kristeva's understanding of the role of the maternal follows in chapter 6 of 
this thesis where we consider the maternal as M/Other.
142 Ecrits : a selection (by) Jacques Lacan, translated from the French by Alan Sheridan, Tavistock 
Publications, 1977. See also Philippe Julien, Jacques Lacan's return to Freud : the real, the symbolic 
and the imaginary. New York University Press, 1994 and Madan Sarup's, Jacques Lacan,, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992.
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connoted in masculine terms. These boundaries, and the development of male 
symbolic language that will follow them, mark the emergence of a notion of the "I".
One key difference Kristeva makes in her adoption of broadly Lacanian theories of 
infant development is the insertion of an intermediate stage between the first stage of 
the "chora" and the third stage, which relates to Lacan's "mirror stage." This 
intermediate stage is a pre-linguistic stage that Kristeva associates with the "abject". 
At this point, as individuation is in its earliest state of development, the threat of 
falling back into the pre-linguistic stage of the "chora" strikes the subject with fear 
and horror. To fall back into the undifferentiated "chora" means giving up all the 
developing linguistic structures by which the social world is ordered and gains 
meaning. This intermediate phase is unique to Kristeva. For Kristeva the feeling of 
threat, and the fear of the "abject", is key to heralding the third stage of development. 
At the third stage the infant will begin to understand and use symbols, partially in 
response to the threat of the "abject". As we shall see later in this chapter, the role of 
the "abject" continues to exist and threatens the notion of the stable self after it has 
been formalised.
For Kristeva, this intermediate stage gives way at around 6-18 months of age to what 
Lacan terms the "mirror stage." Both Kristeva and Lacan see this as a defining 
moment in the creation of selfhood. The "mirror stage" is present as the young child 
identifies with his own image; an identity Lacan terms the "Ideal-I" or "Ideal ego". 143 
This recognition of the self s image precedes the entrance into language, after which 
the subject can understand the place of the image of the self within a larger social 
order. This "Ideal-I" is important precisely because it represents to the subject a 
simplified, bounded form of the self, as opposed to the turbulent chaotic perceptions, 
feelings and needs felt in the previous stages. Importantly, this "Ideal-I" is a 
construction rather than a given of identity. According to Lacan and Kristeva this 
creation of an ideal version of the self gives pre-verbal impetus to the creation of 
phantasies in the fully developed subject. It establishes what Lacan terms the 
"imaginary order" and this order continues to assert its influence on the subject even 
after the subject enters the next stage of development.
143 Lacan, op. cit.
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The final stage of development occurs at approximately 18 months to 4 years of age. 
The most important occurrence in relation to the emergence of selfhood occurs at this 
stage. The acquisition of language here further separates the developing "self from 
its former connection to "the Real". Language acquisition at this stage rests upon the 
ability to differentiate. Once the differential system of language is entered upon, it 
forever determines the self s perception of the world. For both Lacan and Kristeva, 
this explains why the intrusion of materiality (termed "the Real" for Lacan and the 
"semiotic" for Kristeva) becomes a traumatic event after this stage. Kristeva adds that 
language is ultimately a "fetish," an effort to resolve the trauma we inherently 
experience in our relation to death and materiality,
"It is perhaps unavoidable that, when a subject confronts the factitiousness of 
object relation, when he stands at the place of the want that founds it, the fetish 
becomes a life preserver, temporary and slippery, but nonetheless 
indispensable. But is not exactly language our ultimate and inseparable fetish?" 144
Having briefly outlined the four main stages of an individual's subjective 
development, we turn now to a closer examination of the role of the semiotic in 
Kristeva's schema. In this we seek to extrapolate exactly how she sees the subject as 
being created. 145
3.2 The Chora and the Semiotic
As we have seen, in Revolution in Poetic Language Kristeva adopts Lacan's 
fundamental distinction between the imaginary and symbolic. Lacan's imaginary 
becomes her semiotic. In this she makes a number of adaptations, of which perhaps 
the most important is that the semiotic is self-disruptive, and has a more ambiguous 
and less historical role in subject formation than Lacan's 'imaginary'. Kristeva's 
semiotic persists as an 'other' to the subject and will be a continuing presence in the 
process by which it is de-centred.
144 Kristeva RPL, p.37
145 Whilst the parameters of our thesis will not allow for a discussion here, we note that Lacan's 
theories of the development of selfhood are contentious. A summary of the positions critiquing Lacan 
is made in Criticism and Lacan: On Language, Structure and the Unconscious, ed. Patrick Colm Hogan 
and Lalita Pandit. See especially "I-ing Lacan" pp.96-108 by Norman Holland for a reader-response 
critique of Lacan's theory of language acquisition and the development of selfhood and "Signifying the 
Father's Desire: Lacan in a Feminist's Gaze" pp.111-119 from Jane Flax's Thinking Fragments: 
Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West, Oxford, Berkley 1990 for a 
feminist critique of Lacan.
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Kristeva suggests that before the creation of language and the notion of a separate "I", 
the child's experience is of the 'semiotic.' These initial 'signifiers' are the raw 
material of later-acquired language, which will come to overlay the semiotic 
foundation, as the individual identity of the child emerges. However, for Kristeva, the 
semiotic is never fully replaced, but is merely superseded by the learnt symbolic 
ordering. 146 It continues to exist, much in the way of an "other"147, and disrupts and 
challenges the apparent coherence of the symbolic order.
"To summarize briefly, the two trends designate two modalities of what is, for 
us, the same signifying process. We shall call the first 'the semiotic' and the 
second, 'the symbolic'. These two modalities are inseparable within the 
signifying process that constitutes language, and the dialectic between them 
determines the type of discourse (narrative, metanarrative, theory, poetry, etc.) involved."148
The semiotic and symbolic are never experienced in isolation. It is the dynamic 
relationship between them that will shape both the nature of discourse and the 
emerging subject.
We shall now examine the notion of the semiotic more closely so as to assess its role 
in the creation of the speaking subject. This will initially involve a consideration of 
Kristeva's notion of the chora, the space where the semiotic is first experienced.
The notion of the "chora", the Greek word for 'womb' or 'enclosed space', is unique 
to Kristeva and one of the most important contributions she makes in her re-working 
of Lacan's psychoanalysis. This term is appropriated from Plato's Timaeus, where the 
chora is described as an amorphous receptacle or space from which form emerges. 
Plato links this space to ideas of the maternal,
"Wherefore the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any 
way sensible things is...an invisible and formless being which receives all 
things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible and is most 
incomprehensible."149
Plato describes a process whereby a deity impregnates this amorphous space, so 
producing ordered forms. Kristeva appropriates this term linking it to the first stage of 
infant development. She sees the male symbolic order of language, Lacan's "Law of
146 Kristeva RPL, DL.
147 A notion we shall return to in chapter 6 of this thesis.
148 Kristeva RPL, p.96 
149 Plato Timaeus(5 la)
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the Father", as analogous to the deity impregnating the chora and producing the 
symbolically constructed self and the sense of order which language provides. 
Kristeva is keen to continue Plato's notion that the chora is linked to the maternal. For 
Kristeva, the chora is the undifferentiated space shared by the body of the mother and 
child. It is,
"Receptacle, unnameable, improbable, hybrid, anterior to naming, to the one, 
to the father and consequently maternally connoted... An essentially mobile 
and extremely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their 
ephemeral stases." 15°
In her essay "Women's Time" Kristeva sees the chora as,
"Matrix space, nourishing, unnameable, anterior to the One, to God and, 
consequently, defying metaphysics." 151
For Kristeva, the chora is not to be directly associated with the body of the mother. 
The chora is neither a 'sign' nor a 'signifier', but is rather "generated in order to attain 
this signifying position." 152
Elizabeth Wright describes the Kristevan chora as:
"The unnameable, unspeakable corporeality of the inextricably tangled 
mother/child dyad which makes the semiotic possible." 153
The semiotic chora is split in the later "thetic" phase as the subject begins to attribute 
difference: between subject and object, self and other. Once the acquisition of the 
overlay of symbolic language is fully achieved, the chora is felt only as a disruption 
upon thetic language or, as in the case of poetic language, a disruption from within 
language itself. 154 Kristeva emphasises that the chora is not the seat of semiotics, but 
the process by which the semiotic pulses were first gathered. In this way she avoids 
falling back into any essentialist notion of the self, which she has rejected from the 
outset. In other words, the chora is not an actuality to be possessed, but rather it is 
itself a process. In the notion of the chora Kristeva offers an important revision of
150 Kristeva, RPL, p. 133.
151 Kristeva, "Women's Time" first published in Signs 7:1 (1981) pp.13-35, this quote p.13.
152 Kristeva RPL p.94. We address the issue of what the maternal body signifies in chapter 6 of this 
thesis.
153 Elizabeth Wright (ed.X Feminism and Psychology: A Critical Dictionary Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, 
p.195.
54 A point we return to in chapter 6, where semiotic-rich poetic language is seen as an 'other' to the 
stable self.
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Lacan. Lacan rejects the possibility of the female speaking subject (the symbolic order 
is male) and insists that the desire for the mother must be repressed in order to form 
an illusion of stable selfhood. Kristeva reminds us that without the maternally 
positioned chora there would be no space from which the subject emerges. She goes 
on to insist that while the desire for the mother is repressed it continues to exist, as the 
"semiotic", and can subvert the male order by its multiple meanings and sounds which 
recall the choratic experience. She contradicts Lacan and insists that the Law of the 
Father is not all that persists in subjectivity and so makes a place for the maternal and 
feminine.
There are other noticeable and important contrasts between Kristeva and Lacan. 
According to Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a language being susceptible to 
articulation, while remaining equivocal. For Lacan the unconscious is fundamentally 
symbolic. Subjecthood is constituted as the pain of a child's separation from the 
primary and simple identification with the mother and is symbolised as 'lack' 
("castration"). On the contrary, for Kristeva, the unconscious is that which disrupts 
the symbolic.
Clearly, for Kristeva, the element termed 'the chora' is the means by which the 
encounter with the semiotic is made possible and becomes incorporated into self- 
identity. The chora is therefore the presupposition of the encounter. Kristeva's thesis 
hinges upon the persistence of the chora and the semiotic, as existent beneath the 
apparent unity of the symbolic.
The persistence of the chora is perhaps indicative of Kristeva's unwillingness to 
deconstruct identity further. The chora is not any seat of essential selfhood, being in 
itself a process, and extremely provisionally articulated. In an extensive footnote to 
Revolution in Poetic Language she says,
"How far can one think an articulation of what is not yet singular but is 
nevertheless necessary? All we may say then, to make it intelligible, is that it 
is amorphous but that it 'is of such and such a quality' not even an index or 
something in particular ('this or that').'"'"155
155 RPL,p.l26.
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Kristeva appears to take great pains not to give the chora substance. It is not a place, 
but a "space". It is "amorphous" but has given qualities. At the same time this 
"space" persists, it has a function; it is universal. It might appear that in her treatment 
of the notion of the chora Kristeva is caught between deconstructing the subject 
through literary criticism and retaining some element of identity through 
psychoanalysis. Toril Moi suggests that Kristeva has a professionally invested 
predisposition to preserve some place for human subjectivity, rather than continue the 
deconstruction of identity further.
"It is Kristeva's psychoanalytic practice that makes her put the case with such 
force for an unstable and always threatened, yet nevertheless real and 
necessary, form of subjectivity. The analyst is after all engaged in the task of 
healing her patient, and has therefore to provide them with some kind of 
'identity', which will enable them to live in the world, that is to say, within the 
symbolic order dominated by the law."156
Leaving aside the ambiguity surrounding the reasons for Kristeva's assurance that the 
chora persists, we can see, from her writings, that the chora and the semiotic share in 
the function of disrupting male symbolic structure and language. It is this disruptive 
function that is key for the speaking subject to be a process rather than an entity. The 
function of the semiotic is to bring about a dynamic disruption that will ultimately 
defy symbolic order.
3.3 The Speaking Subject as Process
In our thesis so far we have seen that in Revolution in Poetic Language Kristeva 
theorises how language is constituted and meaning created and then how the female 
semiotic breaks this in a continual process of re-presentation. It is the action of the 
semiotic that gives rise to the unstable and ever-changing speaking subject, which 
Kristeva has described as,
"[An] eternally premature baby, prematurely separated from the world of the 
mother and the world of things, (which) remedies the situation by using an 
invincible weapon: linguistic symbolization...by constructing a network where 
drives, signifiers and meanings join together and split asunder in a dynamic 
and enigmatic process."157
156 Toril Moi's Introduction to The Kristeva Reader. 1986, p.14.
157 Julia Kristeva in an interview with Francoise van Rossum-Guyon reprinted as "Talking About 
Polylogue" in French Feminist Thought: A Reader ed. Toril Moi, Blackwell, 1987.
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The speaking subject is, therefore, the defensive illusion created as the individual 
finds itself in the midst of a process of semiotic disruption of the symbolic. The 
"premature baby" that is the speaking subject, constructs symbolic order through 
language to defend its own tenuous position within the network of discursive reality.
"Identifying the semiotic disposition means in fact identifying the shift in the 
speaking subject, his capacity for renewing the order in which he is 
inescapably caught up; and that capacity is, for the subject, the capacity for 
enjoyment."158
It is clear, thus far, that Kristeva's thesis utterly rejects the notion of the centred or 
substantive self. In its place, as we have examined, Kristeva offers a reworking of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis where the self is created through the continual disruption of 
semiotics upon the symbolic order. The result of this is not a finished or static self, but 
rather a dynamic process; a decentred speaking subject. We refer to this process as if 
it were an entity. For Kristeva, even this tenuous identification of selfhood, of the 
subject, must ultimately call itself into question,
"The subject of the semiotic metalanguage must, however briefly, call himself 
in question, must emerge from the protective shell of a transcendental ego 
within a logical system, and so restore his connection with that negativity - 
drive-governed, but also social, political and historical - which rends and 
renews the social code."159
If one were to seek a definition of the type of process that Kristeva characterises as 
the subject, it would be a process of continual disruption. The themes of displacement 
and disruption have been used to describe the overarching characteristic of Kristeva's 
writing as a whole. In his now famous description Roland Barthes says,
"Julia Kristeva changes the order of things: she always destroys the latest 
preconception, the one we thought we could be comforted by, the one of 
which we could be proud; what she displaces is the already-said, that is to say, 
the insistence of the signified; what she subverts is the authority of the 
monologic science and of filiations." 160
This process of dispersal and disintegration has popularly been termed "the death of 
the self." For Kristeva, this 'death' has its roots in a process acted upon by both
158 Kristeva, "The System and the Speaking Subject" in Toril Moi, op.cit. p.29. We shall comment on 
the notion of enjoyment - jouissance- in ch.9 of this thesis. We use this quote here to explain how 
Kristeva sees the self as "shifting" in a process of re-defining itself and its arena of discourse.
159 Kristeva, "The System and the Speaking Subject" op. cit., p. 33.
160 This quote is taken from Roland Barthes reviewing Semeiotike in "La Quinzaine Litteraire."
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external and internal stimuli. Externally, it is the semiotics within art and poetic 
language and the persistence of the abject and the chora prompting 'rupture' of the 
tenuous self; leaving only the possibility for a range of unstable subject positions. 
However, internally, the subject is also fundamentally divided. Kristeva agrees with 
Lacan here; the subject contains both the semiotic ('Imaginary') and the symbolic. 
Disruption is an inner state. Therefore she says,
"The T, subject of a conceptual quest, is also a subject of differentiation - of 
sexual contradictions." 161
In describing the subject as a disruptive process, Kristeva focuses on the theme of 
sexual multiplicity within each individual. Given her emphasis, our own examination 
of her notion of the subject as process shall necessarily include a thorough 
consideration of her understanding of multiplicitous and contradictory sexuality.
Kristeva describes the notion of internal disruption and the linking of this to sexual 
multiplicity:
"All speaking subjects have within themselves a certain bisexuality which is 
precisely the possibility to explore all the sources of signification, that which 
posits a meaning [male] as well as that which multiplies pulverizes and then 
finally revives it [female]."162
This is an instance where the importance of the arena of the speaking subject is 
important. We recall that, for Kristeva, reality is discursive. In this she is decidedly 
opposed to realism. Here, as in the case of the semiotic "feminine", Kristeva is not 
connoting the experience of men or women, but rather the theoretical and discursive 
realities of sexuality alone. Although Kristeva (tentatively?) uses the word 
"bisexuality" in the above quote, the multiple identity opportunities infer more than 
two sexual identities, indeed an infinite variety available to each individual. With no 
external meaning behind signification an endless possibility for change and 
multiplicitous identity creation becomes possible. It marks the end of the pre-modern 
and modern preoccupation with a core identity and accepts the understanding that,
"Both 'sex' and 'gender' are woven of multiple, asymmetrical strands of 
difference, charged with multifaceted, dramatic narratives of domination and 
struggle." 163
161 Kristeva DIL_p. 167.
162 Kristeva RPL, p. 165.
163 Haraway cited by Elaine Storkey Created or Constructed: the great gender debate 2000, p.42.
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If, with Kristeva, the dualism of sexual difference is rejected, the multiplicitous 
subject can enjoy any number of sexual and gender identifications.
"As a result, a strange body comes into being, one that is neither man nor 
woman, young nor old. It made Freud dream of sublimation, and the 
Christians of angels, and it continues to put to modern rationality the 
embarrassing question of an identity that is sexual (among other things), and 
which is constantly remade and reborn through the impetus provided by a play 
of signs."164
For Kristeva the post-modern defeat of the powers of constructions such as 'gender' 
or 'sex', she imagines, will free each individual to re-position their 'self within a 
matrix of experience and identity, to bring "a strange body" into being. Such a 
revolution must begin with an acceptance that subjectivity is created by language: the 
belief in 'the speaking subject'.
"In my view, a critique of this 'semiology of systems' and of its 
phenomenological foundations is possible only if it starts from a theory of 
meaning which must necessarily be a theory of the speaking subject." 165
In summary then, Kristeva identifies subjectivity as a facet of language, and language 
disruption as a characteristic of female semiotic otherness. This disruption in language 
and meaning leads to a further fundamental challenge to the subject's sense of static 
identity, and opens the way for a radical dispersal of identity. The myth of the unified, 
transcendent 'self is de-bunked as the unconscious is prioritised (as per Freud and 
Lacan). The speaking subject is therefore merely apparent in language, having no 
necessary form, no given sex or gender.
For the purposes of our project, we may meaningfully describe this as the pitching of 
semiology against metaphysics (ontology). Kristeva shares in the anti-humanist 
project to 'dethrone' or debunk the myth of the transcendent, unified self. This former 
notion is, has we have seen, largely attributed to Cartesian epistemology, where 
priority is given to the self-consciousness and rationality. This notion of the self has 
been described as the "myth of the number one" by the feminist theorist Susan
164 Julia Kristeva in an interview with Francoise van Rossum-Guyon reprinted as "Talking About 
Polylogue" pp.110-117 French Feminist Thought: An Anthology ed. Toril Moi, Blackwell, 1987, 
p.lll.
165 Kristeva, RPL p.29
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Bordo."166 This privileging was challenged and reversed by Freud and Lacan in their 
insistence upon the influence of the unconscious, and further emphasised by the post- 
structuralist understanding of subjectivity as a facet of language, both notions being 
found within Kristeva's work.
3.4 Some Feminist Critiques of Adopting Lacanian Psychoanalysis
Until now this chapter has outlined Kristeva's adoption and adaptation of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Despite the revisions to Lacan's schema, many contemporary 
feminists do not share Kristeva's keenness to adopt Lacanian psychoanalysis.
The feminist critique of Kristeva begins at her adoption of Lacan's "mirror stage", 
where the infant begins to recognise difference and separation such as its own self- 
recognition. At the mirror stage the thetic infant begins to encounter what Lacan and 
Kristeva term "elementary signifiers." As we have seen this process begins the sense 
of separation of the subject from their experience of external stimuli and will be 
completed in the Oedipus complex where the child uses representations to designate 
its experiences. Contentiously for feminist critics, Kristeva agrees with Lacan that this 
process of subject-creation occurs through the child's relation to 'the Phallus' as 
master signifier.
".. .The phallus totalizes the effects of signifieds as having been produced by 
the signifier: the phallus is itself a signifier. In other words, the phallus is not 
given in the utterance but instead refers outside itself to a precondition that 
makes enunciation possible." 167
Many feminists do not see in Lacan a satisfactorily extensive revision of the sexism 
and biologism inherent in Freud's work. 168 These critics assert that Freud's distinction 
between the biological penis and the "Phallus," a fantasised emblem of power and 
sexuality has been somewhat collapsible (and here Lacan and Kristeva would also 
agree). Lacan has attempted to vindicate psychoanalysis against charges of biologism
166 Susan Bordo "(Re) Writing the Body: the politics and poetics of female eroticism" 1986 pp.7-29 of 
The Female Body in Western Culture ed. S Suleiman, Harvard University Press, 1986.
167 Kristeva, RPL, P47-48.
168 See Judith Butler's "Gender trouble, Feminist Theory and Psychoanalytic Discourse" Ch.13 of 
Feminism/Postmodernism. Linda Nicholson ed., Routledge, 1990 and also Jane Flax's Thinking 
Fragments: Psychoanalysis. Feminism and Post-Modernism in the Contemporary West University of 
California Press, 1990.
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by stressing that the "phallus" is a "signifier" rather than a biological organ. He 
keenly distinguishes between the "symbolic" of the phallus in his schema, rather than 
the real function (of possession or lack) in Freud's system.
In support of Lacan, Elizabeth Wright says,
"The distinction between penis and phallus enables Lacan to problematize 
Freud's biologism and to replace it with a more social, linguistic and historical 
account."169
However, Lacan's attempt to see both sexes as equally 'lacking' in the possession of 
the phallus has elicited feminist derision. Many feminist theorists claim, in 
disagreement with Kristeva, that the phallus unjustifiably remains the 'master 
signifier' around which other signifiers revolve. 170 They also contend, as Wright 
points out, that:
"The phallus cannot be a neutral signifier; the relationship between the penis 
and the phallus is not arbitrary but is clearly socially and politically 
motivated."171
At this fundamental level, Kristeva's theories begin to be at odds with many other 
contemporary feminist theories. Her confident adoption of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
can be seen as the fundamental point from which her uneasy relationship to feminism 
originates.
There are further internal tensions apparent in Kristeva's thesis. An obvious inherent 
dilemma is how to speak of the semiotic in thetic (symbolic) terms. For Kristeva, 
there is no way back to the pre-Oedipal 'babble' of pure semiotics. From this we can 
infer that Kristeva is suggesting that the desire to return to a pure semiotic realm, 
which one might say characterises Helen Cixous' work, 172 is not admissible since the 
semiotic is carried within the symbolic once the process of individuation is underway.
With no return to pure semiotics permissible, Kristeva's own theory is under the 
constant, and we believe unresolved, tension of putting the "unsayable" semiotic into
169 Elizabeth Wright (ed.), Feminism and Psychoanalysis: a critical dictionary. Blackwell, 1992, p.322.
170 See "Signifying the Father's Desire: Lacan in a Feminist's Gaze" pp.111-119 from Jane Flax's 
Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis. Feminism and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West. 
Oxford, Berkley 1990.
171 Wright, op. cit. p.322.
172 See Helene Cixous, The Body and the Text. Harvester, 1990.
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the written, symbolic words of her doctoral thesis. This tension is perhaps apparent in 
the complex and disrupted syntax and writing style Kristeva adopts. The complexity 
of Kristeva's writing has received a mixed reception. Perhaps less generous or 
suspicious critics may charge Kristeva with a level of obscurity that renders her 
theories absurd. However, in defence of Kristeva on this point, it would be expected 
that in seeking to put semiotic notions into symbolic language, the language itself 
should necessarily become disjointed and disrupted. It is an example found in much 
post-modernist writing where the means of expressing theories of disruption and 
deconstruction elicit a complex and obscure writing style. 173 The medium is very 
much linked to the message in Kristeva's work. However, one might say that the 
difficulty in reading Kristeva has contributed to the somewhat cautious response to 
her work among non-French audiences.
Whilst the parameters of this paper prohibit a full discussion here, we believe that it is 
important to attempt to briefly delineate differences between the "French Feminists" 
Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva. 174 In attempting this we will reject previous scholarship 
that has falsely homogenised their work, and express some of the advantages we 
believe Kristeva's work offers our project.
We have already hinted at the distinction Kristeva makes herself in distancing herself 
from the "ecriture feminine" project of Cixous. As Rachel Bowlby rather lightly puts 
it,
"Cixous is knocked out for subscribing to a notion of ecriture feminine which 
finally sweeps away all analytical power in a vague celebration of anarchic 
fluidity and endless writing." 175
Kristeva distances herself from such a project that will ascribe the anarchic, fluid 
writing style to one particular essentialist sex: that of women. There is the danger of
173 Kristeva's essay "Stabat Mater" provides a good example of this, whereby, not only the syntax of 
the writing is complex, but also the text itself is interrupted by a series of poems that cut into the layout 
and confuse the usual reading pattern. The physical disruption of the text becomes a visual and textual 
representation of her theory that the semiotic breaks through its symbolic overlay in the experience of 
maternity. "Stabat Mater", In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith Trans A. 
Goldhammer, New York Columbia University Press. This essay is reprinted The Kristeva Reader ed. 
Toril Moi, Basil Blackwell, 1986 pp. 160-185.
174 In this, among other secondary sources we shall refer to Elizabeth Wright (ed.) Feminism and 
Psychology: A Critical Dictionary. Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, Rachel Bowlby Still Crazv After All 
These Years Routledge, 1999 and Elaine Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron (eds.)New French 
Feminisms. Harvester Press, 1981.
175 Rachel Bowlby op.cit. p. 121
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biologism in Cixous' emphasis on 'writing the body'. Kristeva's work keenly avoids 
all such notions of the 'marked' body preferring a more wholehearted adoption of 
post-modern notions of biology as a discourse vulnerable to deconstruction. 176
The relationship between Irigaray and Kristeva is somewhat more difficult to 
delineate. Irigarary's work offers a thesis whereby feminine counter-mythology is 
seen as a way to subvert the 'phallogocentrism' of male logical coherence. 177 By this 
we mean that Irigaray seeks to re-introduce the feminine to a place of powerful 
prominence by identifying it with the irrational, bodily and erratic, an inverse of the 
male rational, social and coherent order. At first glance this seems more akin to 
Kristeva's approach. However, Irigaray is perhaps equally vulnerable to an unhelpful 
slide into essentialism as Cixous, in that she views women as privileged in the new 
counter-mythology, having special access to the feminine, and she emphasises the 
female body as a site of jouissance. 178 In this Irigaray might be said to reinstate 
biological essentialism, the very notion Kristeva will go on to deconstruct. While, for 
Irigaray, sex may be a pragmatic category, she emphatically claims that it must be 
used in order that the voices of women have some place to be heard. One reading of 
Irigaray (perhaps Kristeva's?) might connote her as an essentialist, yet her 
essentialism may also be understood as a necessary construct which, once established, 
can be dismantled at a future date when the hegemony of the male specula culture is 
countered. 179 As we have seen, Kristeva is unwilling to venture down this same path. 
She insists upon the complete deconstruction of notions of sexual difference.
In attempting to situate herself within the difficult grouping of "French Feminism," 
Kristeva considers her relationship to feminism per se. Kristeva's essay "Women's 
Time" (1981) proposes that feminism be seen as having been through two not entirely 
separable generations, or "times". The first generation of feminists appeared 
unconcerned with sexual differentiation and argued for access to social power within 
existing structures, from which women are excluded. The second generation rejects 
this very structure as masculinist and proposes a feminine alternative: a feminine
176 We shall return to this theme and the problematic effects in regards to corporeality in ch.6 where we 
consider critiques of Kristeva's use of the maternal body as subject-less.
177 Marks & de Courtivron, op.cit.
178 We shall return to consider Kristeva's use of this term, which is perhaps a possible telos for the 
subject in French feminism, in chapter 9 of this thesis.
179 Rachel Bowlby, op. cit. agrees with this reading of Iraigaray, refusing to classify her as an 
"essentialist".
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vision of social relations. Following this historic summary Kristeva imagines what a 
third generation of feminism would look like and views her own work as part of such 
a new generation. She sees such a project as having the primary aim of ending binary 
sexual identification all together. Instead, she argues, human subjectivity should be 
seen as intrinsically plural and multifaceted. There will be no place for essentialism or 
biologism in such a third generation. In this essay, Kristeva might be said to infer that 
the other "French Feminists" continue to be too closely allied to the second generation 
project of creating a feminine alternative culture to properly enter the third generation 
of sexual dissolution. From this we can tentatively conclude that Kristeva is the most 
post-modern and deconstructionalist of the three "French Feminists". She appears the 
most willing to be post-feminist, in that she disallows the category of "women" in any 
realist sense, or even as a pragmatic category on the way to such dissolution, as 
Irigaray does. She perhaps exceeds both Cixous and Irigaray in the extent to which 
she is wary of essentialism and biologism. For the purposes of our project then, 
Kristeva might be said to offer the most decidedly post-modern notion of the self from 
among the "French Feminists". She might appear, therefore, to be the most useful 
partner in seeking a theological response to post-modernism's radical notions on 
selfhood.
However, we note that the programme for a third generation feminism is not without 
its critics. In (Re)Writing the Body: The Politics and Poetics of Female Eroticism 
Susan Bordo (1986) identifies that, in contradistinction to the discourses of race, class 
and ethnicity, it is within feminist analysis alone that there has been the speedy uptake 
of the notion of deconstructing the very categories which these voices formerly 
insisted were recognised. In the case of feminism this has been the deconstruction of 
the categories of gender and now sex. We certainly have yet to witness a proletariat 
call for the dissolution of class difference or the deconstruction of the idea of 
blackness from African-American theorists! For Bordo, Kristeva's project represents 
a worrying turn of events which, she suggests, could play into the hands of the 
masculinist status quo, and it is one that should warrant caution in the use of post- 
modern deconstruction for feminists. It could be argued, with Bordo, that the fear of 
universalisation has affected contemporary feminists to a greater degree than other 
social and cultural analysts. As we have suggested, this is perhaps most evident in
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Kristeva's work where the adoption of a post-modern understanding of identity can 
been seen as just such a response to the fear of universalisation. 180 This could be an 
explanation of Kristeva's continuing deconstruction of the notions of gender and 
sexual difference within her examination of the self as a process.
Kristeva's speaking subject can therefore be summarised as a dynamic process within 
a discursive reality. Within such a process even the "already-saids" of sexual 
difference are to be rejected in favour of a notion of subjectivity in which the 
individual is free to choose from a spectrum of sexual identities which have nothing to 
do with supposed biological type, but everything to do with discursive reality.
In our assessment of Kristeva's notion of the subject as boundless process, 
exemplified by the self as sexually unmarked, we bear in mind Susan Bordo's 
challenge to post-modern feminists (or post-feminists) that post-modern notions of 
identity have exchanged the Cartesian "myth of a view from nowhere" for the co- 
related myth of "a view from everywhere." Bordo sees in postmodernist schemas such 
as Kristeva's the exchange of the Cartesian metaphors of spectatorship for post- 
modern metaphors of dance, the dance of the disembodied "shape-shifter." 181 The 
essence (for want of a better word) of our debate concerns the extent to which 
deconstruction, of the type carried out by Kristeva, fosters a notion of the subject 
which is equally 'mythically' transcendent as that of the Enlightenment self. 
Given these critiques, has Kristeva unwittingly upheld the modern myth of 
transcendence? Under the Cartesian understanding of the transcendent self, 
postmodernists argue that there is the notion of self-dislocation by virtue of the 
privileging of rationality to allow, as it were, a view from above reality. Are we 
witnessing here a replacement of such a modernist myth with a dislocation in terms of 
the subject's ability to metamorphosise through reality in postmodernism?
180 See chapter 2 of this thesis where we consider possible motives for the post-modern rejection of 
universals. For Bordo (op.cit.) feminism is in less danger of the "totalization" tendency of feminists 
than of an increasingly paralyzing anxiety over falling into ethnocentricy or "essentialism".
181 Bordo, "(Re) Writing the Body; the politics and poetics of Female Eroticism" pp.7-29 of The Female 
Body in Western Culture S. Suleiman (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1986.
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Have Kristeva and the 'total social-construction' 182 theorists of identity underplayed 
and disregarded the extent to which we are, in Susan Bordo's words "centric". Do we 
really enjoy the extensive ability explored in Kristeva's theory to adopt and reject an 
endless variety of sexual and personal identities? Or are we fundamentally defined by 
the particularity of our bodies, and so forth? We shall return to Kristeva's treatment of 
maternity as a process without an agent in discussing this, and consider these themes 
in a dialogue with Rahner's theory of the person as hearer that arguably offers greater 
credence to the facet of particularity. 183
Before turning to such an engagement, we turn to the third and final foci of our 
examination of the creation of subjectivity, which is Kristeva's privileging of poetry 
and religion and her exploration of the borderline patient.
3.5 Poetry and Religion
For Kristeva, art in its many forms produces the subject, rather than the more 
commonly held assumption that the subject produces art,
"The work of art, the production, the practice in which (the artist) is engaged 
extends beyond, and reshapes subjectivity."184
In the interview which we have quoted from above, Kristeva advocates "aesthetic 
practices" in the construction of subjectivity, in that they explore the possibility of 
multiplicitous identifications: a subject with a myriad of possible identities, including 
an array of gender identifications.
According to Kristeva in art, music and literature semiotic processes are liberated 
from the unconscious. This is particularly so in avant-garde poetry. In the final 
chapters of Revolution in Poetic Language, and using the poetry of Mallarme and 
Lautreamont as examples, Kristeva describes how the primary processes of rhythm 
and sounds are liberated from the unconscious. She relates the use of sound in poetic 
language to primary sexual impulses. For instance, the sounds 'Mama' and 'Papa' set 
the nasal 'm' against the plosive 'p'. The 'm' denotes maternal 'orality' while the 'p'
182 We use the term "total social construction" to distinguish Kristeva's thoroughly post-modern and 
post-structuralist approach from feminism more broadly which has always sought to highlight the 
extent to which gender is socially constructed.
183 We shall consider this theme in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
184 Perry Meisel, "Interview with Julia Kristeva" in Partisan Review Vol. LI no.l 1984, p!31.
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relates to male 'anality'. The final chapters of her thesis work through examples of 
how in avant-garde poetry, with its use of primary sound and rhythm, the semiotic re- 
surfaces to disrupt the symbolic order. She suggests that poetic language revisits, 
through the function of sound, the pre-Oedipal semiotic rupturing the symbolic order. 
In this way poetry is seen to resist 'the Law-of-the-Father' and bring about a semiotic 
revolution.
According to Kristeva, poetry is the most potent key to unlock semiotic power in that 
the semiotic sounds surfaces within the symbolic word structures of the poem. 
The thetic, or symbolic, meaning arrives carrying within it the semiotic rhythm and 
irrational suggestion of poetry. It is a middle ground, or meeting place for both forms 
of language and meaning. In agreement with other French Feminists Kristeva sees 
poetic language as offering a challenge to the dominant rational 'Male' symbolic 
discourse. Poetry is described as having a transgressive value,
"From its roots in ritual, poetry retains the expenditure of the thetic, its 
opening onto semiotic vehemence and its capacity for letting jouissance come 
through.. .Poetry - more precisely, poetic language - reminds us of its eternal 
function: to introduce through the symbolic that which works on, moves 
through and threatens it. The theory of the unconscious seeks the very thing 
that poetic language practices within and against the social order: the ultimate 
means of its transformation or subversion, the precondition for its survival and 
revolution."186
In writing on poetic language Anna Smith describes the shift in perception and 
disruption of the coherent order as a theme of both philosophy and literature,
"In different ways philosophy and literature have sought procedures that 
would estrange the object of perception in order to render it paradoxically 
more beautiful, more knowable, or both."187
For Kristeva, the power of poetry, and most especially avant-garde poetry, is to allow 
the semiotic level of language to break through the symbolic (thetic) overlay of later- 
learnt signification. It has a disruptive force to "rupture" meaning, and ultimately 
fragment the subject.
185 Although the parameters of this thesis disallow this, a worthwhile comparison might be offered of 
the increasingly poetic and discordant writing style of a number of feminist theologians, such as Mary 
Daly. Here too, the poetic use of language and the disruption of syntax and vocabulary are used to 
express the feminine challenge to patriarchal discourse. See Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics 
of Radical Feminism. Beacon Press, 1978. She addresses this point specifically in the "Original Pre- 
Introduction" to Bevond God the Father. 1986 edition.
186 Kristeva RPLp.80-81
187 Anna Smith, Julia Kristeva: readings of exile and estrangement. Macmillan Press, 1996, p.3.
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"We view the subject in language as decentering the transcendental ego, 
cutting through it and opening it up to a dialectic in which its syntactic and 
categorical understanding is merely the liminary moment of the process, which 
is itself always acted upon by the relation to the other dominated by the death 
drive and its productive reiteration of the 'signifier'."188
For Kristeva, the nature of encounter with the semiotic poetic language is one 
whereby what was 'taken as read', and incontrovertible, becomes alienated and 
strange, dislocated from familiarity. This is the purpose and character of poetry and as 
such it is instrumental in the process of continual disruption and de-centring of the 
illusory centred self. Art and poetry are seen as the catalysts to undertake this journey 
towards the de-centred subjectivity. Such a journey may seem initially threatening, 
since it involves the rejection of our notion of having a stable and static sense of 
identity.
On this John Lechte says,
"To be challenged by art is to be confronted by the void of non-meaning and 
the prospect of our own hell, our own suffering caused by a loss of identity 
inducing our melancholies and the truly tragic aspect of being. Once to 'travel 
hell' was possible: for God was love (agape); now, God is dead and we are 
alone and afraid of the challenge of the void."189
Acknowledging the enormity of the task, in Desire in Language Kristeva asks, "What 
discourse, if not that of religion would be able to support this adventure?"190
What are we to make of this question? Is Kristeva being ironic here? 
Joy Greybeal asks,
"Is she saying, "It surely must not be a religion?" Or is she saying, "Whatever 
it is, it will in some sense be a religion?" What could take the place of the 
sheltering function of religion without simply replicating it?" 1 l
Could Kristeva be suggesting that the way beyond the religious (and other) 
projections of the stable self and its legacy of dualistic difference would inevitably be 
in some sense a "religious" act?
188 Kristeva RPL p.98
189 John Lechte, Julia Kristeva, Routledge, 1990 p.219.
190 DILp.210
191 Joy Greybeal's essay "Joying in the Truth of Self-Division" appears in Body/Text in Julia Kristeva: 
religion, woman and psychoanalysis ed. David Crownfield, State University of New York Press, 1992, 
p.133-134.
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Graybeal suggests that Kristeva does indeed speak of art in an "apocalyptic, if not 
religious way", suggesting that Kristeva sees aesthetic practices as an alternative to 
religious projection. Can we infer that Kristeva is seeing art as a new religion?
Certainly in Powers of Horror she says,
"The artistic experience... appears as the essential component of religiosity" 
and that "it is destined to survive the collapse of historical forms of 
religion."192
What does Kristeva make of Christianity in this respect? Is the Christian religion a 
place for semiotics to break through the male symbolic order? Why should Kristeva 
argue that it should, or will, be superseded by "artistic experience"?
In answering this question we are struck by the extent to which Kristeva engages with 
Christianity in her various writings. She writes extensively on the Cult of the Virgin 
Mary and offers a thorough exploration of Christian mysticism. 193
In her early writings Kristeva sees religion, and Christianity especially, as a central 
pillar supporting the masculine symbolic order, as a tool of feminine repression. This 
is the standard psychoanalytic critique of religion. She says,
"We maintain therefore that science and theological dogma are doxic. By 
repressing the production of doxy, they make the thetic belief from which the 
quest for truth departs; but the path thus programmed is circular and merely 
returns to its point of departure."194
In other words religion is fixated with justifying its beliefs as dogmas. In this they 
never question the psychological drives which might explain how these beliefs might 
be said to arise. In this, she argues religion supports a male symbolic order where 
truth is dogmatic rather than explore the greater mysteries and disruptive forces of the 
semiotic.
192 PH p. 17, quoted by Graybeal op.cit. p. 134.
193 Of special interest here are "Stabat Mater"appearing in The Kristeva Reader ed. Toril Moi, Basil 
Blackwell 1986pp. 160-185. In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Fait trans A. 
Goldhammer, New York Columbia University Press, 1987 (abbreviated hereafter to IBL) and 
Kristeva, Powers of Horror. An Essay on Abjection Translated by Leon S Roudiez New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1986 abbreviated hereafter to PH.
194 Kristeva RPL, p.59.
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However, Kristeva does see the semiotic as a force apparent in the poetic language 
and imagery of religious art and liturgy. She sees artistic and poetic religious 
expression as having a "capacity for letting jouissance come through."195 In this 
Kristeva offers a more complex evaluation of religion by suggesting that the former 
broad feminist understanding of Christianity as a male construct, reflecting a male 
reality that excludes women, is a mere fa9ade covering a more complex relationship 
with the feminine. In essence, Kristeva argues that Christianity is entirely reliant upon 
the feminine semiotic, which is instrumental in its formation. Christianity is seen as 
the most grand attempt to escape its origin, or perhaps more properly, its "mother". 196 
She concludes that in Christianity "Jouissance is thus not so much forbidden as 
regulated."197
"We thus find sacrifice and art, face to face, representing the two aspects of 
the thetic function: the prohibition of jouissance by language and the 
introduction of jouissance into and through language. Religion seizes this first 
aspect, necessary to the institution of the symbolic order."198
Among the earliest of Kristeva's considerations of the relationship between 
Christianity and the semiotic is that found in "Women's Time" where she credits the 
dualistic separation of the sexes as being at the root of monotheistic belief.
"Monotheistic unity is sustained by a radical separation of the sexes: indeed, 
this separation is its prerequisite. For without this gap between the sexes, 
without this localization of the polymorphic, orgasmic body, laughing and 
desiring the other sex, it would have been impossible, in the symbolic sphere, 
to isolate the principle of One Law - One, Purifying, Transcendent, Guarantor 
of the ideal interest of the community."199
Kristeva argues here that the symbolic order itself, and with it the notion of 
monotheism and its "Law of the (ultimate) Father", is built upon a sustained rejection, 
or type of enforced forgetting, of the earlier maternal semiotic realm. For Kristeva, the
195 Kristeva RPL, p.80. We shall consider the notion of jouissance in ch. 9of this thesis. Here we can 
briefly say that it is an ecstatic experience when the semiotic disrupts the symbolic order and the true 
state of polymorphous meaning is displayed.
196 A chapter considering Kristeva's notion of the M/Other, will follow in this thesis. Here we 
concentrate on Kristeva's thesis that Christianity is an attempt to escape the feminine semiotic, but is 
entirely reliant upon it for its own existence.
197 Kristeva, RPL, p.78.
198 Kristeva, RPL, p.80.
199 Kristeva, DIL, p.33.
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key theme in Christianity, and all monotheistic paradigms, is to escape and repress the 
feminine.
For Kristeva a grand outworking of Christianity's attempt to subsume the feminine is 
found ironically in the cult of the Virgin Mary. It is in the cult of the Virgin that 
Kristeva sees the fundamental representation of the feminine within Christianity as 
being one of the idealised women: a virgin and a mother200 . Kristeva in "Stabat 
Mater" considers the power of Mariology201 . She examines the nature of the powerful 
attraction of the Cult of the Virgin, especially to male Christians. She says that an 
interest in Mariology has survived the onset of modernism, and could be said to have 
reached its peak in the years following the Second World War. At this time several 
important dogmas were formally recognised by the Roman Catholic Church, 
including the Assumption, and the title of Mary as "Queen of Heaven" (1950, 1945). 
Kristeva questions the nature of the appeal that such doctrines offer.
""What is there in the portrayal of the Maternal in general and particularly in 
its Christian, virginal, one, that reduces social anguish and gratifies a male being?"202
In "Stabat Mater" Kristeva concludes that the post-war world needed and the caring 
and giving qualities of Mother-love, personified in Mary, and thus there was a revised 
interest in Mariology. According to Kristeva, this instinct is driven by the 
remembrance of the care and protection of the womb and the Mother-love 
experienced by the newborn, semiotic infant.
"This love, of which the divine love is merely a not always convincing 
derivation, psychologically is perhaps a recall, on the near side of early 
identifications, of the primal shelter that ensured the survival of the 
newborn."203
200 The parameters of this thesis will not allow for a consideration of the Christian portrayal of woman 
as temptress or helpmeet, which many feminist theologians argue have an equally powerful hold over 
the understanding of what constitutes femininity. For such a discussion see Daphne Hampson's After 
Christianity ch.5, "Woman as Other", SCM Press, 1996. Here, our decision to restrict this examination 
to the idealisation of the feminine in Christian thought follows Kristeva's primary interest in the cult of 
the Virgin Mary.
201 This essay first appeared in Tel Quel, and was reprinted in Tales of Love (1983)
202 Kristeva, "Stabat Mater", p. 170 appearing in The Kristeva Reader ed. Toril Moi, Basil Blackwell 
1986pp. 160-185
203 Kristeva, "Stabat Mater", reprinted 1986, p. 176.
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with an Other that is no longer substantial and maternal but symbolic and 
paternal."205
In her study of Christian mystics206, Kristeva unpacks this further. She discusses Saint 
Augustine's use of the metaphor of Christian unity with God as being that of a child 
feeding from its mother's breast. She says of this,
"What we have here is fusion with a breast that is, to be sure, succouring, 
nourishing, loving, and protective, but transposed from the mother's body to 
an invisible agency located in another world. This is quite a wrench from the 
dependency of early childhood, and it must be said that it is a compromise 
solution, since the benefits of the new relationship of dependency are entirely 
of an imaginary order, in the realm of signs."207
Kristeva's analysis of the cult of Mary and Christian mysticism suggests that the very 
formulation of ideas about divine care and comfort, whether projected onto the person 
of Mary or onto God the Father, are complex reactions to the remembrance of the 
original feminine semiotic M/Other. In such religious expressions of a desire for 
comfort, Kristeva sees the semiotic resurfacing through its symbolic overlay. 
However, in religion, Kristeva sees that this desire is repressed as it is symbolised and 
therefore denied. Kristeva's critique of religious art sees such as an example of the 
attempt to maintain the symbolic order of the "Law of the Father", and as such a place 
of shelter for the illusory unitary and gendered subject. In fact for Kristeva, all 
attempts by Christian feminists to instigate a sense of the feminine, or jouissance, into 
religion inevitably serve only to strengthen the dominance of the male symbolic order. 
In application this means that contemporary Christian feminist concern to develop 
inclusive liturgies, or find ways of exploring God as Mother, are ultimately subsumed 
in the "Law of the Father" and patriarchal discourse. They are simply serving as a 
means of letting some of the repressed feminine through whilst remaining within the 
symbolic order themselves. In some ways Kristeva suggests that the 'pressure valve' 
of religious representations of the feminine only serve to maintain the persistence of 
the male symbolic order by allowing some of the pressure off the male order. In other 
words, if the semiotic experience of jouissance is what a self really desires then the 
occasional surfacing of this through religion maintains the place and value of religion 
and so the strength of the symbolic order persists.
205 Kristeva, IBL., p.24.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
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However, importantly, in Christianity this does not lead to the formulation of 
feminine images of divinity, but rather to an idealised woman, virgin and mother, 
whose status and identity is entirely dependent upon her relation to a male child.
Furthermore, Kristeva sees projections of the desire to return to a state of comfort at 
the site of a pre-Oedipal Mother projected into the most overtly male identification of 
God, as Father. Here, she sees Christian Creedal expressions uncovering the 
projection of feminine attributes within the male Father God. According to her 
analysis, in a patriarchal culture God must, by necessity, be male and Father. 
However, so strong is the desire for mother-love and a return to the repressed semiotic 
relationship of comfort, that "motherly" attributes are projected even onto a male 
Father God. She sees this as apparent in several early Christian writers in her study of 
Christian mysticism. She quotes Clement of Alexandria,
"God is love, and we seek him precisely because of that love. In his ineffable 
majesty he is Father; but in his love he has opened himself up to us and 
become our Mother. Yes, in his love our Father has become woman, and the 
greatest proof of this is his Son born of her."204
Here the male God has assumed feminine characteristics, subsuming any possible 
feminine expression of divinity and attempting to obscure the fundamental need for 
the M/Other.
Interestingly, according to Kristeva in "Stabat Mater" (1983), this process of original 
reliance upon the feminine and its later repression and subjugation is not restricted to 
religion. Kristeva sees a similar secular account of this process within Freud, where 
the Father possesses both gender characteristics. Her re-working of Lacan can be said 
to be an attempt to uncover the original feminine as source of identity creation.
Returning to a discussion on Christianity, Kristeva argues that the fundamental desire 
to re-encounter the semiotic Mother is represented and repressed at the same time.
"Overcoming the notion of irremediable separation, Western man, using 
'semiotic' rather than 'symbolic' means, re-establishes a continuity of fusion
204 Quoted from Leonardo Boff s The Maternal Face of God: The Feminine and its Religious 
Expressions. Collins, 1989, p.85. Boff offers a full exploration of the emergence of feminine 
characteristics for the Father from Patristic writers and throughout the Middle Ages. See also Marina 
Warner's Alone of All Her Sex. The Myth and Cult of the Virgin Marv. Vintage Books, 1983.
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However, we note here that in her discussions regarding the "abject" in Powers of 
Horror,208 Kristeva expounds her theory of the undeniable attraction of the maternal 
by saying that the relationship to the maternal body is not purely one of attraction but 
also involves the feeling of revulsion. Her explanation of such phenomena includes a 
discussion about the way in which a child learns to distinguish itself from external 
elements such as its own excrement. Arguing that a fear of defilement is also related 
to the maternal body, Kristeva says,
"Devotees of the abject, she as well as he, do not cease looking, within what 
flows from the other's 'innermost being' for the desirable and terrifying, 
nourishing and murderous, fascinating and abject inside of the maternal body."209
The relation of both male and female adults to the maternal body is therefore 
ambivalent. As Greybeal says,
"On the one hand we have separated from the maternal plenum and want at 
some level to go back there, and on the other hand, we have each both made 
some kind of peace with the societal structure of meaning and law and yet 
experience alienation within it."210
What then of Kristeva's analysis of religion as a place of semiotic renewal? At first 
she appears to draw negative conclusions about Christianity in this respect. At the 
heart of her critique is that the Kristevan subject is a disunited and decentred subject. 
It appears to have dealt with this within the Christian tradition by a varying array of 
denials and repressions as it attempts to cling to the normatives and absolutes of 
hierarchical structures and Christian doctrines which represent the self as a static 
unity. Christian art and doctrine are seen as particularly to blame in this respect. In 
these, according to Kristeva, inner self-division is denied and repressed in the 
construction of a meta-narrative where God the Father reigns. In this the religious 
subject projects its inner plurality onto the idealisation of the feminine, such as 
witnessed in the cult of the Virgin, and subsumes it into stable symbolic and 
patriarchal identities, such as God the Father. In all this Kristeva sees an unhealthy 
tendency to escape from "jouissance" or "joying in self division"211 . In her works
208 Kristeva, PH.
209 Kristeva, PH., p.54.
210 Greybeal, op. cit, p. 131.
211 This notion is seen as the telos of the speaking subject, and will be covered at length in ch. 9 pp.215- 
237 of this thesis.
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"Powers of Horror" and "Tales of Love" Kristeva warns of the consequences and 
perversion of our true sense of multiplicitous selfhood if we follow such tendencies. 
She sees Western history as witness to such dangers, with its social intolerance and 
violent persecution of the "stranger."212 Religion is seen as instrumental and 
fundamental to this denial of difference. To free us from this power we must 
undertake a revision in our own notion of identity, and know the "jouissance" of self- 
division in both a personal and political sense.
However, as we said in our opening question on Kristeva's relationship with religion, 
Kristeva herself asks what possible system could replace the sheltering power of 
religion other than something in some sense religious? Art and poetry provide for
o 1 iKristeva, "the modern reply to the eternal question of morality" in the absence of 
religion itself. Kristeva suggests that poetry and art offer the subject a way to explore 
the plurality of being and meaning and such ventures are "destined to survive the 
collapse of historical forms of religion"214 . She suggests that the work of artists and 
poets are experiments in just such a rejection of religious and symbolic certainty and 
offer artistic experience, and her description of such is certainly as apocalyptic, if not 
as religious in itself.
However, we might consider how reductionist a view of religion, and Christianity in 
particular, Kristeva adopts in her assessment. Joy Greybeal's essay questions whether 
Kristeva denies the "side of religion that does allow for and even demands 
jouissance?"215 Greybeal sees an internal contradiction within Kristeva's writings in 
that she uses discussions from Christian mysticism as "a counter-example" to her own 
generalizations about religion."216 Kristeva herself cites religious texts where the 
mystical experience of otherness, or plurality of being, ruptures the implied unitary 
religious self.
212 The ethical outworking of Kristeva's notion of the creation of selfhood will be appraised in ch. 6 of 
this thesis.
213 Kristeva, OIL., p.35.
214 Kristeva, PH., p. 17.
215 Greybeal, op.cit., p. 134.
216 Greybeal, op.cit. p. 135.
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We should also note that Grace Jantzen points out that the maintenance and 
preservation of the male symbolic order, through religion or otherwise, could be 
ultimately read in a positive way within Kristeva's schema. Jantzen says,
"Taking the position to its logical conclusion, however, means that unless the 
symbolic were in a place of mastery, chaos would ensue: in terms of an 
individual we would speak of psychosis; in terms of society, self-destructive 
anarchy.. .The result, given Kristeva's conceptual linkages, is not only that the 
phallus is in fact dominant but that it is necessary for the health and balance of 
individuals and societies that it remains so. Although it appeared that the 
semiotic/maternal would subvert the hegemony of the patriarchal/symbolic, 
this could at best only be a modification of its rigidity, not a system of 
equality."217
In Jantzen's assessment Kristeva's critique of religion is laid upon a suspect 
foundation which assumes the primacy of the phallus, as per Lacan. She argues that 
this foundation leads to the conclusion that only the symbolic order allows for the 
"health and balance" of individuals. As we have seen from Kristeva's notion of the 
repression of the chora and abject, Kristeva agrees that the semiotic can only exist as a 
repressed but disturbing force through language once the infant has developed a sense 
of selfhood. She would therefore agree with Jantzen's reading, although not the 
normative values implied.
However, what if the primacy of phallus were discounted for a paradigm which saw 
the basis of reality founded upon a model of reciprocal relationality rather than 
repression and dominance? We will suggest that the very central doctrine of the 
Trinity and imago dei could be seen as quite the opposite understanding of the basis of 
reality; one which also disrupts the notion to the unitary and static self, and 
contradicts Kristeva's pre-supposed reductionist view of religion. We shall explore 
this more fully in a future dialogue using the work of Karl Rahner. 218 In seeking a 
system of thought that allows for an understanding of the subjectivity whereby "you 
do not take place as such, but as a stance essential to a practice", 219 is Kristeva 
overlooking the most powerful themes of inner plurality that arise from within the 
Christian doctrine of the Trinity?
217 Grace M. Jantzen Becoming Divine: towards a feminist philosophy of religion Manchester 
University Press, 1998, p.199.
218 See chapters 7 and 10 of this thesis for our consideration of Rahner's use of the Trinity as a model 
of intra-subjectivity.
219 Kristeva, "Novel as Polylogue" OIL, p. 165.
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3.6 Subjectivity Explored Through the Borderline Patient
We recall that Kristeva is a practising psychoanalyst. She has a special interest in 
melancholia and depression as states where the nature of human subjectivity can be 
explored. In Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia220 Kristeva explores case-studies 
of patients who have lost the power of speech or show no interest in it. This is a 
particular and extreme form of melancholia, sometimes termed narcissistic 
depression. Kristeva explores this borderline state with reference to case studies from 
her own practice as well as artists and writers from a variety of times: the artist 
Holbein the Younger; the poet Nerva; the authors Dostoevsky and Margaret Duras. 
For Kristeva, the depressed patient portrays an extreme version of the battle for 
subjectivity that is common to all. The depressed narcissist feels "wounded, 
incomplete, empty."221 This emptiness prompts the patient to lose interest in speaking, 
or even to lose this ability altogether. It is this facet which makes the depressed 
patient a borderline subject. Without the ability to express their being symbolically, 
the person risks complete loss of the sense of their own subjectivity. In exploring this 
state, Kristeva argues that it is due to an underlying loss suffered at the developmental 
stage of abjection which leaves the child unable to break between subject and object. 
She has lost the "Thing". Kristeva uses this term to express an enigmatic, 
indeterminate something that is missing in the process of entry into the symbolic 
realm.
"Let me posit the Thing as the real that does not lend itself to signification, 
the centre of attraction and repulsion, seat of sexuality from which the object 
of desire will become separated."222
The depressed narcissist is left in a state of severance from the symbolic realm. They 
have "the impression of having been deprived of an unnameable, supreme good, of 
something unrepresentable".223 They lack the desire for objects, and in this, words 
seem pointless. In McAfee's words, they are "like an orphan in the symbolic
f*\^\ A
realm". In losing touch with the symbolic realm the depressed narcissist risks losing 
their ability to form a fictive sense of being a "self. The borderline here is between 
having some sense of subjectivity and falling back into the undifferentiated semiotic
220 Kristeva Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, English Transl. 1989, trans. Leon Roudsiez, New 
York: Colombia University Press.221 BS p. 12
222 BS p. 13
223 BS p. 13
224 Noelle McAfee Julia Kristeva. Routledge Critical Thinkers. 2004, p.63.
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realm. To avoid this, the depressed person shields their subjectivity with sadness. 
Such sadness acts as a cohesive force to the disintegrating subjectivity.225
The struggle to retain a sense of selfhood for the borderline patient is explored in 
detail in Black Sun through an interpretation of the poetry of Gerard de Nerval. 
Kristeva interprets Nerval's poems as the expression of the depressed narcissist 
attempting to claw back from self-disintegration and regain access to the realm of 
signs. Kristeva views his writings as providing a temporary salvation from his 
depression and threatened total loss of the sense of being as subject. He constructs a 
new symbolic family for himself in his poetry, "this construction becomes a substitute 
for the lost ideal in the same way as it transforms the woeful darkness into a lyrical 
song that assimilates 'the sighs of the saint and the screams of the fay'".226 In her 
exploration of Nerval's writing, Kristeva suggests that the borderline patient 
experiences in extreme what is universal. They must deal with the realm of symbols in 
order to achieve subjectivity. We anticipate a striking resonance here between 
Kristeva's theory and that of Karl Rahner, who will also view subjectivity as 
necessarily involving symbolisation.227 For Kristeva, artistic and literary creation 
offers a means for the subject to proceed. For the depressed melancholic or borderline 
patient this will be the means to turn sadness into a symbolic object and so express 
themselves within the realm of signs without which they face total dissolution of 
subjectivity.228
3.7 Provisional Conclusions
While it is far too early in our work to reach any evaluative conclusions it may be 
worthwhile here to summarise the findings of this appraisal so far.
By revising Lacan's psychoanalysis Kristeva has retained a place for the feminine in 
the origins of identity creation and as a repressive force at work in identity destruction 
and repositioning. In this she may be seen as redressing the balance of psychoanalysis 
somewhat, although we note that she seems to disqualify the feminine speaking 
subject in her agreement with Lacan that the phallus is the prime signifier.
225 BS p. 19-22
226 BS p. 162
227 See ch's 4 and 9 of this thesis.
228 Kristeva relates her theory of the borderline patient to Freud's Death Drive and Melanie Klein's 
writing on melancholia. BS p. 19
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Kristeva's major concern is to forward a notion of the divided subject; de-centred and 
multiplicitous, created by the exercise of the co-existent forces of symbolic order and 
semiotic disruption. In this we have seen her privileging language in meaning and 
identity creation. The loss of access to the symbolic order renders a subject 
dangerously at the borders of total loss of meaning and any sense of being a subject. It 
is only through literary or artistic creation that such a threat can be avoided. In the 
creation and maintenance of subjectivity Kristeva radically privileges poetry, art and 
even religious language. We anticipate an area of shared concern with theological 
systems, specifically that of Rahner, which similarly considers the relationship 
between symbolisation and self-actualisation and gives art and poetry a significant 
role in the creation of subjectivity.229
Most importantly for our project we have raised questions as to her understanding of 
religion as prohibitive of the acceptance of internal self-division and otherness. We 
suggest that this is one area where theology can meaningfully respond to Kristeva's 
theories and we seek to do this by examining Rahner's use of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. We anticipate, in Rahner's thought, a model and origin of plural intra- 
subjectivity in the Trinity.230
We have noted Kristeva's concern to explore the way in which interconnected 
relationships constitute subjectivity. These have been described in terms of dynamic 
and conflicting forces between the semiotic and symbolic order. Kristeva believes that 
neither force can exist independently, the symbolic providing the semiotic with its 
only possible form of expression, the semiotic with the raw material to drive and 
disrupt the process. This has been seen to set her against those, such as Irigaray and 
Cixous, who seek a feminine discourse, and been a cause of feminist critiques of her 
work.
Most importantly to our thesis we note that the semiotic and symbolic are impersonal 
forces, and offer the possibility for impersonal relatedness rather than inter-personal
229 See ch.4 of this thesis for our consideration of Rahner's philosophy of language.
230 See ch.7 of this thesis and ch 10 where we reflect on the possibility of Rahner's account of the 
person as hearer meeting some of the concerns raised by Kristeva and some of her vision of the 
potential of religion, without falling into the traps she views as inevitable in religion.
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relationship in constructing a sense of selfhood. We anticipate that this understanding 
of relationality in the creation of selfhood may foster individualism. Relationality is 
present but in a form which privileges the operation of texts over pre-existing 
subjectivity. The speaking subject has no "centre" to give it the power of agency in 
affecting its own creation or that of others; it is the text, and its internal forces whcih
O^l
are active. In this Kristeva's subject has the power to "speak", to say "I", but cannot 
be fully in control of what it says because discourse is unstable and meaning 
fluctuates. We seek to compare and contrast the speaking subject in these regards to 
the notion of the person as hearer, to which we now return.
231 We return to consider the individualism inherent in the notion of the speaking subject in ch.8, 9 and 
10 of this thesis.
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4. Rahner: the Creation of the Hearer 
- A Philosophy of Language and Symbols
Here we examine Karl Rahner's theory of language, paying particular attention to his 
theory of symbolisation, since this is key to the notion of the person as hearer. As we 
proceed we keep in mind that the apparent emphasis on theories of language and 
symbolism has provided Rahner with a notion of subjectivity that takes the role of 
language seriously. We anticipate that this area of common interest will provide scope 
for an engagement between our two theorists. Our question therefore, as we turn to 
Rahner's theory of language, is to what extent is the hearer shaped by language and in 
what ways is this similar and different to the role of language in the creation of the 
speaking subject?
4.1 Rahner's Transcendental Argument
As a prerequisite to our exploration of Rahner's ideas about language and personhood, 
we should first become acquainted with his use of the transcendental method of 
argument. This method begins with an understanding of how something is 
experienced and argues back to what must therefore be. It is a regressive argument 
and characteristic of Rahner's methodology. Charles Taylor defines this approach as,
"A regressive argument from an unquestionable feature of experience to a 
stronger thesis as the condition of its possibility."232
Michael Buckley sees Catholic theology in general favouring the transcendental 
method. For example, in Catholic thought the existence of God is established from the 
experience of God.
"In the history of Western thought, there have been two general ways of 
affirming the existence of God. One argues from the notion of God, that He 
must be; the other argues from the analysis of experience, that He must be. 
.. .The Catholic tradition has favoured the second."233
232 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.21.
233 Michael J. Buckley /'Within the Holy Mystery," the essay appearing in A World of Grace: An 
Introduction to the Themes and Foundations of Karl Rahner's Theology ed. Leo J O'Donovan, The 
Seabury Press, 1980, p.34.
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It could be suggested that the Catholic tradition might be at an advantage when 
seeking a dialogue with many contemporary disciplines, including postmodernism 
generally and Kristeva in particular, given the increasing importance of non-rational, 
experiential knowledge in contemporary discourse. It might be said that its 
methodology relates well to other discourses that have been similarly 
influenced by existential philosophy. This is an encouragement to our project. 
Certainly, at the heart of Rahner's epistemology is the Heideggerian existentialist 
definition of the human person as infinitely questioning.234 For Rahner, continual 
questioning is a universal trait; the human person will always grapple to know more 
of the great mystery of his or her being,
"It belongs to man's basic make-up not only that he can inquire about being, but also 
that he must do so."235
Rahner's epistemology gives rise to an existentialist anthropology. In other words, the 
question of what being human means can only be addressed by giving primary 
reference to the human experience of being. In this Rahner rejects the rationalist 
notions of the human person as essentially a thinking subject. This is an important 
fundamental similarity between the notion of the self as hearer and that of the 
speaking subject. For Rahner, human personhood is dynamic, relational and
___
existentially formulated. These are all themes which Kristeva similarly favours in a 
rejection of the rationalism of modernity.
Turning to Rahner we find that the experience of questioning acts as a focal point for 
Rahner's theological anthropology. For Rahner, in the universal human act of 
questioning, and especially in the act of acquiring self-knowledge, the person is 
already experiencing the presence of God. This transcendental experience is, for 
Rahner, "the basic and original way of knowing God."237 As Michael Buckley puts it,
234 See ch. 1 pp. 13-29 of this thesis and Robert Masson, "Rahner and Heidegger: Being, Hearing and 
God" in The Thomist 37 (1973), pp.455-488.
235 Rahner, HWp.13.
236 Cf. Leo J O'Donovan fed.) A World of Grace: An Introduction to the Themes and Foundations of 
Karl Rahner's Theology Ed., The Seabury Press, New York, 1980.
237 FCF, p.57.
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"The human mind goes spontaneously to the context to answer questions about any 
object. It does so because human experience is that this object can be understood; that 
it makes sense - but not finally in terms of itself. Its intelligibility is ultimately 
derived from its context.. .This is what Rahner means by asserting that the drive of the 
mind is toward the infinite."238
For Rahner, the search for understanding is a spiritual and 'Spirit-present' act. In the 
characteristically human trait of the urge to question, the human person demonstrates 
the possession of both a measure of the known and the unknown239 because one can 
not inquire after the utterly unknown.
"This implies further that every being, as possible object of knowledge, has of 
itself and on account of its being, hence essentially, an inner ordination to 
possible knowledge and so to a possible knower."240
In this, Rahner draws on the epistemology of Aquinas and Kant, where sensible 
experience is the foundation for all human knowledge. For Rahner the orientation 
towards mystery and the transcendent must necessarily require a measure of pre- 
reflective, original knowledge; he sometimes terms this "pre-thematic knowledge".
David Ford describes Rahner's approach to knowledge as the replacement of a 
Kantian cognitional a priori with a metaphysical a priori.241 Where Kant argued that 
the transcendent structures of reason make it possible for the sense perceptions to be 
construed as knowledge, Rahner begins with ordinary knowledge drawn from 
experience and pre-supposes a prior readiness to affirm the nature of their subjective 
existence. Rahner describes this metaphysical, transcendent reality as a "backdrop of 
being" (Vorgriff auf esse), which is reached by a reflexive analysis of knowledge 
itself. Rahner's method places God at the centre of human existence, as the 
metaphysical a priori to all human knowledge. In other words, and using the concept 
of revelation as an example, Rahner argues that given the actuality that Christians
238 Michael Buckley, op. cit. p.36-37.
239 Rahner first explores this concept in his philosophical works Spirit in the World first published in 
1968 and in Hearers of the Word 1969 both published New York, Seabury Press 1975. Abbreviated 
throughout as and 
240 Rahner HW p.7.
241 David Ford The Modern Theologians: an introduction to Christian theology in the twentieth century 
Blackwell, 1997.
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confess revelation has occurred, we know something of what must be true about the 
structures of human knowledge for such revelation to be recognised and received.
In this, we contend that Rahner has introduced a level of complexity to the 
contemporary desire to "know thyself'242 . The 'turn to the subject' so evident not only 
in contemporary academic disciplines but in their 'high street' versions of pop- 
psychology and what might be seen as 'the cult of self help', have viewed self- 
knowledge as achievable by a process of introspection. We shall see that, for Rahner, 
the quest for any type of knowledge inherently includes an encounter with God: the 
background to all being and knowledge. We might connote this as a process of 
"exo-spection" in contrast to cultural postmodernism's introspection.243 For Rahner, to 
"know thyself is also, in some fundamental sense, to 'know' or rather 'experience' 
God.244
We move now to consider how Rahner's transcendental method shapes his 
exploration of the nature of language and how it relates to the creation of human 
personhood.
4.2 Rahner's Theology of Language
On one level Rahner shares Kristeva's belief that language is formative of human 
subjectivity. Language and enunciation lie at the heart of how we experience 
ourselves and how we relate to others. Rahner offers a thorough-going philosophy of 
language and an exploration of the nature and work of symbols. Whilst we anticipate 
many differences, the shared valuing of language as self-creative is an encouragement 
to our task. The remainder of this chapter will focus upon Rahner's theory of language 
in respect to the creation of personhood. Our thesis is that Rahner's system shares
242 This inscription is supposed to have been taken by Socrates to be his personal maxim and was 
written across the walls of the temple to Apollo at Delphi; so much for the notion that the turn to the 
subject is a modern phenomenon!
243 Our term here relates Rahner's process of acquiring self knowledge and directly to Pannenberg's 
anthropology, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, 1985. Here, for Pannenberg, authentic human 
personhood is achieved by "turning outwards" from the ego; "exocentricity" as opposed to the sinful 
process of "egocentricity". We refer to the similarities between Pannenberg and Rahner's anthropology 
in ch. 8.10 of this thesis.
244 We shall see that Rahner's placement of the self within the arena of graced history and his 
Christological notion of Jesus as the norm and of the human person will also lead him away from 
the contemporary view that is the route to self-knowledge. For Rahner, the truths about 
the self lie in an exploration of the person of Christ. See ch.9 of this thesis. Furthermore, for Rahner, 
the whole process of searching for such answers is itself viewed as a process utterly dependent, 
epistemologically, upon the presence of God.
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many of the advantages of post-structuralist approaches. We contend that in his 
philosophy of symbolisation Rahner succeeds in de-centring the self as a dynamic and 
relational process.
As we turn to a close examination of Rahner's philosophy of language our project is 
immediately impeded by the fact that Rahner does not set out to provide an explicit 
theory in this respect. In seeking this we are required to trace the theme of linguistics 
and symbolisation through Rahner's works, from a number of sources within his 
major writings as well as from numerous articles. We discover in this search that a 
theory of language and symbolisation is developed as Rahner reflects upon varied 
theological and religious interests. In essence, throughout his consideration of many 
theological topics, Rahner keenly asks, 'What is language? What is its role in the 
creation of the human person?' Recent theological scholarship has centred upon a 
number of his works. Most notable here are Rahner's essays on "The Theology of the 
Symbol" and "The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Statements"245 as well as "Poetry 
and the Christian" and "Priest and Poet"246 . In seeking to examine Rahner's 
understanding of the nature and role of poetry, scholars have also concentrated upon 
his writings on the cult of the Sacred Heart.247 It is an encouragement to the task at 
hand that scholars such as Robert Masson 248 assure us that a coherent theory of 
language can indeed be drawn together from Rahner's disparate works.
One focus for this chapter will be an in-depth examination of Rahner's 
Transcendental Thomist notion whereby it is considered more profitable to confront a 
fundamental examination of language itself than to concentrate upon the concepts that 
language might produce about God. Rahner's contention is that language is only 
possible because of the existence of God. In short, everything we know, all objects 
that we conceive of in terms of language are revealed against an infinite horizon, or 
backdrop of Being, which is God. For Rahner,
245 TI 4, pp.221-252 & pp323-46.
246 T I 3, pp.294-320.
247 T I 8. Michael Walsh is particularly helpful here. Walsh expounds Rahner's notion that words 
contain the potential to evoke Absolute Being in his consideration of the word "heart", a theme we 
shall return to under the heading of "Surplus of Meaning" pp.93-100 of this thesis. Michael J Walsh, 
The Heart of Christ in the Writings of Karl Rahner Gregorian University Press, 1977.
248 Robert Masson, "Rahner and Heidegger: Being, Hearing and God" in The Thomist 37 (1973)
pp.455-488.
Central to Masson's thesis is the extent to which Heidegger's aesthetics has informed Rahner's view of
language as symbol.
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"Everything which we say here about the knowledge of God is indeed said in 
words, but it refers to a more original experience." 249
In other words, what Rahner terms "unthematic knowledge" and the experience of 
God precedes language and is the prerequisite for it. This theological theory of 
language is obviously fully convergent with Rahner's theological metaphysics of 
knowledge, whereby knowledge itself requires the presence of God; as such we shall 
often be required to deal with the two together.
4.3 Rahner and Symbolisation: Symbolic Realism
Rahner's seminal essay on symbols, "The Theology of the Symbol,"250 can be 
understood to be an expansion of the notions he set forward in Spirit in the World. 
From this later essay it is apparent that Rahner's theory contains two basic principles, 
which he relates to all expressions of being, whether sentient or otherwise. The first is 
a development of the Thomist understanding of being as essentially self-expressive.
"Our first statement, which we put forward as the basic principle of an ontology of 
symbolism, is as follows: all beings are by their very nature symbolic, because they 
necessarily 'express' themselves in order to attain their own nature." 251
For Rahner, all beings must express themselves to an external reality in order to 
achieve self-actualisation. Furthermore, the ability to create or emanate symbols is 
reliant upon the inherent inner-plurality of being itself. Following Thomist principles, 
beings are composed of both matter and form; it is this intrinsic, plural nature which 
gives them their ability to create symbols.252
Rahner's second principle in the theory of symbolisation involves a distinction 
between signs and symbols. According to Rahner, signs are separate from the being 
they signify. They are expressions of this reality in time and space but are not 
intrinsically linked to the original being. Conversely, symbols render another reality 
present. They are the expressions of being as it makes itself known to an "other".
249 Rahner, FCF., p. 56
250 Appearing in TI 4, pp.221-252.
251 Rahner, TI 4, p.224.
252 Stephen Fields, Being as Symbol: on the origins and development of Karl Rahner's metaphysics 
Georgetown University Press, 2000.
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"The symbol strictly speaking is the self-realisation of a being in the other 
which is constitutive of its essence."253
In other words, for Rahner, a symbol expresses the form of being and is the necessary 
manifestation of this form to external reality.
Importantly, in this theory of symbolisation Rahner states that the nature of being is 
neither given nor static but a process. A being can only come to experience itself 
fully, and so perfect its nature, by expressing itself. According to Rahner, this self- 
expression has two parts, "emanation" and "return."254 In the process of symbolisation 
a being emanates from itself into its own "other" by creating a mediating sign, a 
"realsymbol". The process of recognising or "returning" to this "other" is the means 
by which being constitutes itself as a reality. Symbolisation is therefore a dynamic 
process and the means by which all beings achieve expression and ultimately self- 
fulfilment. Rahner's understanding is thoroughly Thomist in this respect. It is 
important here to note that within such a Thomist paradigm, Rahner is able to speak 
of the "ontology of symbolisation". In his understanding, symbols are far from mere 
human conceptions. In fact, symbols share to some extent in the essential nature of a 
particular expression of being; they are ontologically linked to the being that they 
express. They are essential in the self-expression of any given being and are the 
means by which all beings come to express and fulfil their nature. There is therefore a 
unity between the nature of a being and the symbol it produces to express itself.
Relating this understanding of symbols to language, for Rahner, words are the 
vehicles of symbolic meaning. They contain as well as carry symbolic meaning, and 
in this, they are somewhat linked to essential being. Rahner will go so far as to say 
that some words have greater symbolic qualities than others do. He calls these words 
"primordial words". Even non-primordial words convey, albeit in a lesser and 
mediated way, a symbolic thought, which is itself related to the being or form it 
expresses. Such a belief puts Rahner at immediate odds with post-modernist theories. 
For Rahner, within signs, the relationship between "signified" and "signifier" is far 
more than an arbitrary matter of convention with no connection to a reality behind
253 Rahner, TI 4, p.234.
254 Rahner TI 4, p.229.
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discourse.255 The signifier carries and shares, to some extent, the same reality of being 
as the signified. This is not to say that the relationship between signifier and signified 
is static or automatic for Rahner. There are many different ways to express this 
essential reality of being, thus there are many possible translations of each signifier. 
However, for Rahner, a symbol must share to some extent in the very nature of the 
thing it symbolises. A key notion here is found in Rahner's statement that a symbol is 
both "derivative and congruous"256 with the being it symbolises. Rahner states that the 
symbol contains and does not merely represent the essence of the being it carries.
It is at this point that Rahner's transcendental epistemology truly breaks through into 
the theory of language. In Spirit in the World Rahner hypothesises that the nature of 
"knowing" gained from external data is only the understanding of a universal. In order 
to progress from knowing a universal to knowing a particular object the intellect must 
make a judgement. Rahner will argue that this process requires the pre-apprehension 
of the horizon of absolute being.257 In some way this pre-apprehension provides a 
backdrop by which to fix the particular entity, and so understand it. To put this 
simply, an object becomes distinct against a background. Human beings can make any 
object a background in order to recognise a particular thing. However, a further 
removed and subsequent background makes this act of identification possible. This 
ultimate background can never be truly seen; else it would become an object. For 
Rahner this ultimate background of being is God, the "holy mystery".
The insight given in a particular seeing of an object against the background happens, 
according to Rahner, when the intellect actively produces a "phantasm," an image of 
the external object. Here Rahner adopts the theological understanding of "image" as a 
way to understand the symbol, which contains "ontological representation" rather than 
mere similarity.258
Rahner describes the creation of this "phantasm" as an act of "conversion." The 
ability to judge and create a "phantasm" of the external object is reliant upon the 
human spirit's "pre-apprehension" or "foregrasp" of the Absolute. Judgements about
255 A post-modern concept of language we examined in ch.2 of this thesis.
256 Rahner: TI 4, p.231.
257 Rahner's Transcendental Method was outlined in the beginning of this chapter.
258 See Rahner SW, pp387-93.
particular realities can be conveyed through language because of what Rahner terms 
the "dialectical relationship" between the act of conversion and the pre-apprehended 
"horizon of the Absolute".259
In simplistic terms, we can say that particular things are only knowable through the 
tension inherent in knowing something by what it is part of (the universal, the 
Absolute) and through the understanding that it is only a small part of it. Particular 
things are seen and known by appreciating them in relation to the Absolute. Without 
the pre-apprehension of the Absolute the human "hearer" could not create this 
"phantasm" and could not actually know anything. The intellect's "foregrasp" of 
infinite being presents it with the contrast necessary for its grasp of finite data. This 
contrast causes the individual datum to be determined precisely as a particular 
entity.260 For Rahner, this "foregrasp" of the Absolute is universal in human beings 
and is definitive of their nature. This component of human nature drives the human 
being to question and seek answers from outside their spatial and temporal setting.
"The world raises questions for human being which it does not answer, but to 
evoke a question is to suggest and anticipate an answer. On the other hand, the 
drive of the mind is the anticipatory experience of God, because the drive of 
the mind is for a coherence that "makes sense" out of everything. And the 
drive towards coherence is embodied in every question we ask."261
For Rahner, this "foregrasp" of a horizon of Absolute Being is the self-disclosure of 
God, which is graciously revealed as a transcendental existential of the human person.
We believe that a key term in Rahner's analysis of the process of knowledge gained 
from language reception is "contrast". The act of intellectual judgement can only take 
place while the ability to contrast particulars and the universal is possible and, as we 
have seen, this is ultimately guaranteed by the presence of God. In such a way 
Rahner's is truly a of the symbol.
Since we anticipate that Rahner's theory of language might be meaningfully brought 
into a dialogue with that of Julia Kristeva, it is worthwhile giving greater 
consideration to the terminology he adopts. One danger in constructing an inter-
259 Rahner, SW, p.389.
260 Rahner, SW, pp395-400.
261 Michael J Buckley, "Within the Holy Mystery" from A World of Grace: An introduction to the 
Themes and Foundations of Karl Rahner's Theology, ed. Leo J O'Donovan, Seabury Press, 1980.
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disciplinary dialogue is that the terms found in each system become terribly confused. 
This is especially relevant when we consider the differentiation between signs and 
symbols.
As we have seen, in "Theology of Symbols" Rahner sees symbols as having 
ontological attachment to the form they represent. This is only true to a much lesser 
extent for mere signs. However, even signs such as words or images may contain a 
symbolic dimension, and indeed some - which Rahner calls "primordial words" - do 
so more than others.
The distinction between signs and symbols is fully considered in Paul Avis's God and 
the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol and Myth in Religion and Theology.262 
Chapter ten of Avis's work offers a clear description of the differences between signs 
and symbols as used within theological settings. He says,
"All symbols are signs but not all signs are symbols."
Rahner's understanding of the ontological facet of symbols places him in the category 
that Avis describes as "Symbolic Realism".263 In symbolic realism one key difference 
between signs and symbols is that the symbol has the inferred ability to transcend the 
sign, and as such has a dynamic and living quality. Signs do not exhibit the same 
lively quality; they are much more straightforward and static. Whilst symbols rely on 
recourse to the imagination, signs point to something on the same level of reality and 
rely on a conditioned or automatic reflex.
In Philosophy in a New Key Susanne Langer expresses the difference between signs 
and symbols saying,264
"The sign is something to act upon, or a means to command action; the symbol 
is an instrument of thought.265
262 Paul Avis, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor. Symbol and Myth in Religion and 
Theology. Routledge, 1999.
263 See Avis op.cit. chapter 13, pp. 152-185.
264 Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp.60-61.
265 Langer, op. cit., p. 63.
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According to Avis, signs are conventional and arbitrary; for example red lights give 
the sign to "stop!" There is no deeper connection between the sign of a red light and 
the command to stop. However, on this point, Avis muses that the connection between 
red and stop may have its origins in the colour of blood, in which case they would 
exhibit a measure of "symbolic" quality present. Avis contrasts this with the idea that 
symbols "effect a connection between the moment and eternity."266 Most 
interestingly, in light of our consideration of Rahner's theory of symbols, Avis states 
that symbols have a "translucent" quality. By this he means that they reveal 
something about the being they represent yet do so in an ambiguous way that makes 
the being or object they represent at one and the same time clearer and yet more 
obscure and problematic. They do this by encouraging implicit references to a level of 
being beyond the present level of reality they inhabit.
"The mediation of symbols between the known and the unknown gives them 
their orientation to transcendence."267
Rahner would wholeheartedly agree with Avis's understanding of the symbol as 
"translucent" and "orientated to transcendence." These are key definitions in his 
theory of language and symbolisation. For Rahner, the "sign" of the word, carries the 
"symbol" of thought which is "derivative and congruous" with the being or essence it 
communicates.
Avis suggests that Coleridge's view of the symbolic power of metaphorical language 
is the best example of this understanding of "translucent" symbols and emphasises the 
"transcendent" quality of symbols.
"(A symbol) always partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible; and 
while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that unity of
o/^c
which it is the representative." 
In Coleridge's view symbols are "the visible tips of an ontological iceberg."269
According to Avis, Coleridge represents the re-emergence of the incremental view of 
the symbol in the Romantic Movement. This approach emphasises a link between 
symbols and an ontological reality beyond themselves, which is clearly Rahner's
Paul Avis, op.cit. pi 06.
267 Avis, op.cit., p. 107.
268 Avis, op. cit. p. 108 citing Coleridge, 1972, p.30.
269 Avis op. cit. p. 108 citing from Swiatecka, 1980, p.59.
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view. Avis is clear that the "other reality" mediated by symbols need not be the 
"sphere of divinity" but may be the "spirit of a nation, a tradition, a cultural legacy, a 
political ideal; it always carries a value greater than the individual."270 However, for 
Rahner, it is indeed an aspect of 'the holy mystery,' as a backdrop of being, which is 
encountered in and through the symbol.
Avis continues his exploration into the theological and religious use of symbols with 
an examination of Paul Ricoeur's notion of "tensive symbols." 271 We find that there 
is a resonance between the theories of Rahner and Ricoeur.
Ricoeur sees symbols as "tensive" in that they are constantly held in the tension 
between revealing and obscuring. They work both to veil and unveil meaning. They 
are "translucent;" at one and the same time clear and obscuring. Contrary to Derridan 
denial of "presence" Ricoeur sees that the symbol "testifies to the primordial 
rootedness of Discourse in Life. It is born where force and form coincide."272 Rahner 
and Ricoeur insist upon continuity between the symbol and the thing it symbolises. 
They share in an 'incremental' rather than 'ornamental' view of symbols273 because 
they do not only add something to convey meaning but are "vehicles of tensive truth." 
Language used symbolically, such as in religion or poetry, becomes "like an army 
fighting on a moving battlefront: fighting to conquer the not yet expressed on behalf 
of the expressed."274
As we have seen, for Rahner, language as self-communication is a necessary and 
implicit part of the nature of being. We now turn our attention to address the question 
of what Rahner says of the words that we use to express such communication.
270 Avis, op. cit, p!07.
271 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, Texas Christian University Press, 1976 and The Rule of 
Metaphor, Routledge 1978.
272 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory .Texas University Press, 1976, p.59.
273 Avis, op. cit., p.93.
274 Ricoeur, "Response to Karl Rahner's Lecture: On the Incomprehensibility of God" Journal of 
Religion 58 (1978) pp.126-131.
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4.4 Surplus of Meaning and Primordial Words.
In Rahner, words are described as the "matter" of meaning.275 Meaning is grasped 
because the medium of the word incarnates and expresses it. Therefore, in Rahner's 
philosophy of language, words have recourse to objective signification. This is clearly 
a point of conflict with post-modernist theories whereby the symbol can hold no claim 
to congruence or derivation from the essence of a being.
Rahner might be seen as offering a warning to the deconstructionist project when he 
says,
"All definitions have constant recourse to new words, and this process must 
come to a stop with the ultimate words, whether these are absolutely the last 
possible words or merely those which constitute in fact the final point of a 
man's reflexive self-interpretation." 276
To dissect words continually for their meaning is to kill them. For Rahner the strength 
and nature of words is in their ability to represent the being they symbolise, as matter 
to form. In this they are multi-layered,
44We are not speaking here of worn-out words which are preserved, impaled 
like dead butterflies, in the showcases of dictionaries." 277
With language coupled to the realm of transcendent pre-apprehension and requiring 
the presence of Absolute Being, we should not be surprised that for Rahner all words 
have a "surplus of meaning."278 It is this notion that we shall now focus upon.
According to Rahner, every word has the potential to evoke some knowledge of the 
Absolute, no matter how dimly. Every word is produced as a sound or symbolic 
representation of the intellect's process of imagination, abstraction and judgement all 
set against the pre-apprehended horizon of the Absolute.279 Because of the complexity 
of this process, and the necessity of the transcendent as a background upon which to 
see individual meaning, words have what Rahner calls a "surplus of meaning."280
275 Rahner, TI 4, p.232.
276 Rahner, "Priest and Poet" p.297. The essay appears in TI 3, pp294-320.
277 Rahner, TI 3 p.296.
278 Rahner "The Theological Meaning of the Sacred Heart" TI 8, pp. 217-228.
279 Rahner; "Poetry and the Christian" p.359.
280 See Michael Walsh, The Heart of Christ in the Writings of Karl Rahner 
Gregorian University Press, 1977, where he also considers a further passage from 
TI 1, "Considerations on the Development of Doctrine".
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Rahner says that words "embody" meaning. This expression suggests that knowledge 
of a word's definition does not exhaust the meaning or thought that the word 
"embodies". Rahner says that the word's incarnated thought ranges from its minimum 
content to its maximum intelligibility. Rahner calls the former a word's "formal 
statement." This content attempts to delineate one proposition or idea from another. 
However, a word's definition alone fails to fully express its "surplus," which Rahner 
calls language's "formal communication." This is more difficult to specify, it is 
equivocal and remains "translucent" to those who express and receive it.281 As a 
result, words require sustained interpretation.
At this point that Rahner introduces the category of "primordial words."282 These are 
words that do not distinguish one thought from another but harmonise a multiplicity 
of meanings. He says they "evoke the blinding mystery of things."283 For Rahner, 
these words stimulate a conscious awareness of the origin of knowledge, the absolute 
Being.
"Every genuine and living word has roots which penetrate endlessly into the depths."284
Rahner suggests that the words "water" and "heart" as examples of primordial or 
"genuine" words. They are examples of where the mere sign of a word becomes a 
symbol. For instance, the meaning of "water" cannot be reduced to a chemical 
formula. Neither can the meanings of "heart" be contained by biological definitions. 
On the contrary, these words contain a "surplus" which overshadows their respective 
definitions. They are "archetypes"- words that in some way capture unconscious yet 
universal human experiences. For example, "water" evokes "life" and "spirit", and 
"heart" evokes "love" and "inner being." Using the example of the word "heart" 
Rahner suggests that the word is primordial in that it carries with it an awareness of 
the truth of the human being as an embodied spirit who is open to absolute being.285 
Primordial words resist exhaustive definitions and, for Rahner, they offer insight into
281 Walsh, Ibid.
282 Rahner, "Priest and Poet" TI 3 p.296.
283 Ibid. pp. 296-97
284 Rahner, "Priest and Poet" TI 3, p.367.
285 Walsh, Ibid.
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the pre-apprehension within the human spirit of the infinite horizon. Rahner says that 
such words are "redemptive"286 in that they point to humanity's ontological destiny.
Secondly Rahner contends that primordial words are powerful; they have the power to 
transform us. For Rahner, it is in poetry that human sensibility finds its fullest 
expression. It is in using and appreciating poetic language that we experience creative 
transformation. One way in which this is apparent is that we are at some level aware 
of the different ways in which poetry can touch us depending upon our situation. The 
poet uses words which affect us even though we are distanced from the poet's own 
situation. Doud makes the point that poetry viewed this way can be said to "transcend 
the particular".287 As the power of poetic language affects us in different situations 
Doud says, "Creative transformations between variant structures occur." He says,
"The great value of poetry lies in the fact that its primordial words can touch 
the hearts of persons enjoying different visions and structures from those of 
the poet. But, what the reader comes to appreciate is the poet's vision and 
structure, not merely being confirmed in his or her own tradition." 288
Primordial words may be small but they are deceptively powerful.
"Like sea shells in which can be heard the sound of the ocean of infinity, no 
matter how small they are in themselves." 289
Rahner suggests that all words require careful interpretation, since all carry, to a 
greater or lesser degree, a surplus of meaning. For this reason Rahner calls his theory 
of interpretation a "hermeneutics of retrieval." For Rahner, the meaning in primordial
^Qf\
words can never be fully exhausted.
However, there is a third, final and more powerful way in which Rahner sees poetic 
words as transformative. Rahner insists upon a link between poetry and the Christian 
Gospel. He asks,
"Is there a preparation which he must undergo to be or to become a Christian, 
which turns out to be a receptive capacity for the poetic word?" 291
286 Rahner, "Priest and Poet" TI 3, p.300.
287 Robert E Doud, "Poetry and Sensibility in the Vision of Karl Rahner" Thought vol. 58 no.231 
(December 1983) pp.439-452, this quote p.446.
288 Doud op. cit. p.446.
289 Rahner, "Priest and Poet" TI 3, p. 296.
290 Ibid, p.298.
291 Rahner, "Poetry and the Christian" TI 3, p.357
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Rahner insists that in poetry the "happy danger of meeting God"292 is apparent, it is a 
real possibility. Like preparing soil for seeds, Rahner views human aesthetic culture 
and poetry as making the hearer "open for the word through which the silent mystery 
is present."293 Rahner says that the person who appreciates poetry prepares their heart 
to hear the Gospel, and similarly, the person who responds to the Gospel comes to 
appreciate the beauty in other poetry.294
According to Robert the link Rahner makes between the Gospel and poetry sees 
Rahner's Thomist roots resurfacing again. Rahner views human sensibility, the ability 
to be moved by art and poetry, as being caused by the effect of spirit moving through 
matter. With sensibility as a created trait in all human "hearers", poetry is the closest 
to the most original movement of spirit through matter.
"Poetry is spirit's appetite for being made flesh in words or made passionate in 
the need for primordial words." 296
Therefore the ultimate transforming power of poetry is, for Rahner, the possibility of 
an encounter with God. In essence this argument states that the same abilities 
necessary to respond to poetry are required to respond to the Christian Gospel 
Furthermore, according to Rahner, divine grace and revelation can be experienced 
outside of the "sacred" as "anonymous Christianity."
Importantly, this discussion reveals that Rahner does not see the Gospel message as 
restricted solely to the 'religious' sphere. Rahner sees poetry and art as places where 
divine grace is already operative, and where divine communication is possible. We 
recognise a similar notion in Kristeva's idea of the semiotic as resurfacing through 
poetic language. Rahner states that even though artists and poets may never refer to 
grace or Christianity their work is both the product and vehicle of the word of God. 
Rahner says,
"There is an anonymous humanism inspired by grace, which thinks that it is 
no more than human. We Christians understand it, better than it does itself."297
292 Ibid. p. 365
293 Ibid. p. 358
294 Ibid. p. 364
295 Robert Doud, "Poetry and Sensibility in the Vision of Karl Rahner" Thought Vol. 58 no. 231 
(December 1983) pp.439-452.
296 Doud, op. cit p.450. 
297 Rahner, "Poetry and the Christian" TI 3, p.366.
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Art and poetry are "a gift of the grace of God and a tribute to redemption, even though 
as yet it knows nothing of this." 298 Artistic works and words are shot through with 
"anonymous Christianity" in a way that is similar to Kristeva's view that they carry 
with them a semiotic power. Rahner encourages those desiring an encounter with the 
divine to develop a habit for appreciating poetic language. He says that we must learn 
how to be receptive to the poetic word.
"This capacity and readiness must be developed by practice, so that the 
primary words do not glance off the shell of preoccupations, and are not 
choked in the indifference and cynical nihilism of man, are not drowned in 
chatter, but like a lance piercing mortally a crucified man and opening up the 
sources of the spirit, may strike the inmost depths of man, killing and bringing 
to life, transforming, judging and graciously favouring." 2"
We have seen a similar call for aesthetic practice and awareness in Kristeva and this is 
a point of similarity between our two thinkers. For both Rahner and Kristeva language 
itself has the power to transport and transform our very being and opens the way for 
further revelatory encounter. For Rahner this is nothing less than an encounter with 
the divine as "holy mystery". Whilst religious sacraments and Scriptures are special 
examples of the transformation power of the symbol, for Rahner, poetry and art 
enable the creative transformation to take place where Christianity is both present and 
anonymous. Of this, Doud says that for Rahner,
"The religious brings the aesthetic to its highest actualization, and the aesthetic 
gives the religious its very possibility of being expressed."300
Before we move on, and by way of contextualising Rahner's theory of language, it 
can be noted that his particular understanding of symbolisation has its roots in 
Augustinian semiotics. According to Todorov301 this appreciation of the symbol came 
to dominate the medieval tradition and can be traced through Aquinas to Rahner. This 
system maintains that symbolisation is in effect a circuit; beginning with the divine, 
transmitted to human by means of an immanent knowledge of the divine (Rahner's 
pre-apprehension) and objects of knowledge within the soul (Rahner's awareness of 
the horizon). This "knowledge" is expressed as an "inner word," a pre-linguistic word 
within the mind or a symbol; it is then received as an "outer word," as thought, and 
finally produced as a spoken word, a sign. Whilst there are successive mediations in
298 Ibid, p.367.
299 Ibid, p.360.
300
301
Doud, op. cit., p.440.
See Tzvetan Todorov's Theories of the Symbol ,Basil Blackwell, 1977.
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this procession there is an unbreakable link between the spoken word and the thing in 
itself. Such a link is guaranteed in that the sign has its origin in and reference to an 
extra-linguistic realm, that of transcendent deity. In this the symbolic word becomes a 
"realsymbol": it evokes a reality transcendent to itself.
Stephen Fields provides an excellent examination of the Thomist roots of Rahner's 
concept of "realsymbol". Fields suggests that the concept, whilst being an 
achievement within Neo-Thomism has a long history within Western metaphysics.302 
For Fields the notion of "realsymbol" has its roots in the very beginnings of Western 
philosophy with Heraclites and the Stoics. Here the central maxim is that the visible 
world of flux and change is ultimately reconciled in an underlying invisible harmony. 
Fields suggests that in these earliest Western philosophical traditions visible reality 
was understood as "symbolic." It required an external and absolute reality to make 
sense of and resolve the tensions inherent in the ever-shifting flux experienced on the 
'surface', these actions becoming symbolic of the invisible reality 'beneath'.
Furthermore, according to Fields, the concept of "realsymbol" can be seen to relate 
directly to Aristotle's theme that "something of the divine" is to be found within 
humanity, who express but never fully manifest it. In (3:50) 
Aquinas develops Aristotelian thought to become a Christian concept which contends 
that the actions of humans are driven by an inherent desire for God.303 These actions 
become the implicit symbols of the divine.
Whilst the roots of Rahner's concept of the "realsymbol" can be found in such early 
traditions, Fields points out that it was the late nineteenth century ecclesiastical 
programme (to bring the old to completion by the new), in 
conjunction with a renewed interested in Thomism under Pope Leo XIII, that first 
brought Thomism into dialogue with secular thought.304 Leo's project was to inject 
divine truths into the temporal and secular orders by revisiting Thomist concepts and 
relating them to the emerging secular epistemologies and metaphysics. This project 
was interrupted when the succeeding Pope, Pius X (1903-14), perceived these
302 Stephen Fields, Being as Symbol: on the origins and development of Karl Rahner's metaphysics 
Georgetown University Press, 2000, p. 21.
303 Stephen Fields, Being as Symbol: on the origins and development of Karl Rahner's metaphysics 
Georgetown University Press, 2000, p. 21.
304 Ibid. p.22.
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emerging philosophies, loosely termed "modernism," as a threat to the analogy of 
being. This threat was deemed sufficient to cease the inter-disciplinary project. 
Clearly, as Fields, points out, "modernism" could indeed be seen as leading to the 
denial of claims of universal truth.305 The analogy of being, a key Thomist notion, 
holds that the act of human knowing is to unite a changeless universal concept (of 
being) to a datum of sensation. This guarantees the link between the external reality 
and human understanding and establishes a basis for the truth claims of religious 
dogmas and the ethics of natural laws. The ontologies of "becoming" could be seen to 
undermine the faculty of human judgement, but also, and rather more importantly to 
Pius X, the religious claims to universal truth.
Field argues that from the impasse between religious defence of the analogy of being 
and the developing ontologies of becoming, a new synthesis of symbol and analogy 
would eventually be born. 306A key component in this synthesis is the development 
made by Joseph Marechal to bring Kant into dialogue with Aquinas. Marechal 
introduced the evidence for the Absolute's existence in what has become known as 
"Transcendental Deduction.307 Here Marechal asserts that existence of intellectual 
yearning establishes an existential or empirical ground for the possibility of the 
Absolute's existence. Simply put, this argument states that the concept of the 
Absolute is self-justifying. The Absolute's objective existence is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of every affirmation, even, paradoxically, for the 
assertion that the absolute does not exist! Rahner will follow this lead and ground the 
analogy of being within that of human intellectual judgement.308 Finite objects can be 
meaningfully conceived because they are appreciated against the causally immanent 
Absolute.
Rahner's Thomist understanding can therefore be seen as a progression of earlier 
theological and philosophical movements. His contribution is a unique development 
in that he relates the symbolism within the analogy of being to both finite and infinite 
beings and says that the nature of the human person affirms this structure of reality.
305 Ibid, pp.22-24.
306 Ibid. pp23-34.
307 Ibid. p.35.
308 See Karl Rahner: Theologian of the Graced Search for Meaning ed. Geffrey B Kelly, T&T Clark, 
1993, p.39.
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4.5 From a Theory of Language to a Theory of Personhood: The Person's 
Purpose of Self-Expression and Communion
We now more closely examine the effect of Rahner's philosophy of symbols upon his 
notion of the person as hearer. In this we shall see that, for Rahner, human beings hold 
a privileged position in that they are able to transcend the world which also conditions 
them. A primary aspect of the ability to transcend the world is found in the ability to 
express and interpret language. Whilst language is limited and constrained, for 
Rahner, it is the prime tool of the "open human person" striving after the unlimited 
"Absolute horizon of Being." We emphasise here that perfection of knowledge for 
Rahner is not the grasping of certainty, but rather of mystery. For Rahner, the 
fulfilment of the human condition is the apprehension of ultimate mystery rather then 
some climax of rational thought. 309 Rahner, therefore, views the particular nature of 
human thought and language as a facet of human self-transcendence. With the ability 
to transcend the self, the human can reasonably undertake theology, the talk of God. It 
is upon such ground that Rahner establishes anthropology as fully concurrent with 
theology.
We recall that, within Rahner's schema, the state of being is a process of self- 
alienation, recognition and retrieval. Rahner argues for a dynamic and plural inner 
reality to every being. Rahner, like Kristeva, recognises the "stranger within," and the 
possibility of self-actualisation through a system of self-alienation and embracing this 
"other." The process of self-expression is ongoing. It is implicit to all beings and as 
such intrinsic to all beings. The process requires an inner-plurality in which both the 
"form" and the "matter" of the being is actualised and benefits from the presence of 
its complementary "other."310 It is due to such a process that all beings can be said to 
consist of three aspects: "original unity," a medium or "other" and a "perfected 
unity".311 Rahner uses these descriptions of being to discuss the relationship of form 
to matter. For Rahner, form and matter are inseparable. Form and matter must be 
understood as constituting a unity within their difference, that they are "unity-in- 
difference." To use Rahner's phraseology, form "emanates" in matter, "giving itself
309 We shall examine the notion of mystery as it appears in Rahner in chapter 5.4 of this thesis.
310 We return to the theme of the "other" in both Rahner and Kristeva's writing in ch.s 6 & 7 of this 
thesis. Here we address Rahner's understanding that "otherness" is intrinsic to language, and indeed to 
all beings.
311 Rahner, "Theology of the Symbol" TI 4, p. 229.
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away" to matter, in which process matter gains meaning and intelligibility. 312 Here 
we signpost significant shared ground between Rahner and Kristeva. Both emphasise 
inner-plurality and specify language as key to the process of becoming.
Expression in language is understood as involving a complex process by which the 
human being can receive knowledge from another or from an inanimate object. In this 
examination we shall appreciate that Rahner elevates the function and potential of 
language beyond mere human contrivance. Language is the chief means by which 
human beings achieve their purpose. Language, being the means to communicate 
essence, therefore can be said to be the vehicle to bring beings to their perfection. It is 
implicitly involved in the "being" of all beings and brings them towards a fuller self- 
expression. Key to this understanding is that words and language are "human" in 
origin but are made sense of in the intellect, which is a facet of the spirit, the human 
soul. Using Rahner's terms, whilst words emanate from the material realm they are 
received and retrieved by the human as transcendent soul.
In "Theology of the Symbol" Rahner applies his linguistic notion of "realsymbol" to a 
discussion of the human being as body and soul. We will recall that the concept 
"realsymbol" was originally used by Rahner to express the relationship between word 
and meaning. In this anthropological context, Rahner asserts that the human soul 
should not be imagined as pre-existing the body, as some kind of alien to the body. 
Instead he says that body and soul are congenitally joined as a unity-in-difference. 
The body contributes matter, allowing for the person to be seen as individual. 
Through this expression of individuality the soul achieves its perfection as a person.313
"(A) being realizes itself in its own intrinsic "otherness," retentive of its 
intrinsic plurality, as its derivative and hence congruous expression, it makes 
itself known. This derivative and congruous expression, constitutive of each 
being, is the symbol which comes in addition from the object of knowledge to 
the knower - in addition only, because already initially present in the depths of 
the grounds of each one's being. The being is known in this symbol, without 
which it cannot be known at all: thus it is symbol in the original 
(transcendental) sense of the word.'"314
312 Ibid, p.231.
313 Ibid, p.246-7.
314 Ibid. p230-231.
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As a "realsymbol" the person is able to think, imagine and feel. This is only possible 
because the soul is mediated to itself in and through the body.315 In summary 
therefore, Rahner describes human self-consciousness as a special case of the 
operation of a symbol. The human person, as all symbolic beings, achieves self- 
fulfilment by self-alienation and re-appropriation.
Clearly, Rahner's concepts of and 'realsymbol' are central to our 
discussion. These complex and inter-related concepts are vital themes in Rahner's 
exploration of the exo-centric self. We can agree with William Hill in his work The 
Three-Personned God that for Rahner,
"Everything, to the extent that it is, seeks to come to full realization of itself by 
bringing its own being to expression in "another" that it posits over and 
against itself....This is constitutive of the very essence of being in coming to 
its fulfilment. Thus, the mystery of being is such that it is one, but only one in 
its plurality, i.e., it maintains itself precisely by resolving and disclosing itself 
into a plurality."316
In other words, the very essence of reality is of unified inner plurality rather than 
primordial oneness.317 The self cannot exist in Rahner's thinking as a static and 
uncomplicated singularity. The human self is a prime example of the fundamental 
essential truth about the very nature of being itself. For Rahner, "being" is plural, 
relational and procedural.
"A being is, of itself, independently of any comparison with anything else, 
plurality in its unity." 318
This resonates with Kristeva's thesis on the inner-plurality of subjecthood. In both 
Kristeva and Rahner there is the emphatic denial of a unified, singular core to 
personhood.
A central maxim for Rahner's thought is that all beings remain in a dynamic process 
of becoming through self-realisation. For Rahner, every being expresses itself because
315 Ibid, p.232.
316 William Hill, The Three-Personned God The Catholic University of America Press, 1982, p. 137.
317 This point highlights the need for a discussion on Rahner's understanding of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. This will follow in ch.7 of this thesis. We mention the Trinity here as an anticipation of this 
fuller examination.
318 Rahner, "Theology of the Symbol" TI 4, p.227.
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every being desires to be known; every being seeks communion. Reality itself is 
therefore symbolic in as much as it expresses itself in order to realise itself. This is the 
fundamental message of "The Theology of the Symbol."
4.6 An Initial Brief Comparison between Rahner's Theory of Language and that 
of Kristeva.
We appreciate from both our theorists that an understanding of subjectivity needs to 
pay careful attention to the importance and role of language. We have identified that 
both Rahner and Kristeva use an understanding of the nature of language to suggest 
the inner plurality of being. Both emphasise the role of language to bring about the 
process of becoming in the continual recreation of the self, and both privilege poetic 
and religious language in this. Language is seen as transgressive in both schemas. 
Such a wealth of common ground is an encouragement to our task to consider a theory 
of the self from an inter-face between Rahner and Kristeva.
However, our initial enthusiasm at the shared ground in this respect needs to be 
tempered with a consideration of the direction in which each takes this theory of 
language in the creation of an understanding of subjectivity. Rahner's theory of 
language informs the creation of the person, however, it does not wholly prescribe the 
shape of subjectivity. The person as hearer will also be shaped with reference to a 
realm outside of text and ultimately relate to a transcendent reality which is accessible 
to a hearer. This is not the case for Kristeva who, following post-structuralist anti- 
realism, sees discourse as entirely circumscribing reality and the possibilities of 
subjectivity. We shall now consider the aspects of the speaking subject and Kristeva's 
theory of language that do not sit so comfortably alongside theological theories such 
as we have encountered in Rahner.
We recall that, for post-structuralist thinkers such as Kristeva, the signifier does not 
directly express the signified. They attach and separate from each other. Contrary to 
Rahner's understanding of symbolisation, meaning is not immediately present in a 
sign, neither can it be said to be present in a mediated way, by referring to a symbol,
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as per Rahner. 319 Following Derrida, for Kristeva, there is no way that the content and 
means of expression can be unified. The sign must always be studied "under erasure."
Kristeva's understanding of meaning in signs stands in stark contrast to Rahner's idea 
that the symbol is "derivative and congruous" with the being it mediates and that the 
sign may be a vehicle of symbolic meaning. For Rahner, meaning lies within 
language, it is incarnate in words. As Paul Avis says Rahner favours "Symbolic 
Realism", an understanding of symbols that avoids both literalism and anti-realism. 
Avis summarises Rahner's approach for us saying,
"There is no symbolic meaning without an actual symbolic fact to serve as its 
vehicle."320
Furthermore, one of the distinctive features of post-structuralist theories such as 
Kristeva's is the direct application made between theories of language and theories of 
subjectivity. We have witnessed that the "turn to the subject" so evident in 
contemporary thought is achieved by means of a "turn to language." The 
deconstruction begun in textual analysis is extended to destabilise personhood to the 
extent that the notion of a unified or substantial self is completely rejected by 
postmodernist theories. There is the inference within such systems that the unified self 
is necessarily a means of oppression and its demise something to celebrated. In 
Kristeva's system, post-structuralist philosophies of language have been the means to 
achieve such a coup. For Kristeva the theory of the unfixed nature of meaning within 
language can be immediately and directly applied to the deconstruction of the notion 
of the unified self. For instance, if nothing is ever fully present in signs, and the 
components of language are to no extent as fixed as previously imagined, then 
meaning itself is a precarious notion. Meaning will change from context to context. In 
such a deconstructuralist paradigm the human self is to be regarded as constructed 
solely through language,321 and so the idea that personhood is stable or unified must 
also be abandoned. In the place of unified self we find merely the "play" of a 
multiplicity of selves, each one unstable and disintegrating.322
319 Peggy Kamuf (ed.) A Derrida reader : between the blinds. Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991 
& Julian Wolfreys Deconstruction : Derrida, Macmillan, 1998.
320 Avis, op. cit, p. 156.
321 A concept we explored in depth in the previous chapter on Kristeva's notion of the creation of the 
self of this thesis.
322 Such a belief in the dissolution of a unified, coherent self is exemplified in Kristeva's work as we 
have seen in ch.s 2 and 3 of this thesis.
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To a lesser extent, but with arguably significant similarities, the application of 
linguistic theory to anthropology is apparent in Rahner's writing: a turn to the subject 
via an inquiry into the symbol. Whilst Rahner's notion of personhood retains the 
elements of process, reciprocity and evolution it does so without the dissolution of 
meaning. Rahner's notion of the person is one of inner plurality yet anchored, or 
perhaps tethered, as it journeys to an external referent, the transcendent reality of God. 
For Rahner, human personhood reflects the ultimate Being from which it originates 
and to which it travels. Here, language and symbols inform theories of subjectivity, 
but not in isolation. There is an arena outside of the text and a pre-symbolic facet to 
meaning that shapes personhood.
Even given this fundamental difference, there are a number of similarities apparent 
when Rahner's theories are brought into comparison with Kristeva's. Kristeva holds 
the tentative position of allowing a space for the self to shelter from deconstruction, 
in, as we suggested earlier, the persistence of the illusive 'chora'. The subject remains 
as a process of balancing between the semiotic and symbolic linguistic forces. This 
offers the possibility for a number of positive comparisons between Kristeva and 
Rahner's theories.
Firstly, there is an apparent and striking similarity in their notion of poetry. Both see 
poetic words as being powerfully loaded and disruptive. Poetry disrupts the illusion of 
a static self, and more broadly deconstructs the simplistic unity of being itself. Both 
Rahner and Kristeva dismiss the notion of primordial oneness. For Rahner this is 
expressed in the "surplus meaning" within all words, where the poetic or primordial 
which are especially potent. They may even become "archetypes", expressing the 
transcendent realm beyond, and fracturing the sense of uncomplicated meaning and 
object identification. They are rightfully described as translucent. They obscure and 
reveal meaning at one and the same time. He describes them as full of "the soft music 
of infinity".323 Kristeva too denotes the power of poetic words as having a musical 
quality. For her they contain an opportunity for the repressed remembrance of the
323 TI 3 and TI 4, as examined earlier in this chapter.
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sounds of the semiotic M/Other to disrupt the apparent order and unity of the Law of 
the Father in symbolic language324 .
Rahner does not emphatically privilege a certain type of poetry, as Kristeva does in 
her favouring of avant-garde poets. Rather, he stresses that all words have a surplus of 
meaning to some extent or another. However, both agree that the operation of poetic 
words is fundamentally redemptive. For Rahner, they bring about an encounter with 
the transcendent reality and ultimate meanings for which they are the vehicles. They 
also point to the constitution of all being as inherently plural. For Kristeva, poetic 
words are the reappearance of the semiotic as it breaks through the symbolic overlay 
of thetic language. In both writers, the purpose of poetic language is to bring about 
redemption from the imagined notion of the fixed and static self. They bring the "soft 
music of eternity" to bear upon such notions and can transform the self as they are 
used and received as expressions of the other, of plural being. In both schemas the 
enemy is the rationalistic, unified cogito; in both schemas the aim is for a plural, 
procedural self. Both dismiss primordial oneness for relational dynamism. For 
Rahner, this process is driven by divine grace, for Kristeva it is the activity of the 
semiotic. In both there is remembrance and process, an original state of plurality and 
the threat of the static state of illusionary oneness.
In this comparison, where so much is revealed in regards to shared interests, careful 
attention should be given to the very precise and different use of the term "symbolic". 
For Kristeva this denotes the later, acquired, thetic overlay of language which will 
separate the developing individual from its semiotic origins experienced at the 
M/Other. Whilst Kristeva is keen not to give a qualitative judgement to the symbolic, 
her references to the musicality and freedom of the semiotic somewhat entails the 
symbolic to be seen as rigid and confining, an aspect of the Law of the Father. Whilst 
her paradigm will not allow for value judgements to be made, her writing suggests a 
privileging for the feminine semiotic. It is in the recognition of the semiotic, its inner 
divisions and fracturing presence, that the self experiences jouissance.325 However, if 
the semiotic is privileged, Kristeva does not see a way back to the semiotic realm, and
324 This is examined in ch.6 pp. 132-153 of this thesis.
325 This is Kristeva's chosen term denoting the "joying" in inner plurality. It is offered as a for the 
self, a concept we shall return to in ch.9, pp.215-237 of this thesis.
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the symbolic is not to be viewed in a negative sense.326 Kristeva views the symbolic 
as entirely necessary for the development of separate identity. It is also the vehicle by 
which the semiotic is carried into the psyche of the individual. In such a way 
judgements about the value of each process are avoided; neither is "better" than the 
other is.
As we have seen in this chapter, for Rahner, the symbolic is entirely necessary for a 
being to express itself, which is its ultimate purpose. Symbols are the visible or 
audible tip of the ontological iceberg that is being. They are the means by which a 
being both expresses and actualises its being. The symbolic is therefore spoken of in 
unashamedly value-laden terms. It is part of the divine graced gift to the human being 
and is essential in human becoming.
In these areas of shared interest and approach there appears to be ground for 
engagement between the two theorists. It appears possible to use Kristeva's notion of 
the semiotic alongside that of Rahner's notion of symbolic language to argue for a 
notion of subjectivity whereby poetic language is seen as instrumental. However, we 
anticipate significant difficulties in relating Rahner's thought to other disciplines 
outside of theology, since both his methodology and the theories arising from this are 
fundamentally and intrinsically theological. His has been most fittingly titled a 
"theology" of language in our appraisal. We might expect disciplines such as post- 
modern literary theory to view Rahner's use of theological notions within theories of 
symbolisation as an anathema. Does Rahner's reliance upon the transcendent realm 
prohibit any opportunity for a dialogue with Kristeva's?
It is worth considering that popular misreadings of theological theories may assume 
the theologian is arguing from a top-down rationale, i.e.: this is how God is revealed 
(in our religious understanding) and therefore it follows that this is how human reality 
must be. Our reading of Rahner offers encouragement in this respect. Rahner does not 
seek to construct his theology or anthropology in this "from above" way. Rather, he 
begins with an investigation of human cognitive faculties, after Kant, and discovers 
evidence there for the existence of a divine background of being. This is an 
326 Cf. Ch. 3 pp.52-60 of this thesis.
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methodology. His use of transcendence comes after, and not before, a 
study of human faculties.
"Christology is the end and beginning of anthropology. And this
anthropology, when most thoroughly realized in Christology, is eternally
theology." 327
Rahner's pre-suppositions come after reflection upon human experience. As Michael 
Buckley says,
"The world intimates God, and does so because human beings find it finally 
insufficient to answer their questions.... the drive towards coherence is 
embodied in every question we ask."328
Such a methodology may sit at odds with Kristeva's yet, we believe, it cannot be said 
to be negated by it. After all, the problematic exercise of relating post-modern theories 
to lived experiences perhaps suggests that postmodernism's methodology might more 
fittingly be described as "top-down" or themselves. Here, the text takes the 
place of the divine "top" or 'meta-notion'. Theories about the 'active-only' text are 
extrapolated down to notions of the subject.
If it is permissible to argue from a critique of language towards a theory of the nature 
of reality (a far grander exercise, and one undertaken by post-structuralists) might it 
not also be permissible to argue, as Rahner does, in a regressive manner, from things 
as they appear, towards conclusions as to the nature of how things must be? Both 
systems seem to entail certain ideological allowances. Both relate one system of being 
and experience to another of a different scale. In the same way in which Rahner's 
theory can be said to be reliant upon the actual existence of the transcendent realm, so 
too post-modernism's notion about the nature of being (as ultimately anti-realist) rests 
upon its critique of structuralist notions of language. Both suffer if these foundations 
are disallowed or rejected. Our point here is that systems other than theology require a 
certain amount of "faith" in their pre-suppositions. Both only work if these pre- 
suppositions hold firm. In regards to Rahner's pre-supposition (divine nature as the 
ultimate affirmation of a distinct nature of reality), the long history of theology points 
to the impossibility of proving the existence, or indeed non-existence, of God on the 
basis of rational argument alone. Theology has taken the view that religious
327 Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation," TIIV, p. 117.
328 Michael Buckley, op. cit., p.34.
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knowledge involves the operation of a system of "knowing" or believing which 
operates beyond rationalism. Fittingly for our project, this "knowing" of the 
transcendent insists upon the relevance of ways of knowing which involve the 
operation of symbols and creative imagination, as well as the response of faith to 
religious experience.
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5: Rahner: The Person as Hearer
We have considered Rahner's arena for personhood and his philosophy of language. 
We now draw together our examination of Rahner's notion of subjectivity by 
outlining the aspects of the human person as a hearer which we believe are significant 
to contemporary theology and will be of interest in a critical comparison with the 
speaking subject. We Here we allow Rahner to speak in his own terms. We shall 
follow the themes of Rahner's major work Foundations of Christian Faith: an 
Introduction to the idea of Christianity329 and a number of other devotional essays.
Rahner begins his first chapter of Foundations bv asking,
"What kind of hearer does Christianity anticipate so that its real and ultimate 
message can be heard?"330
This is an example of the transcendental method of enquiry that we have come to 
expect from Rahner, since it presupposes the Christian message and argues back to 
what must therefore be true. In this case, Rahner asks, "What must be true of the 
human hearer of the divine Word given the nature and content of the Christian 
message?"331 Alongside this use of the transcendental method comes the 
corresponding appeal to experience. Rahner invites his reader to compare their 
experience of what it is to be a human person with that which can be pre-supposed 
given the nature of the Christian message.
"Everyone then is asked whether he can recognize himself as that person who 
is here trying to express his self-understanding, or whether in responsibility to 
himself and to his existence he can affirm as the conviction which is to be the 
truth for him that he is not such a person as Christianity tells him he is."332
For Rahner, the philosophical transcendental method of enquiry is accessible from the 
point of human self-experience. He suggests that a person is "fundamentally and by 
its very nature pure openness for absolutely everything."333 Essentially, for Rahner, in 
knowing his or her own limits and fmitude the human subject imagines and longs to
329 Rahner, Foundations of the Christian Faith: An Introduction to the idea of Christianity 
Trans William V Dych, New York, Crossroad, 1978.
330 Rahner, FCF p.24
331 We note a similar turn to the experience of revelation, and precisely of revelation as encounter in 
Emil Brunner's anthropology. See Brunner's Man in Revolt: a Christian anthropology, trans. Olive 
Wyon, Lutterworth Press, 1939. "The Word of God, as revealed to us through the Holy Scriptures, is 
thus not merely the ground of knowledge, but it is also the ground of man's being." p.72.
332 Rahner, FCF p.25.
333 FCF p. 19
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move beyond its own reach. This is the first glimpse we have of the person as a hearer 
of transcendence in Foundations. For Rahner, all knowledge is also self-knowledge 
since everything we know is known against the horizon of all that we do not know, 
yet strain towards. This, Rahner says, is a universal and obvious human experience; 
"it is clear that one must speak of it because it is always there."334 This experience 
drives the person to metaphysical explanations of their being. It is the openness of the 
human person to ideas of being that confirms Rahner's claims that all humans are 
necessarily metaphysicians,
"[The human person] wants to know what everything is, particularly in its 
unity, in which everything always already encounters him. He asks after the 
final backgrounds; he asks after the one ground of all things; and, in so far as 
he knows every thing as existent, he asks after the being of all that is."335
"This kind of knowledge is present in every man or woman as belonging 
essentially to the very roots of cognition in him or her, and as constituting the 
starting point and prior condition for all reflexive knowledge...an experience 
so inescapable, in other words, that in its ultimate structures its reality is 
implicitly asserted in the very act of denying it or calling it in question.'??336
In this, Rahner purports that a human person has universal qualities which, by their 
very nature, point to metaphysical explanations. Interestingly, even the denial of this 
original experience of selfhood is in fact proof of its existence. This is so because the 
ability to argue against a particular anthropology is an example of cognition which in 
itself implies unthematic knowledge of the experience of the self. Viewing 
metaphysics an intrinsic part of what it means to be human offers a striking contrast 
between the person as hearer and that of Kristeva's notion of the speaking subject. 
Kristeva rejects all metaphysical notons. In its place we have observed a turn to the 
meta-structures of discourse as the arena of subjectivity. However, we note that the 
subject's ability to take up a variety of subject positions within a text offers a qualified
oo'y
measure of transcendence, the transcendence from a static subject position.
Returning to Rahner, with the focus of experience utilised, he begins with the 
statement that personhood is a "presupposition of the Christian message."338 In other
334 FCF p.26
335 HW p.44
336 Rahner "Experience of Self and Experience of God" TI 13 pp 122-32, p. 125
337 We shall examine the notion of freedom for the speaking subject in ch.8 of this thesis.
338 FCF p.26
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words, subjectivity is personal. Furthermore, personhood is intimately related to 
relationship, in this case to a dialogical relationship with God.339
"A personal relationship to God, a genuinely dialogical history of salvation 
between God and man, the acceptance of one's own, unique, eternal salvation, 
the notion of the responsibility before God and his judgement, all these 
assertions of Christianity, however they are to be explained more precisely, 
imply that man is what we want to say here; person and subject."340
The broad characteristic aspects of the person as hearer outlined in Foundations are of 
the human subject as possessing universal characteristics, an in-built tendency to 
metaphysics and to be a truly personal and relational being.
5.1 The Hearer as Original Experience
In a further anticipated contrast to Kristeva's speaking subject, Rahner's anthropology 
addresses the person in its totality. Other accounts of subjectivity offer what Rahner 
terms "regional anthropologies." These include the human sciences that address 
certain aspects of the person such as biology or sociology. For Rahner, such partial 
answers may be valid, however the human person stands back from them to judge 
their validity against an unthematic original experience of selfhood.
In his insistence that credence be given to an original experience of subjectivity 
Rahner's notion of the person as hearer is clearly at odds with postmodernism/post- 
structuralist approaches which fracture the notion of the subject by deconstructive 
methods. In contrast, Rahner begins with the subject as whole because he says that 
people experience their subjectivity in this way, as an "original experience." He uses 
this term to denote an experience both profound yet obvious to all; one that cannot be 
ignored. We experience ourselves as being selves. This cannot be fully expressed in 
words since it is "unthematic knowledge".
"The product of reflection and objedification is never adequate to the original 
reality or vision." 341
For Rahner, the human person confronts itself as a whole because the conclusions 
reached as we examine any part of the whole (such as gender, biology, or psychology)
339 We shall examine this further in the following chapter of this thesis. It is mentioned here to 
complete the three characteristics of subjectivity in Foundations: universal qualities, a tendency to 
metaphysics and personal relationality.
340 FCF p. 26
341 Geoffrey Kelly's reading of Rahner's notion of the original experience of the self from Karl Rahner: 
theologian of the graced search for meaning ed. Geoffrey Kelly, T & T Clark, p.37.
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will always lead us to stand back and, as a whole person, examine each conclusion. In 
other words we possess a wider framework to assess the claims of regional 
anthropologies, and in this broader frame the self experiences itself to be a greater 
whole. Rahner purports that all attempts to understand what we are require that we 
stand apart from any reductionist answer and confront our "original experience." In 
this way Rahner's anthropology is decidedly opposed to reductionism. He insists that 
the person as hearer is more than the sum of its parts.
"In the fact that man raises analytical questions about himself and opens 
himself to the unlimited horizons of such questioning, he has already 
transcended himself and every conceivable element of such an analysis or of 
an empirical reconstruction of himself. In doing this he is affirming himself as 
more than the sum of such analysable components of his reality.. .A finite 
system cannot confront itself in its totality.. .It does not ask questions about 
itself. It is not a subject. The experience of radical questioning and man's 
ability to place himself in question are things which a finite system cannot 
accomplish."342
The crux of Rahner's argument here is that our very recognition of our fmitude 
indicates that we transcend it. It is this questioning that is the means by which we 
experience ourselves as "transcendent being, as spirit."343
As we continue to explore this "original experience" we find our personhood is not 
straightforward or uncomplicated, but rather, it is one of immense and radical 
questioning. We experience ourselves as selves but also fundamentally as questions. 
For Rahner, our radical questioning of who we are, by many and varied human 
sciences, is not so much what we do but what we are. We might say that Rahner 
would not be surprised by the contemporary turn to the subject in fields such as post- 
structuralism. We might surmise that he would not be shaken by Kristeva's notion of 
the speaking subject. In fact, for him, such theories are evidence of the broader need 
for self-examination and questioning which characterises the person as hearer. 
However, he warns against reductionism and posits a notion of subjectivity which 
challenges us to pitch the claims of various anthropologies against out own "original 
experience". We shall bear this in mind as we turn to a direct comparison between the 
person as hearer and the speaking subject in this thesis.
342 FCF p. 29-30
343 FCF p.33
344 Seech. 10 of this thesis.
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Having set the broad tone of his exploration of subjectivity, Rahner continues to 
explore the nature of the self as possessing a number of "existentials." In Foundations 
Rahner lists them as being directed towards transcendence, being responsible and free, 
placed in history, orientated to holy mystery, capable of sin and social in nature.345 
Here we briefly examine each of these attributes of the hearer.
5.2 The Hearer as Directed towards Transcendence
In respect to transcendence we recall that, following Aquinas, Rahner views the 
human person as possessing both sensory knowledge and intellect.346 Intellect, in this 
Thomist sense, is the ability to know things intuitively, beyond knowledge gained 
through sensory experience.347 Intellect is a facet of the soul, and as such, the human 
intellect contains transcendental experience. In epistemological terms this is the 
hearer's pre-apprehension of the infinite ground of being. Knowing is therefore 
intimately bound to experiencing transcendence.348 For Rahner, always and 
everywhere, in every act of knowing, humanity experiences transcendence. This 
experience is fundamental to what it is to be human. It cannot be avoided, although as 
we shall see, it can be ignored or rejected. For Rahner, all those who embrace an 
openness to encounter transcendence are mystics, whether this is a knowing search for 
divine revelation or not. We are all mystics. As Harvey Egan says,
"Strictly speaking, therefore, everyone is at least a sleeping, distracted, or 
repressed mystic. To deny this experience with one's entire being - not simply 
with words- is to deny one's deepest self'349
Rahner believes that every person is a spiritual being, a mystic and a theologian in the 
sense that all are compelled to 'hear' the revelation that emanates throughout the 
created world and at the very core of their being.
345 FCF p. 26
346 A useful guide to Thomist thought in this respect is An Introduction to St Thomas Aquinas ed. 
Anton Pegis, Random House, 1948. His chapter on human intellect is found pp. 22-27.
347 We saw this in Rahner's understanding of the means by which a person uses symbols. See ch.4 of 
this thesis. Aquinas saw intellect as the means by which angelic beings gain knowledge since they have 
no bodily senses. Animals have only sensory knowledge. The human being stands between these two 
categories, having both sense and intellect. See Pegis, Ibid.
348 See the ch. 4 of this thesis for a detailed account of Rahner's epistemology.
349 Egan, Karl Rahner: Mystic of Everyday Life, Crossroad, 1989, p.57.
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Rahner adds that the person who exercises their openness to holy mystery will not 
only come to experience God as the distant horizon but also as an intimate home.
"Persons who open themselves to their transcendental experience of the holy 
mystery at all have the experience that this mystery is not only an infinitely 
distant horizon...which frightens them away and back into the narrow 
confines of their everyday world. They experience rather that this holy 
mystery is also a hidden closeness, a forgiving intimacy, their real home, that 
is a love which shares itself, something familiar which they can approach and 
turn to from the estrangement of their own perilous and empty lives."350
This facet of Rahner's theology of transcendence opens his notion of holy mystery to 
aspects of religious experience in which the faith encounter is of God as a familiar and 
intimate place of security. It is an important counter-balance to the experience of God 
as horizon and one that embraces a magnitude of faith experiences.
5.3 The Hearer as Responsible and Free
Rahner moves on to discuss the responsibility and freedom351 of the human hearer. 
He says that the Christian message presupposes a hearer who can listen and respond. 
In this the hearer has both responsibility and freedom.
"Like subjectivity and personhood, so too responsibility and freedom are 
realities of transcendental experience."352
Rahner understands a person's freedom to go beyond the capacity to choose from a
variety of options within everyday experience. Freedom is more fundamentally the
ability to decide about ourselves and actualise our being.353 It is a facet of our whole
being, rather than a part that can be separated off. It is an experience of our subjective
reality.
Anne E. Carr, reading Rahner, says
"Freedom is not something which one has, like a motor in a car, a tool which 
one can use for good or ill according to circumstances. It is, rather, who one is 
as one creates oneself in time and relationships, the person one has already 
become, and the person one proposes to be in the future." 354
350 FCFp.l31
351 A more thorough study of human freedom will appear later in ch.8. We are dealing with the topic 
briefly here as a characteristic of the hearer.352 FCF p.37
353 FCF p.36-40
354 Anne E. Carr, "Starting with the Human" from A World of Grace: An Introduction to the Themes 
and Foundations of Karl Rahner's Theology Ed. Leo J O'Donovan, The Seabury Press, New York, 
1980, p.24.
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"Cynicism or hope, despair or courage, indifference or love in the face of 
concrete circumstances shape our lives, indeed our very selves. We are in our 
own hands, and this kind of freedom cannot be escaped."355
This freedom relates to the totality of being rather than just one instance of choice. In 
this way human beings are "coming to freedom."356 According to Rahner, we exercise 
individual freedom in the extent to which we commit to or distract ourselves from our 
transcendental orientation. Human actualisation is therefore measured by the extent to 
which the human being is a hearer. Rahner says that the question of our existence 
begins a process by which we exercise our freedom. The extent to which we co- 
operate with this process is ultimately our responsibility since the question of our 
existence is ever present. Considering human freedom and openness, Rahner says that 
the "regional anthropologies" seeking to explain human behaviour can be the catalyst 
to drive us towards freedom, or become a place to abdicate responsibility. As Brian O. 
McDermott says,
"I can choose to recognize these explanations as the stuff of my freedom, as 
the account of what I am empirically but not of who I am called to be...In 
other words, all the motivational and quantitative explanations of what I am 
can become the field in which I live out my life in gratitude, or the hiding 
place where I avoid my responsibilities."357
We have no excuse that we were not able to understand our responsibility in this 
because our nature as questioning will always presuppose the ability to stand and hear 
a response, even if this response is ultimate mystery.
Rahner is far from alone in his emphasis here. Wolfhart Pannenberg can be seen to 
share in focussing upon the theme of human "openness" and the notion that human 
being is a process to be fulfilled.358 Pannenberg similarly replaces the notion of the 
human being as possessing a substantive soul with one of a relational structure. The 
human is a "becoming" in the extent to which he or she is "open" to the future, to 
relationships and the divine, and this will determine the extent to which he or she 
actualises their own being. Furthermore, Christoph Schwobel describes such relational
355 Ibid, p.26
356 FCF p. 96
357 Brian O. McDermott, "The Bonds of Freedom." A World of Grace: An Introduction to the Themes 
and Foundations of Karl Rahner's Theology. Ed. Leo J O'Donovan, The Seabury Press, 1980 p52.
358 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective trans. Matthew J. O'Connel, T&T 
Clark, 1985
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understandings of the human person as, "Form(ing) a common element in 
contemporary anthropological reflection."359
Rahner's emphasis upon human freedom and openness is synchronous with that found 
in Pannenberg, Moltmann, Jwigel and others. For the purposes of this project, 
Rahner's notion of the hearer provides us with an approach that is in keeping with a 
strong trend within contemporary Christian anthropology.360 According to Schwobel 
contemporary Christian anthropology can be defined by a similar desire to re-situate 
what is characteristic about the human being away from the notion of a substantive 
soul and rationality, and towards relationality and eschatological process.
5.4 The Hearer as Historical
The human person as hearer experiences the extent to which they are deeply 
conditioned and influenced by their historical position.361 This is not seen to be at 
odds with human transcendence, in fact Rahner says, "transcendentality and freedom 
are realized in history."362 He continues,
"In so far as he experiences his historical conditioning, he is already beyond it 
in a certain sense, but nevertheless he cannot really leave it behind. Being 
situated in this way between the finite and the infinite is what constitutes man, 
and is shown by the fact that it is his infinite transcendence and in his freedom 
that man experiences himself as dependent and historically constituted." 363
In other words, the fact that we do experience ourselves as products of our time and 
circumstance is due to an underlying transcendence we have from these inescapable 
conditioning influences. We are dependent upon our circumstances and relationships 
to others in that we do not experience ourselves as subjects in complete control of our 
lives, but as Rahner says, we are "disquieted by the appearance of being" and "open to 
something ineffable."364 Furthermore we do not experience ourselves as the creators 
of our selves, or our situation, but find ourselves as having received limits and 
contingencies from a foundation of being beyond ourselves. Of this, Carr says,
359 Christoph Schwobel, "The Human Being as Relational Being" Persons Human and Divine, p. 141.
360 We deal with this in ch.8.11 of this thesis.
361 We first encountered this theme in our appraisal of the arena of selfhood pre-supposed by Rahner. 
Here we focus on the attributes that emerge in the self from just such an arena.362 FCF p.40
363 FCF p. 42
364 FCF, p.34
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"We experience...our greatness as transcendent spirit and our smallness as 
finite, limited, receptive beings. The paradoxical union of both elements is the 
meaning of human personhood."365
Rahner says that we experience dependence in relation to our historical conditions. 
However, in our awareness of these origins, we are able to transcend them. The 
human person is therefore deeply dependent upon the interpersonal relationships of 
which they are a part. This resonates, somewhat, with the emphasis upon the influence 
of cultural setting within much post-modem thought that might be seen to inform 
Kristeva's notion of the speaking subject. The main difference here is that, as we have 
seen, Rahner insists that the self as hearer is able to transcend these origins to an 
extent and is driven to do so by an awareness of them.
5.5 The Hearer of Mystery
The hearer's orientation to mystery is further suggestive of the place between 
transcendence and finitude that they occupy in history. For Rahner, even when it is 
not overtly apparent, the hearer's orientation to mystery is an orientation to God. 
Rahner exactly relates the terms mystery and God here by stating that the only way 
we can really know what the term "God" means is due to our orientation to mystery.
"A person explicitly understands what is meant by "God" only insofar as he 
allows his transcendence beyond everything objectively identifiable to enter 
into his consciousness, accepts it, and objectifies in reflection what is already 
present in his transcendentality." 366
In a prolonged discussion about the term "God" Rahner suggests that it means "the 
silent one". "God" refers to "silent mystery" and is "the final word before we become 
silent."367 It is important to Rahner that the meaning of the word "God" is outside our 
finite understanding and therefore cannot really be objectified by a word, but in 
silence. For Rahner silence here is not the lack of communication but the place where 
words completely fail and fall silent. It is being "helplessly silent" in response to 
"God" that makes us human hearers and not clever animals.368 Once Rahner has 
explained the restrictions of the term "God" (it can mistakenly suggest an object), he 
replaces it with other terms such as "holy mystery" or "horizon of being".
365 Carr op. cit. p.22
366 FCF p. 44
367 FCF p.46-47
368 FCF p.48
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In elevating everyday experiences to possible mystical encounters Rahner by no 
means reduces the content of revelation to the mundane. In fact, he suggests that were 
we to constantly strain to hear God "with every moment of life" we would be 
undertaking an unfulfillable, yet never futile task. In all of our hearing we hear 
mystery. Rahner states that we only truly know and hear God when we grasp God's 
incomprehensibility. He says,
"When I approach God to the extent I understand him, I only reach him when I 
perceive him as the absolute mystery that surpasses me. And when I do not 
perceive him as the absolute mystery, then I have to say: Stop! You're on the 
wrong track, this path certainly does not lead to the true God of Christianity, 
the God of eternal life.. .For me, God is precisely that mystery of the 
incomprehensible, the inexpressible, toward which at every moment of my life 
I am always tending."369
For Rahner, what we know of God is known 'after the fact'; it is always 
knowledge.370 We can ultimately say with Rahner that the reality of God is not a 
concept we can fully grasp. It is rather that which grasps us.371
The purpose of our hearing God is not, therefore, to lead us to the point where we 
understand the divine with any clarity or certainty; it is rather an experience we grasp 
which is beyond our full understanding. So Rahner proposes that we call the divine 
source of our original experience of transcendence the "holy mystery."372 For Rahner, 
this mystery is inescapable. It is not unknowable: it is inexhaustible,
"Mystery is not what I do not know. I do know it. I know it as Mystery, as the 
final context of my life.. .in this sense, Mystery is in comprehensibility -1 can 
never enclose it in definition. For Mystery is the endlessly intelligible. It is its 
own explanation and the explanation of everything whose reality raises a question."373
What is more, for Rahner, this mystery speaks through silence.
"I recall an interview by Dan Rather with Mother Teresa of Calcutta. "What 
do you say to God when you pray?" he asks, mother Teresa quietly replied, "I 
listen." Slightly flustered, Rather tried again, "Well, then, what does God 
say?" Mother Teresa smiles, "He listens."374
369 Paul Imhof and Hubert Biallowons (ed.s) Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews 
1965-1982", Harvey Egan, trans. (ed). Crossroad, 1997, p.216-217.
370 FCF p.52-53
371 FCF p.54
372 FCF p.60
373 Michael J Buckley, "Within Holy Mystery" from A World of Grace: An introduction to the themes 
and foundations of Karl Rahner's theology. Leo J O'Donovan (ed.), Seabury Press, 1980, p.40.
374 Taken from Philip Yancey, Finding God in Unexpected Places. Hodder and Stoughton, 2002.
119
The experience of Mother Teresa's prayer beautifully illustrates what Rahner is 
speaking about.
5.6 Can we choose not to hear?
In this chapter we have examined the idea that openness to transcendence is a 
universal and inescapable human trait.375 However, in the same passage in 
Foundations, Rahner says that it is the very everyday nature of this awareness which 
can mean that it is overlooked; that we can become so used to the possibility of 
"hearing" that we forget what we are doing and overlook it.
"If it is clear that one must speak of it because it is always there, but for this 
reason it can also be constantly overlooked; if it is clear that by its very nature 
it can never have the novel attraction of an object that is unexpectedly 
encountered, if all of this is clear then one understands the difficulty of the 
task we are undertaking."376
In other words our ability to hear God, to tune in to the transcendent, is something we 
know how to do without having any reason to reflect upon this ability. For Rahner, it 
is only with spiritual discipline and awareness of the "mysticism of everyday life" that 
we can come to this knowledge reflexively. However, can we choose not to hear?
Rahner says that by suppressing our questions and immersing ourselves in concrete 
concerns alone we can avoid acknowledging the transcendent and spiritual dimension 
of our being. This is possible because human transcendence is in the "background." 
Rahner says,
"It is present only as a secret ingredient."377
The person who distracts themselves from all thoughts of transcendence is ultimately 
denying their own being. However, all such attempts will never be able to remove a 
person from the arena in which God's self-communication is received, since this is 
not found within some religious enclosure, but rather permeates the whole created 
order and is constitutive of our very nature.
375 FCFp.21
376 FCF p. 21
377 FCF p. 35
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5.7 The Hearer as Social and Interpersonal
The final attribute of the person as hearer from Foundations is to be social and 
interpersonal. He will develop this theme later in a discussion about how the love of 
neighbour is united to love of God.378 The person who is open to the otherness of 
those in society is precisely the person who is and can be open to the otherness of 
God.
As we saw in chapter one of this thesis there has been a degree of disagreement 
among Rahner's commentators as to whether his treatment of the human person as 
interpersonal is adequate.379 We identified with Mark Lloyd Taylor (1986) that the 
contemporary desire to emphasise this aspect of human personhood is unmet in 
Rahner's Spirit in the World. However, building upon his portrayal of human 
transcendence, Hearer of the Word does include important material on how the human 
person exists in interpersonal relation to other persons in history. Despite this 
inclusion Lloyd Taylor concludes,
"Nevertheless, the discussions of and remain 
orientated toward the human knowledge of material objects.380
Taylor cites a late passage from an essay 
as clarifying Rahner's position,
"Personal spirit is spirit that is directed toward the other, Absolutely solitary 
spirit is a contradiction in itself and is - insofar as there can be such - hell. If 
[a person is conceived as spirit] then this means that the embodied spirit that 
man is, exists necessarily in relation to a Thou...Whoever posits man, posits 
necessarily, not only factually, human community, that is bodily, personal and 
spatio-temporal human community."381
The notion of human relationality has become a major theme across many 
contemporary theological works. Rahner's view of relationality fits with what
^co
Christoph Schwobel terms "multi-dimensional views of human relatedness." Here
378 We shall examine the notion of neighbour-love in ch. 7 and 8 of this thesis.
379 This is the view of Johann Baptist Metz, who was keen to emphasise inter-subjectivity in his 
liberation theology. Mark Lloyd Taylor God is Love: a study in the theology of Karl Rahner, Scholars 
Press American Academy of Religion, 1986, gives a brief outline of the disagreement among German 
scholars. Also see ch.l of this thesis on this point.
380 Taylor op. cit. p. 66
381 The translation from the German text of this essay appears in Mark Lloyd Taylor , op.cit., p.66
382 Schw6bel, "Human Being as Relational Being: Twelve thesis for a Christian anthropology" 
appearing in Persons Human and Divine ed. Christoph Schwobel and Colin E Gunton, T & T Clark, p. 
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the human being is self-reflective, relating to society though a web of symbolic 
systems of communication and to the divine, which is encountered as the absolute 
horizon of its being. This is a non-reductionist view of human relatedness, in which an 
adequate view of what it means to be human cannot be found from one set of human 
relations alone. Neither self-reflection nor the empirical findings of "regional 
anthropologies" account for the whole truth of what it means to be a person. As John 
Zizioulas says, they answer some of the "what" questions about a human person, but 
none of the "who" questions.383 In arguing for a non-reductionist view of human 
relatedness Rahner sees the human person as multi-dimensional and more than the 
sum of the parts of human sociological, biological or other empirical measures. We 
anticipate that this will provide one focus for our thesis that Rahner's notion of the 
person as hearer offers the possibility to engage with Kristeva's speaking subject.2384
5.8 The Hearer as a Process
Having examined the fundamental existentials that Rahner outlines for the human
person as hearer, it remains to say that, for Rahner, personhood remains radically "on 
the way".385 For Rahner, the restless and striving nature of the human person bears 
witness to their unfinished state. The constant questioning and dissatisfaction with 
goals accomplished, that are "always already relativized as something provisional at 
every stage,"386 further suggests that the human being is in process.
For Rahner, human freedom and human knowledge reveal that the human person is in 
part transcendent. This means that there is no set way by which the being is 
determined to fulfil its nature. The human person is a "radically open, unfinished, 
entity." 38? Their finished state has not been determined from the outset. The human 
being is a 'becoming'. We recall from earlier in this chapter that each human being 
remains responsible for the process of becoming, of self-actualisation.
"Freedom is not the ability to choose an object nor the ability to choose a 
particular way of relating oneself to this or that, but it is the freedom of self- 
understanding, the possibility of decision for or against oneself."388
383 John D. Zizioulas "On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood" pp.33-46 in Schwobel 
and Gunton_op.cit.
384 The conclusions drawn from this comparison are drawn together in ch.10 of this thesis.
385 Rahner, FCF p.32
386 Rahner, FCF p.32
387 RahnerTI9p.213
388 Rahner TI 6, p.185. A full consideration of freedom as a characteristic of the human person is
examined in ch.8 of this thesis.
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This chapter will continue by examining the means by which Rahner suggests we 
might become better hearers and the role of theology in this.
5.9 How We Become Better Hearers: Rahner's Theory of Revelation
By way of introduction to this section it would seem worth briefly outlining Rahner's
theory of revelation. In order to be brief, we shall focus upon this doctrine as outlined 
in Foundations.389
For Rahner, revelation is inseparable from grace. Grace and revelation share a single 
history.390 Revelation is simply what always "takes place."391 The human person is a 
revelatory event, before revelation is received or interpreted. This is powerfully 
expressed in Rahner's formulation that the human person is "the cipher of God".392 
He says,
"[The human person] is that which comes to be when God's self-expression, 
his Word, is uttered into the emptiness of the Godless void in love."393
Rahner suggests that the human preson is "the utterance within which God could 
empty himself."394
"When God wants to be what is not God [the human person] comes to be."395
The very existence of the human person, as the creation of God in God's image, 
expresses the self-revelation of God. The human hearer is the other to God, but, in 
this, the precise place where God expresses God's image.
When Rahner says that God's self-revelation is "in" the world, he stresses that the 
things in which we experience God as being present do not "contain" God. Rather, 
particular things, set as they are against an infinite horizon, point to the presence of
389 See especially FCF "The History of Salvation and Revelation" pp. 153-175. Useful supplementary 
material is found in a number of Rahner's other essays including TI 3 pp.277-93 "Spirit and Life" and 
TI 9 pp. 127-44 "Observations on the Doctrine of God in Catholic Dogmatics".
390 FCF p. 141
391 FCF p. 138
392 FCF p.224
393 FCF p.224
394 FCF p.224
395 FCF_p.225
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God everywhere and in all things. They are icons, or sacraments of God's presence.396 
In such a way God's presence is open to the human hearer at all times and in all 
things. Revelation is not merely "from beyond" or outside the human person, but the 
person is inherently constituted by and for God's self-revelation.
Rahner's emphasis upon a relational view of revelation in defining personhood 
demonstrates a key area of agreement between Rahner's idea of the hearer and that of 
Emil Brunner. Brunner brings an understanding of revelation as encounter; basing 
his ideas upon the dialogical personalism of Martin Buber, which stresses the 
difference between "I-It" and "I-Thou" relationships.398 Buber, Brunner and Rahner 
agree that there is a strongly relational element to all revelation in that the human 
person encounters the presence of God. The "hearer" of God is not therefore the 
passive recipient of communication but the 'I-Thou' partner in encounter with God.
For Brunner, the means by which revelation is received is a universal and inherent 
characteristic present within the human person. This led to the famously heated 
exchange that has become known as the "Barth-Brunner" debate.399 Brunner's 
insistence that the human person contains a "point of contact" for divine revelation 
was disputed by Barth who saw this as an attack on the Holy Spirit's ability to impart 
divine revelation without the co-operation of the human receptor. For Barth, the 
"point of contact" for revelation was evoked by the Word of God and is itself the 
result of divine revelation. Where might Rahner be placed in this debate? Whilst he 
shares with both Brunner and Barth the notion that revelation is divine encounter, his 
transcendental method of enquiry pre-supposes that the human person is inherently 
able to receive revelation in the natural, through its "graced" state. For Barth, God's 
grace comes with the impartation of revelation and so enables a point of contact. 
However for Rahner, the graced state is universal and the nature of the human is to be 
just such a graced person who can inherently receive divine revelation; which is a 
position more similar to that of Brunner.
396 FCF.p.l51
397 Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt: A Christian anthropology London, Lutterworth Press, 1939. 
"The Word of God, as revealed to us through the Holy Scriptures, is thus not merely the ground of 
knowledge, but it is also the ground of man's being", p.72.
398 Martin Buber, I and Thou trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, T&TClark 1 st edition 1937.
399 See Natural Theology: Comprising 'Nature and grace' bv Emil Brunnerand the reply 'No!' bv Karl 
Barth London: Bles, 1946.
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For Rahner, God shares in our history. Every event therefore is a possible experience 
of revelation. This has given Rahner the title of "everyday mystic." Religious 
meditation is not by any means the only avenue to hear God. He says,
"The mediation of this experience of transcendence does not necessarily have 
to be an explicitly religious mediation."400
Elucidating on Rahner's "mysticism of everyday life"401 Harvey Egan charts five 
types of experience that hone our encounter with divine mystery and so enable the 
human person to become better "hearers" of God.402 It is worth remembering that, for 
Rahner, no experience is outside of the possibility of hearing God's self-revelation,
"...There is for Christianity no separate and sacral realm where alone God is 
to be found.. .everything then can be regarded as a special providence, as an 
intervention of God, presupposing that I accept the concrete constellation of 
my life and of the world in such a way that it becomes positive, salvific 
concretazion of my transcendental relationship to God in freedom."403
Firstly Egan highlights the Rahnerian theme of "immense longing." This theme is 
foundational to Rahner's anthropology. For Rahner, the experience both indicates our 
true nature as in some ways transcendent and is the result of just such a nature. The 
human as hearer desires transcendent experiences because he or she already possesses 
them in some measure. The constant craving of humans for more from life, Rahner 
argues, is due to our foundational experience of God. As a hearer of God the human 
person has tasted infinity within its pre-apprehension of the horizon of being and 
finite things alone will not satisfy the human thirst. In fact, Rahner suggests, the more 
things a person acquires, the more unsatisfied he or she feels. Even the most abundant 
temporal life, when it attempts to block out the divine, has only more and more of 
what they increasingly know will not satisfy them. This is a desperate state. Egan 
writes,
"The God-experience is the cause of our dissatisfaction with life, for nothing 
measures up to that which rests at our deepest centre."404
400 FCFp.l44
401 This phrase has become a popular way of denoting Rahner's approach to Christian mysticism. It 
appears in his essay "Experiencing the Spirit" from The Practice of Faith eds. Karl Lehmann, Albert 
Raffelt, New York: Crossroad, 1985, p.84
402 Harvey Egan, " 'The Devout Christian of the Future will... Be a Mystic': Mysticism and Karl 
Rahner's Theology" in William J Kelly, (ed.) Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honour of Karl 
Rahner Marquette University Press, 1980, pp!39-158.403 FCF p.89
404 Egan op. cit p. 60
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There are distinct echoes of Augustine's autobiographical Confessions in Rahner's 
understanding of immense longing. 405 The recurring theme of Augustine's reflection 
is upon the incomplete nature of human existence, which manifests itself in hope and 
longing. For Augustine, human longing is based upon the created nature of the human 
who, created in the image of God, desires to relate to God. However, according to 
Augustine, the universality of sin means that no human, apart from an act of divine 
grace, can ever fulfil this longing for a relationship with his or her Creator. 
Augustine's maxim ("longing makes the heart deep") is 
directly compatible with Rahner's notion of the human transcendental existential. For 
both, human experience, of longing and hope, points to a dimension of the human 
person which is not purely temporal and cannot be satisfied within the realm in which 
the human exists. The created human being has an inherent longing for its Creator, 
which it cannot satisfy for itself. According to Rahner, recognising this "immense 
longing" will both give the hearer insight into his or her own nature, and help them to 
understand that they cannot satisfy their longing with finite things.406 For Rahner, we 
cannot elevate a finite good into an ultimate value.
The second way in which "sleeping mystics" can wake up is by reflecting upon 
experiences of happiness and meaning. Whilst Rahner takes seriously the suffering 
and emptiness that are part of the human condition, he argues that moments of joy, 
laughter, goodness and beauty are the basis of a possible argument for the existence of 
God; a kind of anti-theodicy that takes joy seriously. Rahner believes that since, as 
hearers, we experience God in the very depths of our being everyday life can be full 
of God's gracious communication. The "mystical joy" that Rahner speaks of is not the 
preserve of religious encounter, but open to all people who are surprised by the joy
405 The Confessions of St. Augustine. Sheed and Ward, 1943. See Christoph Schwobel's introduction 
to Persons Human and Divine. Schwobel cites J.R. Illingworth's thesis that "the real foundations of our 
subsequent thought upon the point (personhood) were undoubtedly laid in the first Christian centuries, 
and chiefly by Christian hands." Illingworth, Personality: Human and Divine London, MacMillan, 
1894. Illingworth views the main Western conceptions in personhood as arising from Augustine, 
Luther and Kant. In Augustine, Illingworth sees the first time that there is an emphasis, not on reason, 
but on a tripartite nature of human consciousness.See also Brian L Home, in "Person as Confession: 
Augustine of Hippo" in Persons Human and Divine. Home states that Augustine's is the first Christian 
attempt to see the person as a "confessional " being, with "a linking of personhood to memory." He 
agrees with Illingworth that it is not possible to overestimate the influence of Augustine upon 
contemporary Christian discussions about the nature of the person.
406 A theme Egan sees as founded upon Jesus response during his temptations, Matthew 4:4 "People do 
not live on bread alone, but on every word that comes from the mouth of God." Harvey Egan, " 'The 
Devout Christian of the Future will...Be a Mystic': Mysticism and Karl Rahner's Theology" in 
William J Kelly, (ed.) Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honour of Karl Rahner Marquette 
University Press, 1980, pp!39-158.
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and beauty in everyday life.407 For Rahner, this feature of the human experience is 
deeply reassuring; our "pre-apprehension" of the infinite horizon is not an experience 
of nothingness. The silent mystery we face is not absurd or empty. Rahner says that 
whilst we do experience the absurd we also know moments of contrasting and 
powerful hope and joy. For Rahner, the positive elements of life are present even in 
moments of despair.
The third experience that Rahner suggests awakens latent mysticism is that of 
emptiness and loss. Rahner suggests that when we do not distract ourselves from such 
experiences, even those born from a crisis of faith, we can find holy mystery. Rahner 
wrote that even within a spiritual "wintry season" faith might be found and even 
flourish. For Rahner distraction is the main obstacle to this process, rather than 
unbelief or doubt. In fact he urges people to grow into and through their doubt, even 
their atheism. Writing as Ignatius he says,
"God himself: I know God himself.. .if you were to let your scepticism about 
such an assertion, sharpened as it is by an underlying atheism, go to the very 
limit, not only in cleverly expressed theory but in bitter practice of life too, 
then you might have the same experience."409
What Rahner suggests here is that the person who has been forced to face their doubts 
and loss is in just the right place to encounter Holy Mystery. If we are complacent and 
believe that we understand everything in our lives we will perhaps never grapple with 
the very loss that stretches us to look beyond ourselves. Even atheism, in this regard, 
is a better starting place than spiritual complacency.
Egan says,
"The most telling moment, says Rahner, is when everything that props up our 
life fails. Then we are forced to ask if the inescapable darkness engulfing us is 
absolute absurdity or a blessed, holy night." 41 °
The next category Egan constructs from Rahner's teaching on becoming better hearers 
of God is the experience of love. For Rahner, offering love to our neighbour is an 
experience that reveals the absolute worth of another person.411 He suggests that this 
is both the presupposition and a consequence of the love of God. Indeed, both love of
407 Egan op.cit. adds a light note relating Rahner's reported love of ice cream as an example of such 
joy-giving everyday experiences.
408 Paul Imhof and Hubert Biallowons (eds.) Faith in a Wintry Season: Conversations and Interviews 
with Karl Rahner in the last years of his life Trans. Harvey Egan, Crossroad, 1990, pp. 103-105
409 Rahner, writing as Ignatius, in Faith in a Wintry Season p. 105
410 Egan, op.cit p. 62-3
411 We consider Rahner's notion of neighbour-love fully in ch.7.8 and 8.10 of this thesis.
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God and love of the neighbour are seen as a unity. They are both experiences which 
are radically open to the mysterious other.
For Rahner, love is a mystical experience because it involves "abandonment". In other 
words, real love for the other, be it God or the other person, should avoid trying to fit 
that being into one's own framework, as if to imagine that the other could be 
completely comprehended. The love of God and neighbour involves an 
acknowledgement of otherness, and does not attempt to subsume this into our own 
frame of reference.
Rahner describes the love between human beings as a mystical experience of the 
presence of God. This is due to the way in which each act of love, of God or another 
person, is in fact a unity, and also because God is to be found within every person. 
Human friendship and love differ only in degree, rather than in kind, from more 
profound religious mystical experiences, they are an everyday means of hearing God.
We continue with this exploration of the means by which Rahner suggests the human 
person better actualises itself as a hearer with a consideration of the role of theology 
in this respect. Rahner adopts the word "mystagogy" to express the task of theology in 
making its students better 'hearers' of God. The term comes from two sources and 
means both "to teach a doctrine" and "to initiate into the mysteries". Harvey Egan 
says that both Rahner's more scholarly writings and his pastoral works contain 
"mystagogia", the expressed desire to lead people into an experience of God's grace.
"He attempts to evoke, to awaken, to deepen, and to strengthen the basic 
experience of God's Self-communication which haunts the core of every 
person, at least as an offer. Because of his mystagogical concentration, his 
theology begins and ends in a mystical moment: the experience of the lived, 
root unity of self-possessing knowledge and love penetrated by God's self- 
communication." 12
The task of theology is not therefore to enforce external doctrines upon a person, but 
to awaken the personal experience of grace and to challenge, interpret and clarify this 
experience within the person. This is nothing less than to assist a person to encounter 
God. Rahner says,
412 Egan op. cit p. 142
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"If God is truly the incomprehensible God, whose incomprehensibility 
perdures for all eternity, even there where we see God "face to face", as 
Christians are wont to say, then it is completely obvious that a theology that 
wishes to answer all questions clearly and thoroughly is guaranteed to miss its proper "object"."413
The belief in "mystagogy" can be seen as an example of the important influence 
Martin Heidegger had on shaping Rahner's view of the theological task. Rahner 
described himself as a "disciple" of Heidegger, and there is clearly the influence of 
Heidegger's pedagogy in not teaching particular doctrines but in learning a style of 
thinking and investigating.414
In summary, Rahner says that a life lived with an awareness of joy, despair, beauty 
and care, one that does not seek distractions from these experiences but fully enters 
into them, is a life that is open to God. It differs only in degree, but not in kind, from 
the lives of the great Christian Mystics such as Ignatius. For Rahner, God meets us in 
this life. He draws us onwards to see transcendent hope in our circumstances and to 
express our love in an awareness of the otherness within those with whom we share 
our lives. In this way our lives are in constant and mystical union with God. Our part 
is to be open to this process, to truly be hearers of God.
5.10 Why denote Rahner's human person as "Hearer" and not "Knower"?
Much of the weight of academic interest in Rahner's anthropology has focussed upon 
the role of his transcendental epistemology in defining the human person. In this 
respect, we might expect the subject to be denoted a "knowing" subject. However, 
given our examination of the existentials of the human being in this chapter we agree 
with Mark Lloyd Taylor415 that this reading of Rahner's theory of subjectivity is too 
heavily focussed upon epistemology and does not truly reflect Rahner's intention. 
Over-emphasizing and isolating human transcendence as epistemological can also 
unwittingly lead to a misapprehension of the human subject as 'learning' by rational 
exercise in order to move along a transcendent existential. This does not appear to be
413 Rahner, Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews. 1965-1982 trans. Harvey D Egan 
Crossroads, 1986, p.216.
414 Rahner makes this point himself in Karl Rahner in Dialogue. Crossroad, 1997, p. 14, see also 
Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge Charles B Guignon, Hackett, 1981 for a full examination of 
Heidegger's epistemology and pedagogy.
415 Lloyd-Taylor M, God is Love: A Study in the Theology of Karl Rahner Scholars Press American 
Academy of Religion, 1986.
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an accurate or fair reading of Rahner, in our opinion. As we have seen, there is a 
privileged place within Rahner's anthropology for rational questioning. However, in 
Rahner's understanding of revelation the process is more readily likened to a process 
of "tuning in" to God's self-revelation, an act of encounter, which is available in all 
acts of knowledge. Rahner goes further to say that this "knowing" is magnified in 
experiences of love, happiness and joy, as well as despair, emptiness and longing. In 
these experiences we become aware of the transcendent holy mystery breaking 
through our understanding and transforming us. Our experiences of "knowing" 
involved in these experiences is not arrived at by rational thought alone, but involves 
our total being, which Rahner sees in terms of both intellect and sense, and which is 
available at all times whether we are conscious of it or not. In this sense we believe 
that "hearing" is a better term than "knowing". The human can hear closely by 
attending, or on the contrary be inattentive and barely recognize the revelatory act of 
God in everything, much in the way of hearing background noise. In either case the 
noise is continuous and a level of hearing persists; a level of noise is always present to 
the human person, even if it is only the noise of our own being. In just such a way 
human transcendence and divine immanence is within and around us constantly. It 
speaks to us: we are hearers.
"We may therefore summarize our whole anthropology by saying as it were by 
way of definition: we are the beings of receptive spirituality, who stand in 
freedom before the free God of a possible revelation, which, if it comes, 
happens in our history through the word. We are the ones who, in our history, 
listen for the word of the free God. Only in this are we what we should be."416
As we have appreciated from our cursory study of Rahner's Foundations, he takes 
great care to avoid objectifying divinity. There is a great emphasis on mystery and this 
can be read as a counter-balance to the more epistemological aspects of the person. 
Read in this way the hearer's questioning comes from a non-rational feeling of 
immense longing and not from the kind of rational enquiry that might be supposed. 
This strengthens Lloyd-Talyor's thesis regarding a less rationalistic reading of Rahner 
and encourages our connotation of the person as a "hearer" rather than a "knower".
We turn now to focus upon a further area of shared concern between Kristeva and 
Rahner, that of the important role of the "other" in constituting subjectivity. We shall 
focus upon Rahner's use of the Trinity as a model of inner-plurality, and his notion of
416 Rahner, HW p. 142
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the "Neighbour love" as offering an ethic of inter-subjectivity. We turn first to 
Kristeva and her use of otherness in the formation of speaking subject. We begin with 
her theory of the M/Other as the original 'other' of intra-subjectivity and then turn to 
her writings on the "stranger" as offering an ethic of inter-subjectivity.
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6. The Role of the Other - Kristeva's Semiotic M/Other 
and the Stranger in Society.
We now turn to examine the importance Kristeva gives to concepts of otherness in the 
creation of the speaking subject. We anticipate that this area will offer a positive 
contribution in the interface between Rahner and Kristeva.
The theme of otherness is central to Kristeva's more recent work.417 It is a highly 
evolved theme that unites her theories of intra- and inter-subjectivity. We recognise 
that this is an aspect of Kristeva's work that has attracted a great deal of academic 
attention, especially from feminist academics, and as such we anticipate encountering 
a number of complex areas of debate. We do not seek to bypass these areas but to 
examine them as fully as the remit of our thesis will allow. We aim to resist forcing a 
false symmetry between Kristeva's writing on otherness and that of Rahner. To this 
end we will again allow Kristeva to speak on her own terms, identifying areas of 
connection and difference with Rahner's hearer at the end of this chapter; areas that 
will be explored and developed in chapter ten of this thesis. We seek to establish what 
Kristeva's treatment of otherness has to offer theological anthropologies in respect to 
defining the relationship between intra- and inter-subjectivity; the speaking subject 
here informing and resourcing the person as hearer.
Our previous examination of Kristeva's thesis drew mainly upon her doctoral work, 
which was published as Revolution in Poetic Language.418 Our focus now turns to 
later Kristevan works that focus upon the place of the other in the formation of the 
self. Here, we shall concentrate on the works Tales of Love;419 Desire in Language.420 
In the Beginning was Love,421 the essay "Stabat Mater" 422 and Strangers to
417 See PH, ITB and STO
418 Julia Kristeva Revolution in Poetic Language (1974) Trans. Margaret Waller. New York :Colombia 
University Press, 1984 [RPL]
419 Julia Kristeva Tales of Love Trans. Leon S. Roudiez New York :Colombia University Press, 1987 
[TL]
420 Julia Kristeva Desire in Language: a semiotic approach to literature and art edited by Leon S. 
Roudiez Oxford : Blackwell, 1980 [DIL]
421 Julia Kristeva In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith trans. A Goldhammer, New 
York Columbia University Press, 1987 [ITB]
422 Julia Kristeva "Stabat Mater" appearing in Tales of Love trans. Leon S, Roudiez. Colombia 
University Press, 1987.
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Ourselves423 as well as a number of secondary articles and interviews. In doing so, we 
find two inter-related notions of the other: the semiotic M/Other and the stranger. We 
shall explore how the former is used in the exploration of intra-subjectivity, whilst the 
latter provides Kristeva with a basis for inter-subjective ethics. We shall consider the 
role of each in the creation of the speaking subject.
This chapter will be followed by a study of Rahner's similarly twofold use of 
otherness in explorations of subjectivity. He adopts the doctrine of the Trinity as a 
model of inner-plurality and the notion of "neighbour-love", the loving response to 
the other, in the construction of ethics. We suggest that the Kristevan argument that 
recognising 'strangeness within' is necessary in order not to do violence to the 
'strangers in society', is a useful way to understand and expand upon Rahner's notion 
of "neighbour-love."
6.1 The Role of the Other for Kristeva
In essence, the purpose of the other in Kristeva's thesis is to deconstruct the notion of 
a whole and unified self. As we have seen in previous chapters, her notion of 
subjectivity stresses the fragmented and unstable nature of selfhood.424 The other 
continually disrupts the unification of the self, which means that the speaking subject 
is a process which is both ongoing and unfulfilled and remains fundamentally 
"split".425
Kristeva's first use of a notion of the other is related to the "semiotic" force. This 
force is the threat of non-meaning that exists within and beneath the apparent, 
coherent symbolic order. 426 Here we consider how Kristeva relates otherness to the 
body of the Mother and to the feminine generally. We note that Kristeva is keen to 
distance her theory from biologism,427 and uses gendered terms in a purely theoretical 
way. Kristeva defines all biological categories as discursive terms, with no direct
423 Julia Kristeva Strangers to Ourselves Trans. Leon S Roudiez. Colombia University Press, 1991 
[STO]
424 Seech. 3 of this thesis.
425 This notion was covered fully in ch.3 of this thesis.
426 Kristeva, RPL.
427 "Biologism" refers to theories which relate aspects of selfhood to biological entities; a criticism 
often made of Freud, particularly his notion of the "phallus". This critique drove Lacan's revision of 
Freud, where the "phallus" is not related to any biological organ, but to the theoretical notion of power. 
As we saw in ch.2 of this thesis Kristeva adopts an anti-realist schema that would prohibit the 
"marked" human body of a set biology.
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reference to a reality behind or beneath them. In this, Kristeva separates the term 
Mother from mothers, and Feminine from females. This is a difficult and precarious 
distinction to make; the wisdom and validity of this methodology has divided opinion 
among commentators.428 For clarity, and in order to denote the separation of the 
theory of the Mother from the lived experiences of mothers, the term to connote 
Kristevan otherness in this thesis will be termed M/Other.429
Before we commence our examination of Kristevan otherness, we note that 
commentators disagree as to the extent to which she relates "the semiotic" to the 
"feminine," even in this theoretical sense. This is relevant in defining notions of the 
Other in Kristeva. Many, with Elizabeth Grosz, see an explicit linkage,
"The semiotic and the chora are explicitly maternal and feminine in Kristeva's 
account, while the symbolic is paternal, bound up with concepts of the 
symbolic father and the castrated mother."430
Others, like John Lechte, would like to limit the scope of this identification,
"The unnameable, heterogeneous element is called "feminine" in Kristeva's 
writing in the mid-seventies"431
Susan Rowland agrees with the identification of the "maternal" with the semiotic 
M/Other in Kristeva's work, but is less ready to use the terms "the feminine" or 
"female" as interchangeable with "the maternal" as Grosz appears to do. Rowland 
points out,
"The semiotic is structurally linked to the mother's body. It is pre-Oedipal 
maternal so it must contain the potential for both genders as it is before 
symbolic definitions and the understanding of gender as an exclusive binary. 
Therefore the semiotic is not 'the feminine'. 432
428 A point we shall return to when considering feminist critiques of Kristeva later in this chapter.
429 This term is first used in ch.3 of this thesis to express the feminine maternal that is experienced at 
the site of the pre-Oedipal child with its mother. The notion is of the maternal as Other. The term is not 
entirely our own, being first used as "(m)other" by Beth Jensen, 1985, in The (m)other tongue: essays 
in feminist psychoanalytical interpretation Cornell University Press, 1985. Jensen adapted this term in 
her later work Leaving the M/other: Whitman. Kristeva. and Leaves of grass. New York Farleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 2002. This is where we first encountered the term. We have chosen to 
adapt Jensen's term giving the Other its capital letter to connote that the phrase relates to the primary 
source of otherness.
430 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions. Alien and Unwin, 1989, p.49.
431 John Lechte "Julia Kristeva" Routledge 1990, p.201.
432 Susan Rowland, "Jungian Feminisms in Deconstruction with Post-Freudian Feminisms" ch.5 of 
June: A Feminist Revision (awaiting publication).
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Given this, we conclude that it is permissible to relate the semiotic directly to the 
M/Other, but require more caution in relating this to the term "feminine". In any 
respect, the semiotic feminine and the M/Other are used as expressions of otherness 
within Kristeva's thought, even if, as Rowland argues, they cannot be directly related 
to each other.
Whilst we shall return to the debate over Kristeva's use of gendered terms for 
"semiotic", we should first clarify that this does not concern the place of women 
within Kristeva's paradigm. The speaking subject is not a gendered subject. Neither 
does Kristeva seek to suggest an overt privileging of women's experience, perhaps by 
virtue of their monopoly of the semiotic. "Woman" or "feminine" belong to a purely 
pragmatic category having no ontological significance. Kristeva rejects modernist 
ideas of essential female nature; her use of gendered terms for the semiotic is not an 
attempt to formulate a universal female experience. As Bordo comments,
"Gender has become [for Kristeva and post-modernists] a discursive 
formation, inherently unstable and continually self-deconstructing...the 
meaning of gender is constantly deferred, endlessly multiple."433
Kristeva herself says,
"We must use "we are women" as an advertisement or slogan for our 
demands. On a deeper level, however, a woman cannot be; it is something 
which does not belong in the order of being.. .In "woman" I see something that 
cannot be represented, something that is not said, something above and beyond 
nomenclatures and ideologies." 434
Kristeva's point is that, as a socio-political construct rather than an ontological term, 
"woman" cannot and should not be defined. In this, she could be termed a "total social 
constructionist" in that she views sex as well as gender to be social constructs. This 
belief is largely an extension of the work begun by Michel Foucault in that it relies 
upon the deconstruction of scientific language and discourse. According to Foucault, 
discourse, including that found with biology, can never be seen as neutral.435 Rather it 
is based upon the desire to legitimise present social structures by suggesting that they 
are "natural" and incontrovertible. According to Foucault, this process usually
433 Susan Bordo, "Feminism. Postmodernism and Gender-Scepticism" appears as ch.6 of 
Feminism/Postmodernism ed. Linda Nicholson, Routledge 1990, p. 134.
434 From an interview with Kristeva "La femme, ce n'est jamais ca" (Woman can never be defined) 
appearing in Tel Quel, Autumn, 1974.
435 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality trans. Robert Hurley. Pelican Books 1981
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involves setting up hierarchies and dualisms that support the Enlightenment 
philosophy of the rational self. They act to mask the violence or "will to power" that 
underlies them. Foucault's analysis suggests that scientific knowledge is far from 
being incontrovertible and is just as subjective as other discourses, and, as such, is 
vulnerable to deconstruction.
For Kristeva the dualistic construction of biological discourse unduly limits human 
sexuality to one of two given sexes and, as such, is an act of power and control. She 
argues for a deconstruction of such biological terms. She suggests that from a 
deconstruction of dualistic sexuality many other equally legitimate and multiplicitous 
ways of speaking of human sexuality will evolve. This will involve the rejection of set 
biological categories such as male and female. In this way, for Kristeva, gender, 
identity and language are irretrievably intertwined and are therefore examined 
together in this thesis.436
Taking into consideration the debate as to the extent to which Kristeva relates the 
'feminine' to the semiotic, it appears clear to us that Kristeva is mainly concerned to 
express the semiotic as other. In order to do this she resorts to feminine terms in her 
notion of the theoretical M/Other.437 This achieves her desire to place semiotics 
outside of the paternal domain of symbolic relations and absolute distinction. For 
Kristeva, the M/Other, or semiotic realm, precedes such categorisations. The semiotic 
exists as other to the symbolic order and constantly disturbs and disrupts the system of 
language. Kristeva chooses to somewhat anthropomorphise this process of semiotic 
disruption by relating it to the infant's experience of the pre-Oedipal Mother. The re- 
positioning of identity creation to experiences of the maternal body allows Kristeva to 
undermine the phallocentric focus of psychoanalysis.
We shall now turn to a close examination of the role and nature of the M/Other in 
Kristeva's writings, and how this theoretical figure acts as the other to the speaking 
subject in the process of continual re-creation.
436 The use of gendered terms in an anti-realist paradigm will provide a focus for a critique of 
Kristeva's work by contemporary feminists later in this chapter.
437 A notion we explored in chapter 3 pp. 52-60 of this thesis.
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6.2 The M/Other: space and force.
According to Elizabeth Grosz,
"Maternity is probably the most central and sustained object of Kristeva's 
investigations."438
In this examination we consider Kristeva's use of the term "maternity" and how she 
relates this to the mother's body. We shall see that she views the M/Other as the 
central site where both identity creation and language acquisition takes place. In short, 
the maternal is the place that exists before identity. Motherhood and birth are seen as 
fundamental moments of the splitting of selfhood (and all symbolisation). In this, she 
argues for the M/Other to be recognised as the original other and the site for the 
emergence of the split subject.
Kristeva describes the maternal as a motherland existing outside of and anterior to 
language.439 In Grosz's summary,
"'She' remains the necessarily unspoken underside of social and psychic 
order."440
For Kristeva, a proper understanding of the semiotic and symbolic facets of language 
reveals maternal origins to both the development of language and the notion of 
selfhood. The promotion of the feminine as Other will be of great importance to both 
Kristeva's semiotics and her philosophical notions of personhood and this will 
provide for a useful comparison with Rahner's use of otherness in the person as 
hearer.
In examining Kristeva's use of maternity as a critical tool our first focus is the extent 
to which she describes the M/Other as a space; a place for processes to flow across. 
We shall then consider how Kristeva presents the M/Other as a disruptive force. Our 
twin foci are borrowed from Grosz's reading of Kristeva441 . She says,
438 Grosz, op. cit. p.78
439 See Kristeva PH and TL
440 Grosz, op. cit. p.78
441 Grosz, Ibid.
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"The maternal, for Kristeva, designates both a space and a series of functions 
and processes."442
6.3 The M/Other as Space
Kristeva views the human self, from its very beginning, as insubstantial; that is, it is a 
space across which physical and psychic impulses rhythmically flow. According to 
Kristeva, at the earliest developmental stage of the human infant443 these impulses 
centre on the mother.
"Drives involve pre-Oedipal semiotic functions and energy discharges that 
connect and orientate the body to the mother. We must emphasise that 
"drives" are always already ambiguous, simultaneously assimilating and 
destructive...The oral and anal drives, both of which are orientated and 
structured around the mother's body, dominate this sensorimotor
*   ^%444
organisation.
Kristeva first makes the association between semiotics and the body of the mother in 
Revolution in Poetic Language. She refers to her womb and breasts in particular, since 
the early pre-Oedipal drives are experienced here. This notion is expounded in a 
poetic interruption to the text of her later essay "Stabat Mater" where Kristeva 
describes early childhood experience of pre-Oedipal mother's body,
"No time at all. Fragrance of honey, roundness of forms, silk and velvet under 
my fingers, on my cheeks. Mummy. Almost no sight - a shadow that darkens, 
soaks me up or vanishes amid flashes. Almost no voice in her placid 
presence." 445
It is clear from Kristeva's writings that the pre-Oedipal semiotic stage is left behind in 
the child's further development. Prior to this separation the self is not yet distinct, and 
the infant experiences itself as part of the mother, as symbolically joined. We recall 
from our previous chapter that this symbiosis will be broken as the infant enters the 
phase of distinguishing between objects and itself (Lacan's "mirror stage").446 
Therefore, we can say that Kristeva posits that our first experience of otherness is the 
loss of semiotic unity with the M/Other. As this process is entered into, language is 
learned. Kristeva says,
442 Grosz op. cit. p. 79
443 We refer to ch.3 of this thesis which outlines Kristeva's four stages of infant development.
444 Kristeva, RPL p. 27
445 "Stabat Mater" first appeared in Tel Quel (Winter) p.30-49.This essay is reprinted in Tales of Love 
trans. Leon Roudiez, Colombia University Press, 1987, pp. 234-263, this quote p 256.
446 See ch.3 of this thesis
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"Language learning can therefore be thought of as an acute and dramatic 
confrontation between positing-separating-identifying and the motility of the 
semiotic chora. the fort-da game, anality 
and orality, all act as a permanent negativity that destroys the image and the 
isolated object even as it facilitates the articulation of the semiotic network, 
which will afterwards be necessary in the system of language where it will be 
more or less integrated as a signifier."447
The semiotic M/Other is described in Kristeva's later work, Tales of Love,
"(T)hat ideal is nevertheless a blinding, non-representable power - a sun or a ghost."448
In this way the M/Other is an insubstantial space. The prize of separation from the 
M/Other is language acquisition and entrance to the symbolic order (relating to 
Lacan's "Law of the Father").449 The characteristic of this order is the subject's ability 
to make distinctions and construct hierarchies. This order comes to overshadow the 
semiotic order, forcing it beneath itself as its persistent other.
"The symbolic is erected only on the basis of repression of the
maternal.. .civilisation, the symbolic order, the coherent text, then are possible
only at the cost of the silencing, the phallicisation, of the maternal chora." 45°
The first human experience of the other is therefore posited by Kristeva to be an 
experience of original symbiosis and then dramatic loss. This loss permits the subject 
to be created. However having been rejected, the semiotic persists as the 
unrepresentable aspect to language, which defies distinction and representation. The 
maternal semiotic threatens the unity of the subject, and forever forces the emerging 
"I" to be in process or to use Kristeva's term, to be an "exile" from the M/Other.
At this point we might add that in designating the maternal body as a "space" Kristeva 
posits a very controversial notion of pregnancy and maternity. For Kristeva, 
pregnancy does not involve the mother as an agent; maternity has no subject. This is 
apparent in the following passage from Desire in Language,
"Cells fuse, split, and proliferate; volumes grow, tissues stretch, and body 
fluids change rhythm, speeding up or slowing down. Within the body, growing 
as a graft, indomitable, there is an other. And no-one is present, within that 
simultaneously dual and alien space, to signify what is going on. 'It happens
447 RPL p.47 - our emphasis. 448 TLp.41-42
449 See ch.3 of this thesis450 RPL p.49
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but I'm not there.' 'I cannot realize it, but it goes on.' Motherhood's 
impossible syllogism."451
Maternity, viewed this way, is a subject-less process. It happens without the will or 
action of the pregnant woman.
"The maternal body is the place of splitting. Through a body destined to 
ensure reproduction of the species, the woman-subject... (is) more of a filter 
than anyone else - a thoroughfare, a threshold where 'nature' confronts 
'culture'. To imagine that there is someone in that filter - such is the source of 
religious mystifications."452
Kristeva has a particular point to make in this. For her, the presence of the woman, the 
real-life mother, as a subject in maternity would allow the phallic fantasy of the 
"master", the omnipotent mother, to be present. This, for Kristeva, would threaten the 
emerging subjecthood of the developing child,
"If we suppose her to be master of a process that is prior to the socio- 
symbolic-linguistic contract of the group, then we acknowledge the risk of 
losing identity at the same time as we ward it off." 453
We view this to be an example of Kristeva's inherent individualism. Subjecthood is 
viewed here as a process undertaken in isolation from other person-subjects, therefore 
the maternal other is a "space" rather than a person. We shall return to critique this 
notion when considering Rahnerian subjecthood as contrasting with Kristeva in this 
respect.454
6.4 The Abject
It is also worth briefly examining Kristeva's use of the notion of the "abject" to 
connote the disruptive force linked to the experience of the otherness of the M/Other. 
This term, unlike the "semiotic", is not an unmitigated memory of the M/Other but 
rather a feeling of disgust and rejection which comes about because of separation 
from the M/Other.
"Not me. Not that. But not nothing, either. A 'something' that I do not 
recognize as a thing. A weight of meaninglessness about which there is 
nothing insignificant, and which crushes me."455
451 OIL p.237
452 WT reprinted p.238 in The Kristeva Reader
453 DIL p.238
454 Conclusions we draw together in ch.10 of this thesis.
455 PH p.2
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As we saw in chapter three of this thesis, the stage where the developing infant 
experiences the abject is immediately after the semiotic union with the M/Other and 
prior to the full "mirror stage" where it differentiates itself from her.456 Abjection 
therefore refers to "an extreme state of subjectivity - a crisis in which the borders of 
the self and other radically break down."457
Abjection works on a number of levels. Originally it is experienced on the level of 
individual psychosexual development. The abject here marks the moment when we 
separated from the mother, when we began to recognise a boundary between our 
"self and the M/Other. In Powers of Horror Kristeva states that our first experience 
of the abject haunts and destabilises the relationship between mother and child. She 
describes how the emerging subjectivity of the child experiences a primitive terror of 
maternal engulfment that threatens the boundaries of the self almost before they come 
into being.458 In this Kristeva describes how the emerging subjectivity of the child 
knows itself through the experience of being thrown out or repulsed from the 
M/Other. This difficult experience of the maternal involves the feeling of abjection, "a 
fluid haze, an elusive clamminess," "ghostly glimmer" and a "violent nausea".459 For 
Cleo McNelly Kearns the resultant subjective condition arising from the experience of 
abjection around the site of the M/Other is one of "discomfort, unease and 
dizziness".460 This foundational experience of otherness forms the basis for subject- 
object relations.
There is a second level at which we experience abjection, one that is experienced as a 
persistent threat to the formed speaking subject. "Abjects" are neither subjects nor 
objects, but are rather all bodily experiences that threaten our sense of being a distinct 
and "proper" self.461 These could be "unclean food", bodily fluids, wounds, all forms 
of decay, and even criminality. In fact, for Kristeva, anything that represents "the in-
456 As we saw, in ch. 3 this stage is a unique Kristevan addition to Lacan's three stages of infant 
development. In it, Kristeva highlights the sense of threat that the abject causes in the development of 
the "proper self.
457 Magan Becker-Leckrone, Julia Kristeva and Literary Theory Palerave Macmillan, 2005, p.151.
458 PH p.6. See also Cleo McNelly Kearns essay "Kristeva and Feminist Theology" pp.49-80 in 
Transfigurations: Theology and French Feminists ed. C.W. Maggie Kin, Susan M. St Ville and Susan 
M. Simonaitis, Wipf and Stock, 1993.459 PH p.6
460 Cleo McNelly Kearns op. cit. p.58461 PH p.6-7
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between, the ambiguous, the composite" elicits feelings of abjection in the self 
because they remind the self of its initial feeling of horror as it experienced splitting 
from the M/Other. Such processes disturb our sense of having secure borders. In other 
words, our experience of feelings of "abjection" reminds us of the initial splitting 
stage. Kristeva says the abject draws the self towards the place where meaning 
collapses. These disturbing experiences might be known in moments of crisis; they 
threaten the feeling of having secure boundaries to the self and, as such, abjects 
operate as other to the self. Kristeva sees "borderline patients" as particularly aware of 
abjection.462
If abjection is known in moments of crisis and madness then it seems telling that, for 
Kristeva, abjection is the key means to interpret and explain religious motifs such as 
defilement, purification and atonement and, in fact, much religious expression and
463experience.
"Abjection accompanies all religious structurings and reappears, to be worked out 
in a new guise, at the time of their collapse."464
In other words, the evolution of religious motifs is directly linked to the experience of 
primary abjection from the M/Other. In fact, religion is a temporary home for feelings 
of abjection which will outlast religious belief to be "worked out" in other artistic 
expressions. It is none other than the longing for the maternal that drives religious 
sentiment, for Kristeva. The abject is present in religion where the threat of meaning 
breaking down is represented.
"The various means of purifying the abject - the various catharsis- make up 
the history of religions, and end up with that cartharsis par excellence called 
art, both on the far and nearside of religion."465
Furthermore, Kristeva sees art, which is grounded in the experience of abjection, as 
"destined to survive the collapse of the historical forms of religions."466
Kristeva's interpretation denies any transcendental cause for the experience of 
'immense longing'. In other words, the characteristic of longing that we appreciated
462 PH p.7
463 See Kristeva ch.4 "Semiotics of Biblical Abomination" pp.90-112 RPL. Kristeva most usually 
relates the uncanny to religious motifs of purity and defilement.
464 PHp.17465 PH p. 17
466 PH p. 17
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in Rahner's notion of the hearer is, for Kristeva, none other than the recollection of 
the experience of abjection in the emerging subject and a longing for the 
undifferentiated semiotic harmony with the M/Other. In this religion is, like madness, 
an expression of abjection surfacing in the split subject.
Perhaps this reading of the experience of longing is an inevitable pre-supposition for 
Kristeva since she has already discounted the possibility for an external reality in her 
adoption of an anti-realist discursive arena for selfhood. Christian theologians would, 
of course, be likely to reject this explanation and look beyond discursive reality for 
the source of human longing.467 However, it is perhaps worth considering, with 
Kristeva, that the pivotal experience of separation from the maternal body has a 
lasting legacy both in terms of the individual's psyche and in society more generally. 
Could the trauma of abjection in this pre-subjective experience foster the mixed 
emotions of desire and hatred that are, according to much feminist analysis, directed 
towards women's bodies in every culture?468 Kristeva implies this in Tales of Love 469 
where she states that where women have been reduced to a maternal function in 
patriarchal societies which leads to a "misplaced abjection" of women within these 
societies. This is, for Kristeva, the root cause of female oppression and degradation.
6.5 M/Other as a Powerful Force
So far we have considered how Kristeva views maternity as a subject-less space. 
However the lack of agency should not imply a lack of power. The second focus for 
this examination is Kristeva's notion that the M/Other is a powerful, disruptive force. 
Here too abjection is seen as the key means by which the M/Other's power is 
exercised. In her essay "Stabat Mater" Kristeva says maternity is,
467 Although we consider the adoption of non-realism by the Sea of Faith a/theologies in chapter 10 of 
this thesis.
468 This argument is fully considered in an as yet unpublished thesis by Christine E Jamieson "The 
significance of the Body in Ethical Discourse: Julia Kristeva's Contribution to Moral Theology". The
outline of Jamieson' s thesis is found on wvvvv JsM^^S^J^.^sM^^^>:j<M)ll^yl:h.UI^ Jamieson uses 
Kristeva's notion of the abject to inform a reading of Christian body theology giving special emphasis 
to Rosemary Ruether Radford. Whilst we agree with Jamieson's reading of the privileging of the 
maternal body in Kristeva's notion of subjectivity we do not share her expectation that this will 
properly give precedence to the body We believe that Kristeva's denial of agency for a woman 
in the maternal body undermines the possibility of her work being viewed as positive to corporeality in 
any real sense. Whilst the body of the mother is present in the process of producing subjectivity for 
Kristeva, the agency of a real woman is denied. 
469 TL p. 374
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"An identity catastrophe that causes the Name to topple over into the 
unnameable that one imagines as femininity, nonlanguage, or body."470
This notion of feminine power involves Kristeva relating otherness to the feminine 
semiotic that emerges within certain types of writing. It is as otherness within poetry 
and art that the semiotic powerfully disrupts the systems of language of whole 
communities. The link between the disruption of the individual and that of social 
groups is first made in Revolution in Poetic Language. Here, Kristeva interestingly 
traces the power of the semiotic M/Other throughout the development of poetry in the 
twentieth century.
According to Kristeva, by the end of the century, poetic language had developed to a 
stage where its function within literature was nothing less than an attempt to disrupt 
logical order itself. This was not done from a stance which Kristeva terms "delirium," 
the construction of a purely semiotic discourse, which Kristeva believes to be 
impossible. Rather, Kristeva sees in the work of Joyce or Bataille, for example, that 
poetic language moves beyond madness on one hand and realism on the other, 
maintaining both "delirium1 and "logic".471 For Kristeva, this revolution in poetic 
language entailed the recovery of the primary importance of the M/Other. This was 
achieved by an awareness of the phonic facets of poetic language, which recall the 
experience of the M/Other. In this, poetry comes to mediate otherness to the speaking 
subject. Considering avant-garde poetry, Kristeva sees the power of maternal 
semiotics surging up through phonetic, syntactic and logical orders to disrupt them 
and, with them, all ideologies that are erected to ignore or repress the semiotic. 
According to Kristeva, this revolution was truly begun by twentieth century avant- 
garde poets. 472 The new language of twentieth century poetry is seen as beginning a
social revolution,
"Since the end of the nineteenth century "poetry" has deliberately maintained 
the balance between sociality and madness, and we view this as the sign of a 
new era.. .Consequently poetry ceased to be "art" and claimed other functions: 
showing the heterogeneity that works on all practice and furnishing 
disappearance of meaning with a signifying device and practical scope.
470 "Stabat Mater" TL p.235471 RPL p.82
472 RPL p.83 
473 RPLp.212,216
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In terms of society the abject has to do with "what disturbs identity, system, order. 
What does not respect borders, positions, rules." 474
According to Kristeva, the best modern literature explores the place of the abject, the 
place where boundaries, and especially those of subject/object, break down.
"On close inspection, all literature is probably a version of the apocalypse that 
seems to me rooted, no matter what its sociohistorical conditions might be, on 
the fragile border (borderline cases) where identities (subject/object etc.) do 
not exist or only barely so - double, fuzzy, heterogeneous, animal, 
metamorphosed, altered, abject."475
In this way both maternal semiotics and the abject, which is itself the result of 
splitting away from the M/Other, persist as disruptive forces in both an individual and 
societal setting.
We find that artistic representations of the corpse are especially relevant to Kristeva's 
concept of the power of the maternal other in art.476 The corpse graphically portrays 
the breakdown of the distinction between subject and object. It is an abject. A corpse 
confronts us with our own eventual death, made palpably real. In an essay entitled 
"Holbein's Dead Christ"477 Kristeva explores the feeling of abjection arising from a 
particular religious painting, that of Holbein the Younger, "The Body of the Dead 
Christ in the Tomb", (1522).478 In this essay Kristeva reflects on how this painting of 
Christ in the tomb made a remarkable impression upon the writer Dostoyevsky. On 
seeing the painting, one of his characters in The Idiot, remarks,
"That picture.. .that picture! Why some people may lose their faith by looking 
at that picture?"479
The quality of abjection in this painting, according to Kristeva, is the way in which 
Christ is utterly dead. He has lost his subjecthood.
"Rigor mortis had not yet set in, so there is still a look of suffering on the face 
of the dead man, as though he were still feeling it (that has been well caught 
by the artist); on the other hand, the face has not been spared in the least; it is
474 PH, p.4
475 PH p.207
476 PH p.3
477 This essay was originally published in "Soleil noir: Depression et melancholic", 1987. It has been 
reproduced in Fragments for a History of the Human Body Part One, ed. Michel Feher, The MIT Press, 
1989.
478 Musee des Beaux Arts, Bale.
479 Fyodor Dostoyevsky The Idiot trans. David Magarshack, Viking Penguin, 1955.
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nature itself, and, indeed, any man's face would look like that after such 
suffering."480
Here the general feeling aroused by the abject is heightened in that it is Christ's 
corpse being portrayed. Kristeva says,
"The unadorned representation of human death, the death or well-nigh 
anatomical stripping of the corpse conveys to viewers an unbearable anguish 
before the death of God, which is here mingled with our own death because 
there isn't the slightest suggestion of transcendency... this corpse will never 
rise again."481
The portrayal of Christ as utterly dead disturbs not only our sense of immortality but 
also our sense of transcendence in totality. God is viewed as dead here. Furthermore 
in Holbein's depiction, for Kristeva, there is no suggestion of resurrection. This would 
be a cause for the viewer to "lose faith". However, interestingly, in her essay, Kristeva 
adds that the depiction of Christ as utterly dead would have been experienced 
firsthand by the original disciples. She wonders what possibly could have happened to 
them to convince them that this corpse had been raised. Could Kristeva be inferring 
here that only a true experience of resurrection could explain early Christian faith?
Returning to consider how the corpse is an abject, Kristeva says
"Consequently, death reveals itself as such to the imaginative ability of the self 
in the isolation of signs or their banalization up to the point of disappearing: 
such is Holbein's minimalism."482
In this way, Kristeva links the power of the abject to disrupt ideas of the self and the 
stability of symbols. As Kristeva puts it, "The corpse, seen without God and outside 
of science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject."483
Before we proceed further, it may be worthwhile considering the novelty of Kristeva's 
approach. She introduces a psychoanalytical discourse on maternity within that of 
language acquisition and the formation of selfhood. In this her work is situated 
between the fields of contemporary feminism and post-modernism. Here we shall 
observe that Kristeva has been criticised by both camps, and that her work defies each 
category. This is entirely fitting perhaps, given Kristeva's belief that symbolic
480 Reprinted in Feher, op. cit. p. 240
481 Ibid, p.241-242
482 Ibid. p. 265483 PH p.4
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distinctions require disruption. Her work can be seen to disrupt the categories of 
feminism and post-modernism, and challenge both. Whilst other postmodernist 
theorists employ a discussion about language and psychoanalysis in order to explain 
the creation of the illusion of the self, Kristeva is remarkable in the place she gives 
maternity in this process. Her insistence upon a central and significant place for 
female otherness situates her within the broader feminist project to recover the female 
position as a place of power and influence.
In emphasising the role of Mother as Other, Kristeva might be said to extend the work 
of early feminist theorists such as Simone de Beauvoir. In de Beauvoir's monumental 
work, The Second Sex 484 women in a patriarchal society are consistently "other" to 
all that is masculine, and the norm. According to de Beauvoir, 'Woman' has always 
been necessary to man. She is the means by which males, and male culture, formulate 
their own identity and fulfil their own destiny. In this, 'woman' is never "a thing in 
itself but always and only what is not male. Kristeva extends this notion of the 
"otherness" of the feminine one stage further than de Beauvoir and turns the 
marginalisation of the feminine into a positive, rather than a patriarchal, concept. With 
neither "male" nor "female" having any ontological reality nonetheless the primary 
experience of the semiotic centres on the M/Other, and given its persistence after 
separation, the feminine semiotic is a powerful and disruptive force, which pre-exists 
the male discourse of symbolic order.
However, in common with Beauvoir's notion of the "secondary" nature of 
femaleness, the female discourse of semiotics can have no independent existence. 
John Lechte says,
"To avoid psychosis, the feminine element (in men and women) needs to be 
inscribed within the symbolic order. According to Kristeva, the feminine 
semiotic may be potentially disruptive of an overly rigid form of the symbolic 
but it cannot humanly exist independently of it.. .To put it simply: the social 
sphere signified by the Name-of-the-Father is itself complicit with a patriarchy 
that makes the independent existence of the feminine impossible." 485
Rather than accept this exclusion by patriarchy, Kristeva and the 'second generation' 
of French feminists celebrate the marginalised position of "woman". Cixious and
484 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley, Pan Books, 1988 (first published
1949).
485 Lechte, Julia Kristeva London. Routledge, 1990, p201-202.
147
Irigaray share the desire to question dominant systems of meaning by using non- 
traditional narrative structures emphasising linguistic ambiguity and gaps in the 
patriarchal discourse. Of this Catherine Belsey says,
"Whatever the male tradition ignored - intuition, imagination, lyricism - and 
whatever it condemned - wild festivity, witchcraft - French feminism promoted."486
It is Kristeva's gendered description of this polarity within language that groups her 
work with that of Cixious and Irigaray. However, she does not ascribe either sex as 
having ownership of either facet of language. She disallows for the relationship 
Cixious makes between the 'marked' body and language. For Kristeva the body is 
largely unmarked and indeterminate; thus avoiding the biological essentialism or 
reductionism that she sees as threatening the dissolution of gender difference in the 
work of Cixious and Irigaray. Kristeva can be said to be the keenest among those 
known as "French feminists" to stress the anti-realism of binary sexual difference. Her 
refusal to "celebrate the feminine" has led to ambivalence concerning her relationship 
with feminism itself. This does not appear to overly concern Kristeva. Her criticisms 
of feminism are addressed in the essay "Woman's Time". Here she charges feminism, 
or more properly modernist feminism,487 with adopting a limiting remit of seeking 
equality within the existing system. She calls for a fundamental revolution of that 
order and for a move beyond the duality of sex.
"In this third attitude, which I strongly advocate - which I imagine? - the very 
dichotomy man/woman as an opposition between two rival entities may be 
understood as belonging to metaphysics. What can 'identity', even 'sexual 
identity', mean in a new theoretical and scientific space where the very notion 
of identity is challenged? I am not simply suggesting a very hypothetical 
bisexuality which, even if it existed, would only, in fact be the aspiration 
towards the totality of one of the sexes and thus an effacing of difference. 
What I mean is, first of all, the demassification of the problematic of difference."488
If Kristeva is somewhat at odds with contemporary feminists, in that she appears more 
strongly in favour of post-modern anti-realistic notions of the body, she also has a
486 Catherine Belsey (ed.) The Feminist Reader : essays in gender and the politics of literary criticism 
Macmillan, 1997, p.240
487 We use Elaine Storkey's typography from Created or Constructed: The Great Gender Debate 
Paternoster Press 2000. Modernist feminists question the staticity of gender yet hold claim to the notion 
of sexual difference, beyond its basis in the discourse of language.
488 From "Woman's Time" this essay was translated in Signs. 7, no.l (Autumn 1981) pp. 13-35. This 
essay is reprinted in The Kristeva Reader ed. Toril Moi, Blackwell 1986, pp. 187-213, this citation 
appearing p.209.
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difficult relationship with other post-modernist theorists. Her "turn to maternity" is 
viewed by some post-modernists as allowing essentialism to return 'via the back door' 
and as a return to the idealisation of the mother. However, given Kristeva's anti- 
realism, this is certainly not her intention. Her starting point is that, just as "woman" 
cannot be defined, nor should "motherhood" be seen in any essentialist category.
This creates a paradox for Kristeva, a gender-sceptic, which surfaces most readily in 
her essay "Stabat Mater" where the bodily experience of childbirth and motherhood 
are explored in the creation of ethics. She begins her introduction to "Stabat Mater" 
asking,
"If it is not possible to say of a what she (without running the risk of 
abolishing her difference), would it be perhaps different concerning the 
mother, since that is the only function of "the other sex" to which we can 
definitely attribute existence?"489
In "Stabat Mater" Kristeva explores the influence of the cult of the Virgin Mother on 
the understanding of motherhood and femininity. In this the analysis of gender, 
literature, linguistics and religion come together. Offering an insight into maternity, 
this essay was written during Kristeva's own experience of pregnancy and birth, 
descriptions of which interrupt the body of the text as a series of poems and 
observations. She suggests that the experience of motherhood is primarily one of 
separation. In this there is the inference of a special privileging of female experience 
provided by giving birth. Kristeva suggests that the understanding of maternity as one 
encompassing separation, ambiguous self-identity and loss could pave the way for a 
new "herethics" of reproduction and death.490 We recall that in this the feminine 
experience in question is only theoretical the M/other here is a "space" without an 
agent. A woman's experience of giving birth, possibly the most poignant "I-Thou" 
encounter available to humans, may have once been seen as a female experience that 
could inform a feminine ethic, however, no such reciprocity is allowed in Kristeva's 
schema. 
As Grosz says,
"Maternity is thus not the function of a woman... it is an organic, a social, pre- 
signifying space-time: it is disembodied, a function and not a mode of the 
corporeal specific to women. It cannot be attributed to woman, for woman is 
precisely that which does not exist.... She is content to attribute an irreducibly
489 From "Stabat Mater" TL p 234
490 From "Stabat Mater" TL p263
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biological basis to pregnancy while refusing an identity or agency to the 
pregnant woman."
It would appear that Kristeva's use of the maternal body places her at the intersection 
of different and often opposing theories. She faces criticism from both feminist and 
post-modernist camps. Others, and perhaps this is our position, feel disappointed by 
the repositioning of a corporeal experience such as the body and maternity to the 
dislocated arena of texuality.
Feminists such as Elizabeth Grosz have met such theories with scorn,
"Sexual differences, like those of class and race, are bodily differences...the 
body must be reconceived, not in opposition to culture, but as its pre-eminent 
object." 492
While much is said of the role of the body of the mother to the construction of 
discourse, and this being in the formally "female" territory of birth and early 
motherhood, Kristeva dislocates this process from women themselves. Grosz 
concludes,
"It is ironic that (Kristeva) problematizes the concepts of'man', 'woman' and 
'identity', seeing them as forms of a metaphysics of presence, when, at the 
same time and unlike many other feminists, she concedes the relevance of 
biological, physiological, genetic and chromosomal structures in her 
discussion of maternity. She is content to attribute an irreducibly biological 
basis to pregnancy while refusing an identity or agency to the pregnant 
woman.... In refusing to accord a sex to the maternal body, Kristeva seems to 
accept an essentialist notion of maternity as a process without a subject."493
In this way, the influence of corporeality is greatly reduced in Kristeva's wider notion 
of selfhood, in our opinion. The actual mother here has no agency in the gestation or 
birth of her baby. In the early experiences of the child it is 'M/Other' at work, rather 
than a woman. An unbridgeable gap has opened up between the experiences of 
women, as mothers or otherwise, and the power of the pre-Oedipal Mother. 
Embodiment here is side-lined, to a great extent, for a notion of corporeality that is 
only theoretically "feminine", and this as an experience that remains defined by what 
it is not (being ex-centric, and other to a male norm). While corporeality is 
emphasised in the development of the pre-Oedipal child, the importance of this aspect
491 Elizabeth Grosz Space, time and perversion : essays on the politics of bodies Routledge, 1995 p.97
492 Ibid, p.32
493 Ibid. p. 132
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to the mother is to a large extent denied; 'she' is not really present, having no agency 
in a process of maternity that is dislocated from women. This is surely therefore a 
one-sided encounter with Otherness? The dismissal of agency in the M/Other leads to 
the suppression of any notion of reciprocal, personal relationality in the formation of 
selfhood. Instead there is an a-corporeality and individualism that we ultimately find
494wanting.
On a more positive note, in Body/Text in Julia Kristeva Marilyn Edelstein credits 
Kristeva with offering a reversal of the general trend within psychoanalysis to focus 
on the mother as object for the child.
"Kristeva attempts to create more a discourse of maternality-for-the-mother, 
thanmaternality-for-the-other."495
This, however, should not be taken as returning maternal agency to the woman. 
Edelstein suggests that Kristeva's use of 'the maternal' is as "metaphor for metaphor, 
and perhaps even for the split subject itself." 4%
Edelstein's reading of this text rightly, we believe, places the maternal body within 
the discourse of textuality (and perhaps this is entirely the problem for feminists 
hoping to find a place for the woman's body within Kristeva's work). However 
Kristeva's writing once again involves the problematic use of female terminology as 
post-structuralist metaphor. Edelstein herself asks, "Can a biological metaphor ever be 
completely severed from biology? Where does the 'mother' stand in Stabat Mater?"
The most positive use of the maternal body Edelstein appreciates is the linkage 
between maternal and metaphor. She points out that both terms have the same Greek 
root meaning "to bear" or "give birth", and are etymologically related to the term "to 
transgress".
Within Kristeva's "Stabat Mater" the maternal, whilst being linked to the actual 
experiences of mothers, is available to others too. Edelstein suggests that Kristeva's
494 We consider this conclusion fully in ch.10 of this thesis.
495 Marilyn Edelstein Body/Text in Julia Kristeva, State University of New York Press, 1992, p.28.
496 Ibid, p.29
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use of the term places the maternal body as a metaphor for division, for splitting, for 
the divided self.
In our reading of Kristeva so far we have found that her first use of the notion of 
otherness is related to early pre-Oedipal experience of the M/Other. In order to build 
the imaginary ego the self has to reject the mother and begin to embrace the realm of 
distinction and symbolisation, which is expressed in gendered terms as the Law of the 
Father. However, such an experience marks the self in process, as an exile or stranger, 
which is already internally divided or split, having been through the experience of 
loss. The semiotic realm persists beneath the realm of symbolic language and disrupts 
the emergence of a stable ego. In this way the self is an "exile". It is this notion that 
leads us to Kristeva's second notion of how the self encounters the other, of the 
foreigner or stranger that she explores in her work "Strangers to Ourselves." To 
explore the role of the other further, Kristeva brings the notions of inner division and 
the experience of social division together and attempts to relate theories of intra- 
subjective difference to inter-subjective relationships.
6.6 The Other as Stranger
Kristeva adopts notions of the maternal, or the M/Other, to posit a notion of intra- 
subjectivity. As we have seen, she sees the semiotic experience of the M/Other as a 
disruptive force. It is the catalyst for the original formation of the split subject and 
present in the continuing process of disruption of the static self or "I". Having 
established a model of intra-subjectivity, Kristeva extends her notion to inter- 
subjectivity, in a consideration of the role of the foreigner, to which we now turn.
In Strangers to Ourselves Kristeva focuses upon the role of the foreigner in post- 
Christian societies as representing otherness to the speaking subject. Here she views 
the post-Enlightenment dissolution of religious ties as being instrumental in the rise of 
the nation-state.497
In this, Kristeva suggests that the arrival of the nation-state has changed the view of 
identity and brought about the concept of the other as the foreigner within a nation-
497 STO p. 170
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state. The foreigner is often seen as less than 'a man' and used to embody notions of 
otherness.
"This process means that one can be more or less a man to the extent at one is 
more or less a citizen, that he who is not a citizen is not fully a man. Between 
the man and the citizen there is a scar: the foreigner. Is he fully a man if he is 
not a citizen?"498
In considering the role of the foreigner in society, Kristeva considers, with Proust, the 
character of the Jew in the context of Western culture in her recent works Proust and 
the Sense of Time and Time and Sense.499 Here, she sees,
"The character of the writer, the artist, and the homosexual are identical with 
that of 'the Jew' [in Proust]: they are all marginal. This is a position of 
witnessing. To what do the writer, the artist, the homosexual and 'the Jew' 
bear witness: to the impossibility of identity itself.. .In society there is a kind 
of constitution of sado-masochistic bonds where the marginal, the individual, 
the impassioned become a scapegoat in relation to which the others tie the 
bonds of fascination and hatred."500
Kristeva re-introduces her notion of abjection in this discussion, linking the notion of 
abjection to the feelings aroused by a stranger in society. In Powers of Horror 
Kristeva adopts notions from Mary Douglas' Purity and Danger501 to examine the 
sociological dynamics of abjection. In summary, group identity is constructed by 
excluding others, which are seen as threatening the group's borders, in the same way 
that abjection framed the experience of being rejected from the stable, symbiotic unity 
of the pre-Oedipal infant to the M/Other. In this Kristeva adopts the Freudian notion 
of the "uncanny." For Kristeva, the foreigner becomes the "uncanny": the presence of 
the other among the familiar. She says,
"In that sense, the foreigner is a "symptom"...he signifies the difficulty we 
have of living as an and with others."502
In effect, Kristeva is arguing that the rejection of the foreigner in society is an 
extrapolation of the profound experience of the displacement of the self in its primary 
rejection of the M/Other. In order to end the violent response to otherness, Kristeva
498 STO p. 97-98
499 Kristeva, Proust and the Sense of Time Faber and Faber, 1995 and Time and Sense. Columbia 
University Press, 1996.
500 From Kristeva's response to a question by Prof. Jonathan Freedberg, reprinted in Parallax: Julia 
Kristeva 1966-96 Aesthetics. Politics. Ethics 1998. vol. 4 no.3pp.5-16 "Dialogue with Julia Kristeva", 
this quote p. 12.
501 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger. Routledge, 1969.
502 STO p. 103
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suggests the "death of the proper self." She views this process as begun by Freud, 
saying,
"(The self) no longer exists ever since Freud and shows itself to be a strange 
land of borders and otherness ceaselessly constructed and deconstructed." 503
Kristeva considers Freud's notion of the uncanny at the end of 
Strangers to Ourselves. For Kristeva, this is the place where an appreciation of intra- 
subjectivity can effect social and ethical action. Kristeva argues that since the uncanny 
exists internally, within the unconscious, it challenges the rational ego posited by the 
Enlightenment, and ultimately suggests inner plurality and division. Kristeva suggests 
that with the notion of the uncanny,
"Delicately and analytically, Freud does not speak of foreigners; he teaches us 
how to detect foreignness in ourselves. That is perhaps the only way not to 
hound it outside of ourselves." 504
Kristeva suggests a number of things. Firstly, that the use of Freud's notion of the 
uncanny is a relevant way to explore the role of the foreigner in a nation-state. The 
foreigner is the stranger or "other" that disrupts the false notion of a homogenous and 
uncomplicated whole nation-state. Secondly, that the awareness of the uncanny within 
our very self is perhaps the only way to prevent the violent rejection of the other 
outside of ourselves.
"We cannot suppress the symptom that the foreigner provokes; but we must 
simply come back to it, clear it up, give it the resources our own essential 
depersonalizations provide and thus only soothe it." 505
In this Kristeva relates intra-subjectivity to inter-subjectivity, by suggesting that an 
acceptance of internal plurality will facilitate a socio-political tolerance of external 
plurality. In essence she sees a kind of enlightened secularism, which is aware of the 
psychoanalytical structures of semiotics and abjection and their relationship to the 
experience of the maternal, as leading to social equanimity.
"Freud brings us the courage to call ourselves disintegrated in order not to 
integrate foreigners and even less to hunt them down, but rather to welcome 
them to that uncanny strangeness, which is as much theirs as it is ours."506
503 STO p.191 504 STOp.l92
505 STO p. 190
506 STO p. 192
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We note that in Strangers to Ourselves Kristeva argues from the tenuous notion of 
Freud's uncanny to the external notion of the stranger, which is something Freud 
himself did not attempt. In defending her decisions to do so Kristeva asks,
"Are we nevertheless so sure that the 'political' feelings of xenophobia do not 
include, often unconsciously, that agony of frightened joy fulness that has been 
called 
In this, Kristeva suggests that a revolution within the self, undertaken by the power of 
poetry and art, will spark a revolution in society generally; that respect for the 
otherness within the self will lead to the acceptance of the other in society.
"By recognising our uncanny strangeness we shall neither suffer from it nor 
enjoy it from the outside. The foreigner is within me; hence we are all 
foreigners. If I am a foreigner, there are no foreigners. 508
In some ways this is a similar notion to that found in the work of Emmanuel
Cf\Q
Levinas. Levinas seeks to return to the questions of difference and diversity posed 
in the "infancy of philosophy" and address what he calls the "allergic reaction" to "the 
other that remains other."510 Levinas argues for the acceptance of otherness, which is 
absent in notions and actions which attempt to assimilate the other. In this, Levinas' 
idea of the other differs somewhat from Freudian notions of the uncanny. For Levinas, 
the other disrupts the idea of hegemony and unity but does not cause anxiety in the 
way that Freud suggests is characteristic of the uncanny. For Levinas, the encounter 
with otherness leads to an ethical response from the subject. As we have 
demonstrated, Kristeva shares this view, and her work can be read as an attempt to 
move from the anxiety reaction of Freud's uncanny to one of respect and openness to 
Levinas' other. She sees the "immanence of the strangeness within the familiar"511 as 
the catalyst to end the violent reaction to the other in society. Furthermore, in 
Strangers to Ourselves, Kristeva states that the immanence of the stranger preserves 
the transcendence of the other. In other words, she agrees with Levinas that the other 
is not to be subsumed, but rather respected and preserved.
507 STO p.191 508 STOp.l92
509 See Emmanuel Levinas's essay "The Trace of the Other" trans. A. Lingis, appearing in 
Deconstruction in Context ed. Mark Taylor, University of Chicago Press 1986. See also Ethics as a 
first Philosophy: the significance of Emmanuel Levinas for philosophy, literature and religion Adriaan 
T Peperzak ed., Routledge, 1995.
510 Ibid. p. 346 511 STOp.l83
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Allowing for Kristeva's use of Freud's notion of the uncanny, a number of other more 
fundamental problems with Kristeva's thesis remain. Firstly, her thesis can be seen to 
be inherently individualistic. In a telling passage in Strangers to Ourselves Kristeva 
states,
"We are far removed from a call to brotherhood, about which one has already 
ironically pointed out its debt to paternal and divine authority - "In order to 
have brothers there must be a father"."512
This rejection of notions of an essential unity, or more properly community, between 
persons emphatically underlines the inherent individualism in Kristeva's schema. The 
strongest critique of such notions can be found in feminist commentaries on Kristeva. 
For example, Anna Smith says that the Kristevan thesis on the stranger within 
"precisely turns "we" into a problem, perhaps makes it impossible."513 
Rosi Braidotti asks,
"Can feminists, at this point in their history of collective struggles at 
redefining female subjectivity, actually afford to let go of their sex-specific 
forms of political agency? Is the by-passing of gender in favour of a dispersed 
polysexuality not a very masculine move?.. .A multiplicity or polysexuality 
that does not take into account the fundamental asymmetry between the sexes 
is but a subtler form of discrimination. It reinstates and reinforces women's 
subordinate position."514
Furthermore, Kristeva's ethical construction re-situates the problem of political and 
social violence to the realm of the psyche. Can the internal dissolution of the self and 
the privileging of avant-garde poetry, as Kristeva suggests, address social disorder and 
violence? Several feminist commentators have taken offence at such a suggestion. 
Gayatri Spivak says there is
"Something faintly comical about Joyce rising above sexual identities and 
bequeathing the proper mind-set to the women's movement."515
Elizabeth Grosz agrees,
"Advocacy of the (male) avant-garde as spokesman for a repressed femininity 
coupled with [Kristeva's] call for a feminism that is not confined to sexual 
differences but analyses and confronts the question of sexual 
differentiation... imply the annihilation of women's struggles for sexual
ci /c
specificity and autonomy."
512 STO p.192
513 Anna Smith, Julia Kristeva: Readings of exile and estrangement, MacMillan Press, 1996.
514 Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance. Oxford Polity Press, 1991, p.120-1.
515 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "French Feminism in an Intellectual Frame" Yale French Studies 
no. 62. 198. pp. 159-64.
516 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions Alien Unwin, 1989, p.97
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The tendency to re-situate the political to the textual was worryingly apparent in our 
research of a number of Kristeva's interviews. For example, we found it unsettling 
that, when asked to comment on possible solutions for the appalling rise in rape 
within French ghettos (The Guardian April 5, 2003), Kristeva sent a pre-written 
article on psychic space.517 This was interpreted in the article as unwillingness "to do 
both practical and intellectual work". We suggest that it perhaps demonstrates a 
tendency to 'pyschologise' very real social problems. With an over-individualistic 
framework, no "we" of women, and the tendency to re-situate social crisis to psychic 
space, Kristeva's approach offers little if anything to the plight of the women in the 
article. In fact, such theorising without direct recourse to political action seems hugely 
offensive.
A further criticism that can be made against Kristeva's notion of the Stranger as other 
is that it appears at times to be internally incoherent. As has been demonstrated, it 
ironically appears to privilege the experience of women, whilst maintaining that 
gender difference is merely discursive. Kristeva falls into essentialism by speaking of 
the experience of women as being especially related to the experience of being an 
"exile" or "stranger".518 This inherent contradiction is apparent in the article "A New 
Type of Intellectual Dissident":
"A woman is trapped within the frontiers of her own body and even her 
species, and consequently always feels both by the general cliches that 
make up a common consensus and by the very power of generalisation 
intrinsic to language."519
In essence, Kristeva argues that women's experience of estrangement from political, 
historical and social strata offers them a unique insight into the hegemonic rationalism 
of modem society. However, there is nothing in Kristeva's anti-realism and rejection 
of the categories of sex and gender that accounts for such a statement. By suggesting
si?« .cphe femin}sts have deserted the banlieue," reads the national appeal of the Neither Slags Nor 
Submissives campaign. I put this accusation to Julia Kristeva, one of France's leading feminists. Why 
hasn't anyone paid attention before now? She sent me back a one-page article she'd written a year ago - 
on "the damage to psychic space". "It'll be the same thing elsewhere," says Michelle Le Doeuff, a 
professor of philosophy and one of the few intellectual feminists willing to dirty her hands with 
practical issues. "It's frowned upon to do both practical and intellectual work."" The Guardian April 5, 
2003.
518 See Anna Smith, Julia Kristeva: Readings of exile and estrangement. Macmillan Press, 1996.
519 Kristeva, "A New Type of Intellectual: The Dissident" was originally published as an editorial in 
Tel Ouel Winter 1977 (no.74), pp.3-8, this citation p.5.
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that a woman's place of estrangement provides unique insight into the power of 
modern hegemony, Kristeva appears to be positing a universal female experience, 
which she has taken pains to reject.
The final two criticisms we offer of Kristeva's use of otherness are inter-related: the 
way in which it disallows a place for a marked or real body in the creation of the self 
and the lack of reciprocity in her understanding of selfhood.
The lack of a place for the body in Kristeva's notion of personhood has led Susan 
Bordo to accuse post-modern feminists of exchanging the Cartesian "myth of a view 
from nowhere" with any equally incongruent "myth of a view from everywhere."520 
This is described as exchanging the Cartesian metaphors of spectatorship for post- 
modern metaphors of dance, the "dance of the disembodied shape-shifter". Kristeva's 
desire to see the self as polysexual and able to transgress sexual boundaries appears to 
have led to the outright denial of bodily experience in selfhood; there is no place for 
the embodied self. This might be due to what Bordo terms "an increasingly paralyzing 
anxiety over falling (from what grace?) into ethnocentricity or 'essentialism.'" This 
appears evident to some extent in Kristeva's work where the adoption of post-modern 
understandings of identity, even in relation to motherhood, might be seen to be a 
response to the fear of universalisation.
Kristeva disallows corporeal experience in the first instance with the removal of the 
maternal experience from the real mother and therefore will not allow for the mother 
to be a reciprocal partner in the formation of the self. This is achieved by dislocating 
motherhood from the agency of real women. This tendency is echoed in her use of the 
foreigner as stranger. By her immediate recourse to Freud's theory, the foreigner, as a 
person, becomes overshadowed, we believe, by the theoretical notion of the 
"uncanny". This again replaces the agency of the foreigner, and the ability for there to 
be a coadunate encounter with the stranger, with an individualistic intra-subjective 
experience. This will become an important contrast with Rahner's alternative view of 
the other.
520 Susan Bordo's essay "Feminism. Postmodernism and Gender-Scepticism" appears as chapter 6 of 
Feminism/Postmodernism ed. Linda Nicholson, Routledge 1990
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In this chapter we have examined the role Kristeva gives to the maternal in the 
creation of subjecthood. She sees the pre-Oedipal M/Other as replacing the former 
significance of psychoanalytical Father. It is at the M/Other that the emerging subject 
first experiences semiotic union, abjection and finally the splitting of the self. It is the 
maternal semiotics that persists to disrupt all monolithic structures of meaning. In this 
sense, the M/Other is both a space and a powerful disruptive force for the creation of 
subjective experience.
We have raised a number of issues with Kristeva's notion of the speaking subject in 
relation to otherness. Primarily our concern has been with the lack of coadunancy that 
is present when the agency of the mother or the stranger is reduced to an encounter 
with impersonal otherness where agency is dismissed, rather than a reciprocal 
relationality between two persons. We shall return to this theme in a subsequent 
chapter as we contrast Kristeva's use of otherness with that of Rahner.521
However, we have appreciated the strength of Kristeva's argument that notions of 
intra-subjectivity affect those of inter-subjectivity, and can be party to the creation of 
an ethics of toleration of the "others" in society. This could be used to inform a 
theological notion of subjectivity, such as Rahner's. We propose that this explicit 
linkage is a useful tool as we turn to Rahner's use of notions of otherness: God as 
Trinity, and the neighbour.
521 See ch.8.12 and 10.4 of this thesis.
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7. Rahner -The Trinity and the Neighbour: 
Models of intra-subjectivity and the experience of inter-subjectivity.
Our previous chapter explored the way in which Kristeva adopts a model of otherness 
based on the M/Other and uses this to forward an ethic of societal equanimity 
whereby the stranger in society is encountered as other and reminds the subject of its 
original experience of abjection from the M/Other. We identified a two-fold model of 
otherness here, with both intra- and inter-relationality based upon a confrontation with 
the other. This identification has enabled us to discern a similar two-fold use of 
otherness within Rahner's writings, which is perhaps less explicit than that found in 
Kristeva's. We seek to explore this here. Fundamentally both our theorists offer 
models of subjectivity that emphasise the formative influence of the other and make a 
connection between intra- and inter-subjectivity.
In our thesis so far we have considered Rahner's arena of subjectivity and the means 
by which he imagines the person as hearer to be created. This has involved an 
examination of Rahner's theological methodology, his adoption of Thomist ontology 
and theories of symbolisation.522 We can summarise our findings by saying that, for 
Rahner, all being fundamentally exists in a dynamic relationship to divinity realised in 
history. Furthermore all beings express themselves symbolically and relationally to 
other beings in order to actualise their being.523 This is succinctly posited in the idea 
of the person as hearer. In this we note that Rahner inverts the usual notion of 
otherness so that the hearer becomes 'other' to divinity; God's being is prioritised and 
the human being is a derivative. God's being is privileged since God is self- 
sufficient.
We shall now turn to an examination of Rahner's ultimate affirmation of such notions 
of being and personhood: the nature of the divine as Trinity. In Rahner the inner 
plurality of the Trinity perfectly expresses the relation to otherness found to lesser 
degrees in symbolic expression, relationality and communion. The Trinity is Rahner's
522 See chapters 1 and 4 of this thesis.
523 In this we do not infer that for Rahner God must by necessity actualise God's being in relation. 
Rahner will argue that the unity-in-community of the Trinity is perfect self-actualisation. God's 
decision to relate to humanity is an act of love and grace.
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model of intra-subjectivity and the human experience of otherness is derived from this 
model.
As we examine Rahner's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity we encounter 
"Rahner's Rule" and consider the impact that his programme of bringing together the 
understanding of the "economic" and "immanent" Trinity has had in contemporary 
theology. This is relevant to our thesis since Rahner's particular interpretation of the 
doctrine of the Trinity is foundational to the special nature of the person. The Trinity 
serves a similar purpose to Kristeva's M/Other in that it contains the model of 
otherness that will shape the human subject. However the Trinity has ultimate agency 
for Rahner, in contradistinction to the agent-less "space" of the feminine maternal in 
Kristeva. The relationship to otherness is, for Rahner, entirely personal.
This chapter also relates to our previous discussion about Rahnerian theories of the 
symbol. For Rahner, the doctrine of the Trinity is the ultimate basis for a theory of 
direct and coherent relation between being and its symbol. The triunity of God 
establishes that all beings become present to themselves as they express themselves 
through the act of symbolisation. 524 For Rahner, the Trinity is far more than a model 
of symbolic, plural being, it is both the origin and telos of all being; the 'alpha' and 
'omega' of being and of personhood in particular. According to Rahner, a proper 
understanding of the social Trinity fixes human personhood as reciprocal and 
relational.
Having examined Rahner's use of the Trinity to model intra-relationality, we then 
explore the intimate relationship Rahner proposes between the experience of self, of 
God and of neighbour. It is here that we observe a similar desire to relate theories of 
intra-subjectivity to those of inter-subjectivity that we appreciated in Kristeva's 
writings. Rahner's radical argument is for a unity between the experience of God, of 
neighbour and of self. Openness to inner-plurality fosters openness to communality. 
There is a striking similarity, and a number of contrasts here, that will be significant in 
our dialogue between Rahner and Kristeva
524 Rahner's theory of symbolisation was explored in ch.4.3 of this thesis.
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7.1 The Trinity - Rahner's re-assessment.
We begin with a brief analysis of how Rahner revises former understandings of the 
Trinity. He begins with an historic survey of Trinitarian statements. In Foundations of 
the Christian Faith Rahner admits that,
"Statements about the Trinity in their catechetical formulations are almost 
entirely unintelligible to people today."525
Whilst he certainly does not desire to depart from traditional formulations,526 Rahner 
suggests three reasons why these expressions have become less than helpful today. 
Firstly, there is the historic ordering of the doctrine of God prior to that of the Trinity. 
Secondly, there is the unhelpful separation between the economic and immanent 
trinity. Thirdly, there is the problematic use of terms such as "person". We shall 
briefly address Rahner's concerns in turn. In this we suggest that Rahner's revisions 
have opened the way for contemporary theology's relational view of God and human 
personhood, which is of great interest to our project.
7.2 Oneness before Threeness? Rahner and the Ordering of the Doctrines of God 
and Trinity.
Systematic theology traditionally places the account of the Doctrine of God, the 
existence and nature of God, before that of the doctrine of the Trinity. Of this, Rahner 
says,
"Even historically speaking, the relationship between the general doctrine of 
God and the doctrine of the Trinity is problematical."527
Rahner suggests that this ordering mistakenly leads to divine triunity being 
understood as less than central, and perhaps even of marginal importance, to the 
Being of God. Rahner says that this infers a disjuncture between God being One and 
God being Triune. He even suggests that the average Catholic (and, we might add, 
Christian) has no sense of what it means to be in communion with God as Trinity. 528
525 FCFp.l34
526 He makes this clear in his discussion in the use of the problematic and often misleading phrase "God 
as one in three persons" (Sacramentum Mundi 4.b. p!763, 1975) saying that such a phrase could not 
be eliminated from use since "no individual preacher has the authority to do so."
527 TIIX, p. 127-144
528 Rahner, The Trinity Burns and Oats, 1970
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In order to understand how this problem has arisen Rahner begins with a survey of 
Scripture. Writing on the Trinity in Sacramentum Mundi he points out that the triune 
aspects of God's being were formerly exclusively spoken of within the dimension of 
salvation-history.529
"In the New Testament the theology of the Trinity.. .is entirely orientated to 
the economy of salvation. God and the Father are synonyms. The Son and the 
Spirit are spoken of inasmuch as they come into the experience of faith as the 
actual presence of God (the Father) in the history of salvation."530
Rahner's historical survey states that he does not see the present disjuncture between 
God's inherent Oneness and Threeness evident in either the Credal formulations or 
early Patristic Councils. Here, the existence and attributes of the Father were the 
setting for the discussion of Trinitarian aspects of God's being.
"This makes the Trinitarian theology of the fathers a theology based from the 
start on the history of salvation and soteriology."531
Furthermore, as his survey continues, Rahner finds that within early Greek 
formulations the setting for God's Trinitarian nature was once again soteriological and
^1O
was "entirely orientated to man."
"Hence too the Greek patristic theology was content to define the relation 
between the one nature and ... the three ways of being there (for us) in terms 
of formal ontology, by understanding these as relations." 533
Rahner's survey leads him to conclude that modern Trinitarian statements have lost or 
obscured two essential and interrelated aspects that were present in their early patristic 
heritage. He identifies these as the setting of Trinitarian statements within soteriology 
and, secondly, that they were dealt with under the doctrine of God (the Father).
We note here that Rahner's suggested return to a Greek patristic order might be seen 
to risk the threat of subordinationism, similar to that faced by the Greeks. While this is 
clearly one possible disadvantage, for Rahner this remains only a potential risk to be 
overcome by a proper understanding of the relational nature of God's triunity. For 
Rahner, the advantages of resituating the centrality of divine triunity as an essential
529 SM pp. 1756-1758
530 SM p. 1767 
53 'SM p. 1768
532 SM p. 1768
533 SM p. 1768
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aspect of God's personhood and of our salvation experience merit change within 
systematic theology. Without such a change Rahner fears it will be impossible for 
Christians to overcome their "psychological unitarianism," and calls for theology to 
become "more consciously Trinitarian than it has been".534
7.3 Resolving the Separation between the Immanent and Economic Trinity: the 
Development of 'Rahner's Rule'
In respect to otherness, Rahner suggests that the human being's relation to divinity as 
other is an experience that takes place within human history. It is in his writings on 
the Trinity that Rahner's ideas about the nature of reality, symbolisation and 
anthropology meet, and as such an examination of his treatment of this doctrine is 
entirely relevant to our task. The divine is not to be thought of as alien to human 
history. For Rahner, we experience God as God is: in history and as the "God who 
saves us, through Jesus, by the power of the Holy Spirit."535 For Rahner a false 
interpretation of reality is intertwined with a misinterpretation of the Trinity. He 
proposes a 'rule' to resolve this misapprehension.
"The 'economic' Trinity is the 'immanent' Trinity, and the 'immanent' Trinity 
is the 'economic' Trinity".536
Rahner arrives at his rule by suggesting important disadvantages of 'psychological 
approaches' to the Trinity, such as Augustine's, which separate the immanent trinity 
from the economic trinity.537 Rahner expresses concern with the tendency within 
psychological approaches to be overly speculative and disconnected from personal 
experiential knowledge of God. Rahner fears that this runs the risk of becoming what 
LaCunga terms, "presumptuous prying into something about which we know 
nothing."538 We recall that, for Rahner, all human knowledge is based upon a 
metaphysical a priori of existing within a self-disclosing God.539 The experience of
534 Rahner's essay "Observations on the Doctrine of God" p.130 from TI 9 pp.130-134
535 We quote here from Catherine LaCunga's God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life Harper 
Collins, 1991 p. 3. LaCunga takes Rahner's Rule as the starting point for her understanding of the 
relational Trinity. We shall take the opportunity to appraise her work later in this chapter. In short, 
following Rahner, LaCunga sees the doctrine of the Trinity as rather "what it means to participate in 
the life of God through Jesus in the Spirit."
536 Karl Rahner The Trinity Burns and Oats, 1970, p.22
537 SM p. 1768
538 Catherine LaCunga op.cit. p.l 1
539 See chapter 1 and 4.1 of this thesis, which deals with Rahner's epistemology. We shall consider the 
nature, or "modality" of God's self-communication later in this chapter.
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God is, we recall, unthematic and persistent.540 Our experience of the Trinity as Other 
must therefore be an experience attained through unthematic knowledge and not 
rational speculation. It is the failure of psychological approaches to the Trinity to 
begin with our experience within salvation-history, and the separation of the 
immanent trinity from the economy of salvation, which leads Rahner to conclude, 
"Perhaps we can say that ultimately they are not really that helpful."541
Rahner proposes that a false understanding of the nature of reality compounds and 
exacerbates problems in Trinitarian debates. We note that the desire to bring the 
human realm fully back into the continuum of the divine realm has often been used to 
characterise Rahner's entire theological project.542 He rejects the dualistic separation 
of the secular and the divine543 drawing upon ideas of Thomist participational 
continuity. For Rahner the Thomist understanding of reality, one wherein humans 
participate in the divine, is essential to resolve the disjuncture between God as One 
and Three. When the two spheres of humanity and divinity are not construed as 
parallel realities, but rather as continuous, the understanding that we know God as 
God is becomes more possible.
"In the Trinity in the economy and history of salvation and revelation we have 
already experienced the immanent trinity as it is in itself."544
Here Rahner confidently expresses that the participation between human and divine 
realms enables the experience of how God to us as humans directly relates to how 
God is in Godself.
We appreciate then that Rahner's Rule sets the scene for an encounter with otherness 
that is within human history, personal and achievable through unthemeatic 
experiential knowledge rather than rationality. This encounter with otherness is far 
more than prepositional; it is a revelation of relatedness in which the other of God 
reveals Godself as God really is. In revisiting the doctrine of the Trinity we find 
Rahner builds the foundations of a notion of otherness that brings together the notion
540 See ch.s 1.3, 5.1 and 5.6 of this thesis
541 FCF p. 134
542 David Ford The Modern Theologians: an introduction to Christian theology in the twentieth century. 
Blackwell 1997 suggests that at the core of Rahner's theology is a desire to see the human realm as 
completely embraced and irreversibly transformed by divine grace. 
543 Seech.l of this thesis.
544 FCF, p. 137
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of a Social Trinity with that of the human person as in dialogue with the divine Other. 
In this, the inner-plurality of the Trinity is the basis for the human being's revelational 
encounter.
7.4 The influence of Karl Barth's revelationism545 on the development of 
Rahner's Rule
Our examination should not infer that Rahner stands alone in the desire to re-instate 
the doctrine of the Trinity in Christian theology. Neither is he unique in modelling 
God's revelation as an encounter with God as God is. Here we briefly discuss the 
influence of German Idealism and Karl Barth's theology upon Rahner. In this we see 
that the hearer of God, proposed as a model of subjectivity in Rahner, has its roots in a 
return to the doctrine of the Trinity which is informed by German Idealism.
Stanley Grenz argues that it was Hegel's philosophical trinitarianism that set the stage 
for the twentieth century's revised interest in the nature of divine subjecthood.546 For 
Grenz (following Claude Welch and Ted Peters) the most significant contribution 
Hegelian philosophy made to later theology was the notion that God as Trinity was a 
metaphysical truth that could be established more or less independently from 
Christian revelation.547 It is, perhaps, unsurprising then that the two foremost 
twentieth century Christian theologians who drew upon German Idealism, Earth and 
Rahner, should be concerned to revise notions of the Trinity within their theological 
programmes.
Barth's revelation-orientated approach to discussions about the Trinity have clearly 
been greatly influential for contemporary debate. Claude Welch548 sees Barth's 
"thorough-going theological revelationalism" as a new development in contemporary 
theology, in that it develops doctrines, not by appealing to proof texts alone, but with 
an appeal to the whole Gospel as Christocentric. Welch says of such revelational 
approaches to the Trinity,
545 This term is from Welch, C. In This Name: The Doctrine of the Trinity in Contemporary Theology 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952. Welch describes Barth's theological approach this way in that it appeals 
not to proof texts alone, but to the whole Gospel as Christocentric.
546 Stanley Grenz The Social God and the Relational Self Westminster John Knox Press, 2001, p.24.
547 See Grenz, op.cit. p. 29, also Claude Welch In This Name: The Doctrine of the Trinity in 
Contemporary Theology Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952, and Ted Peters God as Trinity: Relationalitv 
and Temporality in the Divine Life, John Knox, 1993.
548 Welch, op.cit.
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"The doctrine of the Trinity is thus not to be understood as per se a 'revealed 
doctrine', but as a doctrine by which we seek to explicate the meaning of the 
revelation in Christ as it bears on the nature of God."549
According to Earth, the triune God both issues and is encountered within revelation. 
Revelation is, in itself, a 'God-event'.
"Thus it is God Himself, it is the same God in unimpaired unity, who 
according to the biblical understanding of revelation is revealing God and the 
event of revelation and its effect on man." 55°
There is, therefore, nothing that can be said of God's actions that is not wholly 
coherent with God's being; in other words, the theological distinction between the 
economic and immanent Trinity is misplaced. Barth says,
"All our statements concerning what is called the immanent Trinity have been 
reached simply as confirmations or underlinings, or, materially, as the 
indispensable premises of the economic Trinity." 551
We see that it is in his particular notion of revelation that Barth holds together the 
immanent and economic trinity, "God reveals himself. He reveals himself through 
himself. He reveals himself,"552 which leads to Barth's famous dictum of the Triune 
God as 'Revealer, Revelation and Revealedness'.553
We note that Hill sees the influence of Barth on Rahner as almost co-incidental,
"Strange to relate, the movement of Neo-Orthodoxy in German Protestantism 
found an ally in German Catholic thought developing in an inverse direction, 
i.e., not away from liberalism introduced by Schleiermacher but, in a qualified 
sense, towards it." 554
Whilst Rahner makes no declarations about nature of Barth's influence in this regard, 
there is clearly a shared revelationalism as well as the clear influence of German 
idealism generally. Rahner's work can be seen as co-extensive with Barth's desire to
549 Welch op. cit. p.26
550 Karl Barth Church Dogmatics I/I. The Doctrine of the Word of God 2nd edition 
Trans, G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, T & T Clark 1975, p.299
551 Ibid, p.429
552 Barth op. cit. p296
553 Ibid, p.299 
554 Hillop.citp.l30
>
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establish the importance of God's self-communication as central to the doctrine of the 
Trinity.555
7.5 Rahner's Two Formal Modalities of God's Self-Communication
Rahner adopts Barth's "revelation and revealedness" as "two formal modalities" of 
God's self-communication. Here we observe Rahner exploring the inner-plurality of 
the Trinity to posit a notion of God as Other and as intrinsically relational.
For Rahner aspects of God's self-communication relate to the persons of the Trinity. 
In The Trinity the Father is termed "God as Such," while the Son (Rahner often 
favours the terms Word or Logos) is God's self-communication as "knowledge," and 
the Spirit is God's self-communication as "love". Importantly for Rahner, and in 
contradistinction to Barth, we note that the double aspects of God's self- 
communication should be seen to pre-suppose the ability of the "hearer" to receive 
divine self-communication.556 In other words, the human person is always, 
fundamentally and constitutionally, a hearer of God who can receive both formal 
modalities of God's revelation. This contrasts with Barth's theories of God's 
revelation whereby human sinfulness results in an inability to hear God, which can 
only be overcome by the work of the Spirit. For Rahner, elements within the human 
personality relate to the dual aspects, or modalities, of God's self-revelation. He sees 
the human ability to search beyond our own situated history as relating to God's self- 
communication of "knowledge", while the ability to be open and receptive reflects 
God's self-communication of "love". For Rahner, these important double aspects of 
God's self-communication allow a duality of "word and response" and "going out and 
return" between the human person and God.557 In other words, the hearer of God is 
also able to truly communicate with God in a dialectical experience of receiving and 
responding to God's self-communication. This is important to our thesis since it 
establishes the self as "hearer" in a dialogical experience of otherness.
555 Hill sees that this influence as almost co-incidental; "Strange to relate, the movement of Neo- 
Orthodoxy in German Protestantism found an ally in German Catholic thought developing in an inverse 
direction, i.e., not away from liberalism introduced by Schleiermacher but, in a qualified sense, towards 
it." op. cit. p. 130. We believe it does not take into account fully enough the shared roots of German 
Idealism and the influence of Barth's revelationalism drawn from such notions of a dialectical reality.
556 A theme Rahner expounds in Hearers of the Word as well as many other works including The 
Trinity and his writing on nature and grace in TI 4 and 9.
557 Rahner, HW and Rahner, "Remarks on the Treatise 'De Trinitate'" TI 4, p. 95-102.
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In reviewing Rahner's theory of revelation it is important to keep in mind that Rahner 
stresses that our knowledge of God is ultimately of a God who is both, and at the 
same time, revealed and profoundly hidden. For Rahner, at best, we hear a mystery.558 
However, our experience of God in salvation history is not of God as proposition,559 
received, so to speak, from outside of our reality, but of the God who fills and 
contains our reality. As such our experience of God is precisely of God as God exists 
within Godself. In other words the self as hearer is engaged in an intimate and 
relational communion rather than listening to propositions from beyond.
"The one God imparts himself as absolute self-utterance and absolute gift of 
love. This communication - the absolute mystery, which is only received in 
Christ - is however self-communication. God does not merely give his 
creature a 'share' 'in himself (indirectly) by creating and denoting finite 
realties through his all-powerful efficient causality: but gives himself, really 
and in the strictest sense of the word, in a quasi-formal causality."560
Revelation is not just what God reveals about Godself, but is an encounter with God. 
Using the transcendental argument,561 Rahner says that we can argue back from our 
experience of God towards the understanding that this must be how God is, within 
God's innermost being.562 Our 'pre-thematic knowledge' of God as Trinity rests upon 
our experience of the persons of God within salvation history (both individually and 
collectively). In this we can say with Rahner that the doctrine of the Trinity is 
profoundly and experientially understood while the precise nature of the social trinity 
remains a mystery which we cannot fully understand.
As Rahner points out, by beginning with our experience, building a theology 'from 
below', the doctrine of the Trinity will never become merely a subtle theological 
speculative game. It is rather "an assertion which cannot be avoided" it is, "so very
558 This concept is outlined in Rahner's philosophical works Spirit in the World and Hearers of the 
Word. See ch.5.5 for our consideration of this theme.
559 Here is an example of the surprising similarities between Rahner and Karl Barth, although Barth's 
schema has often been accused of subsuming the history of the world within that of God.
560 Rahner, "Remarks on the Treatise 'De Trinitate' " TI 4, p. 97.
561 See FCF, p. 136
562 See an explicit statement of this in LaCunga's God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life Harper 
Collins, 1991.
169
incomprehensible and so very self-evident."563 Rahner presents us with a God "of 
infinite distance and absolute closeness."564
Using a similar transcendental method Rahner argues for God as personal.565 He 
begins by stating,
"The statement that God is a person, that he is a personal God, is one of the 
fundamental Christian assertions about God."566
Rahner will again affirm here both the "self-evidence" of this assertion and the utter 
mystery of its truth. Here the triunity and personal nature of God are brought together. 
This facet of Rahner's exploration is important to our task since it is his interrelation 
of these concepts that offers a striking contrast to the relation to the other that we find 
in Kristeva. For Rahner, the triunity of God is also a personal communion. The human 
relation to God as Other is therefore necessarily personal. Again using a 
transcendental method Rahner says that God's personhood is self-evident in that,
"The ground of reality which exists must possess in itself beforehand and in 
absolute fullness and purity this reality which is grounded by it."567
Ultimately, for Rahner, the unique way in which a human can be said to be a person 
recalls, in part, the truths about divine personhood. This personhood of God is at one 
and the same time obvious to the human subject and entirely outside traditional or 
scientific methods of proof. It belongs to a metaphysical pre-knowledge within the 
human subject, whose search for the nature of being must necessarily be founded 
upon the existence of a "ground of being" an "Ultimate Subject." 568
563 FCF p. 137
564 FCF p. 137
565 FCF.p. 55-71
566 FCF p. 73567 FCF p.73
568 See Rahner, Ch.8 "The Free Listener" from HW
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7.6 How Does Rahner's Revised Trinitarianism Impact Upon his notion of 
human personhood? Rahner's Intra and Inter-subjectivity.
Here we shall assess how Rahner draws the axiomatic belief that the human person is 
necessarily relational from his understanding of the Trinity. In doing so we draw 
together two strands of Rahnerian thought so far encountered in this thesis: the 
triunity of God, and the nature of being as symbolic. Taken together, these notions 
form a fundamental belief that to be is to be in communion. In this we shall assess 
Rahner's notion that God, as Trinity, is other (in community) and that the human 
person is eschatologically also to be viewed as becoming a person through 'otherness- 
in-community'. Here we shall further assess Rahner's use of the Trinity as a model 
and originator of otherness, and encounter his use of the neighbour as the opportunity 
to realise the self through an inter-subjective ethic of love.
Colin Gunton points out that social models of the Trinity, such as Rahner's, imply two 
important aspects of divine personhood which, in turn, relate to theories of human 
relationality. For Gunton, these are the aspects of'space' and 'relatedness.' 569 In 
essence, Gunton claims that a conception of God which sees the persons of the Trinity 
in a communion, whereby they maintain their distinction and emphasise their 
relatedness, will foster an understanding of the human person as similarly relational. 
Persons both human and divine realise their being in relations. The "image of God" 
present in human persons is therefore understood as the ability to have reciprocal 
relationships; to reflect the communion of the Trinity and, in so doing, to actualise 
personhood. An important advantage which Gunton identifies here, and to which we 
shall return in chapter ten of this thesis, is the way in which such an understanding of 
the imago dei allows for the bodily aspects of human personhood to be included as 
reflective of the image of God. Since it is relationships which foster the image of God, 
all relationships, whereby the dual aspects of otherness and the relatedness are 
evident, can be said to reflect God's image of community. This can include the body 
and corporeality, which was formally discounted in Cartesian notions of selfhood 
where human reason alone reflected God's image. Gunton surmises that it is most 
especially the experience of love in which otherness and relation are coexistent and
569 Colin Gunton (ed.) Persons Human and Divine: King's College Essays in Theological Anthropology 
T&T Clark 1991. See especially Gunton's essay "Trinity, Ontology and Anthropology" pp.47-61, this 
quote p.58.
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experienced. We shall go on to see that Gunton's thesis is fully convergent with the 
writings of Rahner, where love is privileged as the means to actualise personhood. 
From this we suggest that Rahner's social Trinitarianism fully relates to Gunton's 
thesis and, as would be expected, leads to a relational view of the human person. This 
is doubly important to our thesis since we are considering how the self as hearer is 
able to critique the speaking self. We anticipate that the hearing self contains aspects 
of corporeality that are denied to the speaking subject and has a notion of relationality 
that is truly reciprocal and personal.
One further witness to the plausibility of Rahner's social Trinitarian model, as one 
which facilitates a relational anthropology, is an examination of this process in the 
work of contemporary theologians who have followed Rahner's Rule.
Peters (1993) and Grenz (2001) identify examples of this process.570 Grenz suggests 
that the influence of Rahner's Rule can be seen as greatly evident in initiating the 
"History of God" projects of Jurgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg.571 For 
Peter's, Rahner's revision of the doctrine of the Trinity raised the possibility of the 
history of God project per Rahner's rejoining of the notions of economic and 
immanent trinity enabled theologians to ask the question as to what could be true of 
the history of God if classical assumptions about God's immutability were cast aside, 
and in their place was an understanding that God, in Christ, experiences time and 
change. Just such a question is the crux of Moltmann and Pannenberg's projects. 
Grenz summarises these as intending "to reconceive the doctrine of the Trinity by 
looking at the work of the three Trinitarian persons in history."572 According to 
Grenz's useful summary573 both theologians can be seen to follow the direction set in 
Rahner's Rule. Whilst they make a number of adaptations, basically both continue the 
trend began by Rahner and Barth, to re-imagine the doctrine of the Trinity within a 
soteriological setting.
570 Ted Peters God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in the Divine Life Westminster John 
Knox, 1993. Stanley J Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: a Trinitarian theology of the 
imago dei. Westminster John Knox, 2001.
571 Grenz op. citp. 41-46
572 Ibid, p.41
573 Ibid, pp.41-50
172
This has resulted in a prolonged contemplation in Moltmann's work regarding God's 
ability to experience change. Fundamentally, for Moltmann, God is not immutable. 
God is relationally affected by the historic events in Jesus' life. 574
Pannenberg's relational trinitarianism can similarly be seen as an attempt to take 
Rahner's Rule seriously and explore the consequences for God experiencing within 
Godself what Christ achieves in human history. Pannenberg restates the understanding 
of God's self-differentiation in light of a Hegelian understanding of identity. In 
essence, he agrees with Hegel that the one who differentiates oneself from another is 
dependent upon the other for their identity575 . In short, Pannenberg makes clear that, 
based upon the social model of the Trinity, relationality is reciprocal. The persons of 
the Trinity give and receive identity through differentiation, and this is a reciprocal 
process.
"As Jesus glorifies the Father and not himself, and precisely in so doing shows 
himself to be the Son of the Father, so the Spirit glorifies not himself but the 
Son, and in him the Father."576
Therefore, for Pannenberg, the personhood of the members of the Trinity is a received 
personhood. In turn, the personhood of the human being is not a given, but an 
eschatological possibility for the being possessing human nature; they may become a
C*J*J __
truly human person. This process can similarly only be achieved in relation to 
others.
Grenz sees a third contemporary theologian, John D. Zizioulas, as being similarly 
moved by the desire to explore the consequences of Rahner's Rule.578 Zizioulas 
himself writes,
"Both in the case of God and of man the identity of a person is recognized and 
posited clearly and unequivocally, but this is only in and through a
574 We stress that Moltmann dismisses any notion that God is interdependent on the world. Rather, it is 
in God's decision "to go outside himself that allows the history of the world to be brought into the 
eternal history of God. Furthermore, God experiences the historical events of the person of Jesus Christ 
in a mediated way through the dialectic of the separation of the persons of God as Father and Son.
575 Pannenberg, Faith and Reality trans. John Maxwell, London Search Press, 1977 
576Pannenberg, Systematic Theology trans. Geoffrey Bromiley 3 vols. Eerdmans, 1991, p. 315.
577 We examine this fully in ch.8 where we consider Rahner's distinction between "person" and 
"human nature" and raise this idea here in support of the notion that Pannenberg's notion of received 
personhood is fully coherent with that begun by Rahner.
578 Grenz op. citp. 51
173
relationship...Personal identity is totally lost if isolated, for its ontological 
condition is relationship."579
Zizioulas can be credited with instigating the precedence of the phrase "Being as 
Communion" in contemporary theological anthropology. In summary, Zizioulas' 
understanding sees personhood as constructed through communion with others. Such 
reciprocity maintains the uniqueness of the individual and, for Zizioulas, their value 
as an irreplaceable part of relational existence. As Rahner had done previously, 
Zizioulas arrives at his notion of 'being as communion' by way of reconsidering 
Eastern conceptions of the Trinity. Both Rahner and Zizioulas question the Western 
emphasis on divine substance replacing the emphasis on a model that centres on 
hypostasis. Zizioulas re-phrases this as "ek-stasis of being" to stress the dynamic drive 
towards communion present in all persons, both human and divine. 58°
So far we have traced how Rahner's Rule can be said to have opened the possibility 
for further relational anthropological notions. We shall add one further example of 
this in the work of the Catholic theologian Catherine LaCunga. Here, there is the 
explicit desire to take Rahner's Rule to its fullest conclusions and formulate an ethic 
based on personal relationality. We cite LaCunga here to show what can be achieved 
in developing Rahner's Trinitarian work. LaCunga expresses this saying,
"The identity of the 'economic' and 'immanent' trinity means that God truly 
and completely gives God's self to the creature without remainder, and what is 
given in the economy of salvation is God as such."581
In other words, God's relations to the world are God's relations to Godself, or as it 
was formally termed, God is also In this, there is an essential 
connection between the doctrine of God, as triune, and soteriology. LaCunga insists 
that theology is inseparable from soteriology. In LaCunga, the ultimate expression of 
how the social Trinity can be a model for human relationality.
579 "On Being a Person" Zizioulas' essay appearing in Persons Human and Divine (1991 p.46) 
Christoph Schwobel and Colin E Gunton, ed. T&T Clark ,1991, pp. 33-47.
580 Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church Contemporary Greek 
Theologians 4, St Vladimir's Press 1985
581 La Cugna "Introduction" to Rahner's The Trinity , Seabury Press, 1997, p. xiv.
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Of this, LaCunga says,
"The doctrine of the Trinity is not ultimately a teaching about 'God' but a 
teaching about God's life with us and our life with each other. It is the life of 
communion and indwelling. God in us, we in God, all of us in each other."582
We see in LaCunga the ability to move from theories of Trinitarian relations to those 
of human personhood. All of the contemporary theologians we have briefly examined 
here have made the same use of Rahner's Rule in making such a move. We turn now 
to see the extent to which Rahner himself develops the theory of personal 
relationality. A key part of this consideration is the role of neighbour-love in 
expressing otherness in communion with the human person. However, before we 
examine the neighbour as other, we begin with a brief restatement of Rahner's notion 
of "otherness within" in the role of symbolisation for the emerging person.
7.7 Otherness Within
We examined Rahner's axiom that being is symbolic in chapter four of this thesis and 
recall it briefly in summary here. We saw that for Rahner the human person, as with 
all beings, creates its own "other", a symbolic representation of itself in order to 
actualise its own being,
"Our first statement, which we put forward as the basic principle of an 
ontology of symbolism, is as follows: all beings are by their very nature 
symbolic, because they necessarily 'express' themselves in order to attain their 
own nature." 583
The human ability to create and use symbols, most particularly seen in the use of 
language, is the means by which the human being can become its own other.
"The symbol strictly speaking is the self-realisation of a being in the other 
which is constitutive of its essence."584
We recall that this process is one of "emanation and return" from itself and into its 
own "other" by creating a mediating sign, a "realsymbol."585 The process of 
recognising or "returning" to this "other" is the means by which being constitutes 
itself as a reality. Symbolisation is therefore a dynamic process and the means by 
which any category of being achieves expression and ultimately self-fulfilment.
582 Catherine LaCunga God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life" Harper Collins 1991 p.228
583 Rahner, "Theology of the Symbol", TI 4, p.224.
584 Ibid, p.234
585 See ch. 4 of this thesis, where we consider Rahner's notion of the Realsymbol.
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In this, we recall that otherness is intrinsic to all beings because all beings are 
symbolic. However, our research has identified that when Rahner desires to construct 
a notion of inter-subjectivity from intra-subjectivity he does so from theories of 
Trinity (as a model of intra-subjective communion) moving to notions of neighbour- 
love (as an ethic of inter-subjective relations).586 We do not find him drawing directly 
upon notions of symbolic otherness within the emerging subject, which he has 
previously established as present in his philosophy of language587 . We recall that he 
does not see the process of symbolisation as operating within an isolated individual 
but only within the historically placed person who operates within both 'horizontal' 
and 'vertical' axes of relations to God and other beings. The otherness of the symbol, 
constructed by the emerging being, is driven by the need to be in communion with 
others outside of the being. 588 The creation and return to the otherness within, as the 
formation of symbolic representation, is therefore part of a greater encounter with 
otherness externally: that of the neighbour. This achieves an anti-individualistic 
characteristic of Rahner's notion of the self that is vital to our thesis and from which 
we shall draw conclusions in chapter ten. We now turn to the inter-personal aspect of 
Rahner's use of otherness: his consideration of the neighbour.
7.8 The Other as Neighbour
Rahner posits three creeds in Foundations of the Christian Faith.589 In the second of 
these, "A Brief Anthropological Creed," he emphasises the inter-relational facet of 
human life explored through the concept of 'neighbour-love'. Here the term 
"neighbour" implies another to whom we are morally obliged.
In this second creed Rahner explicitly emphasises the essential relationality of the 
human person,
"A person really discovers his true self in a genuine act of self-realization only 
if he risks himself radically for another. If he does this, he grasps 
unthematically or explicitly what we mean by God as the horizon, the
586 See FCF 1970 and The Trinity. 1978
587 See ch. 4, of this thesis where we consider Rahner's theory of symbolisation.588 TI 4
589 Rahner, FCF. These are "A Brief Theological Creed", "A Brief anthropological Creed" and "Future 
Orientation". It is possible to discern the theme of relationality and otherness in all three creeds, 
however, we chose to focus on the second brief creed in that it adds most to our consideration of inter- 
subjectivity.
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guarantor and the radical depths of love, the God whose existential and 
historical self-communication made himself the realm within which such love 
is possible. This love is meant in both an interpersonal and a social sense, and 
in the radical unity of both of these elements it is the ground and the essence 
of the church."590
Here, Rahner makes clear that the experience of "neighbour love" is an everyday act 
of self-transcendence. For Rahner, the transcendent aspect of human personhood 
makes authentic inter-personal relationships possible. This is because God has made 
Godself the realm, ground and possibility of interpersonal love. In an awareness of his 
or her "horizon" the human person is drawn outwards from ego-centrism, to borrow 
Pannenberg's phase, and towards acts of love for an other, the neighbour. In other 
words, according to Rahner, God's self-revelation, whether comprehended in an 
"unthematic" or an explicit way, has made relationality both possible and necessary 
for the human condition. We are drawn towards the other because we are fashioned 
after the ground of being whose very nature is communality.
Rahner speaks of "risk" in offering neighbour-love since inter-relationality involves 
sacrificial love towards the "other." The hearer is a social being, who can only realise 
his or her potential to personhood in reaching beyond themselves in 'risky' acts of 
neighbourly love. These must be offered in the hope of reciprocity, but without the 
guarantee that the moral obligation to act kindly will be returned. The ultimate 
success of human love exists in a process whose fulfilment lies in hope. 591
We have observed that Rahner's "brief anthropological creed" can be seen to stress 
the social and interpersonal aspect of the human condition. It also introduces 
ecclesiology to relational anthropology.592 For Rahner, the church is the future- 
orientated community which transcends itself and offers authentic interpersonal 
relationships. It is the place where the existential experience of the love of God is 
equally matched by a historical and social expression of the Spirit as truth and love. 
The church exhibits the interpersonal and social aspects of love. Rahner sees that
590 FCF p. 212
591 FCF p. 398
592 FCF p. 398
593 Rahner is aware of the failings of the Church to live up to this calling. He speaks of our obligation to 
love the Church as it is, in a similar manner to loving imperfect parents. FCF p.390
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ecclesiastical life could be transformed with an appreciation that "neighbour-love" is 
"a concrete manner of actuating love for God instead of being understood only as a 
secondary requirement."594 Rahner asks,
"Would not the Christian life look entirely different if we spontaneously and 
unquestioningly heard "Save your soul" as "Save your neighbour"? "595
We complete our appraisal of Rahner's use of notions of otherness by noting that 
every experience of otherness, either within the self, or towards God as the ultimate 
other, constitutes a unity. This concept is expounded in Volume XIII of Theological 
Investigations in the Chapter entitled "Experience of Self and the Experience of God.' 
Here Rahner states,
"The experience of self is the condition which makes it possible to experience 
God.. .they constitute a unity."596
Rahner radically suggests that a unity exists between all relational experiences: of the 
self, the other as 'neighbour' and the divine. He suggests that the extent to which a 
subject experiences himself or herself is inextricably dependent upon how a subject 
encounters their fellow human beings.
We postulate a similarity here with Kristeva's notion of'the stranger'. In recognising, 
and not eliminating the 'stranger within', we learn to accept the strangeness in others. 
Rahner inverts this and prioritises experiences of inter-subjective otherness, with God 
and the neighbour, to shed light on our own internal relationality. Rahner suggests 
that,
"Human beings discover themselves or lose themselves in their 
neighbour."597
Inter-subjectivity fundamentally informs intra-subjective understanding for Rahner, 
vice versa for Kristeva, where inner plurality is prioritised.
594 Rahner "Who are your Brother and Sister?" essay from The Love of Jesus and the Love of 
Neighbour. 1983, and reprinted pp.305-319 Karl Rahner: theologian of the graced search for meaning 
ed. Geoffrey Kelly, T&T Clark, 1993. This citation from Kelly, p.306.
595 Ibid, p.306
596 TI 13 p. 122-132
597 FCF p. 456
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In summary, in this chapter we have seen that Rahner gives a central place to notions 
of otherness in the human person as hearer. The hearer is continually faced by the 
otherness within itself (as it creates symbols to express itself), as a hearer of the triune 
God, and in its social relations with others as neighbours. These relationships 
fundamentally shape it. Rahner suggests that these experiences cannot be separated 
from each other but together are intrinsically part of what it means to be a human 
person.
Rahner's thought can be typified as a theological anthropology that sees the person as 
open to otherness, both to the world and to the future. It is an essentially exocentric 
view of the self. In common with such views, and with obvious similarities to 
Moltmann and Pannenberg's theological anthropologies, there is the co-related aspect 
of the person in process. Being human is, for Rahner, a process of shaping personhood 
by free decision in a relationship of love for God and neighbour.598 The person as 
hearer in Rahner's writing is 'becoming' itself and exercising transcendence not only 
in relation to its context in the world, but with a transcendence that draws it towards 
the relational God in whose nature it is imaged. The notion of "communion", as 
suggested by Zizioulas, has been entirely helpful in expressing how the human person 
is in the image of the triune God. For Rahner, all being desires relationship and has an 
orientation of "ek-stasis", a dynamic desire to share in communion with the other.
The relationality of the persons of the Trinity is used to underpin and provide a telos 
for the experience of human personhood. The triunity of God is the ultimate 
expression of relational selfhood. Within the Godhead such relationality is entirely 
self-fulfilled and fully experienced. The human self is a finite spirit, a creation of God, 
which nevertheless transcends its environment and is transcendentally orientated 
towards the mystery of God. It is therefore a form of subjectivity justifiably explored 
through metaphysics, and characterised by a search after knowledge of being, and the 
ultimate Being. It has the freedom to form and shape itself as it complies with the pull 
of God in all-incumbent revelational experience, and as it offers itself in loving 
service of its neighbour.
598 We shall return to the theme of freedom in ch.s 8 and 9 of this thesis.
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Rahner's project to re-instate and elucidate the doctrine of the Trinity may be seen as 
fully coherent with the "turn to the subject" in his work, and his desire to propose a 
theology of the human person. A properly formulated and social concept of the 
personhood of God provides, in his thought, the origin, arena and telos for the person 
as hearer in the process towards self-realisation and self-actualisation.
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8. Freedom as explored in the Speaking Subject 
and the Person as Hearer
The nature and extent of human freedom is a major focus for both the person as hearer 
and the speaking subject. We propose to deal with Kristeva and Rahner together 
within this chapter and offer an appraisal of the different ways in which our thinkers 
explore this theme. We might mistakenly imagine that because our writers adopt the 
term "freedom" to express something inherent and characteristic in the experience of 
human subjectivity that there is an area of correspondence here. However, this is far 
from the case. Whilst contemporary debates on subjectivity might be seen as 
focussing upon freedom as both a pre-supposition and goal of human existence, 
"freedom" is defined in a variety of ways. Both our writers extend the definition of 
freedom beyond the ability to choose certain options or actions. In each freedom is 
linked to ideas of process and metamorphosis; but to very different ends.
8.1 The Nature of Freedom: Kristeva's Carnival of Shapeshifters
In our reading of Kristeva we find that freedom is primarily the ability to defy 
classification, to be "anti-identificatory". Speaking about her project alongside that of 
other "post-structuralists" Kristeva says,
"In the wake of Freud... we tried to highlight the heterogeneous, 
contradictory, and multifaceted nature of the psychic apparatus, and thus of 
human existence itself...Our work fought against [humanism's unifying] 
tendencies, producing instead a vision of man and his discourse that is not 
"antihumanist" in the simplistic amoral sense that people have attributed to it, 
but it is clearly anti-identificatory."599
In this Kristeva can be seen to portray her work, and the wider deconstructionist 
programme, as attempting to extend human freedom. David Cheetham suggests that 
post-modern writing on freedom often sees itself this way.
"True liberation, according to an intellectual culture deeply influenced by 
postmodernity (and the various 'isms' that accompany it), is about the 
realization of total autonomy from foundational metaphysics and assumptions. 
That is, the post-modern freedom may be characterised as a breaking out of
599 Kristeva responding to a question by Ross Guberman in Time and Sense trans. Ross Guberman, 
Colombia University Press, 1996, p.259. This passage is also cited and commented on in "The Subject, 
the Abject and Psychoanalysis" ch. 2 of Julia Kristeva and Literary Theory Megan Becker-Leckrone, 
Palgrave Macmillan 2005 p.21-22, where Becker-Leckrone explores Kristeva's relation to post- 
structuralism.
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the Enlightenment straight] acket, a loosening of the bonds of reason and 
realism." 60°
For Kristeva, freedom relates to the ability to relocate the speaking subject. We recall 
that subjectivity is about the positioning the speaking subject within a "place" or 
"space". Aside from such a "stance" the subject has no intrinsic, positive value.601 
Subjectivity is about place rather than essence. Following Lacan, for Kristeva the 
subject is always and only defined by absence rather than presence. In this Kristeva 
can be seen to draw from Lacan's use of the notion of subjectivity as "negative
f\r\*)
space". It is the task of the subject to move freely among many subject positions. 
This offers the possibility of tracing its path and tentatively, momentarily defining it. 
This notion of flitting from various subject positions is the principal expression of 
freedom for the speaking subject.
"Individuals in postmodern social conditions do not bind space-time from the 
point of view of one placed at the centre.. .but move through space-time 
configurations in order to discover the possibilities of what one might become."603
One way Kristeva connotes the freedom of the subject is in her use of the metaphor of 
"carnival".604 Adopting this notion from Bakhtin Kristeva uses this metaphor to relate 
to the subject's ability to transgress and challenge norms as it reconfigures itself in 
various subject positions. It is the transgressive quality of freedom that is key for 
Kristeva. She says,
"[Carnival] challenges God, authority and social law."605
Kristeva sees the free "carnivalesque" quality of the speaking subject as operating 
beyond simple parody. The "carnival" Kristeva speaks of has transformative powers. 
Defying boundaries the carnival subject incorporates layers of other identities from
600 David Cheetham's essay "Postmodern Freedom and Religion" appears in Theology vol. 103 
Jan/Feb 2000 pp. 19-26, this quote p. 19.
601 See ch. 2 & 3 pp.29-81 of this thesis where Kristeva's notion of subjectivity is explored fully. 
See Lacan Ecrits "The agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason after Freud" trans. Alan 
Sheridan, New York: WW Norton 1977, where Lacan says, "[subjectivity after Freud is] a question of 
the place man assigns to himself at the centre of a universe".
602 Lacan op.cit. p. 165 where he expounds his notion of the "eccentric" rather than "co-centric" subject; 
a subject defined by forever being elsewhere and unconscious.
603 Anthony Elliot Subject to Ourselves: Social Theory, Psychoanalysis and Postmodernity Polity Press 
1996, p.98.
604 See Kristeva "Word, Dialogue and Novel" the essay reproduced in The Kristeva Reader ed. Toril 
Moi, Colombia University Press, 1986.
605 Ibid. p.50.
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the other side of a given boundary. The carnival subject therefore is not only able to 
occupy different gender positions but to layer them so that the boundaries between 
them dissolve. For Kristeva the carnival tradition is best exemplified in "polyphonic 
novels" of avant-garde writers.606
When speaking of carnival outside of the realm of "polyphonic writing" Kristeva 
relates this quality of transgressive freedom to the ability of the speaking subject to 
exercise freedom over the body.607 It is when Kristeva writes on a subject's freedom 
that she often turns to a discussion on gender, sexuality and the body, to which we 
now turn. We anticipate that it is this particular facet of the speaking subject's 
freedom that will allow for the most striking contrast to that of the person as hearer.
8.2 Freedom from the "Marked Body"
It could be said that the body has become a primary focus for post-modern discourse 
on freedom and the politics of difference.608 If post-modern and post-structuralist 
identity theories can be characterised as desiring freedom from ontology and 
materially determinant categories, then for some post-structuralist writers, including 
Kristeva, these determinant categories have centred on the "marked body". The 
freedom of the speaking subject is therefore imagined to be the ability to transgress 
these categories, and, to borrow Bordo's phrase, to become a 
Kristeva's desire to theorise the body in non-essentialist ways is coherent with her 
broad agenda of promoting difference and heterogeneity.610 In her writing, the body 
comes to be thought of as the site where different social and discursive modes of 
subjectivity compete. The body is stripped of inherent meaning and re-imagined as a 
"site" across which energies travel and upon which meaning is inscribed.
606Ibid. p.50. Kristeva lists Rebelais, Cervantes, Swift, Sade, Dostoevsky, Joyce and Kafka as 
"carnival" polyphonic writers. We consider her use of the term "carnival" in pp.181-192 of this thesis.
607 See Kristeva "Word, Dialogue and Novel" the essay reproduced in The Kristeva Reader ed. Toril 
Moi, Colombia University Press, 1986.
608 See S. Suleimaned. The Female Body in Western Culture. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986; Chris Weedon ed. Feminism. Theory and the Politics of Difference. Blackwell, 1999; Jane 
Gallop Thinking Through the Body Colombia University Press, 1988.
609 Susan Bordo, "(Re)Writing the Body: the Politics and Poetics of Female Eroticism" pp7-29 of The 
Female Body in Western Culture ed. S. Suleiman, Harvard University Press, 1986.
610 See ch., pp.29-52 of this thesis, examining the broad post-modern arena within which Kristeva 
imagines the subject to be formed. This idea is explored fully in Jane Gallop's Thinking Through the 
Body Colombia University Press, 1988.
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"Discrete quantities of energy move through the body of the subject who is not 
yet constituted as such and, in the course of this development, they are 
arranged according to the various constraints always already involved in a 
semiotic process - by family and social structures."61
The desire to re-think and theorise the body is perhaps unsurprising given that 
contemporary theories about identity are being formed at the intersection of several 
critical disciplines: feminism engaging with post-modernism; post-structuralism with 
psychoanalysis; literary theory with gender theory. All of these contemporary 
disciplines share in the desire to emphasise diversity and express heterogeneity, as a 
reaction to the universalising tendencies of modernism. When considering human 
identity, post-modernists, including Kristeva, reject dogmatic modernist ideas and 
norms. Given this disposition, contemporary inter-disciplinary contact has centred 
upon theories of anti-essentialism and social constructionism.612 Within contemporary 
reflections on identity and difference, feminist theory has contributed its hard won 
understanding that the body, and especially the female body, is central to the debate. 
As Chris Weeden says,
"The female body has been central to a range of feminist approaches to difference."613
It might be said that as these various contemporary theories intersect it has been 
postulated that discussions about the givenness of identity can be focussed upon, and 
perhaps resolved, by a consideration of the extent to which the body is biologically 
determined.
We might argue that that there is an intrinsic and irresistible process apparent in 
contemporary theories of identity and sexuality. By this we mean that social 
construction theories of the and of expand previous theories about the social 
construction (which was a central tenet of second wave feminism).
"[In postmodernity] the question whether our sexuality is constructed or 
created was taken to a new emphasis. Modernity based its arguments on a 
distinction between sex (created) and gender (constructed). Postmodernity 
began to reject the differentiation between sex and gender and argue instead 
that all identity, indeed sexuality itself, was constructed."614
611 RPLp.93
612 See Diana Fuss The female body in Western culture: contemporary perspectives Cambridge 
University Press, 1986 and Essentially speaking : feminism, nature & difference, Routledge, 1989.
613 Chris Weeden, Feminism. Theory and the Politics of Difference . Blackwell, 1999, p.99.
614 See Elaine Storkey Created or Constructed: the great gender debate. Paternoster Press 2000, p.37.
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For example, Kristeva's writings could be seen to be the continuation of the previous 
feminist hermeneutics of suspicion; the questioning of the "already saids" of gender 
being extended to those of biological categories such as sex. If gender is biologically 
indeterminate, perhaps being "performed," then what basis is there for saying that 
binary sexual difference, as a facet of biological is immune from erasure? 
Kristeva says,
"Sex is an unconscious and, consequently, a symbolic arrangement structured 
like language."615
In all this, the body has been rediscovered as a site of knowledge and a place of 
discourse. For Kristeva the sexual identity of the body is another place where meaning 
is rather than apparent. Kristeva says,
"In this third attitude, which I strongly advocate - which I imagine? - the very 
dichotomy man/woman as an opposition between two rival entities may be 
understood as belonging to What can 'identity', even 'sexual 
identity', mean in a new theoretical and scientific space where the very notion 
of identity is challenged? I am not simply suggesting a very hypothetical 
bisexuality which, even if it existed, would only, in fact be the aspiration 
towards the totality of one of the sexes and thus an effacing of difference. 
What I mean is, first of all, the demassification of the problematic of 
In seeking to understand how Kristeva arrives at such a vision we recall 
her celebration of diversity and desire to undermine the myth of the single, creating 
author.617 Davis Harvey suggests that ideas of "collage" and "bricollage" have 
become the primary form of post-modern discourse.618 Reading Kristeva on sexual 
identity is entirely evocative of a sexual bricollage whereby sexual identity is playful 
and ironic: a juxtaposition of identities that break the myth of bi-gendered identity.
Kristeva subscribes to the notion that political and social exercise of power provides, 
or inscribes, meaning to the body. She rejects the notion of governance by "inner 
will" preferring one that emphasises the operation of discourse as prior to subjectivity.
615 Kristeva's essay "Feminist Postmodernism" p. 199 appearing in Peter Brooker (ed.) 
Modernism/Postmodernism Xongman, 1992.
616
617
Kristeva, "Woman's Time", appearing p.209 of The Kristeva Reader op. cit.
See ch.2 pp.29-52 of this thesis where we consider how Kristeva arrives at the text-only active 
stance which dissolves the notion of the author.
618 See David Harvey's essay "The Condition of Postmodernity" in The Post-Modern Reader, Charles
 
Jencks (ed.) St. Martins Press, 1992, p.308.
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To observe how she arrives at this position it is necessary to revisit aspects of her 
theories from their foundations in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis.619
Knsteva's theories of the body can be seen as both a progression and revision of those 
of Freud and Lacan. Briefly, we can say that in the theory of "penis envy" Freud re- 
situated the body as a site of psychic importance and the place of identity creation.620 
Freud rejected the idea of a "givenness" for the body. He understood the body to be 
overlaid with psychical and social significance, which displace what might once have 
been understood as a "natural body".621 However, there is some contention among 
feminist theorists in adopting Freud's notion of the body. His theory has been 
criticised as patriarchal in that it posited the creation of female identity as one of 
"lack". As Weeden says, for Freud,
"The male body is the desirable norm, and a women's lack of a penis the key 
factor determining their intellectual and moral differences from men." 622
Although Kristeva rejects Freud's biologism and essentialism, she apparently finds 
valuable resources in the understanding that femininity and masculinity are psychic 
constructs and that, prior to the awareness of possession or lack of the phallus, infants 
are "polymorphously perverse". The polymorphous subject, or "shape-shifter", is 
presented as a contradiction to those suggesting identity is necessarily biologically 
determined. Kristeva arrives at this position by adopting some of Lacan's revisions of
/%o^Freudianism. We recall that Lacan's primary contribution to post-structuralist 
psychoanalysts, such as Kristeva, is the understanding that language pre-exists and 
produces subjectivity.624 In summary, Kristeva can be said to move beyond Freud's 
identification of sexual identity as possession and lack (a binary opposition). She 
retains the notion of sexual identity as originally polymorphous and psychically 
structured and then adopts Lacan's theory of the pre-existence of language to produce 
a theory of the "unmarked" body. The body becomes, for Kristeva, a site where a 
changeable subjectivity expresses itself in a polymorphous way. In short, any number
619 Kristeva relation to Freud and Lacan was explored in chapter 2 and 3 pp.29-64 of this thesis.
620 Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality SE, 7, pp. 123-246 See Jane Gallop's 
commentary on Freud in Thinking Through the Body. Colombia University Press, 1988 and Chris 
Weeden's Feminism. Theory and the Politics of Difference, Blackwell, 1999.
621 See "The Body" from Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary Elizabeth Wright ed.
pp.3 5-40.
"2 Weeden op. cit. p. 78
623 We further consider Kristeva's notion of the shape-shifter in ch.8.1-8.3 pp.181-192 of this thesis.
624 See ch. 3.1-3.3 pp.52-64 of this thesis.
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of sexual identifications are available to the subject and each is formed by the 
operation of discourse.625 We highlight here that this produces, in Kristeva's theories, 
a notion of the speaking subject whereby subjectivity and sexual identity are not fixed 
prior to language. Freedom is imagined as the ability to choose among a spectrum of 
sexual identities and create a collage of sexuality.
We suggest that current academic debate about the body has been further encouraged 
by the technological and cultural possibilities for body metamorphosis explored in 
post-modern society generally. Technological advances in virtual reality and gender 
re-alignment, for example, and the typically post-modern interest in the 'cyborg,' all 
typify the contemporary interest in re-defining the body.626 A popular expression of 
this has been the proliferation of 'body marking' such as tattooing and cosmetic 
surgery. Increasingly the "givens" about the body have been broken down and 
replaced by a sense that the body is a canvas or collage that can be shaped to fit or 
express the subject's desired identity. It seems that the areas where post-modern 
culture finds its most striking expressions are also, concurrently, centred on the body. 
Anne Balsamo sees that the post-modern discourse on the body
"[E]merges through the articulation between technologies, cultural narratives, 
social, economic and institutional forces." 627
She adds,
"The body also serves as the locus for thinking differently about both feminist 
histories and feminist futures, and political aims of feminist cultural criticism 
more broadly." 628
We might conclude that ideas of the body have faced unprecedented revision both 
academically and in popular post-modern culture. The revision of the body is, we 
suggest, symptomatic of the paradigm of post-modernism. In the same way that linear 
or syntactically simple writing is rejected as the propaganda of the dominant
625 For Kristeva this involves the relation of the semiotic upon the symbolic. See ch. 3.1-3.3 pp.52-64 
of this thesis.
626 See Cartographies : Poststructuralism and the mapping of bodies and spaces Diprose and Ferrell 
(ed.s) Alien & Unwin, 1991 and Virginia Eubanks, "Zones of Dither: Writing the Postmodern Body" 
pp. 73-88 . - v.2 no. 3 Body and Society , 1996. We shall also be referring later to the important work 
of the feminist writer Donna Haraway A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science. Technology and Socialist 
Feminism in the 1980's, 1990. Here Haraway uses the metaphor of the cyborg to suggest a post- 
modern We consider the of the speaking subject in ch.9, pp.215-225 of this thesis.
627 Anne Balsamo, Technologies of the Gendered Body: reading cyborg women. Duke University 
Press, 1996, p. 162.
628 Ibid. p. 163
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patriarchal order, postmodernist writers on the body desire it to become a 
problematised concept, to be decidedly obscure. Kristeva seeks to promote the value 
of diversity and the fragmentation of binding categories.
However, before we continue, it is worthwhile recalling that Kristeva uses very 
particular and unusual connotations for gendered terms and this further displaces the 
notion of a biologically "marked" body. Kristeva completely rejects the idea that the 
biological man and the biological woman can be identified with "masculine" and 
"feminine".
"The T, subject of a conceptual quest, is also a subject of differentiation - of 
sexual contradictions .. .All speaking subjects have within themselves a certain 
bisexuality which is precisely the possibility to explore all the sources of 
signification, that which posits a meaning [male] as well as that which 
multiplies pulverizes and then finally revives it [female]." 629
As we saw in chapters two and three of this thesis, terms that usually refer to the body 
and human sexuality are relocated to refer to types of discourse. In this Kristeva 
succeeds in further fracturing notions of prescribed meaning and identity. In speaking 
of "masculine" and "feminine" she refers to modes of textual reality, not biological 
categories of human beings. This can be observed to a great extent in Kristeva's work 
where the very terms masculine and feminine do not relate to the material body at all, 
but rather to modes of discourse.630 The purpose of this dislocation can be seen as an 
appeal to a subject's freedom.
Kristeva's use of the body as metaphor for semiotics can be seen in a positive way as 
freeing women from biologically determined roles. However, this aspect of her 
theory has been vigorously criticised. The main contention is that such approaches 
have been, at best, ambivalent towards the corporeal, material body, preferring to
f*\ 1
stress the body as a "site of signification."
629 DILp.l67
630 See also the denial of the mother's body in ch. 6.1-6.3 pp. 132-139 where the body of the M/Other is 
defined as a agent-less space.
631 A point made by Kathy Davis in her essay "Embody-ing Theory: Beyond Modernist and 
Postmodernist Readings of the Body" in Embodied Practises: Feminist Perspectives on the Body ed. 
Kathy Davis, Sage Press, 1997
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It could be said that such theories deny the corporeal experiences of women (and 
men) and disallow women from speaking about their physical bodies as a means of 
experiential knowledge and identity creation. Susan Bordo says,
"The study of cultural representations of the female body has flourished, and it 
has often been brilliantly illuminating and instrumental to a feminist rereading 
of culture. But the study of cultural representations alone, divorced from 
consideration of their relation to the practical lives of bodies, can obscure and 
mislead."632
We recall, from chapter three of this thesis that Bordo describes the post-modern 
propensity to emphasise identity fluidity as "the myth of the shape shifter." According 
to Bordo post-modern notions of identity have exchanged the Cartesian "myth of a 
view from nowhere" for a co-related myth of "a view from everywhere."633 The 
freedom imagined for the speaking subject is one that ignores the formative influence 
of historical situation and the experience of particular embodiment. In this, Sara 
Ahmed suggests postmodernism offers a "phantasy of woman,"
"That phantasy fills woman with the very meaning of difference (from him) as 
it assumes that woman is precisely the impossibility of meaning The 
relationship of woman to women as embodied (molar) subjects is denied, a 
denial that enables the philosopher to claim her figure and inhabit her 
(swollen) body." 634
Ahmed is critical of the "disappearing body" of postmodernism, in that,
"The disappearing post-modem body is a body without material limits or 
constraints. The body which knows no limits- which appears unmarked as 
such - conceals the mark of the masculine." 635
Ahmed is critical of all theories that posit technological progress as the means by 
which bodily transcendence is offered. We shall consider this criticism as we offer a 
comparison later in this chapter between this notion of freedom from the body and the 
understanding of freedom drawn from Karl Rahner.
632 Susan Bordo's essay "The Reproduction of Femininity" in Writing on the Body: Female 
Embodiment and Feminist Theory ed. Katie Conboy, Nadia Medina and Sarah Stanbury. New York: 
Colombia University Press, 1997, p 104.
633 Susan Bordo "(Re)Writing the Body: the Politics and Poetics of Female Eroticism" pp7-29 of "The 
Female Body in Western Culture" ed. S. Suleiman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986
634 Sara Ahmed op.cit. p.77
635 Ibid. p. 112
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8.4 The Shape-Shifter and Agency
Here we consider the question, "What does this theory of the body mean to human 
freedom and agency?" Speaking of Kristeva's approach to the body, and other post- 
structuralist theories, Anthony Elliot says,
"At the centre of these standpoints lies an unrelenting conviction of the 
irrelevance of selfhood, ego, intentionality and agency."636
It might be said that, in its purest form, the post-modern subject's agency is totally 
negated. This is so because the subject, and its agency, arrives after the operation of 
discourse and is an illusion created by it; there is no agent deciding independently 
from discourse as to the form or shape the subject adopts. Rather, the interaction and 
competition of a whole web of discursive factors and influences determine this. This 
type of approach, the dismissal of agency, portrays the subject as an anarchist in the 
face of a tyrannical monolithic system. Althusser makes this point,
"The individual is interpolated as a (free) subject in order that he shall freely 
submit to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) 
accept his subjection."637
The suggestion here is that autonomy is a mask for subjection, that "the system" sets 
up a notion of subjectivity in order to subjugate individuals. It might be said that such 
an understanding gives no place for the notion of agency as individual freedom, and 
therefore sees nothing much to lose in the loss of the free subject.
However it could be said that some post-structuralist schemas, such as Kristeva's, 
retain a tentative place for the subject as in this process once it has begun.638 
In other words the speaking subject has the power of mediation in the process of 
identity creation. If the subject is able to choose between conflicting sexual and other 
identity markers and create itself from a spectrum of identities, to have some decision 
in the way that it "shape-shifts", then a notion of limited agency is retained. Agency 
becomes the ability to mediate between conflicting and competing discourses of 
identity. This is the notion of identity construction and the freedom of the amorphous 
subject that we have encountered in Kristeva's writings. Pamela Sue Anderson says,
636 Anthony Elliot Subject to Ourselves: Social Theory. Psychoanalysis and Postmodernity Polity Press 
1996, p. 99.
637 Louis Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism 1976 trans. Graham Lock, NLB, p. 169.
638 We noted a similar tendency for Kristeva in ch.2 of this thesis.
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"The formation of sexual identity is seen [in post-structuralism] to be a 
mediated process; this implies that social and symbolic meanings would not 
directly or strictly construct our identities. Instead our subjectivities, including 
sexual identity and non-identity would be formed through a self interpreted in 
the context of our symbolically mediated affective relationships."639
However, even retaining this tenuous place of agency, Kristeva's subject is far from 
"free." It may be able to transcend its biology, but not the arena of discourse within 
which it has been called into being. The speaking subject is entirely at the command 
of linguistic operations which have formed it as an illusion and which continue to 
shape it. At best the speaking subject can mediate in a textual process that it cannot 
transcend. We anticipate that this will contrast with the hearer's agency that we shall 
turn to later in this chapter.
8.5 The Free Subject in Literature
There is another area of freedom that Kristeva is currently exploring, that of the free 
subject in literature. It might be suggested that her axiom that language precedes 
subjectivity has driven her focus from earlier philosophical considerations of the 
discursive self to increasing amounts of fictional writing, such as her novels The Old 
Man and the Wolves640 and Possessions: a novel.641 Considering her latest work, it 
could be said that literary criticism and the production of novels have been of greater 
importance for Kristeva most recently. Literary theory maintains that notions of 
subjectivity cannot be so much as and that literary representations 
of the subject in novels offer this opportunity.
One major characteristic of the subject in Kristeva's writing is dislocation. Kristeva 
consciously disrupts the syntax and logical sequence of her novels and, in doing so, 
problematises the point of view of the narrator. In this she disrupts both the notion of 
the author as the originator of meaning and the stable narrating subject in the text. 
With many "voices" heard in the text, often in a conflicting and disruptive way, the 
notion of "polylogue" is explored. Freedom explored by Kristeva here is the freedom 
of the literary subject.642
639 Pamela Sue Anderson, A Feminist Philosophy of Religion, Blackwell, 1998.
640 Kristeva, The Old Man and the Wolves trans. Barbara Bray, Columbia University Press, 1994.
641 Kristeva, Possessions: a novel trans. Barbara Bray, Columbia University Press, 1998.
642 We will consider that writing meaning-disruptive novels is the only means of political action 
Kristeva endorses having discounted the possibility of collective political action on theoretical grounds. 
See ch. 9.4 pp.233-237 and our conclusion in ch.10.5 p.253 of this thesis.
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Kristeva's trend towards fictional writing is perhaps unsurprising. We noted in 
chapter two that post-modern discursive reality is the pre-supposed arena for 
subjectivity for Kristeva. The subject can only truly be explored within text.643 For 
Kristeva, freedom is a textual freedom just as sexuality was a textual category.
As we saw from chapter three many contemporary feminist writers have judged this 
position as unsatisfactory. In our opinion this position may similarly be interrogated 
by theology. In a very pragmatic sense the question of human freedom does not arise 
from academic literary interests but is what Rahner terms a lived experience. The 
awareness of a notion of freedom arises "unthematically" in lived experiences.
In summary, we can say that, for Kristeva, the speaking subject experiences itself as 
free from prescribed sexual binaries and has the ability to transgress subject-positions 
within texts. In Kristeva's schema, unlike many post-modern schemas, the speaking 
subject retains a limited measure of agency in that it can mediate its position within a 
discursive reality. This process of textual freedom is the means of self-actualisation 
for the speaking subject.
8.6 Freedom in Karl Rahner
Rahner primarily links freedom to the extent to which the person transcends their 
immediate given situation and is, to a varying extent, a hearer of God. He says,
"We are the free ones, who decide about ourselves and thus make up our 
minds whether and to what extent we wish to hear the truth and to let God's 
light shine in our spirit."644
This is a sort of notion of "metamorphosis", and has certain resonance with the 
speaking subject's ability to "shape-shift". Certainly, from Rahner's writings, self- 
transcendence is the decisive characteristic of personhood.
643In reviewing Possessions Rebecca Brittenham is not convinced of the ease in which Kristeva uses 
literature to discuss philosophical questions. She says "Kristeva's fictional work acts as a vehicle - no, 
for conveying her theories.. .Kristeva the mystery writer is overwhelmed by Kristeva the 
socio-psychoanalytical philosopher". "Why Theory Matters :A Review of Julia Kristeva's Possessions" 
in PORT, www.humanities .org/port/99/0315-kristeva.html. 
644 HW p.89
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For Rahner, self-transcendence is connoted in a person's "openness" to the world and 
the horizon of being.645 This understanding of the human being as always "on the 
way" to personhood has important implications for human freedom, which we shall 
examine in this chapter. It places freedom at the very centre of what it means to be a 
person and, for Rahner, the operation of freedom has eschatological and soteriological 
ramifications. In short, Rahner sees freedom as the means by which a human being 
actualises their nature and becomes a person. This too is reminiscent of an aspect of 
the speaking subject, where, we recall, the only possibility for identifying the subject 
is to trace it through its process of displacement. In both schemas emphasis is on 
process.
However there are very striking contrasts between Rahner and Kristeva apparent here. 
For Rahner, human freedom is not so much construed as a right but as a 
responsibility. The hearer's freedom is not unbounded but prescribed by its 
relationship to the divine. It is a prescribed metamorphosis, such as that of a chrysalis, 
we might say, rather than the supposed boundless shape-shifting of the speaking 
subject. We shall examine this notion of freedom by a careful study of Rahner's 
writings on this subject, drawing comparisons with Kristeva's speaking subject as we 
progress.
We recall that freedom is one of the six existentials that Rahner purports to be 
universally characteristic for the human being.646 Here we shall study his terminology, 
most notably and as well as the themes of 
freedom as self-actualisation and moral freedom. We will also examine the role of 
freedom in distinguishing between "nature" and "person."647 Freedom is ultimately a 
freedom to love, which will be the final focus for this chapter.
645 An idea closely related or even perhaps identical in meaning to Pannenberg's "exocentricity" from 
Anthropology in Theological Perspective T T Clark, 1985, p.34-40.
646 See ch.5 pp.112-121 o f this thesis.
647 To this end we refer to several of Rahner's essays and major works on freedom, including 
"Theology of Freedom" in Theological Investigations 4. "The Theological Concept of 
Concupiscentia" Theological Investigations 1 and "The Dignity and Freedom of Man" in Theological 
Investigations 2 and Grace in Freedom (1969). We shall also consider ch. 8 of Hearer of the Word and 
commentaries on Rahner's work including Andrew Tallon's, "Personal Becoming: The Concept of 
Person in Karl Rahner's Transcendental Anthropology" Thomist 43 (1979) pp.1-117 and 
"Spirit, Freedom, History: Karl Rahner's Horer des Wortes (Hearers of the Word) Thomist 38 (1974): 
pp. 908-19; Mark Lloyd Taylor's, God is love: A study in the Theology of Karl Rahner. Atlanta 
Scholars Press, 1986; George Vass's "The Mystery of Man and the Foundations of a Theological 
System." Vol. 2 of Understanding Karl Rahner Westminster Christian Classics, 1985; Tiina Allik's
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8.7 How Rahner relates the term "Person" to "Freedom"
In his essay "The Theology of Freedom"648 Rahner begins by stating that human 
freedom is a given, not something that can be chosen. It exists before it is exercised,
"Freedom is first of all "freedom of being". It is not merely the quality of an 
act and capacity exercised at some time, but a transcendental mark of human 
existence itself."649
For Rahner, the nature of human freedom differs in degree, though not type, from 
divine freedom. This is because Rahner links freedom to For Rahner, God is 
perfectly realised being and freedom. Humans, as the creation of being 
and freedom, neither of which is perfectly realised. Human freedom "exists truly in 
the mode of a creature" 65°
Rahner distinguishes human freedom from God's in two ways. Firstly, he says that 
human freedom is "borne and empowered by its absolute horizon."651 In other words, 
human freedom is contingent upon God. In Foundations of the Christian Faith Rahner 
argues that freedom is a "reality of transcendental experience."652 Rahner states that it 
is only because God is the horizon of our being as well as the source and pattern of 
our being that "we are subjects at all, and hence free."653 Importantly, for Rahner this 
dependence on God does not diminish human freedom, but rather, as he states in 
Sacramental Mundi.
"Dependence on God - contrary to what takes place in intra-mundane 
causality - actually means being endowed with selfhood." 654
Given the contingent nature of human freedom Rahner suggests that,
"In this sense we encounter God in a radical way everywhere as a question to 
our freedom." 655
"Nature and Spirit: Agency and Concupiscence in Haueerwas and Rahner" Journal of Re
ligious Ethics 
15 (1987) pp. 14-32 and Robert Hurd's "The Concept of Freedom in Rahner" Listening 17 (1982).
648 Rahner's essay "The Theology of Freedom" appearing in TI 6.
649 TI 4 p. 184
650 TI 4 p. 193 651 TI4p.l93
652 FCF p.37
653 FCF p. 98654 SM p.362
655 FCF p.98
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This is a similar argument to that concerning the act of human knowing that we 
explored earlier, whereby the presence of God as horizon enables the human being to 
know of particular objects. With respect to freedom, God's absolute and perfect 
freedom has endowed the human being with freedom. We therefore encounter God in 
every act of freedom, as the horizon of our freedom. This encounter, as it is for 
knowledge, is unthematic and can operate on an unconscious level. The notion of 
freedom for Kristeva's speaking subject does not include this idea of contingency. As 
we saw, freedom there is more likened to transgression and the ability to shift 
positions in text. This too operates beyond the realm of conscious choice, but is not a 
contingent facet of personhood. For Rahner, there is a "givenness" about human 
freedom, due to the doctrine of creation. Just as the human being is a created being, 
human freedom is created freedom. To the extent to which a person surrenders to God 
and accepts their dependence on God, they are free.
Secondly, Rahner distinguishes human freedom from God's by stating that the 
operation of human freedom is always mediated through the world and other 
persons.656 This gives important parameters to our individual freedom, which is a 
direct contradiction of the unbounded freedom supposed by the notion of a speaking 
subject. Every free act of every person will affect, and may impinge upon, the free 
acts of other persons. Rahner stresses that each individual life is also full of events 
and circumstances that are not freely chosen, but have to be borne. Even in this 
Rahner maintains that the human being is not purely passive, but can still be open to 
active self-creation.
"A human life is an inextricable pattern of doing and being done to, of activity 
and passivity. Yet the passivity on one level can become the material of a 
more profound activity - the doing of my one life.. .Even what we did not 
choose for ourselves in our lives can become the expression of who we desire to be."657
656 TIIV p. 193-4
657 Brian McDermott's essay, "The Bonds of Freedom" p.53, appearing in A World of Grace: An 
Introduction to the Themes and Foundations of Karl Rahner's Theology ed. Leo J. O'Dononvan, The 
Seabury Press, 1980. McDermott gives the example of the human responses to imprisonment and 
injustice as examples of how, even in a concentration camp, the human person can choose to live in a 
way that affirms themselves as a person. With this amazing ability the person can exhibit a free spirit 
even while the body is oppressed and confined in the most inhuman way. In making decisions about 
how we will behave in such circumstances, even the most terrible, McDermott argues that we can 
maintain the ability to create who we will be through them.
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The emphasis on self-creation relates to the metamorphosing subject of post- 
structuralism, however, in this second distinction of human freedom, Rahner 
underlines the historicity of the person as an important aspect of human freedom. For 
Rahner, the "time and space" of the particular human person is the only arena for their 
freedom to be exercised. He uses this argument to suggest that other notions of human 
freedom which do not allow for the spatial and temporal realities of human life should 
be rejected,
"(Human freedom has) a certain space for realizing itself.. .Seen from this 
point of view, a retreat into the merely 'private' is contrary to nature."658
This emphasis on how freedom relates to human fmitude may be an important 
contrast between Rahner's hearer and the post-structuralist speaking subject, and 
again demonstrates the fundamental importance of the pre-supposed arena for 
subjectivity.
There is a further area of direct contrast between hearer and speaker that can be drawn 
from Rahner's consideration of freedom. This is the emphasis Rahner gives to the 
personal nature of freedom, which directly challenges the a-personal quality of the 
carnivaleseque shape-shifter. Andrew Tallon considers Rahner's emphasis on human 
freedom saying his anthropological approach is one of "personism". Tallon defines 
"personism" as an anthropology having "contemporary focus on freedom.. .and 
relationality rather than on knowledge (consciousness, thought, mind, intellect etc.) 
and substantiality as characteristic of man."659 According to Tallon the term "person" 
is absent from Rahner's Spirit in the World and appears for the first time in the second 
of Rahner's major works, Hearers of the Word. Tallon argues that from this 
monumental work the 'turn to the subject' is highly developed in Rahner's thought to 
the extent that his anthropology can be meaningfully termed "personist." 
Tallon identifies the close link in Rahner's thought between "person" and "freedom", 
saying that these terms are "coextensive" in Rahner's writings. According to Tallon, it
658 Rahner, "The Freedom and Dignity of Man", p.240. The essay appears in TI 2. Rahner's insi
ght here 
will be useful in comparing the notion of freedom he offers with that of postmodernist theorist
s. We 
shall return to the emphasis Rahner gives to human fmitude when we compare his work with 
postmodernism later in this chapter.
659 Andrew Tallon's essay "Personal Becoming: The Concept of Person in Karl Rahner's 
Transcendental Anthropology", appearing in Thomist 43. 1979, pp. 1-17. George Vass agrees 
with 
Tallon. See "The Mystery of Man and the Foundations of a Theological System", appearing in
 Vol. 2 
of Understanding Karl Rahner. Westminster Christian Classics, 1985.
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would be entirely fitting to say that, for Rahner, freedom is the vehicle through which 
a human becomes 
Rahner succinctly states this in his essay "The Freedom and Dignity of Man,"
"Freedom is self-achievement of the using a finite material, before the 
infinite God."660
The human being fully becomes a human person by the operation of free choices. 
The notion of becoming, of process, is seen as forming an eternal state. Rahner 
expresses this in Foundations of the Christian Faith,
"In our passage through time we are performing this event of freedom, we are 
forming the eternity which we ourselves are and are becoming." 661
This relation with and movement towards God is a given for Rahner, in fact he states 
that the human is,
"[A]lways already on the way to God, whether or not we know it expressively, 
whether or not we will it. We are forever the infinite openness of the finite for God."662
Such an argument might not be given much of a hearing by anything other than a 
theological audience, where the presupposition that the human is created and lives in 
relation to God is admissible. However, by positing freedom as a broad notion of 
openness it is hard to completely dismiss Rahner's argument by confining it to a 
religious arena. Postmodernism itself, which we would expect to be most dismissive 
of Rahner's claim that freedom is contingent upon God, could in fact be construed as 
an example of the pushing back of the horizon of human freedom. The existential of 
self-transcendence could be one way of interpreting the post-structuralist desire for 
metamorphosis that we have identified in Kristeva's notion of the speaking subject.
An important way to understand the nature of human freedom is Rahner's use of the 
term which shall now become the focus of our examination. 
Rahner states that the human person is endowed with a number of characteristics in 
order to enable them to enter the divine life. For Rahner, these are tellingly not
660 Rahner, 1963, p246-7
661 FCF p. 96
662 HW p.53
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rationality but freedom, spirit, sociality, individuality and embodiment.663 Within each 
human being is the potential for a life of divine grace, of becoming truly a human 
person. This turn from rationality as the primary human characteristic, the essential 
attribute of the is common in existentialist-based theologies and we believe 
makes it more possible to relate this theory of personhood to those emerging in post- 
modernism where there is a similar focus on freedom and experience.
Rahner calls the experience of transcendence the reaching outwards toward 
being. In his translation of Hearer of the Word Andrew Tallon sees this term as best 
translated as "anticipation" in that it essentially carries the same meaning as Aquinas' 
664 Rahner says,
"Only in Christianity is each 'person' completely unique and of eternal value - 
in God's personal love for men - and hence a personality which must be 
accomplished through the highest personal responsibility and hence in freedom." 665
For Rahner, the human is a created being standing in the distinguished position 
of a "Hearer of the Word." In this, they have an inherent dignity, even before they 
proceed towards becoming a person. Rahner argues for the inherent dignity of the 
human, one independent of the individual's decisions to use their freedom positively, 
or not. This belief maintains a respect for all human life, despite the actions of 
individuals.
"The human person by its nature and dignity demands an unconditional 
respect which is independent of any freely exercised determination of an end 
and value - i.e., is absolute." 666
However, for Rahner, the actions of an individual, upon other individuals or objects, 
determines their status in achieving personhood. We note that their "being" is not 
under question; they possess the dignity of a human being irrespective of their actions 
and should never be seen as an "object". They should be treated with the dignity of 
one who is a partner in dialogue with God. Such a view of the inherent dignity of all 
human beings is a clear appropriation of Kant's ethical imperative that states that a
663 See "The Dignity and Freedom of Man", TI 2.
664 Andrew Tallon, Introduction to "Hearer of the Word" xiv.
665 Rahner "Theology of Freedom" p. 179
666 «Thg Dignity and Freedom of Man" p.245
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human being should always be treated as an end in themselves, and never a means to 
an end.667
8.8 The Distinction Rahner Makes Between Person and Human Nature
Rahner's essay "The Theological Concept of Conupiscentia"668 clearly distinguishes 
between his use of the terms "person" and "nature". "Concupiscentia" is the lived 
tension between human nature and human personhood. "Nature" here is the set of 
traits that exist before a human being takes free decisions. This would include 
emotions, reflexes and the spontaneous actions of the body. This also importantly 
includes the theological existentials of sin and grace. On the other hand, "personhood" 
is dependent upon the free will decisions made. Nature is given; personhood is self- 
created. "Concupiscentia" is the human being in tension with itself.
Tiina Allik argues that Rahner's use of the term "concupiscentia' allows for, and even 
celebrates, the vulnerability of the human.669 Allik contrasts Rahner's use of the term 
with that of Hauerwas where "concupiscentia" is viewed as a negative limit on 
human agency. Allik says that Rahner avoids devaluing nature in the way that 
Hauerwas might be said to. This avoids the dualism between matter and spirit, with 
matter seen as negative or evil, against the goodness of spirit. Relating 
"concupiscentia " to human freedom Rahner sees the tension between nature and 
personhood as being experienced when either "good" or "bad" moral decisions are 
made. He gives the example of lying to demonstrate this. A person may make the free 
decision to lie (a decision relating to their personhood) but might be expected to 
involuntarily blush (an act of nature). 67° Personal freedom, therefore, is seen in 
Rahner's thought as having the dual aspects of spontaneous acts (those arising from 
our given nature) and moral acts (relating to us a person). These dual aspects need not 
always be thought of as in conflict with one another and often work coherently as 
nature presents the evolving person with inclinations to differing moral decisions.
667"The Dignity and Freedom of Man" p.245.
668 T->T -i
669 Tiina Allik, "Nature and Spirit: Agency and Concupiscence in Hauerwas and Rahner" Journal of 
Religious Ethics 15 (1987), pp. 14-32.
670 See Rahner "Theological Concept of Concupiscentia" p.365 where Rahner rejects the understanding 
of this inherent tension as sinful in itself. It is rather the distinction between "nature" and "person" 
apparent as the human being is drawn to exercise free moral decisions that may or may not be in 
conflict with their nature.
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Furthermore, commenting upon Rahner's essay "The Theological Concept of 
Concupiscentia" Allik sees the human tension between nature and person in Rahner's 
thought as another continuation of his underlying distinction between form and
671
matter. Just as form can never fully express itself in matter, the human nature can 
never be totally expressed, and so become a complete and finished human person, 
whilst expressing itself in this life. This tension between personhood and nature is to 
be seen as a definitive aspect of human life. We note that this somewhat relates to the 
Kristeva's notion of the subject as unfinished and always "on the way".
8.9 Rahner's "Fundamental Option"
Rahner states that human freedom has a This is an obvious and stark contrast 
the boundless nature of freedom supposed in post-structuralism. For Rahner, in 
choosing to become myself, I am in fact choosing to respond positively to God's 
invitation. Choosing self and choosing God are inseparable acts. Therefore, for 
Rahner, human freedom has soteriological implications. He says that in the way in 
which a human being lives he or she chooses a "fundamental option" for or against 
God. The of every human life is to choose to become a person, through freely 
taken acts of "openness to the world." In doing so, the person says "yes" to God, 
which is a salvific act. The choices and openness of a person can be said to determine 
their self-actualisation and their salvation,
"Freedom in its origin is freedom of saying yes or no to God and by this fact is 
freedom of the subject toward itself."672
In the way a person decides to live, whether "open" to others and to the world, or 
closed-off, he or she chooses a "fundamental option". Reading Rahner, Brian 
McDermott says each individual "chooses an ultimate way."
"Which kind of person do I choose to be and become in all my particular 
choices and actions - open to a possible "more" or closed in a finite circle of 
meaning and value?" 6
In "Theology of Freedom" Rahner carefully defines what the fundamental is not. 
Firstly, it is not to be seen as the sum of a person's moral choices. Neither is it the 
moral value of our last act or moral choice before death, unless this act or decision
671 Rahner, "The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia" p365-9.
672 Rahner, "Theology of Freedom", p. 182.
673 Brian McDermott, op.cit., p.53.
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constitutes an expression of the whole person. Rahner says that the "fundamental 
option" is never undertaken in ignorance. If we choose to say "no" to God it is a 
definite and conscious decision,
"(The evil person) understands this evil as what he is and what he definitely 
wants to be." 674
The fundamental option is therefore the sum total of who we are, whom we choose to 
be.675
"The entire life of a free subject is inevitably the answer to the question in 
which God offers himself to us."676
In McDermott's terms if we reject openness, we are, in effect, "choosing to be a thing 
not a person." We are a "thing" in that we opt for a closed system of behaviour, 
energy and outlook and this will eventually lead to a "rigidity and paralysis of spirit" 
where the human being is "for and by themselves alone".677
The fundamental option is, therefore, nothing less than the exercise of freedom and 
leads to the human being becoming a human person. This is deeply inscribed within 
each human being in what McDermott calls "the experience of original grace."678 Our 
very being is predisposed to pursue this given existential of openness and freedom.
8.10 Is the Fundamental Option a Real Freedom?
Our question now is whether the arena of grace, pre-supposed by Rahner, negates the 
real freedom of the person as hearer. Intrinsically, for Rahner, given the extent of 
God's grace, we are created to say "yes" to God. This raises the question of whether 
we can say "No" to God? Rahner calls this the "mystery of evil". It is a mystery first 
and foremost because saying "no" to God runs entirely contrary to our created nature, 
which is to be open and directed towards transcendence. It frustrates our nature and is 
in fact a rejection of ourselves as God's creatures. Rahner speaks of the actions of 
Adam and Eve as just such a rejection. He says that the Genesis act was "an act of
674 FCF p. 103
675 Rahner, "The Dignity and Freedom of Man" p.246.
676 FCF p. 101
677 McDermott op.cit. p. 54
678 Ibid, p.56
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basic and original self-interpretation."679 It is self-interpretation, rather than the 
acceptance of the givenness of our created nature. In this way it is "sin", which is for 
Rahner, the rejection of God's grace.680
The "no" to God is also a mystery because it does not carry the same ontological 
significance as the life that is a "yes" to God. This is because the "yes" to God fits 
with our nature, it 'follows the grain' of our created being, and is as God wills human 
life to be. The "no" to God is never willed by God but is permitted in his decision to 
give human beings real and autonomous freedom. Here, Rahner presents the "no" as a 
real possibility. However his careful language tempers this by saying that saying "no" 
to God is
"[A]bortive, something which miscarries and fails, something which is self- 
destructive and self-contradictory"681 .
The "no" to God therefore exists as a coincidence of the greater and more 
fundamental possibility to say "yes" to God. The "no" is a "miscarriage" of the "yes", 
not its corresponding opposite.682
Rahner presents the "yes" to God as effecting positive change and progressing the 
human self-actualisation; the "no" to God degrades the human being. However, even 
in this state Rahner states,
"Men cannot, indeed, cancel out or change his pre-established essential dignity 
as he pleases.. .he can degrade it by becoming culpable before God." 683
"(The "no" to God) remains embraced by this "yes" of God, which remains 
victorious in the history of salvation as a whole."684
679 FCFp.ll5
680 See Rahner "Original Sin" in p.328-34 and "The Sin of Adam"
 in TI 11 
pp.247-262.
681 FCF p. 102
682 In this way "evil" is not seen as having the same ontological significance as good, a vi
ew that agrees 
with Earth's notion of evil as absence, lack or "nothinglessness" rather than substantive 
presence. Karl 
Earth, Church Dogmatics 3 (3) ed. GW Bromiley, T&T Clark, 1961, p.289-368. 
Using a similar argument to Earth's theodicy Rahner strongly rejects dualism and insists that creation 
is "good" and evil is an aberration, or miscarriage of good, that is only possible because 
of God's 
decision to create beings other than Godself. See Stephen T Davis Encountering Evil: Li
ve options in 
theodicy. T&T Clark, 1981, for a discussion of the similarities in approach by other mo
dern 
theologians including Moltmann.
683 Rahner "The Dignity and Freedom of Man" p.242
684 Rahner "Theology of Freedom" p. 196
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This raises the question as to whether there is any strength or power at all in the "no" 
to God. It may be a possibility, according to Rahner, but is it at all effectual in terms 
of a person's salvation? If not, then does the possibility of saying "no" to God have 
any soteriological significance at all? Rahner seems partly to avoid this question by 
speaking of "the whole" of salvation history rather than the salvation of the 
individual. He says that salvation history "cannot be reduced to that of the various 
individuals".685 Salvation, for Rahner clearly relates to all humanity (and in fact, as he 
states elsewhere, the whole created order) rather than the individual. God's "yes" to 
humanity appears to overrule the "no" of an individual to God. This has led Rahner's 
soteriology to be described as "Universalist". Rahner's notion of the universality of 
grace in Christ is important in this regard. 686 The individual "no" to God is embraced 
in the much greater "yes" of God to humanity as a whole achieved in Christ.
However, this reading does not pay enough attention to Rahner's contention that the 
freedom to say "no" to God is a real freedom, which he elsewhere states does indeed 
have eternal consequences. For instance, in Foundations of the Christian Faith Rahner 
says that when we refuse God's offer, his question of our being, we face, and can 
choose "in the absolute, the deadly and final loneliness of saying "no" to God."687 Is 
there a contradiction here? It would appear that the difficulty arises in that this is 
spoken of as for the human being, in Rahner, but that the emphasis in 
other works appears to be on the improbability of such an act and the extent to which 
the "no" to God must be taken with full awareness and extensively throughout life, so 
that it constitutes the "heart" of who we are. Could any person actively choose such 
"deadly, final loneliness"? Furthermore, while this decision, Rahner explicitly states, 
will damage the person's self-actualisation and their relationship to God, it is held 
within the macro scale of God's greater "yes" to humanity.
Is it therefore possible that the person saying "no" to God is in any sense damned? 
In our study we have found, that, as on this occasion, Rahner resists addressing such 
questions. This should not be taken to be hesitation or a lack of ability on his part. It is 
rather that we are asking the wrong question. Rahner rejects notions of a separation
685 Rahner, "Freedom" in SM p.245
686 See "The Sin of Adam" TI 11, p247-62 where Rahner sets out his interpretation of the Genesis 
account and outlines his understanding of the universal grace achieved in Christ - the greater "yes"
 of 
God into which an individual "no" is encompassed. 
687 FCFp.l03
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between the transcendent and the immanent; he therefore does not accept the 
separation of heaven and earth, or indeed earth and hell. In resisting polarities Rahner 
argues for a holistic and communal experience of life and salvation. Hell, where it 
does exist, is the chosen and self-imposed egocentricity that defies our very nature 
and leaves a human being as less than a person; rigid of spirit and closed to the world.
"One has chosen the hell of the false self, the hell which consists in being 
without the other." 688
Where Rahner does address the question of how the "fundamental option" relates to 
eternal salvation he first dismisses the idea that God holds out two possible ends for 
human beings, that of heaven and hell. Rahner rejects this oversimplification, stating 
that God in effect, heaven, and that hell is what we create for ourselves if we say
_ 
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no to God. This, therefore, would appear to suggest that "hell" is the process and 
state of a life lived saying "no" to God. The soteriological significance of the "no" to 
God is felt in this life, as the consequences of separation from God. In this the human 
person is degraded and ultimately experiences the full weight of chosen loneliness and 
isolation. With no separation between this and what others suppose to be the "next" 
world it remains unclear as to whether this state of loneliness continues after God's 
fully realised "yes" to humanity in the consummate redemption of creation at the end 
of time. It is this ambiguity that leads Rahner's soteriology to its ultimate 
universalism. He suggests, although never explicitly, that "hell" is subsumed in God 
in his consummate act of redemption in Christ, and that this is the only eschatological 
reality.
Rahner adds that the human person can never be sure whether their life is offering a 
"yes" or "no" to God. He says,
"(The human person) cannot "judge itself because it is historical and hence 
while its process is still going on it can never be fully present to reflection."6
688 McDermott op.cit p.55. He relates this to John-Paul Satre's "bad faith" from Being and Nothing 
where the inauthentic life is one lived in a rejection of the other, and withdrawn from the existential 
reality of a chosen existence.
689 "Theology of Freedom" p. 191
690 "Theology of Freedom" p. 195
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nis expresses the Roman Catholic reticence over and against the Protestant doctrine 
of assurance. In this respect, the final fundamental option is the final and total 
orientation of the human being. This will be either outwards towards God as the 
horizon, or as a decided rejection of openness, a state similar to Pannenberg's 
egocentricity.691
For Rahner, this end state cannot be judged by the human subjects themselves, since 
they stand within the history, and cannot judge its final state; God can only make such 
a judgement.
8.11 Freedom as Neighbour-Love
Rahner's emphasis throughout his treatment of the fundamental option is that it is the 
"yes" to God which is ultimately the of human being.692 This follows the created 
nature of the human and actualises its being to become evermore a human person. 
This perhaps leads to the question, "How does the life of "yes" to God show itself?" 
For Rahner, the "yes" to God is a life intrinsically containing a yes to the value and 
dignity of God's creation, and most especially other human persons. In essence it is a 
life of neighbour -love. Such a life is the and goal of human being, where 
personhood is achieved. Summarising Rahner's position Mark Lloyd Taylor says,
"The capacity to love is the single, final structure that adequately expresses the 
authentic nature of the human person."693
This type of love is distinguished in its willingness to be "open" to the other person, at 
self-sacrificial cost.
"What love demands of a person in none other than his very self."694
The recipient of such love, the neighbour, is not necessarily the person closest to the 
person. Rahner argues that true neighbour love is,
691 Wolfhart Pannenberg Anthropology in Theological Perspective translated Matthew J. O'Connel, 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1985
692 We consider Rahner's writing on in the ch.9, pp.225-237, and only briefly introduce the theme 
here.
693 Mark Lloyd Taylor op.cit. p.39
694 Rahner, "Theology of Freedom" TI 9 p. 188
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"The sombre service of political love...which is directed toward the whole of 
humanity and makes the most distant person one's neighbour."695
Rahner sees no distinction between neighbour-love and love of God. Commentating 
on 1 John 4:20-21, Rahner says,
"The original relationship to God is love of neighbour." 6%
Rahner states that neighbour-love contains the whole truth of the Gospel and is human 
freedom at its ultimate and fullest realisation.697 It is in loving the other person that 
Rahner says humans can experience God most directly.698 Andrew Tallon says that for 
this reason being, freedom and love are correlative,
"For me to will and to love is to be present to the other.. .Love is being for the 
other...."699
Rahner is clear in pointing out that neighbour love, whilst being correlated with the 
love of God, is not a "moral consequence" of the person's foremost love of God. 
Rather the neighbour is loved for his or her own sake and this "concrete act" is 
affirmed as love of God. The love of God as the act of neighbour-love is "unthematic" 
and may well be unconscious.
"The explicit, categorical love of neighbour is the primary act of love of God, 
which, in the love of neighbour as such, intends God...unthematically, but 
genuinely and without fail."700
Rahner sees the exercise of neighbour love as the means by which the human person 
reaches "maturity". He defines this term as the total integration and self-actualisation 
of the person in love. "Maturity", for Rahner involves the integration of all the 
existentials of human nature, and says that the act of self-giving love alone unites 
them all.701
Our last point on how neighbour-love is distinctive is that it reaffirms the person as a 
relational being. According to Rahner, part of the human existential is to be a
695 Ibid. p. 191
696 Ibid. p. 189
697 Ibid. p. 187
698 Ibid. p. 190
699 Tallon, "Spirit, Freedom, History: Karl Rahner's (Hearers of the Word)" p.917 
Appearing in Thomist pp. 908-19. 
70° Rahner, Systematic Theology 6 p.295 
701 Rahner, "Theology of Freedom" p. 187
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"community-building person". This requires the person's acceptance and protection of 
the dignity of the other person, which is in itself an act of love.
"The person is not the opposite of community; rather both are correlative 
realities.. .there is community only where there are persons and where persons 
are protected; he is a perfect person in the measure in which he opens himself 
in love and service for other persons."702
The human person is therefore formed in relation to other persons. In such 
relationality there is a reciprocal self-creation of our own personhood and that of 
others. This is, according to Rahner, the most fundamental human responsibility.
Given that a life ultimately saying "yes" to God is a human responsibility to be 
realised in freedom, we might ask how human freedom relates to divine sovereignty. 
With such an emphasis on freedom the theological question of human autonomy and 
divine sovereignty seems apparent and will be dealt with briefly here. Can a human be 
free if there is a God who is sovereign?
In reading Rahner, McDermott presents this question as a "false dilemma".703 It 
assumes that the self-creating subject cannot exist if it is fundamentally the object of a 
greater, infinite, controlling subject. Or, in other words, that human autonomy cannot 
exist alongside divine sovereignty. It is here that the link Rahner makes between 
freedom and love is vital. Rahner maintains that God's sovereignty is acted out in 
pure love. When love impacts upon freedom it does not control but nourishes and 
develops the possibility for growth and achieving potential. An example of this is the 
determination of a child's personality when it experiences the love of is its parent. 
Parental love is "controlling" in that its presence is hugely and fundamentally 
significant to the child's development. Such parental love is, in this way, a 
determinant of the child's personality and who they will become, but it does this by 
enabling the child to flourish and grow into their potential, rather than setting a 
prescriptive and fixed account of exactly who the child will be. The parental love 
allows the child to become who they are. A lack of parental love would be devastating 
in this situation. The "control" of the parent is therefore an act of love which nurtures 
the self-development of the child. Love "causes" in a specifically different way from
702Rahner, "The Dignity and Freedom of Man p.239 
703 McDermott op.cit p.56
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"mechanical or impersonal modes of causality."704 Its "causing" is an "enabling to 
become" rather than a "causing to become"705 . It is this model of divine sovereignty 
which Rahner offers, and as such is entirely coherent with maintaining human 
autonomy and real freedom. God, as the parent of humanity, loves and so enables the 
process of self-actualisation with which God has imbued human beings.
"Love offers nourishment to the other persons to be and become themselves, 
their own most authentic selves."706
According to Rahner, human beings have true freedom and are autonomous. By the 
"dark mystery" of evil, a side-effect of the act of their creation, they can even reject 
God's invitation and offer lives that are a "fundamental option" of saying "no" to 
God.
8.12 The Theme of Freedom in Contemporary Theology
The importance Rahner gives to the aspect of personal freedom within his notion of 
the person as hearer resonates with other theological anthropologies. We shall briefly 
consider wider theological notions of freedom in order to contextualise Rahner's 
writings. This might prove useful as we draw conclusions later about the extent to 
which this interface between Rahner and Kristeva might infer further possibilities for 
other theological engagement with post-structuralist theories. Again, as we observed 
in the theological anthropology in chapter 6 of this thesis, a return to the doctrine of 
the Trinity can be seen as informing this debate. Here we shall briefly examine how 
other contemporary theologians have explored the theme of human freedom through a 
consideration of the freedom of God the Father within the Trinity.
Zizioulas shares Rahner's interest in Greek Trinitarian}sm and draws from it a similar 
theme of personal freedom. Zizioulas sees Greek readings of the Trinity as 
emphasising the freedom of the Father in "willing communion".707 God, as Trinity, is 
portrayed as enjoying relationality and freely choosing communal relationships. God
704 Ibid, p.56
705 Process thought and theology takes this notion further by limiting God's omnipotence and viewing 
God's action as only a "call" or "drawing forward" rather than the imposition of divine will. See 
Charles Hartshorne The Divine Relationalitv: A Social Conception of God New Haven, 1948, and the 
commentary on Process thought, "The Attributes of God in the light of Process Thought" appearing in 
The Expository Times 81 1969-70.
706 McDermott op.cit p.56
707 Zizioulas, Human Capacity p.410
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freely wills that God's image on earth be similarly free. Bonhoeffer expresses the link 
between God's freedom and relationality and that of created humans,
"Only in something that is itself free can the one who is free, the Creator, see himself."708
Rahner, Zizioulas and Bonhoeffer link the theme of relationality with freedom. God 
as relational Trinity creates external beings to relate to, and, as God's images, they 
must too be free.
Although a full consideration of human sexuality is not apparent in Rahner's writing it 
is an issue that other contemporary theologians have turned to when considering 
models of human freedom as reflective of divine freedom. Here the theme of freedom 
as freedom to relate to the other is paramount.
In The Social God and the Relational Self. Stanley Grenz709 offers a summary of how 
contemporary theology has included notion of human sexuality in the examination of 
created relationality. He suggests that contemporary theologians have sought to 
understand how human sexuality might be seen as an to God's 
own Trinitarian relationality.
Bonhoeffer made the connection between sexual differentiation and divine 
relationality. According to Bonhoeffer, human freedom can only be exercised in 
relation to other beings, and the template for this is best observed in the sexual 
differentiation of humans.
"Man is free for man, Man is not alone, he 
is in duality and it is in this dependence on the other that his creatureliness 
consists."710
For Bonhoeffer, freedom only exists where it can be experienced as "freedom for the 
other."7HBarth takes up this theme in the development of his dialogical personalism 
found in the explanation of God's own "I-Thou" Trinitarian relationality. According 
to Barth, cosmic expressions of relationality are threefold. God in Godself enjoys the
708 Dietrich Bonhoeffer Creation and Fall/Temptation: Two Biblical Studies trans. John C Fletcher and
 
Eberherd Bethge, MacMillan Press, 1959, p.38.
709 Stanley Grenz, "Human Sexuality and the Divine Relationality" pp.294-298 of The Social God and
 
The Relational Self. Westminster John Knox Press, 2001
710 Bonhoeffer op. cit. p.38 
71 ' Bonhoeffer op.cit. p.37
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"I-Thou" relationality of the Trinity. God desires to express this in the creation of 
human beings, also created as free and relational, with whom God can relate. 
Furthermore, human beings are characterised by their freedom to relate to each other 
as "I-Thou." Intrinsic to this is the inherent relationality supposed in the duality of 
human sexuality. Human sexuality is therefore theologically important. For Barth 
"male and female being is a prototype of all 'I and Thou'."712 Grenz finds Barth's 
ability to find a place for human sexuality within the as offering "among his 
greatest contributions to theological anthropology."713 Grenz sees human sexuality as 
essential to notions of relationality. He says,
"At the heart of human sexuality is embodiment, which includes the sexed 
body that marks the person as male or female and out of which other aspects 
of human existence emerge. Bound up with embodiment is the sense of 
incompleteness, coupled with the drive for completeness, that together lead to 
bonding. Sexuality, therefore, is the dynamic that draws human beings out of 
their individual isolation into relationships with others."714
How does this reading of human sexuality relate to Kristeva's notion of the dispersal 
of dualistic sexuality that we examined earlier in this chapter? If Grenz is correct the 
notion of relationality that Barth has arrived at through the model of human sexuality 
is undermined by the dispersal of sexual categories. However, Grenz might be 
overstating the importance of sexuality, and specifically a understanding of 
sexuality. It might be seen that the duality of sexuality explored by these theologians 
is to the notion of relationality If this is the case the understanding 
of "I-Thou" relationality is not damaged by the removal of sexual polarity. Certainly, 
Grenz views Barth as demoting the relationship of male to female beneath the 
opportunity it offers for "I-Thou" encounter. 
Grenz says,
"In viewing human bipolarity in this way, Barth fails to find theological 
significance in the creation of humans as embodied, sexual creatures, despite 
his focus on the creation of humankind as male and female. In the end, human 
sexuality serves as little more than a symbol for what Barth perceives to be 
deeper I-Thou relationality that makes humans similar to the triune God and 
hence casts them as the 
Kristeva's dispersal of sexual categories need not therefore be detrimental to the 
theological understanding that the relationality of human experience mirrors that of
712 Barth Church Dogmatics HI/4 T&T Clark, 1961 p. 150, quoted in Grenz op.cit. p.298
713 Grenz, op.cit. p.300
714 Grenz op.cit. p.301 
715 Grenz, op.cit. p.301
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the divine. Previously, the duality of human sexuality has perhaps mirrored and 
symbolised "I-Thou" relationality. It does this because it has been understood as 
offering a model of similarity and difference in relation, expressed through a dualistic 
understanding of sexual categories. This appreciation might be obscured slightly 
were this duality lost; however, male-female sexual relationships could never 
encompass all expressions of human relationality and could never be conceived as an 
for divine relationality. We suggest here that theological relational 
anthropology need not be threatened by Kristeva's fragmentation of sexual categories 
in the theory of the speaking subject.
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9. A Telos for Subjectivity: Christology and Jouissance
We propose to examine one final area of significance in our theorists' writing on 
subjectivity. This is the consideration of whether a an ultimate end or purpose 
for subjectivity is possible or permissible.716
We are immediately required to clarify that no exists for Kristeva's speaking 
subject in terms of an absolute or universal norm. Kristeva attempts to deconstruct all 
such universals.717 However, if we leave aside the idea of a normative or absolute goal 
for the speaking subject we do find in Kristeva the idea of the speaking subject's most 
authentic experience of actualisation in the notion This concept 
provides Kristeva with a means to judge the "subject on trial".718 In this, the Kristevan 
notion ofjouissance is a goal for the speaking subject and as such a tentative in 
terms of actualisation. We seek to contrast this with the definitive of the person 
as hearer.
9.1 Post-modern ecstasy as a telos for the speaking subject
In reading Kristeva's work we have become accustomed to the way in which her 
writing is syntactically disrupted and its meaning purposefully heterogeneous. The 
medium is very much the message. This is no more apparent than when Kristeva 
speaks of the experience ofjouissance. The difficulty in unpacking this notion does 
not lie in identifying this term within Kristeva's writing; it is more that her notion 
explores literary concepts through corporeal and sexual terminology.
The usual English translation of the is "enjoyment." However, this 
translation does not carry the sexually orgasmic connotation of Kristeva's original 
French word. Her term implies an ecstasy similar to sexual orgasm. However, this 
should not infer that Kristeva has stepped beyond the purely discursive paradigm we
716 is the Greek term for the end, completion or purpose or goal of any thing or activity. Ar
istotle 
gave this term the inference of a final cause that accounts for the existence and nature of a thing
. In this 
he can be seen to connote a universal goal in actualising being for the nature of any thing, such 
as the 
self. See F. E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon .New York University 
Press, 
1969.
717 We explore Kristeva's post-structuralist schema and anti-universalist notion of the self in ch
.s 2, 3, 
6&8ofthis thesis.
718 This is inferred from her phrase The French term both denotes the self in p
rocess 
and has legal connotations: the self on trial. See chapter 3 pp.60-64 of this thesis.
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outlined in chapter two. Employing a word play, Kristeva with 
the ecstatic joy found in the presence of meaning; "I heard meaning". 
When sexuality refers to a linguistic reality the sexual ecstasy produced 
the play of desire.
In order to understand her use of this term we note that Kristeva develops her notion 
from its use by Lacan. In Lacan (1975)719 the expresses an 
interrelation between three French meanings. It signifies an extreme or deep pleasure, 
sexual orgasm and the sense of having the legal right to use something. The form of 
sexual ecstasy that Lacan connotes here is unrelated to phallic forms of sexuality.720 
We recall that both Lacan and Kristeva relocate sexuality to text.721 They see desire as 
only being satisfied in language.722 involves the symbolising of 
unconscious desire in free-associating speech. This takes the form of imaginative, 
poetic writing where the endless loops of meaning defy the constraints of rational 
language.
Lacan uses the term to connote the condition of merging with the other, which can be 
associated with orgasm, but also with gaining a desired object or condition. In his use 
of the word, Lacan emphasises the aspect of following a sensation to a point of 
discomfort. In this, Lacan draws from Freudian theory. In the essay "Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle" (1920) Freud posits that ecstatic pleasure experiences are related 
to the death drive. In this, Freud implies that ecstatic pleasure contains an urge to 
regress to the oblivious state that preceded life. In her notion Kristeva 
adopts these ideas from both Freud and Lacan, describing the subject in a state of 
as being on the boundary between the symbolic and the semiotic. This is, 
for her, the same as being both in a state of merging with otherness and coming close 
to personal annihilation. For Kristeva, in the state the speaking subject 
is positioned between symbolic centred life and semiotic total dispersal, which is in 
effect the death of selfhood.
719 Lacan, The language of the self: the function of language in psychoanalysis translated with notes 
and commentary by Anthony Wildenn New York: Dell, 1975
720 Lacan, op.cit., 70-71
721 See ch. 2 & 3 of this thesis where we consider Lacan and Kristeva's situating of sexuality within 
texuality.
722 Kristeva, RPL and Lacan The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis ed. Jacques Alain 
Miller, Penguin 1979pp.281-91
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"On the one hand, there is pain - but it also makes one secure - caused as one 
recognizes oneself as subject of (others') discourse, hence tributary of a 
universal Law. On the other hand, there is pleasure - but it kills- at finding 
oneself different, irreducible, for one is borne by a simply singular speech, not 
merging with the others, but then exposed to the black thrusts of a desire that 
borders on idiolect and aphasia."723
Kristeva, therefore, with the ability of the subject to embrace a state 
of inner plurality. This state merges the semiotic and symbolic and so actualises 
subjectivity at the borders of its collapse. It is a state of dynamic balance between 
actualisation and annihilation of the subject. Jean Graybeal usefully translates 
as "the joying of self-division."724 The pleasure aroused in this state has its 
origins in the remembrance of original pre-Oedipal M/Other where the pre-subject 
fully experienced semiotics.725 Later the speaking subject recalls this experience 
through the disruptive act of the semiotic. Rather than attempting to deny or reconcile 
this division, Kristeva argues it is possible, through aesthetic practices, for the self to 
learn how to 'joy' in such division. The experience is therefore closely 
allied to the acceptance of otherness.
Kristeva goes on to describe the means by which the subject can access such 
experiences. She sees aesthetic practises such as writing transgressive poetry or 
creating avant-garde art as helping the subject to express and joy in self-division. In 
other is the enjoyment of expressions of internal difference. 
Meaning is "present" here, but not in a dogmatic sense, rather in the realisation and 
enjoyment of the heterogeneous nature of meaning. This understanding is also a 
understanding which revitalises self-actualisation. It is in this respect 
is a possible for the speaking subject. The speaking subject is, in moments of 
experiencing its fullest expression of self-actualisation.
As we noted at the beginning of this thesis, Kristeva's speaking subject is the 
both a "self in process" and "on trial". Kristeva seems to suggest that the 
subject can be judged on the extent to which it can balance between the opposing 
forces of the semiotic and symbolic, in its own
723 Kristeva OIL p.x
724 In her chapter with this same heading appearing as ch. 7 of Body/Text in Julia Kristeva ed. David 
Crownfield.
725 RPLp. 101
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insurmountable division. In this way is a tentative but persistent notion of 
for the speaking subject.
This notion is explored in Kristeva's essay "Woman's Time". Here, Kristeva suggests 
two basic options for the divided subject. One path involves a variety of ways to 
ignore, repress or attempt to resolve the tensions inherent in such self-division, the 
other, ways to explore and play with division. Although Kristeva resists making overt 
normative judgements as to which path is better she clearly infers that latter represents 
a more actualised state of being than the former. Kristeva includes religious practices 
in this less authentic option, viewing them as repressive of semiotics. As we have 
observed, Kristeva sees religion as a place where the semiotic is only allowed to 
surface in order for it to be sublimated. 726
However, Kristeva states that even "feminist" ideologies and practices, which 
celebrate heterogeneity, can be corrupted and become a less authentic pathway for the 
speaking subject, one that resists the experience of In "Women's Time," 
describing herself as an avant-garde feminist, Kristeva fears that 
leads to an ideology becoming "a religion". She sees this in the feminist propensity to 
"sacralize the Woman"727 . She views the attempt to stabilise and secure identity, of 
women, or any individual, by the creation of a static "I", as a rejection of otherness. 
For Kristeva this will perpetuate the subject's subjugation to the Law of the Father. 
For Kristeva this is a state of being a "slave of meaning," which is based upon 
attempts to deny difference, both within and outside of the subject. She says,
"Our only chance to avoid being neither master nor slave of meaning lies 
within our ability to ensure our mastery of it (through technique or knowledge) 
as well as our passage through it (through play or practice). In a word 
Kristeva suggests that the "passage through" mastery of the male symbolic order is 
found in keeping in touch with semiotic forces that disrupt this system. In other 
words, a tentative for the speaking subject is found in living with the acceptance 
of the paradoxical nature of reality and, most especially, of our own heterogeneous 
subjectivity. This is ultimately what Kristeva has to offer as a of the speaking 
subject.
726 We examined this view of religion in chapter 3.5 pp.70-80 of this thesis.
727 WT p. 208
728 OIL p.x
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"The subject "masters" the symbolic system - knows what it means, knows 
how to speak and participate in the system of which she is a part - and yet is 
also in touch with the semiotic forces on the other side, which both require and 
make possible her individual playful passage through that system."729
In this, there is a measure of coherence between Kristeva's notion and 
the more general post-modern notion of "play". The or "trial" of the speaking 
subject is its ability to get by in the realm of the Law of the Father without being 
entirely confined and crushed by it; to revolt against the set categories of identity and 
meaning and yet not to fall into the extreme other state of semiotic psychosis. In 
"playing" with the balance between semiotic and symbolic the subject knows 
Before we move on we note that Kristeva suggests that the experience of marginality, 
such as that of women, is a refuge 
The various forms of marginalism  according to sex, age, religion or 
ideology  represent in the modern world this refuge 
Kristeva sees the marginalised place of women in society as offering them a more 
ready access alongside other marginalised groups. She suggests that this 
is because they already feel excluded by the symbolic order and so are more prone to 
seek ways to express this exclusion. In this there is somewhat of a contradiction 
between Kristeva's philosophical anti-realism and its dismissal of sexual categories 
and her inferred privileging of the experience of women.
Allowing for this inherent inconsistency it remains to ask how the post-modern goal 
of the speaking self, the expression can be seen in post-modern culture. 
Grenz suggests that "the central hallmark of post-modern cultural expression is 
pluralism."731 Cultural expressions of a post-modern ethos intend to confront the 
audience with an irreconcilable cacophony of ideas, or the reader with a polyphony of 
de-contextualised narrative voices. This creation of bricollage, with its juxtaposition 
of eclectic styles, is just the type of endeavour that Kristeva sees as eliciting 
An example of this can be seen in the way in which Kristeva herself plays
729 Joyce Graybeal, "Joying in the Truth of Self-Division" p. 133 appearing in Body/Text in Julia 
Kristeva: religion, women and psychoanalysis ed. David Crownfield, State University of New York, 
1992.
730 Kristeva, "Women's Time", p.202.
731 Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism. Eerdmans, 1996, p.20.
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with the structural format of her essay "Stabat Mater". The "male" symbolic text 
scrolls down the right hand side of the page to be occasionally interrupted by 
Knsteva's poetic writing about her experience of childbirth, which appears 
occasionally in the left-hand column. Sometimes the right hand column takes 
precedence over the whole page, only to be interrupted later. This format makes the 
page less easy to read. Should you follow the voices separately, read down one 
column at a time, or interrupt your reading by mixing both voices? Here Kristeva 
demonstrates a simple notion of hypertext. This is a textual collage, disrupting the 
symbolic nature of the text in just the same way that the semiotic disrupts the 
symbolic order.
It is the ironic play with ideas of identity and the dissolution of set meaning in popular 
cultural expressions such as fashion, the visual media, art and texts, which Kristeva 
suggests will force a re-evaluation of meaning and identity This phenomenon 
is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in contemporary science fiction where there is 
an overt questioning of what is possible in terms of human identity and a play with 
ideas of what constitutes reality.732 Often these explorations are undertaken with 
reference to the cyborg.
"The dominant image [in post-modern science fiction] is that of the cybernetic 
cyborg, a figure of indeterminate interface. The body is dissolved: malleable 
as data and more ephemeral than its own stored image. Even sexuality is 
distilled to the meaninglessness of transparency and surface."733
Theorists seeking to understand the prevalence of this genre suggest that the cyborg 
has become a projection of the type of amorphous selfhood imagined by post- 
structuralist, post-modern theories such as Kristeva's.
"The dissolution of boundaries, the "end of borders and frontiers"...the 
waning of affect, the erosion of meaning and representation, the rise of 
spectacle and simulacra, and the demise of history - all these familiar tropes 
are played out upon the physical manifestation of the subject - the [cyborg's] body." 734
732 See Scott Bukatman Terminal identity: the virtual subject in post-modern science fiction Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1993. For a general discussion on postmodernism as a cultural phenomena see 
Madan Sarup Identity, culture and the post-modern world , Edinburgh University Press, 1996 For a 
consideration of post-modern culture in film see Norman K. Denzin, Images of post-modern society : 
social theory and contemporary cinema. Sage, 1991.
733 Bukatman op. cit p. 245
734 Ibid, p.246
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Given the prevalence of so many varied cultural phenomena exploring the crossing of 
symbolic boundaries, post-modern society should be rich 
In all this, the preferred state is one of perpetual conflict. Commenting on this 
Kristeva makes an interesting point about the place of psychoanalysis in displacing 
Western philosophical and religious heritage. Here she identifies a fundamental 
difference between the self as hearer and as speaker.735 She describes traditional 
philosophical and religious practices, such as praying and reading, as "subjective self- 
interrogation" whereby,
" 'Man' can learn to know 'himself, his being, by turning inward upon 
himself, by turning a gaze upon himself, by looking back into himself."736
Kristeva sees psychoanalysis as the contemporary expression of this desire. However 
she indicates important differences.
"The aim of the traditional modes was a form of reconciliation - in religious 
terms, with God. The result or aim was grace and a sense of happiness. This is 
not the aim or end with psychoanalysis. .. .In contrast to the tradition I have 
outlined, analysis reveals that reconciliation is not possible because the 
permanent condition is that of conflict. Reconciliation is provisional. To use a 
metaphor, analysis is intellectual Trotskyism: the revolution is permanent."737
Whilst religion sought ultimate reconciliation, psychoanalysis embraces a process of 
continual evolution achieved through conflict, according to Kristeva. Given this, 
Kristeva asks,
"So what is the solution to this permanent condition of conflict?
*71ftCreativity...the best outcome is a recognition of permanent conflictuality."
We might well challenge Kristeva's notion of the aim of religion as a reconciliation 
that implies subjective stacity. Rahner's notion of sanctification through a process of 
deification would certainly disallow her reading of the Christian tradition as offering a 
kind of stagnant whereby reconciliation is a realisable goal and the self is static 
rather than process. However, even allowing for this, Kristeva identifies here that 
there is no true final purpose for the speaking subject. The best the self as speaker can
735 Parallax: Julia Kristeva 1966-96 Aesthetics. Politics, Ethics vol. 4, no.3, p.13-15.
736 Ibid. p. 14
737 Ibid p. 15
738 Ibid p. 15
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hope for is to be driven to creative practice by its own inner conflict. There is no 
resolution to this conflict for Kristeva.
Perhaps one might conclude that experiencing leads to an ethic of social 
tolerance and pluralism. This would build the post-modern society that rejects notions 
of centre or norm; Foucault's "heterotopia."739As we have seen in Kristeva's 
argument in Strangers to Ourselves740 it is the acceptance of internal otherness, or 
strangeness, that reduces the tendency to project differences outward. Rather than the 
depiction of the foreigner as the other, the battle with differences must take place 
within the psyche itself,
"... in order that the struggle, the implacable difference, the violence can be 
conceived in the very place where it operates with the maximum 
intransigence, in other words, in personal and sexual identity itself, so as to 
make it disintegrate in its very nucleus."741
Certainly, Kristeva's earliest writing was formulated under a Marxist framework and 
linked the individual transformation to a wider societal shift.
"There can be no socio-political transformation without a transformation of 
subjects: in other words, in our relationship to social constraints, to pleasure 
and more deeply, to language."742
In other words the ever-disruptive speaking subject would, from its own inner- 
plurality, break social constraints and lead a political revolution against dogmatic 
humanism. In this the individual's goal would be to assume subjective positions that 
refuse to conform to binary or other fixed classifications; a goal which encourages a 
plurality of expressed subject positions. Margaret Whitford identifies that this goal 
would be to adopt a "stance of perpetual negativity" a "position of dissidence;"743 in 
other words the speaking subject aims to make a continual assertion of what it is 
According to Whitford, for Kristeva, this is a "feminine" or "feminist" practise in that 
it is driven by the work of the subversive "feminine" semiotic.
739 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Pantheon Books, 
1970, p. xviii
740 See chapter 6.6, pp. 153-161 of this thesis, where we consider the stranger as "other".
741 WT reprinted in The Kristeva Reader p. 209
742 Kristeva interviewed in Tel Ouel Autumn 1974, reprinted in New French Feminisms: An Anthology 
ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron Harvester Press, 1981
743 Margaret Whitford "Preface" in Mapping Women Kath Jones (ed) CPL 1994, p. 10.
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As Kristeva herself says,
"Woman can never be defined; a feminist practice can only be negative."744 
We observe here that a political and social revolution is construed as the goal of the 
individual and carried our by acts of literary dissidence.
However, we would like to raise some objections to casting a socio-political goal for 
the speaking subject. We do not believe that this is a correct reading of Kristeva. As 
Whitford suggests, the socio-political goal of the speaking subject appears somewhat 
obsolete given that, in order to subvert society, there is a concurrent loss of the notion 
of communality.
"The fragmentation of identities (the multiplicity of sexed positions), to which 
Butler's and Kristeva's detotalising positions lead threatens to eliminate the 
basis for any kind of solidarity or action on behalf of women."745
A socio-political goal for the speaking subject is undermined in this; the 
"detotalisation" of personal identity leads to the fragmentation of society into a web of 
loosely drawn and ever-shifting subject positions. The goal of bringing about a 
revolution through dissident uses of language leads to the dissolution of the notion of 
communality. What purpose then for a socio-political goal if, in achieving it, the 
individual comes to obliterate the very notion of society?
Furthermore, Kristeva shows an apparent lack of interest in describing the eventual, 
post-revolutionary state.
"The solution is infinite, since what is at stake is to move from a patriarchal 
society, of class and of religion, in other words from a pre-history, toward - 
In any event this process involves going through what is 
repressed in discourse, in reproductive and productive relationships."746
It is also worth noting at this point that Kristeva limits the goal to an 
individual's solitary experience. cannot be shared. The writer, artist or 
performer can involve themselves in the aesthetic practices that Kristeva suggests are 
keys but they cannot directly share this experience with another. We 
have already suggested there is an inherent individualism within Kristeva's notion of
744 Kristeva in New French Feminisms: An Anthology ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron, 
Harvester Press, 1981, p. 137.
745 Margaret Whitford, "Preface" in Mapping Women Kath Jones (ed) CPL 1994, p. 10
746 Julia Kristeva from "Woman can never be defined" an interview by "Pyschoanalysis and Politics" in 
Tel Quel Autumn 1974. This is reprinted in New French Feminisms: An Anthology Elaine Marks and 
Isabelle de Courtivron (ed.s) The Harvester Press Ltd 1981pp. 137-141 (with my emphasis added).
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the speaking subject, and this is one more example of it. We believe that the solitary 
experience demonstrates the inherent individualism of the speaking 
subject, and is, as such, vulnerable to a critique from Rahner. We find the 
impossibility of constructing communal social or political action from the notion of 
the speaking subject extremely disturbing. Feminist commentators were the first to 
outline and critique this facet of post-structuralist notions of selfhood.747 We find their 
dissatisfaction with post-structuralism on this point compelling and anticipate a 
similar criticism from a theological standpoint, such as Rahner's, where the 
communality of the human self is emphasised and there is a collective aspect to self 
actualisation, often expressed in terms of ecclesiology.
We conclude therefore that the notion offers a tentative for the 
speaking subject. The subject in process can be judged by the extent to which it joys 
in plurality. This is again a textual experience which somewhat denies corporeality. It 
is also an inherently individualistic experience which can be neither reciprocally 
shared nor lead to communality.
9.2 Rahner's use of Christology in the telos for the person as hearer.
Rahner has no apprehension in speaking of a for the person; one which infers not 
only a goal or aim but, in the Aristotelian sense, a final cause which accounts for the 
existence and nature of a thing.748 His notion of the self as hearer includes a model of 
the fullest actualised human self in the person of Christ. In this, Christology is closely 
allied to anthropology. As Rahner says,
"Christology is transcendent anthropology, anthropology is deficient
Christology."749
We shall consider Rahner's Christology and see how the person of Christ embodies 
the of the person as hearer and how this contrasts with the individualism of the 
speaking subject.
Rahner seeks a Christology that allows for Christ to be seen as the most actualised or 
"ascended" human being: the embodiment of the fully-actualised hearer of God. With
747 Chapters 3 and 6 of this thesis outline a number of feminist critiques of Kristeva in this regard.
748 F E Peters Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon New York University Press, 1967
749 .TI lp.164
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this is mind he begins by critiquing classical "descending" Christologies.750 Such 
approaches begin with the premise that God "descended" to earth in the man Jesus, 
beginning with the assumption of divinity and approaching humanity from that 
perspective. Rahner believes that by returning to other Christian sources, such as the 
New Testament accounts and the apostles' sermons, the possibility for an "ascending" 
Christology arises. This will present Christ as the most actualised human being and 
provide a model for all hearers of God.
To this end Rahner points to the preaching of the apostle Peter, as it appears in Acts, 
which builds Christological statements about Jesus' divinity from a description of a 
fully human Jesus, who suffers and dies,
"This Jesus, whom you crucified, God has made Lord and Christ".751
Rahner asks whether such "ascending" Christological statements can be dismissed as 
merely "primitive" in comparison with the more sophisticated "descending" 
Christology of the later passages in John I.752 However he suggests that these New 
Testament statements portray important Christological pointers, which classical 
"descending" Christology obscures. For Rahner, classical Christology needs to be 
measured against the original experience of the risen Christ as reported in the New 
Testament, both in the synoptic Gospels and the preaching reported in Acts.
Rahner argues that whilst New Testament Christological statements are somewhat at 
odds with classical descending Christologies, neither should be seen to undermine the 
other. Rather, classical Christology is a straightforward development of the "late" 
Christology found in the New Testament, such as that in John I.753 Rahner cites the 
example of Galatians 1:4, "Christ gave himself for our sins", as implying the later 
classical ontological statements of Chalcedon, so providing a link between New 
Testament statements and later reflection in the Creedal formulations.754 Despite their 
differences, Rahner sees a legitimate link between New Testament and Creedal 
Christologies. 755
750 See TI 1, 2 and TI 5 pp. 187-192. The same material is treated in similar terms in FCF pp 178-203. 
75 'Acts 2:36, NIV
752 Rahner, TI I,p.l55.
753 Ibid.
754 FCF p.285
755 TI 1 pp. 149-155
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To summarise, for Rahner, the classical formulations require re-balancing with the 
primitive New Testament ascending Christologies that arose from the original 
experience of meeting the Risen Christ. Rahner overtly expresses this in his essay 
"Current Problems in Christology."756 Rahner famously states that the Chalcedon 
formulation should be viewed as a rather than an of the Christological 
quest,
"The clearest formulations, the most sanctified formulae, the classic 
condensations of the centuries-long work of the Church, in prayer, reflection 
and struggle concerning God's mysteries: all these derive their life from the 
fact that they are not the end but the beginning, not goal but means, truths 
which open the way to the ever greater Truth."757
In our desire to see how Rahner links Christology to a for personhood it is 
important to note that Rahner constructs his Christology within a soteriological
*7^C
setting; one which emphasises the divinisation of the self. According to Rahner, 
salvific meaning is found in that,
"We are saved because this man who is one of us has been saved by God." 759
Rahner's concern here is to offer a Christology that is fully applicable to non- 
substitutionary soteriological themes. It portrays the man Jesus as the one in whom 
God intended from all eternity to reconcile human beings. The hearers of God accept 
God's invitation to respond in the hope that God will affirm them in a similar way to 
that in which God affirmed Jesus.
The apparent emphasis on participation and divinisation need not infer that Rahner 
lessens the uniqueness of Christ. Rahner purports that the incarnation is an 
unsurpassable event within salvation history. The "event of Jesus Christ" is absolute 
and eschatological. Rahner says,
"God must live out its history as his own history and retain it permanently." 76°
756Rahner, Til, pp. 149-200
757 Rahner, TI 1 p. 149
758 Rahner, FCF
759 Ibid, p.284
760 Ibid, p.301
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Here we see the notion of Christ as as having a soteriological component. This 
quote also makes the point that Christ as telos has implications for the being and 
interrelatedness of God.
Rahner views Christ as the evolutionary pinnacle of temporal life, the most actualised 
human spirit. This is, in some ways, similar to the "degree Christologies" that see 
Jesus as the "divinised man"761 . However this is offset, in Rahner's writings, with 
ontological, "high" Christological statements as he examines Jesus' eternal Sonship. It 
is also important to recall that Rahner refuses to separate transcendence from 
immanence. The evolutionary process, which reaches its peak in Jesus, is not 
"either/or" human or divine action but rather "both/and", since this world is a 
"both/and" world where God is present transcendentally and immanent in every 
common event.
Rahner's concern in adopting the language of evolution is not therefore to suggest a 
purely "degree Christology". Such approaches were developed in the twentieth 
century and have since been viewed as relying too heavily on Hegelian views of 
history, which might be said to lead to an overly humanistic and optimistic view of 
the human state. Rahner does not offer a "degree Christology", although he does draw
/TO 
_from Hegelian principles of evolution . He seeks rather to marry his Christology 
with his view of the temporal realm as completely infused with God's grace; as the 
realm where immanence and transcendence meet.764 The "both/and" world requires 
God's consistent grace to redeem it, a process that reaches its climax at the 
Incarnation and will be fulfilled in Christ's return. This, we believe, does not indicate 
an overly optimistic or humanistic confidence in the ability of the human to evolve, 
but rather a confidence in the faithfulness and loving action of a gracious and 
redeeming God. For Rahner, the evolutionary aspect of history relates to the process
761 For a critique of such views see Gunton, Yesterday and Today: a study of continuities in 
Christologv. Darton, Longman and Todd, 1983 pi5-18 and p 98-100
762 We consider Rahner's notion of reality in ch.l pp.13-24 of this thesis and Rahner's Rule for 
resolving the tension between the immanent and economic Trinity, which is the basis for this notion of 
reality, pp. 165-167.
763 See Gunton's analysis of Hegel's influence on Rahner, Gunton, op.cit. p. 16-17.
764 This desire will lead some Christian commentators such as Gunton to say that Rahner has divinised 
creation and conflated the order of salvation with the order of creation in what Gunton terms "near- 
Pantheism" (op.cit. p. 127). This critique is not easily dismissed as this is in effect what Rahner's 
understanding of the human realm entails. God is immanently present in this world and must never be 
objectified into a world or realm beyond.
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of God's communication rather than the unaided progression of the self as hearer. 
Rahner sees that the revelation of God in Christ guarantees and anticipates the 
"divinization of the world as a whole". 765
It is difficult to confidently place Rahner's understanding of Jesus salvific work 
within any one commonly used soteriological model, although commentaries often 
place Rahner within the "example" model. However we do not believe that this 
adequately expresses all that is contained in Rahner's notion of Christ as telos. John 
Mclntyre offers thirteen soteriological models: ransom; redemption; salvation; 
sacrifice; propitiation; expiation; atonement; reconciliation; victory; penalty; 
satisfaction; example and liberation.766 He places Rahner in the "example" model 
category. Mclntyre distinguishes the various types of "example" models from the 
others, seeing them as being of "second order" in that they require the presence of 
other models, usually those of salvation or atonement. Mclntyre argues that Christian 
theologies offering "example" models do so having already established the unique 
role of salvation achieved by Christ. This categorisation, with its caveat, seems to fit 
Rahner's soteriology much more adequately than a simplistic "example" model. It 
requires the reference to first order models where in some way Christ's death 
as well as inspires us to follow his example.
Within this evolutionary framework, the incarnation represents the climax of God's 
relation to human history. Soteriologically therefore, there is the expected Catholic 
emphasis on the incarnation, rather than the cross and resurrection, as salvific event. 
For Rahner, the incarnation quite simply means salvation. It means that the man, Jesus 
of Nazareth, who preached the kingdom and died in obedience to God's will, showed 
himself to be the one whose life and words were affirmed by God. As we encounter 
Jesus, through revelation and the Gospels, we understand that the transcendental offer 
of God was, at least in Jesus, fully accepted. Further, we realise that we can also hear 
God's offer and respond to it as Jesus did.
Situating the person's within an ascending Christology acknowledges the extent 
of continuation between the human state and the divine. Rahner finds assurance of
765 TI 5, p. 161.
766 John Mclntyre, The Shape of Soteriology: Studies in the doctrine of the death of Christ. T&T 
Clarke, 1992.
225
this in the "solidarity" between the incarnate Word and human beings.767 This is 
perhaps where Rahner's anthropology is decidedly optimistic and why it so easily 
relates to his Christology. The hearer is,
" a reality absolutely open upwards; a reality which reaches its highest 
perfection .. .when in it the Logos himself becomes existent in the world."
769
768
It is his positive and optimistic approach to the state of the human being that 
establishes a real place for Jesus' human will and nature to come to the fore, 
bequeathing modern Christology with a very human Christ. At the same time the 
human being is elevated, and its salvation is seen as a progression rather than an 
obliteration of what was formerly present. It gives the self as hearer a that is 
perfectly exemplified in the person of Christ and realised as a possibility for all 
hearers through Christ's unique salvific work. Jesus is humanity's "limit-case. 
In Christ we see the possibility of what the hearer can be, and how far short we fall 
from this or ideal.
The important theme of relationality is apparent as Rahner relates Christology to the 
of the preson as hearer. This theme, which has been central in the creation of the 
hearer, remains central to its It is here that Rahner's notion confronts the 
individualism of the speaking subject. According to Rahner, the human person should 
be redefined as not only a subject (rational and free, an existential event) but also a 
(a being defined in relation to others, and ultimately an ontological 
category).770 It is only in the dual personhood of Christ as subject and subject-in- 
relation that the human and the uniquely divine coincide.
According to Rahner, as a Jesus Christ shares, but exceeds, our understanding 
of the infinite within the finite. Jesus' human consciousness is more attuned to the 
Absolute, but only in degree. However, as a Jesus exceeds our 
experience in quality (and not solely degree) in his relationship with God. He is 
uniquely related to the Father. In this respect, Jesus' understanding of the infinite and 
eternal differs from ours and his uniqueness is maintained. All human subjects can
767 FCF p.289 
768Rahner, TI I, p. 183.
769 Gerald O'Collins Christoloev: A Biblical. Historical, and Systematic Study of Jesus. Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p.214.
770 We see in notion of the self as relational in ch.1.2 and ch.5.7 of this thesis.
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follow the example of Jesus' radical openness to divinity. However, for Rahner, 
Christ is also a and as such he is shaped by all of his relationships. 
Christ's particular relation with God is unique. His relationship with the Father is not 
fully attainable by other human persons.
By distinguishing these two essential components in all persons (both subjects and 
subjects-in-relation) Rahner's Christology holds together Christ's twin natures, his 
uniqueness and the evolutionary model of soteriology. Christ is the realsymbol of God 
and models the fulfilment of the human person. This bequeaths the notion of the 
hearer with an important facet, stressing relationality whilst concurrently allowing for 
an aspect of individuation.
A further facet of Rahner's Christology as it relates to the of the person as hearer 
is that it overcomes the problem of Christ's self-knowledge being seen as purely a 
product of beatific vision. By this we mean that it need not be supposed that Christ, as 
the of personhood, walked by sight (or understanding) rather than faith. In 
Rahner's understanding, Jesus, the subject, is not aware that he is a divine subject by 
means of beatific vision, but by means of openness to the Absolute. He walks by faith, 
as do all hearers of God. The recognition of the infinite contained within the finite is 
possible to all human persons and exceeded in the person of Christ by a matter of 
degree. We need not feel disadvantaged if we are not graced with beatific vision, but 
should rather foster a sense of openness to the Absolute which is available to 
everyone in the "mysticism of everyday life".771 In this we are reassured that the 
of personhood is achievable.
We should briefly consider here that other critics find that Rahner has not been 
completely successful in marrying the themes of Christology and self- 
transcendence.772 Gunton asserts that the notion of self-transcendence itself, "actually 
obscure(s) the heart of Christianity." 773 For Gunton, the "heart of Christianity" is the 
fact that in this one particular human life God brings salvation for all. Gunton states 
that according to biblical testimony the difference between Jesus and us is not any 
degree of self-transcendence but the fact that we succumb to temptation where he did
771 See ch.5.5 where we consider Rahner's theme of mystery.
772 Colin Gunton, Persons Human and Divine. T&T Clark, 1991.
773 Ibid, p.16
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not. This may not be an entirely legitimate criticism of Rahner since it appears to 
overlook the link between self-transcendence and moral purity that is apparent in 
Rahner's writings. Jesus' sinless state is seen as the by-product of his self- 
transcendence, the extent of his openness to the divine. Rahner views sin as the 
corruption of the proper human desire for God, which is overcome by self- 
transcendence. For Rahner, the ordinariness of Jesus is maintained in the emphasis on 
building a Christology from below which seeks to maintain the real humanity of 
Christ.
Gunton's more compelling contention with Rahner's Christology is the degree to 
which Rahner allows findings of transcendental philosophy to dominate (Gunton uses 
the term "obscure") aspects of Christological tradition. We believe that there are some 
grounds for his complaint. However, this is partly due to the way in which Rahner 
writes and the way in which his work is published. In particular there is a noticeable 
attempt to revisit high Christological statements and re-emphasise the unique Sonship 
of Christ in the later work Foundations whereas in the earlier Theological 
Investigations the emphasis is far more on evolutionary Christology. This might be 
interpreted as Rahner himself understanding the need to provide checks and balances 
to his earlier emphasis on "fully ascending" Christology. Without this chronological 
overview of Rahner's work a false impression of Rahner's Christology and his 
broader relationship to philosophy can emerge.
Ultimately, we can say that Rahner's anthropology and Christology together suggest 
to us that our life too can be open to God's offer of self-revelation; that we can be 
hearers of God.
9.3 Openness as Telos
In seeking to establish the person of Jesus as the ultimate "limit case" of human 
personhood Rahner presents us with a model of human life. In this he states that the 
purpose of human life is essentially "openness." Rahner views openness as a universal 
characteristic; it is essentially what it means to be human. It is in realising this 
openness that the human being actualises personhood. The theme of "radical 
openness" is therefore the link between Christology and anthropology and is offered 
as a for human personhood.
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Pannenberg and Macquarrie agree that the concept of openness is increasingly 
prevalent in both Christian "doctrines of Man" and secular anthropologies.774 They 
argue that it is key theme in all contemporary anthropologies. Pannenberg 
expresses this in the notion of "exocentricity," which is revealed in the phenomena of 
human existence such as imagination, trust, self-consciousness and the hope for life 
after death. Neither Pannenberg's "exocentricity" nor Rahner's "openness" limits this 
notion to religious experience alone. Rahner agrees with Pannenberg that human 
beings are in a very real sense naturally religious; that an awareness of the presence of 
God gives "a correct appreciation of what it is to be human."775 As Pannenberg states,
"It is the ability to transcend one's own situation which characterises man.. .In 
questioning the reality he encounters and going beyond its currently given 
aspects to its very essence through this inquiry, thus disclosing its 
questionable-ness, man is in the last analysis asking about himself, about his 
own destination. Thus it makes good sense to describe man as a question that 
continually pushed him further into the open." 776
Both argue that human openness, expressed as a super-natural existential or as 
exocentricity, is a universal trait. Furthermore, in support of this, Pannenberg claims 
that both secular and theological anthropologies draw the same conclusion: that 
humanity is characterised by self-transcendence, an "openness to the world".777 This 
correlates to Herder's and Kierkegaard's philosophical claim that human personal 
identity must be grounded outside of itself.778 Rahner's anthropology can be readily 
situated within this stream of theological thought. He suggests that not only is there a 
religious component in individual and corporate human life, but furthermore, the 
destiny of human existence is eschatologically to become evermore in the image of 
God. The for human personhood lies outside of ourselves in becoming evermore 
like God, as exemplified in the person of Jesus Christ, though whom we achieve this 
goal. Openness to transcendence is therefore the foremost characteristic of Rahner's 
ascending Christology.
774 See John Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought. SCM, 1990, and Pannenberg, Anthropology 
in a Theological Perspective. T&T Clark. 1985
775 Pannenberg's own description of anthropology Anthropology in Theological Perspective T&T 
Clark. 1985, p.21.
776 Pannenberg Basic Questions SCM Press, 1970, p.216.
777 Pannenberg Anthropology in Theological Perspective, p.42.
778 Pannenberg op.cit p.58 for a discussion of Kierkegaard's "The Sickness unto Death" on this theme.
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9.4 The speaking subject's jouissance and the hearing person's openness
We shall attempt to suggest what can be learnt by a critical comparison between the 
notion and the theme of radical openness to transcendence. We suggest 
that the notions of openness are akin to an understanding of a for 
the subject, although, as we have noted, this claim needs to be modified for Kristeva's 
schema.
Immediately we foresee problems in that claims of universal characteristics are highly 
problematic for post-modern theorists, but essential to Rahner. Pannenberg attempts 
to resolve this with a consideration of scientific anthropological studies. Rahner does 
not adopt this approach, but rather leaves the claim for a universal openness to 
transcendence as an obvious and unavoidable facet of the human state; one which our 
own experience will validate for us. We find this hard to argue with. Firstly because 
Rahner extends the definition of human "openness to transcendence" to encompass far 
more than religious sentiment alone. Rather, it is inclusive of all categories of human 
questioning and especially the task of self-understanding. In this, Rahner seems to 
encapsulate the very project Kristeva undertakes (and indeed our own project) in that 
to question the "already saids" can be seen as an expression of radical openness. 
Kristeva's work might infer her openness of being, the universal characteristic 
suggested by Rahner, Pannenberg and others.
Secondly, we note that there is an inherent individualism in Kristeva's notion of 
which is not found in the idea of the openness of the hearing subject-in- 
relation within Rahner. This is best exemplified by recalling Kristeva's contention 
that there should be a rejection of collective political action in favour of "A New 
Political Dissident" - the individual experimental writer. Kristeva's argument that the 
subversion of Western society, with all its discriminating hierarchies, lies in the hands 
of avant-garde artists and writers negates the possibility of the collective political 
activism of marginalised groups. Kristeva goes as far as to suggest that political action 
from within the symbolic order, such as the "Women's Movement" remains "within 
the limits of the old master-slave couple"779 and is at best counter-productive in that it 
does not overthrow the notion of set categories such as "women". We recall, in
779 Kristeva's essay "A New Type of Intellectual: The Dissident" first appeared in Tel Quel 1977, 
no.74, Winter 1977. It is reprinted in The Kristeva Reader. Toril Moi (ed.) pp.292-300. This citation 
from Moi, p.295.
summary, that for is the experience of joying in 
self-division. The emphasis is on intra-subjectivity. cannot be transferred 
to another. Political action is therefore resituated to the individual work of a number 
of poets and artists rather than the collective action of marginalised people. We take 
issue with the individualism of such a notion. It contrasts with the pains Rahner takes 
to differentiate between the and the and annuls the facet of 
interpersonal reciprocal relationality. As we have seen in his Christology, Rahner 
views these aspects of selfhood, the separate and the relational, as needing to be taken 
together in order to understand the nature of the self. As demonstrated in his 
Christology, the relational aspects of the self are vital.
Furthermore, it seems somewhat naive to suggest that expressions of experimental 
writing can overturn political systems. Feminist writers have expressed this 
incredulity. In relating Kristeva's call for the new dissident to feminist political 
action, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak says,
"There is something even faintly comical about Joyce rising above sexual
identities and bequeathing the proper mind-set to the women's movement."780
Elizabeth Grosz agrees,
"Advocacy of the (male) avant-garde as spokesman for a repressed femininity 
coupled with [Kristeva's] call for a feminism that is not confined to sexual 
differences but analyses and confronts the question of sexual 
differentiation... imply the annihilation of women's struggles for sexual 
specificity and autonomy."781
The critique of feminists in this respect is relevant to all marginalised peoples. 
Kristeva's of individual does not therefore equate to collective 
experience or action. As we suggested in our consideration of the notion of freedom, 
this individualism can be seen as undermining theological understandings of the 
Church. Against this, Rahner posits a notion of the Church782 as a community of 
subjects-in-relation who, by their free acts of love, assist and express a communal 
and move together in a process of divinisation.
780 Spivak, "French feminism in an intellectual frame" Yale French Studies no.62, 1981, pp. 159-64.
781 Grosz, Sexual Subversions. Alien and Unwin, 1989, p.97.
782 The remit of this thesis will not allow for a consideration of Rahner's ecclesiology. However this 
does not greatly disadvantage our task since we can draw this inference from his Christology and 
anthropology in the ideas of subject-in-relation and the existential of being a community-building- 
person. See ch.1.2 pp.17-24, ch.5. 7 pp.122-124 and 9.2 pp.225-237.
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However, Kristeva describes relates somewhat to Rahner's concept of 
openness in its understanding that the of the self inherently involves a process of 
de-centring. In a similar way to that which we identified in chapter eight on freedom, 
for Rahner, this is a process of exo-centricity, the joying of self-actualisation in 
relation to transcendence. For Kristeva this is a process of ex-centricity, the dispersal 
of the illusionary self in relation to text. However, both stress the notion of change 
involved and in doing so stress the human subject as being-in-process. They share a 
confidence in the ability of expressions of semiotic disturbance, such as religious art 
and poetry to enable this process. Whilst Kristeva has viewed religion itself as a 
repression of the semiotic she allows religious art and poetry to be helpful 
transgressive expressions. Rahner sees such experiences of transgression (for him this 
is transgression from the confinement of a false focus on temporal life) as unconfmed 
to the religious sphere. Both emphasise the joy found in journeying self-realisation, as 
well as temporary moments of'loss' of the self, which are inherent in de-centring. 
Furthermore, they judge those who resist seeking behind or within the apparent order 
to be rejecting the for selfhood. For Rahner this is ego-centricity, for Kristeva it 
is being the slave of the symbolic order. In both, resistance to de-centring is viewed as 
anti-actualisation of the subject or person. This is an important area of agreement that 
encourages the subject to be seen as a process of de-centring and leads to joy in both 
accounts.
Ultimately, the fundamental difference in this discussion on is the arena of 
reality within which either or openness takes place. As we saw in our 
previous chapter, the subject or person's ability to transcend itself, or in other words, 
the extent of its openness, is defined by its arena. Within Kristeva, the subject's 
transcendence is restricted to changing positions, or voices, within a discursive reality. 
In shifting positions it experiencesyow/ssfl«ce, but it cannot break free of the meta- 
narrative of the text. For Kristeva then the process of de-centring the subject leads to 
the realisation of heterogeneity. However, for Rahner the de-centred person 
experiences more than but full This is due to the 
fact that Rahner's view of reality suggests that much more is available to the person. 
He suggests that in Christ we see the fullest extent of human self-actualisation. This is 
the divinisation of the human person in a radical openness to transcendence. For 
Rahner, Christ demonstrates the pinnacle of temporal life and both points the way,
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and makes a way, to eschatological self-actualisation which breaks free from the 
bonds of discourse or temporality and lives out a dialogue with divinity.
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10: Reflections and Conclusions
This study demonstrates the significant value of Rahner's theology in relating 
Christian anthropology to the challenges raised by post-structuralist notions of 
subjectivity. Rahner's capacity for engagement with post-modern concerns is verified 
in many areas where this dialogue has been constructed. This is relevant to 
contemporary theology as it seeks to engage with post-modernism.
The critical comparison between the speaking subject and the person as hearer has 
thrown up areas of surprising similarity as well as those of significant divergence. 
These have elucidated issues in contemporary discussions about human subjectivity; 
the tension between individualism and relationality, the possibility of transcendence 
and the recognition of social construction, the role of otherness and the place of 
rationality and symbolisation. Here we consider each area of asymmetry and 
coherence between the person as hearer and the speaking subject and draw 
conclusions from this critical comparison.
From the outset it has been made clear that this project has sought to critically 
compare and contrast notions that do not exactly relate; this is immediately apparent 
in the difference in terminology alone. We are not bringing together like with like. 
Our project deals with thinkers from divergent paradigms, which some might see as 
adversarial. Given their paradigmatic differences a straightforward comparison has 
not been possible. This has shaped our methodology. We have allowed each theorist 
to speak in their own terms and tried to avoid inferring a false symmetry between 
them. Given these methodological difficulties, in defence of this endeavour, we 
contend that their fields of questioning are clearly not unrelated, however different 
their pre-suppositions and methods. Both seek to revise ideas around what it means to 
say that an individual human experiences a sense of "self'. Both ask how human 
subjectivity be best explored and which former conceptions need to be revised or 
dismissed. Rahner and Kristeva seek to interrogate the notion of selfhood, sharing 
dissatisfaction with modernist substantive conceptions. They both undertake types of 
deconstruction in order to compose more adequate concepts. In this endeavour, from 
divergent camps, with distinct tools and to different effects, they seek to explore a
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notion that has become problematised. Kristeva brings the findings of post- 
structuralist linguistics, Continental post-modern philosophy and the findings of 
psychoanalysis to this task. This brings her to the notion of the speaking subject. 
Rahner brings renewed Thomism, theological theories of language and symbols and a 
contemporary social trinitarianism to the task and formulates a notion of the person as 
hearer.
Here we identify three fundamental areas of asymmetry between the speaker and 
hearer. We then turn to shared themes and outcomes. We suggest that there are three 
significant areas where the hearer and speaker share coherent themes and one 
important area where they arrive at consistent outcomes.
After considering these areas of concurrence we offer a reflection upon the value of 
Rahner's theology to a contemporary theology that seeks to interface with post- 
modern and post-structuralist theories.
10.1 Areas of Asymmetry: The Arena for Human Subjectivity
The most obvious difference between Rahner and Kristeva has been the arena they 
imagine human subjectivity to take place within. Chapters one and two found them at 
their most fundamentally divergent. Rahner describes a theistic realist paradigm that 
circumscribes human subjectivity. The particular flavour he gives his theological 
reading of reality is one where divinity co-exists with materiality and speaks through 
it. Rahner has been seen to pursue a notion of reality that resolves the separation 
between transcendence and immanence. The arena for the hearer is a relational reality 
where the human being is the creature reflecting God's inner-plurality. It is an inter- 
personal reality where the form of both divinity and humanity is expressed in and 
through the material realm. It is also to be understood as a dialogical reality, best 
characterised as the place of divine revelation. It is also an historic situation which 
both confines and offers the possibility of transcendence to the self as hearer. In 
summary, Rahner's hearer is created, exists and can be explored within a reality that 
is theistic, graced, dialogical, historical, relational and personal. In this, evidently, 
Rahner was re-thinking the nature of reality; the grand-narrative arena of human 
subjectivity. In offering a process, dialogical account of creation and an 
anthropological approach to theology, Rahner can be seen as revising the Christian
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understanding of the arena for human subjectivity significantly before the challenge of 
post-modernism.
Even given this early revision, Rahner's paradigm is at immediate odds with 
Kristeva's arena of speaking subject. For her, reality is purely discursive. This is not 
to say that Kristeva dismisses the existence of a material realm. It is rather that post- 
structuralism informs her that there can be no fixed meaning for any material entity. 
Meaning is inscribed upon the material order by discourse, rather than described by 
pre-existent subjects.783 In short, language precedes both meaning and subjectivity. 
Initially, we can say that Kristeva does not see the subject as existing outside of this 
textual, discursive arena, although we note that she retains a tenuous place for its 
persistence in what she terms "the chora".784 In this she holds a position between the 
outright anti-realism of postmodernism and the emphasis on multiple subject positions 
found in post-structuralism. Given this, we may conclude that her task is not so much 
to dissolve the self entirely within a "text-active" schema but rather to retain a place 
for selfhood as a "space" or "stance" within discourse. Our study in chapter two 
suggests that Kristeva has arrived at her understanding of a non-realist reality from a 
study of linguistics rather than an rejection of realism.785
Is it really possible to relate ideas that come from theistic realism to others rooted in a 
purely discursive post-modern paradigm? It appears that one stream of contemporary 
theology has concluded that this is not possible and that the findings of post- 
modernism require a paradigmatic shift within theology; the concurrent rejection of 
realism. The theological movement adopting a non-realist paradigm is sometimes 
known as the "Sea of Faith" network, after Don Cupitt's book of the same title (1984). 
Hugh Dawes, David Hart and Mark Taylor can be seen as other examples of this 
movement.786 "Sea of Faith" theologians believe that post-modern anti-realism
783 See ch. 2 of this thesis, where we discuss the anti-realist paradigm pre-supposed by Kristeva.
784 See ch.3 of this thesis, where we examine the notion of the chora.
785 See ch.2. and ch.3 of this thesis where we discuss Kristeva's arrival at anti-realism from a 
consideration of post-structuralist linguistics.
786See Hugh Dawes A Credible Christianity for Today SPCK. 1992; Mark Taylor Erring: A 
Postmodern A/Theology. Chicago University Press, 1984; Don Cupitt Sea of Faith ,1984 and Tak
ing 
Leave of God. SCM Press, 1980 and David A. Hart, Faith in Doubt: Non-Realism and Christian 
Belief, Mowbray, 1993. The willingness of some theologians to embrace anti-realism is discussed
 in Is 
God Real? Edited by J. Runzo, Macmillan, 1993 and A. Walker's Different Gospels, SPCK, 1993
.
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presents an opportunity to re-envision both faith and God. This process is seen as both 
positive and existentially painful.
"You have to go through inner turmoil; you have to descend into the primal 
chaos, into that meaningless region in the depths of the human soul where all 
meanings are unmade and remade. There at the source of the creative energy 
that makes us and our world, you pass through a kind of death and rebirth. The 
more you lose, the more you have to gain."787
Such theologians see realism as oppressive and an objective God as tyrannical.788 We 
have encountered these beliefs in post-modern philosophy, yet it seems unsettling to 
our project that they appear in contemporary theology. Are Rahner, and other realists, 
anachronistic in not accepting the metaphysical freedom of postmodernism's anti- 
realism? 789 Certainly the type of "Nomadic A/Theology" which Taylor envisions, and 
Cupitt's "Sea of Meaning,"790 welcome the type of freedom imagined by Kristeva.791 
Indeed, the textual freedom they describe is the only freedom in a world of 
discourse rather than objective reality.
"We have come to see that there can be nothing for us but the worlds that are 
constituted for us by our own languages and activities. All meaning and truth 
and value are man-made and could not be otherwise....It is we who impose 
shape upon it to make a world to live in."792
Taylor and Cupitt see that within a non-realist paradigm the human self is free to set 
up its own religious discourses, creating Gods (or not) and leaving behind the 
shackles of objective truth and realism.
"Your God is only your faith in him; your values are only your commitment to 
them. That is liberation. You're free."793
In examining non-realist theology, Colin Crowder suggests that for this group, "what 
matters then is not theism, but spirituality."794 In other words, Crowder suggests that it 
is a crisis within the spiritual pragmatism of Christianity, for these writers, which 
prompts them to seek a different understanding of reality. In Crowder's words
787 Cupitt, Sea of Faith p. 14-15
788 See Cupitt op.cit. p.3
789 Our remit does not allow for a full examination of post-modernist a/theology, we are only able to 
consider it as such in its relation to the issue of freedom.
790 Cupitt The Time Being. SCM Press, 1992, p.66.
791 See ch.8 of this thesis where we consider Kristeva's notion of freedom as the ability to adopt new 
subject positions within language and so disturb and recreate meaning.
792 Cupitt, Sea of Faith, p.20
793 Cupitt, The Time Being, p.66.
794 Colin Crowder, God and Reality: Essays on Christian Non-Realism, Mowbrav 1997, p.4.
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"They tend to be far less interested in establishing the claim that theism (as 
understood by realists) isn't true than in arguing that it doesn't work."795
It would seem that exchanging theism for non-realism is possible for this group 
because they believe that religion is entirely man-made.796 As such it is in the hands 
of the human self to re-imagine a religion where reality is constructed from discourse 
and activity alone.
Can non-realist theologies be seen as Christian theologies? David Cheetham questions 
whether such post-modern a/theologies can be seen as theologies in any 
sense. He asserts,
"It is surely possible to argue that the hope for some kind of metanarrative or 
objective assurance is the very heartbeat of religion."
Citing June O'Connor, Cheetham continues,
"Non-realism offers a profound pessimism in so far as we alone and in this life 
alone, constitute the resources for our own fulfilment and transformation." 79?
Cheetham concludes,
"Cupitt's joyous autonomy is O'Connor's profound pessimism."798
Cheetham contends that post-modern anti-realism might give rise to a type of 
a/theology but this could not be seen as "religious" in that it undermines one of the 
foundations of religious experience and one of its main characteristics: to turn the 
subject outside of itself to a transcendent reality beyond. This stance is clearly entirely 
antithetical to Rahner whose person as hearer is characterised by just such a 
transcendental existential.
It may also be telling that a growing number of those who might have been termed 
"non-realist" Christian theologians would now prefer to describe themselves (or face 
being described by their theological contemporaries) as "post-Christian". We refer
795 Crowder op. cit. p. 4
796 This relates to Pannenberg's discussion of modern atheism, which he relates to Feuerbach. See 
Pannenberg Basic Questions vol II
797 David Cheetham "Postmodern Freedom and Religion" Theology 2001 Jan-Feb p. 24, citing June 
O'Connor's essay "It's time to talk about trust" in Runzo (ed.) Is God Real, p. 177.
798 Cheetham op.cit., p. 177.
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here to Daphne Hampson and Don Cupitt himself.799 Crowder warns us that the "Sea 
of Faith" group is itself diversirying800and that some of its members stop far short of 
the increasingly rigorous post-modern anti-realism which Cupitt and Hampson pursue 
today. It might be said that embracing post-modern anti-realism has such a 
fundamental effect on the construction of theology that it moves it decidedly away 
from being a recognisably Christian theology. Certainly the type of a/theology posited 
by Taylor and Cupitt finds no place in Rahner's thought, where the very meaning of 
human personhood is the given desire and ability to relate to a transcendent reality 
external to itself, one which is unbounded by a textual arena; God who is the 
primordial "speaker."
Realist theologians might well conclude that the non-realism of the "Sea of Faith" 
group is a disguised atheism. After all "God" here is only what the self makes God. 
Consequently there is no objective measure for ethics and no norm for the self beyond 
being a type of metaphysical web-spinner.801 Graham Ward argues that the non- 
realism of this group, and we might add, the challenge of post-modern anti-realism in 
general, could be an opportunity to re-imagine "theological materialism".802 The crux 
of Ward's argument is that a realism that places God "out there" in a "more real 
reality" than our own is rightfully challenged by post-modern theology. However, 
there are resources within theology and within theological materialism that hold that 
immanence should not be discounted at the expense of transcendence. We have 
appreciated just this emphasis in Rahner's writing where the transcendent is found 
immanence.803 Ward suggests that realism can justifiably be understood 
with a model of transcendence which is more akin to the notion of the sublime 
reality rather than objective meaning it. Perhaps it is the otherworldliness of 
some theologies, which posit meaning as "at a distance", that are at the root of the 
spiritual crises prompting the Sea of Faith group's non-realist quest? Therefore such a
799 Hampson's progression towards post-Christianity can be seen in comparing Theology and 
Feminism. Blackwell 1990, with the later After Christianity, SCM Press 1996. Don Cupitt's The Last 
Philosophy SCM Press, 1995 and Solar Ethics SCM 1995b might also be seen as moving to a post- 
Christian position when compared to his earlier works.
800 Crowder op. cit. Introduction
801 This is the opinion of the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett in Consciousness Explained , Penguin, 
1991 who describes human consciousness as the illusion created by its inherent ability to "spin a web 
of discourses" p. 416.
802 See Graham's "Theological Materialism" in Crowder op. cit. pp. 144-159.
803 See ch.l of this thesis where we consider Rahner's holistic notion of reality where transcendence 
and immanence co-exist.
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rejection of theism could be based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of realism. 
This need not happen. Mark Elliot suggests that the model of a separate transcendent 
reality is actually unbiblical. He says,
"According to Derrida and other non-realists there is nothing 'behind' what we 
encounter. There is no hidden 'presence', nothing more...In one sense the 
Biblical witness agrees with this. The Bible does not think of the spiritual 
realm as a 'place' happening 'somewhere else' while we speak ...(God's) 
presence is not behind, but in our encounter with the world, although not 
swallowed up in anything."804
From our consideration of Rahner we have appreciated that there is a very different 
way to view reality than the dualistic modernist approach. We have seen Rahner 
present an arena for selfhood that does not remove transcendence from immanence. 
Our consideration of the graced arena Rahner posits will not allow for the separation 
of immanence and transcendence, and will not allow God to be displaced to a place 
"beyond" the hearer's arena. In Rahner, the emphasis on dialogue infers that Cupirt's 
reality is unnecessarily reductionist. If reality is only "the worlds that are constituted 
for us by own languages," then Rahner would argue that this view takes into 
account only one of the partners in the dialogue that creates our world. For Rahner, 
God speaks too. God eternally offers symbolic emanations of divine being; the 
foremost being found in the nature of the human being which reflects the double 
aspects of God's self-communication.805 In Christ, the Realsymbol of God, Rahner 
states that God became present in history, taking the particularities and limitations of 
a given place within such a matrix of meaning and pointing to transcendence from and 
within it. God's revelatory Word does not exclude, or even devalue, the voices of 
God's hearers, but rather enables the hearer to receive and respond, and so to be a 
speaker too. Within this multi-faceted dialogical reality the voice of God is
OA/C
reciprocally responsive to that of the hearer and co-creative of human subjectivity.
Clearly, the paradigmatic differences circumscribing the speaker and hearer cannot be 
underestimated. However, seeing theism and discursive visions of reality as entirely 
antonymic relies on a particular dualistic understanding of immanence and 
transcendence. We find that there is scope within Rahner's symbolic realism for self-
804 Mark Elliot "Human Embodiment" appearing in The Dynamics of Human Life. Paternoster Press, 
2001 p. 87
805 See the knowledge/love duality as examined in ch.7 of this thesis.
806 See ch.l and 4 of this thesis where we consider the relationality of the hearer of God.
240
creative dialogue between divinity and humanity and space to consider language as 
other than purely referential and to appreciate its importance in the creation of human 
subjectivity. In this we do not suggest that there is any great measure of coherence 
between Rahner's theism and Kristeva's purely discursive anti-realism, only that a the 
type of symbolic realism Rahner purports is not at such odds with the tenets of a 
discursive reality as to disallow any opportunity for dialogue. In this project, Rahner's 
symbolic realism opens a way to engage with the anti-realist challenge offered by 
post-modernism. Where this task is necessary as contemporary theologians such as 
Ward suggest,807 Rahner can be said to be an important and relevant resource for this 
engagement.
10.2 Areas of Asymmetry: Epistemology
The second area of fundamental difference is epistemology. Clearly each thinker's 
theory of knowledge arises from their respective pre-supposed ideas of reality. 
Kristeva adopts an anti-foundational perspective of knowledge. Her work is informed 
by post-modern theories of the dispersal of meaning. In this way knowledge and 
meaning are transient and provisional and meaning can only be fleetingly grasped 
through tracing its path through a web of textual connections and slippages. Meaning 
is created in the play of text and reaches a climax in the experience the
orvo
ecstatic experience of "hearing meaning".
In contradistinction, Rahner's theory of the hearer rests upon a much wider and 
multifaceted epistemology that includes pre-thematic knowledge.809 Rahner's 
epistemology rests upon Thomist ideas of the intellect as a facet of the spirit. This 
allows for non-sensory knowledge to be accessible to the human being. For Rahner, 
the experience of searching for answers outside of the immediate realm and of 
possessing the ability to stand back from self-examination and make judgements as a 
"unity-in-plurality"810 all point to the existence of pre-thematic, inferred knowledge. 
He views pre-thematic knowledge as utterly profound and yet entirely obvious within 
each person's lived experience. For Rahner, knowledge can be inferred in an extra-
807 See Graham Ward's "Theological Materialism" in Crowder op. cit. pp. 144-159.
808 Seech. 9 of this thesis.
809 Seech 5 of this thesis
810 See ch.5 of this thesis.
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textual way, through the fundamental relationship with a transcendent horizon of 
being. Inferred knowledge might be inaccessible to rationality yet is always present as 
the background to every act of knowing. From this perspective, Kristevan 
epistemology appears to be reductionist. 811 Non-realists assume that nothing can be 
known, or said to have meaning, outside of the arena of textuality. Of this, Ward says,
"The question remains, then, that there may be nothing outside textuality that 
we can intellectually grasp and possess, but is there that outside textuality 
which can be inferred, the recognition of which provides the basis for any 
knowing at all?"812
Rahner clearly answers "yes". We posit that Rahner's pre-thematic knowledge of God 
is the kind of inferred extra-textual knowledge Ward speaks of. Ward suggests a 
notion which, we argue, is similar to Rahner's awareness of the "horizon of being" 
saying,
"Language is not a totality. It presents the aporias, the effects of an alterity 
which has preceded and gone ahead of it. This alterity we can neither capture 
nor tame. But neither is this an other which is so other that we can know 
nothing about it. It is an other, a negative plenitude, which makes possible all 
our mediations and promotes the endlessness of supplementation - 
God, as the horizon of our given situation, or perhaps of textuality, can be seen as the 
"negative plenitude" or "empty margins" around the text. Rahner suggests that God, 
the "extra-textual", can be known in that God freely wills communion and has created 
the human to be precisely the being which can hear and respond in creative, reciprocal 
dialogue with divinity.814 For Rahner, the basis of this free willing of relationships is 
precisely found within the nature of the Godhead.815 According to Rahner's 
understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, communality and relationality is 
experienced within God's self as an "enjoyment of relationality."816 God has created 
humans as beings who can hear and know God in precisely this non-textual way: a 
knowledge that is both self-evident and mysterious. For Rahner, this is a universal 
characteristic of the human person. Furthermore the unthematic knowledge of God
811 See ch.3 of this thesis, which approaches this question from the stance of a critique of Saussarian 
linguistics.
812 Ward op. cit. p. 147
813 Ward op. cit p. 158 - our emphasis.
814 See ch.5.9 of this thesis where we considered how we become better hearers of God.
815 See ch. 7 on Rahner's understanding of social trinitarianism.
816 See Zizioulas's Human Capacity where he views the Trinity as enjoying relationality, this was 
examined in ch. 7 of this thesis.
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guarantees a "backdrop of being" which makes other particular events of knowing 
available to the "hearer". Rahner's understanding of the self as hearer therefore posits 
that whilst the subject cannot intellectually grasp knowledge outside of language, as 
the speaking subject suggests, it can "hear" in a pre-thematic way the experience of 
transcendence. This hearing forms a backdrop to all other knowledge.
We note that Rahner's methodology of speaking of the subject in its totality, an aspect 
of "original experience" that was allowed for in Rahner's extended epistemology, was 
made before the full impact of post-structuralism's deconstruction had been felt. Does 
this make his views on the self-reflective individual archaic? We do not believe that 
this is necessarily the case. More recently a similar line of argument is found in the 
feminist Seyla Benhabib's critique. She takes issue with the post-structuralist denial 
of the self-reflective individual.817 Benhabib uses Jurgen Habermas's communicative 
ethics to argue for a notion similar to Rahner's "original experience". She is 
committed to viewing the person as socially situated and interpersonally constructed, 
however she argues that a narrative conception of the self renders the idea of a core 
self and coherent identity intelligible without promoting the type of transcendence 
found in the Enlightenment subject. Benhahib argues that autobiographical stories can 
include the many voices within us and be constantly under revision; nonetheless, these 
narratives do not collapse into incoherence. They pre-suppose a core capacity to 
describe and reflect on one's experience; much in the same way that Rahner's notions 
allows for self-reflection upon many theories relating to subjectivity from a range of 
disciplines.818 This is vital for Benhabib, as she views self-reflection and reason as 
indispensable to the feminist emancipatorary project. Benahib's contemporary critique 
of the post-structuralist dissipation of the centre of subjectivity perhaps suggests that 
Rahner's view need not be viewed as archaic. It may have been formulated before 
Kristeva's post-structuralism, but Rahner points to an idea of the subject that has been 
viewed as important in a most recent feminist reflection. We would suggest that, far 
from being archaic, Rahner's view of the self-reflective original experience of the 
hearer, and its plurality-in-unity, offers theology with a useful resource to engage with 
the challenges of post-structuralism.
817 Seyla Benhabib (ed) Habermas and the unfinished project of modernity : critical essays on The 
philosophical discourse of modernity. Cambridge Polity Press, 1996. Also addressed in Feminist 
Contentions, Routledge, 1995.
818 We considered Rahner's notion of "original experience" in ch.5.1 of this thesis.
Having considered the vital differences in epistemology between Rahner and Kristeva 
we cannot imagine a way in which they can be wholly correlated. We note that within 
Rahner's epistemology there is scope to include the findings of a Kristevan 
understanding of the transitory nature of meaning as it is elicited In 
other words, it would appear possible to have a theory of the unstable meaning in 
relation to textual meaning and the knowledge gained from for language within a 
Rahnerian schema. However, Rahner would be totally unwilling to restrict all facets 
of knowledge to the textual arena alone but rather insists upon the presence of a 
transcendent horizon, a margin, around textual reality. In this, Rahnerian 
epistemology is fundamentally irreconcilable with Kristeva's schema. She does not 
hold with any conception of knowledge that transcends discourse or can be inferred 
from outside of it. This is why we connote the difference as rather than 
diametrically oppositional. Rahner's schema can make room for Kristeva's post- 
structuralist epistemology, in one respect, but Kristeva's cannot accommodate 
Rahner's on any level.
10.3 Areas of Asymmetry: Is Subjectivity fundamentally Personal or Textual?
There is a final area of interesting asymmetry between the speaker and hearer; they 
respectively privilege textual and personal entities. We have found that in all aspects 
of the person as hearer there is an emphasis on a personal nature of being. Rahner's 
arena for the human subject, his theory of knowledge, his model of relationality and 
the telos he proposes all have a decidedly personal emphasis. The arena for 
personhood is found in a dialogical relationship between divine and human persons, 
revelation is encounter with a three-personned God, the telos of the hearer is to better 
pursue these in inter-personal acts of neighbour love. His notion of the self as hearer 
includes a model of the fullest actualised human self in the person of Christ. He offers 
a notion of the hearer that is emphatically a (a being defined in 
relation to other persons) as well as subject.819 At every level Rahner's understanding 
of subjectivity involves personal relationality.
By contrast Kristeva privileges textual entities in all areas of her construction of the 
speaking subject. Subjectivity exists secondary to language and is produced solely by
819 We see in notion of the self as relational in ch.1.2 and ch.5.7 of this thesis.
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the interplay of semiotic and symbolic facets of discourse.820 The subject has no real 
agency external to this realm and acts only as a mediator in the conflict between these 
two textual, impersonal forces. We have suggested that this gives rise to an 
impersonal view of subjective relationality. This was seen most emphatically in 
Kristeva's treatment of pregnancy as a process without a personal subject or personal
821
agency. We recall that the maternal other is a "space". In this, Kristeva posits a 
very controversial notion of pregnancy and maternity, taking great pains to remove 
the mother's presence as subject and dismisses her agency because subjecthood is 
viewed as a process undertaken in isolation from other person-subjects. 
We suggested here that it is the anti-realism of postmodernism that threatens notions 
of the autonomy of the self. It does this without hesitation seeing the illusion of 
autonomy as a tool of oppression and control. In an anti-realist schema the speaking 
subject is free to create its own reality. This involves artistic and literary creation as 
well as the positioning of itself in a variety of subject positions within various 
discourses, most importantly those of sexuality and gender. We noted that Kristeva 
retains a tenuous place for agency for the speaking subject as mediator in the process 
of a subject's repositioning of itself.
The theme of freedom also highlights the hearer and speaker's respective emphasis on 
personal or textual entities. For Rahner the hearer's freedom is the based on the ability 
to choose acts of neighbour love. It is only possible to exercise ultimate freedom in 
love as one person to another, in an act of self-sacrifice, where the other's needs are 
preferred. This is an inter-personal and reciprocal act. It is creative in two respects. It 
enables the recipient to flourish in their creative process of becoming a person, 
because it respects their inherent dignity. This process also fundamentally moves the 
giver into a state of ekstasis that will actualise their personhood. In being open to the 
other person, and not subsuming their being in the process, the giver of neighbour- 
love is moved towards self-fulfilment and the of a life of love. This relationship 
is, Rahner suggests, most beautifully portrayed in the parental love shown to a child. 
This notion relates somewhat to Kristeva's thesis of the M/Other as the site of original 
self-creation. However, quite tellingly, Kristeva displaces this act to be a function of 
discourse, happening apart from the actions of a real embodied woman, to be a
820 See chapter 3 of this thesis
821 See ch.6 of this thesis.
process without an agent.822 By positing this act as the work of the Maternal or 
M/Other (denoting a separation from real individual women) this removes the element 
of reciprocity from the act of self-creation through love. In Rahner's case, the exercise 
of freedom creates selfhood for two persons. For Kristeva the arena of self-creation, 
whilst appearing to be bodily, is repositioned to the arena of semiotics. In this inter- 
personal relationality is ultimately rejected.
In this respect our two theorists are at odds. The different privileging of personal or 
textual entities in relationality results in a loss of autonomy for the speaking subject, 
which we explored in our consideration of the subject's freedom. 823 The lack of inter- 
personal relationality might also be viewed as falling into individualism. For Kristeva, 
this position is preferable to a personal account of relationality because, for her, 
subjectivity itself is an illusion of language and the lack of autonomy more accurately 
reflects the reality of human subjectivity. We have noted her careful insistence on the 
connectivity and cultural influences upon the subject, from which it is unable to 
escape. The subject is only able to its position within a pre-existing matrix of 
discourse. The speaking subject cannot act autonomously. It has rather to find a 
measure of transcendence by seeking ways to "shape-shift" and explore its 
"carnivalesque" anti-identificatory positions within an encapsulating discourse. 
Kristeva suggests that poetic writing, art and the rejection of binary sexuality are a 
means to this end. Our evaluation of Kristeva's position notes a distinctive difference 
between the roles of jouissance and that of spirituality on this point. The textual nature 
of the speaking subject, and its incapability to transcend the discursive matrix, fixes 
the experience of fullest actualisation as momentary moments of jouissance. There is 
no final resolution or fulfilment for this process. The purpose of jouissance is to 
catalyse further disruption. It is also fundamentally individualistic, a "subjective self- 
interrogation."824 In contrast, the type of spirituality Rahner describes is also a process 
of self-actualisation, but one with eschatological resolution and fulfilment as the 
hearer becomes a fully-actualised person.825 This is carried out in the context of 
communality and acts of freely chosen "neighbour love". This important contrast
822 See our examination of the M/Other as agent-less subject in ch.6 of this thesis.
823 See ch. 8 of this thesis.
824 Ibid, p.14
825 See ch.s 8 and 9 of this thesis.
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highlights one possible way whereby Rahner's hearer can be used to highlight and 
critique the inherent individualism of the speaking subject.
Given these three areas of fundamental asymmetry we might be surprised to find large 
areas of correspondence, both in terms of shared themes that run throughout their 
work and in an important outcome of their reconstructions of subjectivity. We shall 
now explore these in turn and go on to suggest possible conclusions that these 
similarities might offer to contemporary theology as it seeks to engage with post- 
modern and post-structuralist theories.
10.4 Areas of Coherent Themes: Language is creative in Subjectivity
From our study of the person as hearer and the speaking subject we note that both 
share the privileging of language as the means to actualise the subject or person. For 
Kristeva there is a direct and all-encompassing relationship between language and the 
subject. The subject is a facet of language, formed through the dynamic relationship 
between textual forces. There would be no subject without language. This is apparent 
in borderline patients where withdrawal from the realm of the symbolic results in the 
threat of complete subjective dissipation.
Rahner also privileges language and has a complex view of its nature and role. He 
retains the element of language as a "vehicle of meaning" and the notion of "forms" 
of pre-existent meaning. Initially this type of theory of language seems incompatible 
with Kristeva's theories which insist that language precedes meaning rather than 
being meaning.826 However, in his consideration of poetic language 
Rahner allows for the idea that human language is unstable and has transcendent 
qualities that prevent it being viewed as merely descriptive of meaning. In this, he too 
rejects the purely "referential" theory of language. This is expressed in his notion of 
the "surplus of meaning" within words. This "surplus" is seen to disrupt the simple 
identification between signified and signifier.827 Furthermore, we recall that, for 
Rahner, the ability to process meaning from words is a facet of the rather than the
826 See ch.2 & 3 of this thesis where we consider how the subject emerges after language.
827 See ch.4.4 of this thesis where we examine the notion of the surplus of meaning.
intellect. Given this, he too rejects theories of language whereby meaning is 
attained through stable rational capabilities alone. Rahner can be seen as somewhat 
sharing the post-structuralist desire to re-examine how meaning is conveyed. With 
this in mind it appears possible to use Kristeva's notion of the semiotic alongside that 
of Rahner's notion of symbolic language, since both stress the flexibility and 
transience of meaning. Both see a sublime quality to language that disrupts the notion 
that it is possible to directly refer to a signified concept. In this, Kristeva's semiotic 
relates, in some respects, to Rahner's notion of horizon; both point to the limitations 
of language as simply objectively descriptive.
We suggest that Kristeva's understanding of the disruptive nature of semiotics can be 
seen as coherent with Rahner's and can be used to inform his notion of a "surplus of 
meaning". Kristeva's theory of the semiotic implies that this surplus of meaning is a 
constant disruptive force the self rather than externally in the way of a pre- 
existent "forms". This need not be seen as incompatible with Rahner's understanding, 
but rather as refining it. In the first case, Rahner's "forms" are not, in a Platonic sense, 
fundamentally external to the realm of the self. We recall that divinity and objective 
reality is emanated through material reality.829 It could therefore be possible for the 
disruptive semiotic to be viewed as the self as hearer, since for Rahner form is 
expressed through the materiality of the self. The self as hearer could then retain a 
semiotic facet, which would be due the remembrance of its subjective development as 
Kristeva suggests.
Kristeva makes the point more strongly than Rahner that the language available for 
self-expression is not self-made. In Rahner's understanding of symbols there is an 
implicit understanding that symbols are given rather than made. Kristeva goes much 
further in emphasising that the system and codes of language are inherently unstable 
and arbitrary. Rahner's theory of language can be informed by this understanding so 
that his notion of the "mystery of language" includes that of the transience of the very 
linkages between signified and signifier.
828 See ch4.2, 4.3 of this thesis, where we examine the Thomist roots of Rahner's belief that the 
language is processed in the soul in order to attain meaning.
829 See ch.4 of this thesis, where we consider symbolisation as a means to self-actualisation.
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Our consideration of the theories of language in Rahner and Kristeva has suggested 
that both view language as fundamentally important to the self. For Rahner, language, 
as symbolic representation, is the foremost means by which a being expresses itself 
and so achieves self-actualisation.830 Although Rahner is careful to stress its 
limitations, the process of symbolisation within language is viewed in an entirely 
positive light. Kristeva shares the view that language is central to self-creation. 
However, she does not seem to view the self s entrance into the symbolic order of 
language in a completely positive way. She does say that this process into the male 
symbolic is necessary in creating a subject position and she is careful not to use 
normative terms. However, there is a sense that can be inferred from her writing that 
the necessary adoption of language is, in a very real way, a confining experience. We 
have seen this in her choice of terms to describe the different experiences a self goes 
through in the two modalities of language. The semiotic is described in inviting and 
pleasant terminology. This can be contrasted with the more confrontational 
terminology and notions of "loss" when describing the imposition of the male 
symbolic order. This can be seen in comparing the two passages below,
"Fragrance of honey, roundness of forms, silk and velvet under my fingers, on 
my cheeks. Mummy. Almost no sight - a shadow that darkens, soaks me up or 
vanishes amid flashes. Almost no voice in her placid presence." 831
"Language-learning can therefore be thought of as an acute and dramatic 
confrontation between positing-separating-identifying and the motility of the 
semiotic Separation from the mother's body, game, anality 
and orality, all act as a permanent negativity that destroys the image and the 
isolated object even as it facilitates the articulation of the semiotic network, 
which will afterwards be necessary in the system of language where it will be
fi^O
more or less integrated as a signifier."
The semiotic is clearly spoken of in more positive and preferential terms than the 
symbolic. We suggest, therefore, that Rahner's theory of language could not take on 
board the notion that the symbolic order is repressive or constrictive in a negative 
sense. He views symbols as limited and finite, since they are evidently immanent. 
Given this the finitude and constraints of language are a given for Rahner, but he does 
not view these negatively, preferring to emphasise an appreciation of the self-
830 See ch.4 of this thesis.
831 "Stabat Mater" first appeared in Tel Quel (Winter) p.30-49, and is reprinted in The Kristeva Reader. 
Toril Moi (ed.) This citation, Moi, p. 180.
832 RPL p. 100-101
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actuahsation possible in language. Symbols are rooted in, and lead to transcendence 
and as such are a way in which the self can express its being and achieve self- 
actualisation.
Our consideration of Rahner's writing suggests that his lack of concern for issues of 
gender is one area where his theories are found lacking and offer little to this aspect of 
post-modern concern. His use of masculine pronouns as inferring "anthropos" rather 
than a gendered subject is an obvious example of this. We note that where Kristeva 
speaks of the subject in masculine terms she explicitly infers the subject's necessary 
positioning within the male symbolic order. This is a particular use of gendered terms, 
used to contrast with the pre-subjective, semiotic experience centred on the M/Other. 
We recall that the gendered terms within Kristeva relate to aspects of language. 
Rahner does not approach the use of gendered terms for the subject with this 
awareness, and as such has little to offer contemporary interest in gender issues within 
subjectivity.
10.5 Areas of Coherent Themes: Otherness
We identified that notions of otherness form an important and fundamental role in 
shaping the subjectivity of both the hearer and speaker. In both, otherness has a two- 
fold function, being present in both inter- and intra-relationality, and leads to an 
appreciation of inner plurality. In our consideration of the self as "speaker" and 
"hearer" we can say that both writers view the self as otherness. We 
have identified in both theology and critical theory the desire to topple the centred self 
by means of a consideration of otherness.
According to Rahner's theories of symbolisation the hearer is continually faced by the 
otherness within itself (as it creates symbols to express itself), as well as being held in 
a creative dialogue with the supreme otherness of its divine horizon. For Rahner, the 
process by which the self is de-centred involves the self turned outside from its centre 
in "I-Thou" reciprocal relationships; in so doing the human self mirrors the 
perichoretic Trinity. 833 Only in this exo-centricity can the self achieve actualisation 
and become a person. Jttngel termed the notion of de-centred selfhood "a new and
833 See ch.7.6 of this thesis where we considered how Rahner's social trinitarianism impacts upon 
relational selfhood.
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highly differentiated unity of the I with itself," a unity that is "opened up from the 
inside." Here relatedness encompasses both distinctive identity and difference, 
where selfhood is given to the other in the interests of the other. The human being, in 
becoming a person, is driven to express itself through social relations with others as 
neighbours. In each respect relationality is linked to love. Rahner suggests that these 
experiences cannot be separated from each other but together are intrinsically part of 
what it means to be a human person. We identified Zizioulas' notion of "communion" 
as entirely helpful in expressing how the human person relates to otherness. We 
further noted that the emphasis on otherness and relationality typifies the exocentric 
anthropologies of much contemporary theological reflection.
Our reading of Kristeva found that her initial use of the notion of otherness is related 
to early pre-Oedipal experience of the M/Other. In order to build the imaginary ego 
the subject has to reject the mother and begin to embrace the realm of distinction and 
symbolisation. Even after this separation is achieved, otherness persists as the 
semiotic realm. This facet of language, the threat of meaning dispersal, comes from 
beneath the realm of symbolic language and disrupts the emergence of a stable ego or 
static meaning. In this, Kristeva's Other is unnameable; existing outside of the 
symbolic order. We noted the tension that this brings to Kristeva's writing; she 
struggles to deal in the symbolic order with notions that are always beneath it. We 
saw that this distinguishes her from other "French feminists", such as Cixous who 
believe that the feminine other can exist apart from the male symbolic order in non- 
linear, irrational feminine".
We identified a second use of theories of otherness in Kristeva in her consideration of 
the foreigner or stranger in society. Later in subject's life, the foreigner comes to 
represent the "uncanny" the presence of the other among the familiar that reminds the 
subject of its tenuous existence. Kristeva brings notions of inner division and the 
experience of social division together and attempts to relate theories of intra- 
subjective difference to inter-subjective relationships. This provides her with an ethic 
of tolerance that she relates to the socio-political arena, although we posited several 
critiques of her in relation to this. We found that the speaking subject, just like the
834 Jungel God as the Mystery of the World p. 395 quoted by Charles Marsh in "In Defence of a Self: 
the theological search for a postmodern identity" Scottish Journal of Theology, 2002.
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person as hearer, is de-centred. However, we suggest, that this is not in terms of being 
turned outside of itself but rather turned to its own inner plurality and instability. 
Perhaps this is more a notion of dispersal rather than de-centring; of the 
the self apart from its centre rather than turned outwards>o/n its centre. When 
related to ethics the privileging of the individual over communality might be expected 
to give rise to a lack of inter-personality; to introspection over practical social action. 
This is the very criticism of Kristeva's ethics that we covered in chapter six of this 
thesis.
In contrast, Rahner's hearer is exo-centric; the self realised by turning to acts of self- 
giving to others, by making symbols which express the self to others and ultimately 
by relating to God as Other. Kristeva's speaker is ex-centric; the self aware of its 
inner-plurality and forming new and ever-tenuous subject positions within discourse.
Both the hearer and speaker are formed through relations to otherness. In this both are 
forced to confront their inner-plurality and, given this, may be driven to deal with the 
foreignness of other subjects in a way that does not attempt to conflate or repulse 
them. We have suggested that Kristeva's direct linking of intra- to inter-subjectivity is 
stronger than Rahner's and can be used to encourage a greater appreciation of this 
aspect in Rahner's work. In this way the speaking subject can help to refine ideas 
within the hearing person.
However, we have suggested that the emphasis on impersonal otherness and 
relationality in the speaking subject can, ironically, be viewed as leading to 
individualism. We saw that the speaking subject appears to privilege intra- 
relationality and, as such, might be seen as an example of egocentricity, which Rahner 
and Pannenberg warn against.835 This is due to the rejection of truly personal 
relationality for a concept of impersonal textual relations where no agent is present in 
any other than a restricted mediatory role, because it is ex-centric rather than exo- 
centric. We recall that for Kristeva the personal nature of the foreigner is not as 
important as their significance as a representation of the uncanny to the speaking 
subject.
835 See ch.8 where we consider openness as a for the self as hearer.
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"In that sense, the foreigner is a "symptom".. .he signifies the difficulty we 
have of living as an and with others."836
A hearer (personal or otherwise) is not necessary for the speaking subject in the way 
that a speaker is required for the hearing person, since other ways are found to 
represent the uncanny, such as in the disruptive power of art and poetry. 837 The 
relationship with the stranger is not reciprocal in that the effect of an encounter with 
the uncanny is representational, turning the subject inwards to explore its own inner- 
plurality. It is only then that there is an opportunity for social or political effect, as the
 
subject becomes at ease with its own heterogeneity and ceases to be afraid of the 
plurality in society. This is a much reduced and introverted relation to the other. In 
this respect we suggest that there is a fuller notion of social relationality in Rahner's 
work than in Kristeva's; one which might prove to be more immediately useful in 
practical application and the construction of an ethic of social justice. Rahner's notion 
of the ex-centric hearer positions the person in a reciprocal dialogue with otherness, 
where both self and other possess a measure of distinction and yet offer the possibility 
for self-actualisation in relationship. As we saw, this is modelled on the three- 
personned God.838 This position ensures that the other is never subsumed within the 
identity of the hearer, but is freely loved as a neighbour. This has proven to be a key 
theme in contemporary theology that seeks to prioritise praxis and community 
explorations of spirituality, of which there are many examples. These include the 
theoretical explorations of relationality in the context of ecclesiology such as those 
found in work of Zizioulas839 and Moltmann840, to the practical outworking of this 
understanding of relationality by many Christian feminist and liberation theologians 
such as Russell and Ruether-Radford841 , Gutierrez and Bonino842 .
In stressing the personal and reciprocal nature of relationality Rahner offers a clear 
alternative to that of Kristeva; one that rejects introspection and individualism of the 
speaking subject's emphasis on m/ra-relationality in favour of an 
836 STO p. 103
837 See ch. 6 of this thesis.
838 Seech. 7 of this thesis.se  en / 01 m mc
839 Zizioulas Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church. St Vladim
ir's Press, 1985.
840 Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit SCM Press, 1977
841 Letty Russell, Church in the Round feminist interpretation of the church, J Knox 
Press 1993, 
Ruether-Radford, Women-Church: theology and practise of feminist liturgical commu
nities Harper and
r» ___, 1 AOCRow, 1985.
842 Qutierrez A Theology of Liberation, SCM Press 1974 and Miguez-Bonino, Doing Theology in a
Revolutionary Situation Philadelphia, 1974
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subjectivity to be found in the context of community. We noted the critique of the the 
socio-political usefulness of post-structuralism made by a number of feminist 
writers and contend that Rahner' s notion of otherness has more immediate currency 
in the type of practical application they seek.
10.6 Areas of Coherent Themes: Rationality as deficient.
In our study we found that both the speaking subject and the person as hearer reject 
rationality as a competent means of characterising or exploring subjectivity. For 
Rahner, there is a component to human subjectivity that cannot be effectively 
explored through rational means. This position is arrived at by a careful study of the 
extent to which he promotes mystery and revelation by encounter outside of the realm 
of rational proposition. This stance is evident in Rahner's devotional writings, prayers 
and meditations, which have been an important resource for this study. This notion of 
a revelatory arena for human subjectivity has been summed up as "symbolic realism". 
We have seen that the intellect is a facet of the spirit for Rahner and that this Thomist 
basis allows for a form of "knowing" that is more properly an inferred revelation, or 
"hearing". Given this we have argued that it would be misleading to connote Rahner's 
person as a "knower". His theories of language suggest that there is a pre-thematic 
"surplus of meaning" that can be "heard" in words apart from their rational content; 
this in itself strengthens this less rationalist reading of Rahner. There is a mysterious 
non- or extra-rational component to knowledge that cannot be grasped by the intellect 
is more properly described as "hearing music".844 He views liturgy, art and poetry as 
key ways to encounter the divine; the "happy danger of meeting God."845 He writes 
widely on religious poetry and has an interest in the use of "primordial words". In 
this, Rahner places an emphasis on religious imagination and non-rational ways to 
encounter meaning as the horizon of our being. Whilst religious sacraments and 
Scriptures are special examples of the transformation power of the symbol, for 
Rahner, poetry and art enable the creative transformation to take place where 
Christianity is both present and anonymous.
Kristeva shares the view that art and poetic language are self-transformative, 
transgressive and disrupt the illusion of unitary oneness. Given this they are to be
843 See ch.6.6 of this thesis.
844 TI 3 and TI 4, as examined earlier in chapter 4.
845 Rahner, "Poetry and the Christian" TI 3, p. 365
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Privileged in the exploration of subjectivity. We recall that, for Kristeva, in art, music 
and literature semiotic processes are liberated from the unconscious. We have 
considered her focus on religious art.846 Kristeva has a complex view of its role. We 
considered that she begins from a positive stance, with an analysis of religion as a 
place of possible semiotic renewal and envisions the potential of this were it carried 
out in full measure.
For Rahner art and poetry offer nothing less than an encounter with the divine as 
"holy mystery". Recent trends in contemporary theology have taken the importance of 
art and imagination more seriously, exploring the relationships between faith and 
aesthetics.847 This is another area where Rahner might be said to be ahead of his time, 
with perhaps Tillich concomitantly sharing in this endeavour. In privileging poetry 
and art, Rahner seeks to explore religious motifs through religious imagination as 
much as by rational enquiry. In this he anticipates the current interest in exploring 
theology through the media of art, film and literature. It is an example of his desire to 
conduct theology in an open way. This is an expanding area of current theological 
enquiry, and can be seen specifically where theology seeks to engage with 
postmodernism. With Rahner, this line of theological enquiry sees that art and poetry 
offer places where theology can not only engage with contemporary culture, but 
explore facets of spirituality, among other things, in ways that rationality has been 
found deficient. By seeing art and poetry as important sources for theological 
expression and contemplation Rahner shares the desire to seek non-rationalistic ways 
to explore the themes of theological investigation and as such is in accordance with 
post-modern rejections of rationalism. His notion of "anonymous Christianity" as 
present in art and poetry concurs with a strengthening desire to see the power and 
truth of art as precisely what spirituality is about at its heart.848 In this, again, Rahner 
can be said to pre-empt later trends in contemporary theology.
Kristeva shares this belief in the power of art to inform, and indeed transform, 
subjectivity. For her, art is the new religion and the only possible place to mount
846 See ch.6 of this thesis.
847 See G. Pattison Art. Modernity and Faith SCM Press 1991, E. Parley Faith and Beautv: a 
theological aesthetic, Ashgate, 2001 and P. Sherry Spirit and Beautv SCM 1992.
848 E.g Parley Faith and Beautv: a theological aesthetic. Ashgate, 2001 and P. Sherry Spirit and Beauty 
SCM 1992.
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social revolution. She therefore shares in Rahner's interest in the wealth of Christian 
art and views it as a place where semiotic power is elicited.
However, despite her interest in Christian art and writing, we found that Kristeva goes 
on to draw negative conclusions about Christianity itself, viewing the tradition as a 
grand attempt to repress the semiotic. She presents her study of Mariology in evidence 
of this conclusion. However, we suggest that her conclusion has overlooked other 
important aspects of Christian doctrine. We have suggested that Rahner's 
understanding of the inner-plurality of the Trinity offers the opportunity for an 
appreciation of inner-plurality to disrupt the notion of the unitary and static self and so 
is an example of the very disruptive semiotic power that Kristeva seeks in art. This 
contradicts Kristeva's pre-supposed reductionist view of Christianity.
For Kristeva art and poetry are vital to the continual process of fragmenting and 
resituating the subject within the matrix of discourse. In this, both Rahner and 
Kristeva agree that the operation of poetic words is fundamentally redemptive. Both 
dismiss primordial oneness for relational dynamism. For Rahner, this process is 
driven by divine grace, for Kristeva it is the activity of the semiotic. In both there is 
the remembrance of an original state of inner-plurality. Importantly, for both Rahner 
and Kristeva poetic language and art have the power to transform our subjectivity and 
open the way for further creative encounter.
10.7 Areas of Coherent Outcomes: Process not stativity
This leads us to our final area of coherence between the speaking subject and the 
person as hearer. Considerations around questions of subjectivity lead both Rahner 
and Kristeva to conclude that human subjectivity is a process, not an entity, and 
dynamic rather than static.
For Kristeva the unstable and dynamic nature of the subject mirrors the nature of the 
discursive reality that circumscribes it. The speaking subject is a dynamic process 
because it is situated within a process and is created by it. The "sujet en process" 
emerges through its passage through an arena of disruption and deconstruction; its 
ability to do so is a trial. The pinnacle of this process is found in moments of 
jouissance. Subjectivity requires the careful balancing of the ability to speak in the
256
symbolic realm coupled with the awareness of the operation of the disruptive semiotic 
found in poetic and artistic media.849
For Rahner, too, personhood remains radically "on the way".850 This process is 
spoken of in terms of freedom and responsibility. Its unfinished nature is expressed as 
a "radically openness" both to the horizon of its being and to other persons which are 
encountered as neighbours. 851 The human being is a 'becoming' and personhood is a 
telos for the process rather than a given. The process is one of self-actualisation 
through the realm of self-expressive symbols and in freely chosen acts of neighbour- 
love.852
We appreciated that viewing human subjectivity in terms of relational process and 
openness has become widespread in theological reflection since Rahner. We note that 
Rahner's emphasis upon process and openness is synchronous with that found in 
Pannenberg, Moltmann, Jiingel and others. In fact, Christoph Schwobel describes 
such relational understandings of the human person as, "forming a common element 
in contemporary anthropological reflection."853 . According to Schwobel, 
contemporary Christian anthropology can be defined by a desire to re-situate what is 
characteristic about the human being away from the notion of a substantive core and 
rationality towards an emphasis on relationality and eschatological process. What is of 
interest here is that Rahner is at the beginnings of this trend. Although certainly not 
alone in this, we might mention the work of Rahner's contemporaries within Process 
Theology as well as Teilhard and Tillich. With Rahner, their theology pre-empts 
many future contemporary reflections.
We have suggested that Kristeva's notion of jouissance is somewhat coherent with 
Rahner's idea of the encounter with holy mystery.854 Both contain the idea that an 
encounter with otherness contained within the straightforward rationalistic realm leads 
to the actualisation of the subject. This happens in a series of moments of a 
heightened appreciation of otherness. Within Kristeva's textual schema jouissance is
849 Seech. 9.1 of this thesis.
850 Rahner, FCF p.32
851 Rahner TI 9 p.213
852 See ch.9.2 of this thesis.
853 Christoph Schwobel, "The Human Being as Relational Being" Persons Human and D
ivine, p. 141.
854 See ch.9 of this thesis.
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similarly intangible yet transformative and powerful as Rahner's description of 
spiritual ecstasy. Both view these facets of subjective experience to the "telos" of the 
subject. Both speaker and hearer experience increasing self-actualisation through 
moments where otherness breaks through the perceived stable order. This has been an 
important area of cohesion, and is related in both theorists to the power of art and 
poetry.
Conclusion
The significant areas of coherence between the speaking subject and the person as 
hearer point to Rahner's usefulness in the task of engaging with post-structuralist 
theories. This engagement need not overlook or downplay the areas of fundamental 
asymmetry between these disciplines; they are of themselves informative. Both areas 
of coherence and asymmetry have demonstrated that Rahner shares many of the 
concerns that have arisen in later post-modern thought. This has resulted in many 
shared themes and even outcomes as Rahner and Kristeva consider human 
subjectivity.
From our study we suggest that a notion of the subject that is immediately acceptable 
to both post-structuralists and many Christian theologians seems implausible. 
Fundamentally, the suggestion of an accessible, objective, extra-textual reality, such 
as we have drawn from Rahner, is at immediate odds with post-modern suspicion of 
grand narratives. As Anthony Thiselton says,
"How can the post-modern self which has become habituated to suspect and 
distrust, know whether such an extended narrative is anything but a wish- 
fulfilment deceptively projected by the self, or, still worse, a manipulative 
construct which serves the power-interests of those who suggest it?"856
From our consideration of the interface between Rahner and Kristeva we suggest that 
where theology desires to engage with post-modern or post-structuralist theories there 
is a need to appeal to post-modern thinkers to rethink the nature of grand narratives. 
We suggested earlier in this chapter that Rahner can be said to have begun this 
process in his re-evaluation of reality where transcendence is seen as coherent with 
immanence. We have suggested that the pre-suppositions about the arena of selfhood
855 We noted in ch.9 that Kristeva would never allow for this term in its Aristotelian sense.
856 Anthony C. Thiselton Interpreting God and the post-modern self: on meaning, manipulation and 
promise Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995, p. 160.
258
fundamentally shape the subject. Furthermore it is a particular interpretation of the 
Christian schema that has been rejected by Kristeva, and other post-modernists, 
seeking to position the subject away from the imagined oppression of a dominant or 
"master" voice. We might therefore ask whether a grand-narrative always a "master- 
narrative" based upon will-to-power? In this, theology, with Rahner, might stress that 
a Christian understanding of reality is one governed by perichoretic love rather than 
will-to-power. The relation to otherness becomes then, as Thiselton says, something 
in the manner of the "lover-in-relation-to-loved, or loved-in-relation-to-lover".857 We 
would argue that the notion of the person as hearer, as based upon the social Trinity, 
suggests just such a paradigm; one where the distrust of the grand narrative might be 
dissolved in the experience of being loved by a self-giving Lover (and this in both 
senses; one where the individual gives of themselves to the other, and in doing so 
gives "selfhood" to the other). Could such a re-envisioning of reality extend the 
notion of what is accepted as "real" in the post-modern mindset?
Thiselton suggests,
"Perhaps the self of modernity had been right to hope, but wrong about the 
basis on which it built its hope. Perhaps the post-modern self had been right to 
despair if will-to-power exhausted the content of all reality, but wrong in its 
assumption that this exhausted all that might be called 'real'."858
The appreciation of shared themes, and even outcomes, between Rahner and Kristeva 
is surely an encouragement, and perhaps a resource, to the task of contemporary 
theologians such as Graham Ward859 and Anthony Thiselton who seek an interface 
between theology and post-modernism/post-structuralism. In this, we believe that 
there are other possibilities for such an engagement besides that taken by the Sea of 
Faith theologians and their adoption of non-realism. Importantly, we have suggested 
that there are aspects of Rahner's work that make his theology especially fitting for 
such an endeavour. We have found these to be his understanding of symbolic realism, 
his ability to relate intra- to inter-subjectivity, the privileging of poetic language and 
religious imagination and an emphasis on otherness and communality.
857 Ibid, p.161
858 Ibid, p.161
859 See Graham Ward, Barth. Derrida. and the language of theology. Cambridge University Press, 1998 
and The Blackwell Companion to post-modern theology. Blackwell, 2001 (ed.).
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The suggestion that Rahner is a fitting collaborator in the contemporary task to engage 
with post-modernism may appear somewhat surprising given that more developed 
theological considerations of relationality and social trinitarianism have been 
constructed recently. However, we suggest that the themes identified in Rahner's 
notion of the person as hearer pre-empt many recent theological findings. 
Furthermore, his theology is broad in scope and open in nature. His axiomatic belief 
that anthropology is the starting place for theology is wholly relevant to the task of 
relating theology to a contemporary arena where there is a "turn to the subject", and 
we might go as far as to suggest that Rahner provides a methodological and 
theological rationale for such a task. Rahner's desire to engage with other disciplines 
contrasts with many of his contemporaries; perhaps the starkest being Earth's closed 
theological system. However, allowing for this, Rahner's work remains 
unapologetically "Christian" in focus and method. It might at first seem unlikely that 
considerations of religious motifs and a series of devotional meditations would be of 
use in an attempt to engage with post-modernism. However, in this study we find that 
from such sources we can identify a complex reflection on the nature of symbols and 
words that, we believe, is able to engage with a post-modern emphasis on language. 
Perhaps this is even confirmed by the Kristeva's interest in religious belief. It would 
also seem surprising that there could be any use for reflections on the doctrine of the 
Trinity and Christology in the inter-disciplinary task. However, we find that Rahner's 
understanding of the social, relational Trinity and the multi-faceted nature of 
subjectivity, as explored through Christology, are indeed useful. They foster 
confidence in subjective inner-plurality and privilege communality above 
individualism. All of these themes within Rahner's social trinitarianism concur with a 
contemporary desire to counter the Enlightenment substantive self. We note that they 
do this without dissolving the individual in pure relationality and also allow for the 
experience of being a self-reflective individual, which has been appreciated as 
necessary in contemporary feminist emancipatorary programme by Seyla Benhabib. 
Furthermore, Marit Trelstad warns us of the inherent danger done to women when 
they are defined in such a solely relational way. 86° We recall that the subject-for-itself 
and the subject-for-others are both facets of subjectivity explored through social 
trinitarianism and Christology within Rahner's theology.
860 Trelstad, "Relationality Plus Individuality: The Value of Creative Self Agency"860From Dialog vol. 
38, number 3, summer 1999, pp.193-198. See chapter 1 of this thesis.
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We would expect such an interface to be instructive to both perspectives. We have 
found ways where Kristeva's theories can be used to refine and bring into sharper 
focus some aspects of Rahner's as well as areas where Rahner's work provides a 
critique of some aspects of Kristeva's. In this, the critical comparison between the 
person as hearer and the speaking subject has provided a useful experiment in the 
ability to relate Christian theology to contemporary post-structuralist theories that we 
believe might open the way for further exploration and engagement.
Finally, we have found that confronting the "otherness" of post-structuralism has 
acted as a catalyst to return to familiar theological resources with a greater sense of 
appreciation. Engagement with disciplines outside theology is hardly avoidable and 
given the paradigmatic challenge of post-structuralist ideas to all "grand-narratives", 
such as Christianity, it is surely a timely and important engagement. From such an 
inter-disciplinary interface we can challenge previous theological conceptions of 
subjectivity. In this we find that the deconstructive process that is at the heart of post- 
structuralism should be embraced rather than feared. It appears possible to take on 
board many post-modern concerns (about the privileging of language, the relational 
process of the construction of the subject) without falling into the dissolution of 
meaning and anti-realism, as Cupitt and the Sea of Faith theologians do. With Rahner, 
we have found that concerns of postmodernism can be, and perhaps were already 
being, met within a Christian theist paradigm based upon symbolic realism and a 
social trinitarianism that provides a model for the self-expressive person to emerge. 
Perhaps, we can say that Rahner provides us with the impetus for a different kind of 
engagement with postmodernism other than that taken by the Sea of Faith. Rahner's 
schema appears able to accept many of the findings of post-structuralism, as these 
relate to reality within language, whilst maintaining the possibility for an extra-textual 
dimension, or horizon of being. Such an original and pre-thematic knowledge can be 
argued for in that it appears to concur with our lived experience and makes sense of 
our ability to stand back from the provisional answers we raise in questioning our 
subjectivity to judge their adequacy. Finally, we take from Rahner that it is from 
vigorous explorations of theological concepts in relation to those from other 
disciplines that contemporary theology is able to explore subjectivity in the fullest 
sense.
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